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Abstract 
 
 
There are strong indications that Public-Private Partnership (PPP) will remain the preferred 
policy tool for provision of infrastructure development in Brazil, involving private sector 
participation in the design, construction and operation stages of public infrastructure 
projects. For PPP project formulation, governments in Brazil have increasingly relied on the 
Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI), in which project design costs are transferred to the 
private sector, and actors engage in informal pre-tendering interactions since no formal 
contract binds them in the process. However, many PRI cases are still struggling to 
complete the pre-tendering stage or have failed entirely, and there is evidence indicating 
problems with the elements currently used to arrange PPP formulation processes. This 
research, therefore, was undertaken to explore why many cases are not finishing the PRI 
pre-tendering process by unpacking the unclear workings of actor-relations at this stage. 
Since the PRI process highly depends on interactions, this research explored the dynamics 
of actor-relations in the formulation of an infrastructure PPP project that used the PRI 
mechanism and completed the pre-tendering stage in the municipality of Fortaleza. From 
an institutional perspective and using a qualitative approach based on 34 interviews as 
primary data collection method, this research focused on the adjustments in practices and 
perceptions, as well as on the institutional framework influencing the process. The findings 
indicate that many PRI cases have not been successful because the policy instrument 
largely focuses on structures and neglects the intrinsic and socially constructed elements of 
the process. The findings also indicate that the PRI formulation of infrastructure PPP 
projects requires a balance between formal and informal elements, between structures 
and internally developed “soft” control mechanisms and between guidance and strategic 
flexibility, as well as the recognition of the complexity involved and the contextual 
embeddedness of actor-relations for PPP formulation.  
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
This thesis is a study of the dynamics of relations between public and private actors 
for the formulation of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects for infrastructure 
development in Brazil. There are strong indications that the PPP instrument will be 
continuously selected as a policy tool by governments at the federal, state and municipal 
levels due to its perceived benefits and the large number of projects being elaborated. In 
Brazil, the PPP instrument is used for the provision of public services associated with 
infrastructure development with the participation of the private sector in the design, 
construction, financing and operation stages. For the formulation of PPP projects, 
governments at all levels have relied on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI), which 
has been favoured because the other alternatives available face a series of constraints. 
Based on the PRI mechanism, the government transfers costs of PPP project formulation 
to the private sector, and actors engage in informal interactions since no formal contract 
binds them in the formulation process. These interactions take place at the pre-tendering 
stage, prior to the competitive bidding process for the selection of the private company 
that will sign a contract with the public sector and implement the PPP project. Although 
the PRI mechanism has been increasingly selected in Brazil for the formulation of 
infrastructure PPP projects, many cases have failed or are still struggling to complete the 
pre-tendering process. There is evidence that the approach currently used to arrange and 
organize these arrangements of PPP formulation has neglected the role of process and 
focused on structural elements that have not been sufficient to support many PRI cases 
towards completion of the pre-tendering stage.  
In view of these observations, the main motivation for this research is to 
understand why many cases of PPP project formulation do not finish the PRI pre-tendering 
stage. Thus, this research aims to explore the pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects 
based on the PRI mechanism and the elements that influence the process through an 
understanding of the pre-tendering dynamics of relations between actors. The workings of 
actor-relations in this stage are still unclear, especially considering that the Procedure for 
Request of Interest (PRI) is a new mechanism involving the private sector in the 
formulation of projects. The focus adopted in the research, which is on the dynamics of 
relations in the process, is an innovative approach to policy analysis in Brazil, considering 
that most research done so far in this field is not on the process of policy-making, but 
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mostly on its outcomes (Vaitsman, Ribeiro & Lobato, 2013, p. 1). Moreover, since the 
publication of the 1988 Federal Constitution, after nearly 20 years of military dictatorship 
in Brazil, policy analysis has been mostly based on quantitative methods for decision-
making and outcome assessment and frequently focused on three areas of services: 
health, education and social assistance (Andrews, 2013, p. 29). Therefore, this research is a 
novel qualitative study considering that the focus is about actor-relations in the process of 
PPP project formulation for policies in infrastructure development. It is an in-depth 
exploration of the PRI pre-tendering formulation of a PPP project based on 34 interviews, 
of which 11 were undertaken with actors from the public sector, 9 with private actors and 
14 with technical actors.  
Setting the scenario for the research, this chapter will provide a brief introduction 
on the Brazilian context for Public-Private Partnership projects in infrastructure and for 
their formulation based on the PRI mechanism, as well as on the elements that have been 
insufficient to support many PRI cases towards completion of the pre-tendering stage. This 
chapter will also present the research aim and objectives, followed by a summary of the 
structure of the Thesis.  
In Brazil, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as an instrument for the provision of 
infrastructure have received increased attention from the federal government, states and 
municipalities since the publication of the federal PPP law in 2004. The main drivers for the 
use of PPPs are the need for better social and economic infrastructure in Brazil to stimulate 
economic growth and development and for more investment in urban mobility, energy, 
telecommunications, basic sanitation, transportation and logistics infrastructure such as 
highways, railways and ports, which are precarious and outdated. Considering this, 
Brazilian governments at federal, state and municipal levels have adopted PPPs as an 
alternative to the lack of sufficient government resources in order to obtain immediate 
private funding for long-term projects. However, PPPs as a policy instrument have been 
sub-utilized in Brazil. The total of approximately 50 projects at municipal, state and federal 
levels that have reached PPP contract signature is still considered a small number for the 
country’s  need  in  infrastructure  development  (Enei & Mundim, 2013). 
Despite the interest in the PPP instrument, there are numerous criticisms because 
many attempts have not moved past the PRI pre-tendering elaboration phase, delaying the 
utilization  of   the   instrument   to  promote   the  development  of   the  country’s   infrastructure  
(Pereira, 2012a; Pereira, 2013). According to the only extensive report published to date on 
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PPPs in Brazil which covers state level, 21 cases of PPP formulation based on the PRI 
mechanism were launched between 2007 and 2010, and 65 PRI cases between 2011 and 
2012, in sectors such as logistics, transportation, urban mobility, basic sanitation, health, 
security and others (Pereira, 2013; Pereira, Vilella & Salgado, 2012). Furthermore, an 
update of the report shows that between January and June 2013, there were additional 15 
state level PRI publications (Pereira, 2013). Although these numbers show that the 
Procedure for Request of Interest has received increased attention; the report shows that 
among the PRIs launched between 2011 and 2012, a total of 39 cases have not been able to 
complete the pre-tendering process (Pereira, 2013; Pereira et al., 2012). According to 
experts, officials and private actors in Brazil, the number of incomplete PRIs is high and 
could discredit a mechanism that is considered an essential alternative for the formulation 
of expensive and complex PPP projects for infrastructure development in Brazil (Pereira, 
2013). 
It is generally acknowledged that the elaboration of a PPP project is challenging 
and complex. According to the literature, the complexity of PPP project formulation is 
related to the fact that the PRI process depends on a large number of stakeholders, on 
their interdependencies and interactions during the informal pre-tendering stage (Enei & 
Mundim, 2013; Pereira, 2011b; Pinheiro, 2011). In their analysis of the scenario for PPPs in 
Brazil, Enei and Mundim (2013) emphasize that a major challenge lies at initial design of 
PPP projects, in the process of formulating such projects. As Pereira (2011b) and Pinheiro 
(2011) explain, the complexity of developing PPP projects implies an intensive work about 
the feasibility of the infrastructure services that will be granted to the private initiative for 
project execution. This intensive work is based on the production of demand, engineering, 
environmental, legal, economic and financial studies which require thorough technical 
analysis and substantial time (Pereira, 2011b; Pinheiro, 2011).  
In the attempt to get these projects off the ground, governments in Brazil have 
adopted the Procedure for Request of Interest mechanism for the PPP project design and 
transferred the costs for project formulation to the private sector. The other option in 
which the public sector retains the costs involves using internal capacity of civil servants or 
hiring external organizations and consultants that offer project elaboration services, such 
as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) or the Brazilian Project Company (EBP) (Pereira, 
2011b; M. P. Ribeiro, 2012a). Although this latter option has been selected for the 
elaboration of some projects, the current tendency has been to use the PRI mechanism for 
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its perceived benefits. With the PRI mechanism, the government not only aims to prevent 
budget burdens for project elaboration and capitalize on private sector innovation and 
resources for this task, but also to build  up  the  public  sectors’  project  database (Haje, 2010). 
It also aims to launch innovative and high quality projects that present cost-effectiveness of 
public money in the official tendering process for future project execution.  
Nevertheless, in many states and municipalities in Brazil public and private actors 
have not been able to complete the PRI pre-tendering process for the elaboration of PPPs, 
failing to support many cases towards the implementation stage. There are substantial 
complaints from the private sector that companies have been investing at their own risk in 
the elaboration of expensive and complex PPP projects that are not reaching the market 
through tendering competition for contract execution. This is considered one of the main 
reasons private parties choose to participate in PRI pre-tendering processes, in the 
expectation to win tendering competitions and to profit from the intervention after 
contract signature (Pereira, 2013).  
In attempts to organize the PRI pre-tendering process for the formulation of PPP 
projects, governments in Brazil have focused on four aspects: (1) expression of PPP as 
priority instrument for specific infrastructure sectors; (2) implementation of clear legal 
frameworks; (3) well-established organizational frameworks with trained teams of civil 
servants; and (4) clear instrumental strategic parameters to guide public-private actors in 
the pre-tendering process (Bonelli & Iazzetta, 2004; Enei & Mundim, 2013; Pereira, 2011a; 
Pereira, 2012b). These four aspects represent the Brazil PPP Framework, which is the term 
that will be used in this research to refer to the combination of the four aspects that have 
oriented most PRI cases in Brazil. The Framework introduces four non-temporal and non-
spatial concepts for PRI processes and assumes that they can lead PPP formulation cases 
towards completion of the pre-tendering stage. The focus of public and private sectors in 
Brazil has been on suggesting the strengthening of the Framework, even though it has been 
unable to support many PRI cases towards completion.  
Considering the first element, Brazilian governments have clearly expressed 
interest in the use of the PPP instrument as a priority through the National Plan of 
Integrated Logistics and through the announcement of priority sectors such as airports, 
ports, highways and urban mobility. It has also focused on the second element, of clear 
legal frameworks by passing in 2012 a revision of the 2004 federal PPP legislation to 
stimulate public and private interest in the use of PPPs as policy instrument for the 
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provision of infrastructure (Law n. 12766, 2012). Many states and municipalities have also 
created their respective legal frameworks by publishing PPP Laws and PPP Decrees. As for 
the third element, the federal government, states and municipalities have also invested in 
the implementation of organizational frameworks, creating PPP Managing Councils and 
technical PPP units, as well as promoting trainings and seminars, in order to strengthen the 
capacity of the public sector in PRI pre-tendering processes. Finally, considering the 
strategic approach for the PRI formulation of PPPs, there has been an increasing tendency 
by states and municipalities to create manuals of best practice setting pre-defined 
parameters for decision making, as well as to publish Decrees of Procedure for Request of 
Interest, establishing instrumental strategies for PPP project design. These strategies focus 
on setting pre-defined goals, budgets, timelines and activities for achieving better 
performance and efficiency in the elaboration of PPP projects.  
Moreover, from the perspective of the private sector and experts in Brazil, in order 
to improve the process of PPP formulation towards implementation, the focus has also 
been on strengthening the elements of the PPP Framework. For the private sector, political 
agents must overcome ideological biases against the use of the PPPs and choose to 
prioritize the instrument, especially for areas such as transportation and urban mobility, 
telecommunications and sanitation (Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts, 2011; M. P. 
Ribeiro, 2012a). Other aspects private actors mention as important include legislations to 
regulate the procedures of the PRI mechanism, better credit conditions and improvements 
in the technical capacity of public actors, which are in line with the elements of the Brazil 
PPP Framework (Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts, 2011; M. P. Ribeiro, 2012a). Moreover, 
according to Pereira (2011a), an expert in PRIs and PPPs in Brazil, it is essential the setting 
of ex ante decision-making parameters to structure the PRI process. For him, the lack of 
parameters prior to the process is a burden that conspires against the public manager. 
Pereira (2011a) adds that the prior publication of the premises that will involve decision 
making of the public sector on PPP projects is more liberating than it might initially seem 
(Pereira, 2011a, own translation).  
Nevertheless, despite suggestion from the private sector that governments should 
reinforce the structuring elements of the Brazil PPP Framework and continuous attempts 
by the federal, state and municipal governments to strengthen them, the Framework has 
been unable to support many PRI cases towards completion of the pre-tendering stage.  
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In view of this problem and to understand why many cases of PPP project 
formulation are not finishing the PRI pre-tendering stage, this research will study the 
process of PPP formulation and the dynamics of actor-relations through a case study that 
has completed the pre-tendering stage based on the Procedure for Request of Interest. It is 
important to consider that completing the PRI pre-tendering stage is the first step towards 
the use of the PPP instrument for obtaining additional investment for infrastructure 
development in Brazil. Since discussions on the PPP theme in Brazil have focused on 
structural approaches and overlooked the role of process, in the case study selected for 
this research, an initial attempt was made to fill in this gap by getting stakeholders to 
reflect on the dynamics of actor-relations and the complexity of the PPP formulation 
process.  
The case study selected for this research is important because it is an urban 
mobility infrastructure project that has completed the PRI process in a scenario that was 
more complicated than the other PRI cases because it lacked the elements of the Brazil PPP 
Framework prior   to   actors’   engagement   in   the   PRI   process.   This   case   will   provide  
information on elements   that   influence   actors’   interactions   in   the   formulation   of  
infrastructure PPP projects and on recommendations for the pre-tendering process based 
on the PRI mechanism.  
The case study is the formulation of an urban and social mobility infrastructure PPP 
project for the re-ordering of the city centre of Fortaleza, Brazil. Besides not having an 
initial PPP Framework, it is a municipal PRI pre-tendering process that faced increased 
complexity due to additional regulatory requirements for the use of PPPs as policy 
instrument in a municipality. In addition to that, in Brazil, interventions for urban re-
organization, development or regeneration have not yet been placed as priority sectors of 
infrastructure development for the use of PPPs. Moreover, the municipality also lacked a 
PPP law and decree and PRI procedures, and its public sector team had limited training and 
no previous experience in PPPs or PRI pre-tendering processes. The following Table 1 
summarizes the four elements of the Brazil PPP Framework and presents respective 
observations about the absence of these elements in the initial stages of the case study.  
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Table 1 - Typology of Framework for Pre-tendering PPP Formulation based on the PRI 
Mechanism 
Typology 
Brazil PPP Framework as 
initial driver for PRI process 
of PPP project formulation 
Case study: lacking PPP 
Framework for the process 
Policy Framework: 
PPP determined as 
priority instrument 
for specific sectors of 
infrastructure 
development  
Clear ex ante influential 
environment promoted for 
use of PPP policy instrument 
in specific sectors, expressed 
through political will, 
economic stimulus, 
favourable financial scenario  
Non-clear sectoral scope for 
use of PPP instrument 
promoted prior to pre-
tendering engagement in the 
policy formulation process 
(PPPs not expressed as 
preferred instrument and not 
prioritized in agenda of public 
sector)  
Legal and Regulatory 
Framework: legal 
rules, procedures and 
conditions  
Existing PPP legislation (law 
and decrees) that sets legal 
boundaries, conditions, 
criteria and standardized 
procedures for the structuring 
of PPP projects through PRI 
mechanism 
Absence of PPP legislation (no 
municipal PPP law or PRI 
decrees) to orient actors prior 
to their engagement in the 
process  
Organizational 
Framework: 
organizational and 
human capacity  
Organizational frameworks in 
place, generally created by 
PPP Decrees and represented 
by Managing Councils (or 
Committees) and PPP Units 
(or Technical Groups). 
Seminars and trainings 
promoted, teams with 
specialized (sectoral) 
knowledge, background and 
experience in PPPs 
Fragile PPP organizational 
framework. No officially 
published PPP Decree, 
creating Managing Council and 
PPP Units. Limited or no 
background and experience in 
PPPs or PRI pre-tendering 
processes. Limited PPP 
training and technical 
knowledge 
Instrumental Strategic 
Framework  
PRI decrees in place with pre-
designed strategic guidelines, 
as well as availability of 
manuals of best practices  
Absence of published PRI 
decrees; lack of manuals and 
guidelines or database of 
previous projects 
 
The next section considers the aims and objectives of this research, followed by a 
summary of the structure of the Thesis. 
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1.2 Aims and objectives 
The principal aim of this research is to understand why few cases of PPP project 
formulation are finishing the PRI pre-tendering stage. It does this by unpacking the as-yet 
unclear workings of actor-relations at this stage of the process. More specifically, this 
research explores actor-relations in the formulation of an infrastructure PPP project that 
completed the pre-tendering stage based on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) 
mechanism. This study also intends to inform recommendations for the PRI pre-tendering 
formulation process of infrastructure PPP projects in Brazil.  
The objectives of this research are: 
1. To identify the actors involved in the PRI pre-tendering stage and their relations in 
the PPP formulation process; 
2. To understand how actors’   constructed   and   enacted   a   ‘PPP   Framework’   though 
their relations, and how it influenced actors in the completion of the PPP 
formulation process in the PRI pre-tendering stage; and  
3. To learn lessons for the formulation of infrastructure PPP projects in Brazil in the 
PRI pre-tendering stage.  
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
After this introduction, Chapter 2 clarifies the context of this research, discussing 
the concept of Public-Private Partnerships as policy instrument for infrastructure 
development worldwide and in Brazil, the historical evolution that led to the use of PPPs, 
advantages and criticisms, and examples of the use of PPP in different countries. After this, 
Chapter 2 discusses PPPs for infrastructure development in the Brazilian context and details 
the pre-tendering process of PPP formulation based on the PRI mechanism. It also explains 
each of the elements of the Brazil PPP Framework, showing that they have been 
insufficient to support many PRI cases towards completion of the pre-tendering stage. 
Chapter 3 examines the literature on Public-Private Partnerships and identifies the 
main elements suggested to influence the formulation of such projects. This chapter 
demonstrates that the formulation of PPPs is influenced by aspects that go beyond legal 
and contractual relations, formal organizational arrangements, instrumental strategies and 
external policy stimulus to also emphasize the dynamics and complexity of interactions 
between public and private actors.  
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Chapter 4 discusses the research theoretical approach, which is primarily based on 
the old institutional theory. This chapter explains that, based on the theoretical framework 
adopted, the PRI pre-tendering formulation of PPPs is perceived as a dynamic and socially 
constructed process in which practices and assumptions are produced and reproduced in 
on-going formal and informal relations between actors.  
Chapter 5 presents the conceptual framework that will be used to analyze the case 
study and to answer the research questions, which are presented in this chapter. The 
framework focuses on contextual processes of reinforcement and overcoming  of   ‘ways  of  
thinking   and   acting’ in the pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation. These processes and 
four main analytical concepts are explained in this chapter: the dynamics of formal and 
informal actor-relations; practices, opinions, perceptions and expectations; attitudes, 
strategies, resources and skills; and the influence of external forces.  
Chapter 6 describes the research design and the methods used as strategy to 
implement the research. It justifies the design based on philosophical assumptions 
grounded on the social construction of institutions by actor-relations, which can in turn 
affect  preferences,  expectations  and  opinions  that  guide  actors’  interactions  and  behaviour.  
This chapter also explains the qualitative line of inquiry adopted and the approach to data 
collection and analysis. It explains the selection of a holistic case-study for the analysis of 
an urban mobility infrastructure PPP project that completed the PRI pre-tendering 
formulation stage, which is the city centre re-ordering PPP for the municipality of Fortaleza, 
Brazil. 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 provide the results of the qualitative study undertaken in this 
research. This involves a chronological descriptive–analysis of actor-relations in different 
stages of the PPP formulation process in the case study selected for this research.  
Chapter 10 presents the concluding thoughts from the analysis. It presents answers 
to the research questions, including recommendations for policy and practice based on 
reflections on wider implications. It also presents reflections on the research process and 
new questions and future directions for the research and policy/practice communities.  
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Chapter 2 - Public-Private Partnerships for infrastructure 
development: policy and practice  
 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize the research topic by first discussing 
the concept of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a policy instrument for infrastructure 
development worldwide and in Brazil, considering its historical evolution, advantages and 
criticisms and the use of PPP in different countries. Second, this chapter focuses on the 
Brazilian PPP context and demonstrates that PPPs have been selected by governments at 
federal, state and municipal levels as an additional source to complement the funding gap 
for investment in economic and social infrastructure. Third, it introduces the pre-tendering 
process of PPP formulation based on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) 
mechanism by explaining two main aspects: (1) the pre-tendering stage; and (2) the 
complexity of the process. Finally, the chapter explains the framework that has been in 
place guiding actor-relations in the process, which is called the Brazil PPP Framework in this 
research. It focuses on each element (policy, legal, organizational and strategic) and 
demonstrates that they have been insufficient to support many PRI cases towards 
completion of the pre-tendering stage, based on examples and evidence from Brazil. 
2.2 The concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) as policy 
instrument for infrastructure development 
In several countries the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) has been 
adopted in different ways as a policy instrument to bring private financing for the provision 
of public services. A policy instrument can be defined as a tool or technique of public action 
for the delivery of public policy goals (Salamon, 2000; Voß, 2007). PPPs have been used as 
an instrument for the provision of public services associated with the promotion of 
infrastructure development. It is often used when governments want alternative sources of 
funding for expansion of urban assets and services and decide to take advantage of 
partnerships with the private sector for access to innovation, finance, knowledge of 
technologies and managerial efficiency (HM Treasury, 2012; S. Kumar & Prasad, 2004). 
Since the 1980s, with the crisis of the interventionist state and the introduction of 
neoliberal ideas, many countries have adopted a pattern of private financing as public 
policy instrument for economic and social development (Gouveia, Abdalla & Calvosa, 2009). 
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In developing countries like Brazil, India and China, facing fast urbanization and urban 
infrastructure gaps, private financing in infrastructure has been directly associated with 
economic and social development (Lakshmanan, 2008; Wang, 2013; Yang, Hou & Wang, 
2013). It is argued that adequate provision of infrastructure services is essential for 
increased productivity and efficiency, economic growth and even reduction in income 
inequality (Calderon & Serven, 2004; Ceratti, 2013; Graefe & Alexeenko, 2008; Lakshmanan, 
2008; Stanley, 2011; UNECE, 2012).  
The infrastructure for which PPPs is often used as policy instrument is usually 
defined in three ways: economic infrastructure, social infrastructure and government 
infrastructure. Economic infrastructure refers to the provision of physical assets and 
associated services for economic growth, such as sanitation, energy, transit and mobility, 
ports, railways, bridges, and highways (Sluger & Satterfield, 2010). Social infrastructure is 
often connected to the provision of physical assets and services for human development, in 
sectors such as education, popular housing, health care and security (i.e. prisons, 
rehabilitation centres) (Anker, 2012). Government infrastructure includes the provision of 
facilities for citizen services and administrative centres. Besides these three types, there 
are also other forms of infrastructure for which governments use private financing, such as 
cultural, sports and recreational infrastructure (i.e. football stadiums, convention centres, 
parks, museums) or a combination of different types in urban infrastructure regeneration, 
re-organization or redevelopment projects (Regenerating Intermediate Landscapes, 2012). 
These might involve the transformation of public parks, transit systems, civic spaces, 
housing, and other type of real estate, as well as the recovery of derelict areas in urban 
centres (Regenerating Intermediate Landscapes, 2012).   
Although it is generally acknowledged that PPPs are important policy instruments 
channelling private financing into the provision of infrastructure, there is no single 
definition for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) across countries (Asian Development Bank, 
2008; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Pinto, Godoy & Ribeiro, 2011; World Bank, 2012b; Zhang, 
2005a). Among many aspects, the different definitions vary in terms of the partners 
involved, the arrangement type and the task of the partnership.  
While PPPs are frequently considered any interaction between the public and 
private sectors in development cooperation; it can also define any form of cooperation 
between government and non-governmental entities, including not only businesses, but 
also voluntary organizations (NGOs, trade unions), knowledge institutes or communities, 
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which is a definition adopted in the Netherlands and in the United States (Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). There are also approaches to PPPs that differ on the 
formality of the arrangement between sectors. While it can be considered a loose 
agreement between public and private sectors (i.e. Netherlands and United States); other 
concepts emphasize the formal and contractual character of the partnership (i.e. Australia 
and Brazil). Definitions of PPPs also vary according to their objectives. In certain cases, PPPs 
and privatization are used interchangeably, in which partnerships are considered the 
transfer of asset ownership (sale of assets) from the government to the private initiative 
(i.e. United States). According to most perspectives, however, the objective of PPPs is the 
provision of public infrastructure services or assets by the private sector on behalf of the 
government, not necessarily involving transfer of asset ownership (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008; Australian Government, 2008; HM Treasury, 2012; Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2013; World Bank, 2012b). Despite the different types of PPPs and concepts 
adopted across countries and organizations, many share common characteristics with the 
PPP approach used in Brazil. The definitions usually agree that public and private actors 
engage in contractual partnerships for the provision of public asset or services, in which 
there is sharing of risks and resources for infrastructure development (Australian 
Government, 2008; HM Treasury, 2012; NCPPP, 2013; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2013; World Bank, 2012b).  
In Brazil, the concept of Public-Private Partnerships has a clear definition that 
involves the main aspects shared by the approaches of other countries. The definition of 
PPPs used for this research is the one officially adopted by the Brazilian 2004 federal law on 
Public-Private Partnerships in Brazil, in which PPPs are considered a public administrative 
contract for a specific type of concession between public and private sectors, not involving 
transfer of public asset ownership. Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract for the 
provision of infrastructure services, worth not less than R$ 20 million, for a contract term 
ranging from 5 to 35 years. It can be signed between a private company and the federal, 
state or municipal governments. In the PPPs, the private sector is paid entirely by the 
government or by a combination of user fares for the services provided plus public 
resources (Brazilian Federal Government, 2012). 
PPPs were introduced in Brazil as an innovative type of concession to complement 
both the common concession policy instrument, created in 1995 and the traditional 
contracting out instrument created in 1993. Both of these instruments were introduced 
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after the 1990 National Program of Destatization (PND), which reduced the role of the 
State in the provision of public services and transferred the responsibility to the private 
sector, while the government assumed the role of regulator and supervision. This was 
aimed at higher efficiency and lower costs in the provision of public services (De Queiroz 
Pereira, 2006; Pinto et al., 2011). In Brazil, traditional procurement, common concessions 
and PPPs are different from privatization because they do not involve transfer of asset 
ownership to the private sector (Alvarenga, 2005; Campos, 2007).  
The traditional contracting out law introduced in 1993 (8666 Federal Law) 
establishes rules and procedures for government purchases and contracting out of public 
works to the private sector through several modalities, including the competitive bidding 
process, which is also used for public procurement of PPPs in Brazil. Based on this 
traditional procurement instrument, the government frequently seeks quotations for the 
construction of public works and hires the proponent with the lowest project budget for 
contract execution (Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts, 2010a). On the other hand, the 
concession instrument created in 1995 (8987 Federal Law) was a step forward in the 
transfer of responsibility for service provision from the government to the private initiative. 
Unlike the traditional 8666 Law, in which the government bears complete financial 
responsibility for capital investment and service provision, the 1995 common concession 
instrument allows the public sector to transfer commercial and capital investment risks to 
the private concessionaire because the latter assumes the burden, at its own risk, to invest, 
implement, operate and maintain public infrastructure (Rossa, 2011). The common 
concession instrument is used for economically and financially self-sustainable projects, in 
which the demand for the services is considered enough to remunerate the capital 
investment of the private sector. Under the common concession, the private sector 
remuneration is completely obtained from the fares charged to service users, with no 
contribution of resources from the government. Since 1995, when this instrument was 
introduced in Brazil, many infrastructure projects have been implemented in sectors such 
as telecommunications and distribution of electric energy (Fiocca, 2005; M. P. Ribeiro, 
2012a). 
The instrument of Public-Private Partnerships, created in 2004 (Brazilian federal 
law. 11079, 2004) is a step ahead of the common concessions. The federal PPP law 
introduced norms for the public procurement of PPPs in order to attract private financing 
to projects that could not be implemented under the common concession regime, mainly 
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because they were not economically and financially self-sustainable. The PPP instrument 
was introduced to enable the implementation of urban development infrastructure 
projects that could not be sustained solely from the fares directly charged to users. They 
were also considered of high risks, which did not attract the interest of the private sector 
(De Queiroz Pereira, 2006).  
In order to make these projects attractive to private participation, in 2004 a 
concept of PPPs was introduced in Brazil that involves risk-sharing between public and 
private sectors. The PPP instrument also involves full public sector remuneration for the 
provision of services, known as administrative PPP concession (concessao administrative); 
or only to complement fares charged to users, known as sponsored PPP concession 
(concessao patrocinada). To exemplify, while sponsored PPP concessions are better suited 
for projects that involve construction and operation of highways, metro and sanitation 
infrastructure, in which users may be charged for the services provided; administrative 
concessions are suitable for projects in which the public sector is considered the direct user 
or services, such as in the case of prisons, public hospitals and school. In the latter case, 
user fares from consumers do not apply, and the government becomes the sole client (De 
Queiroz Pereira, 2006; Pasin, 2012). The remuneration from the public sector in PPP 
projects,   known   as   ‘pecuniary   payment’,   is   a   risk-sharing mechanism that differentiates 
PPPs from common concession. It is the main device to attract private financing to non-
self-sustainable infrastructure projects (Pasin, 2012). Gouveia et al. (2009) mentions that 
the Brazilian concept of PPP emphasizes the risk and resource sharing between public and 
private actors to enable   the   joint   intervention:   “PPPs   are   indicated   for   projects   that,   if  
implemented and operated solely by private enterprise, certainly would not get the desired 
return,  and  if  depended  only  on  the  State,  they  could  never  get  off  the  ground”  (p.  7).  The  
following table presents the distinction between the different types of policy instruments 
in Brazil for infrastructure development.  
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Table 2 - Typology of Policy Instruments in Brazil for Infrastructure Development 
Type of 
instrument 
Privatization 
Traditional  
public 
procurement 
(8666 Law) 
Common 
concession  
(8987 Law) 
PPPs  
(11079 Law) 
Type Sale Contract 
Contract (self-
sustainable 
projects) 
Contract (non-
self-sustainable 
projects) 
Objective of 
contract 
Sale of asset 
Government 
purchase of 
public works 
or services 
Transfer of 
service provision 
to the private 
sector, associated 
or not with public 
works 
Transfer of public 
service provision 
to the private 
sector, associated 
or not with public 
works 
Asset 
ownership 
Private Public 
Public (reversion 
of assets to public 
sector at the end 
of contract) 
Public (reversion 
of assets to public 
sector at the end 
of contract) 
Capital 
investment 
Private 
(purchase) 
Public 
Private (if there is 
construction) 
Initially private 
but compensated 
by public 
resources in 
construction 
and/or operation 
stages 
Financial 
Compensation 
Private 
(purchase) 
Public sector Fares only 
Public 
compensation 
only or in 
addition to fares 
Commercial 
risk allocation 
Private 
sector 
Public Sector Private Sector 
Public and Private 
sectors (risk 
sharing) 
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2.3 Historical evolution towards PPPs as policy instruments  
The birth of the PPP concept adopted in Brazil and in this research is usually linked 
to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) introduced in the United Kingdom by the Conservative 
Government in the 1990s. It was announced in a scenario of recession to control fiscal 
policy, limit public sector spending and increase economic growth, and it was taken 
forward by the New Labour Government in 1997 (Jane Broadbent & Laughlin, 1999; De 
Queiroz Pereira, 2006; Entwistle, Bristow, Hines, Donaldson & Martin, 2007; Peci & Sobral, 
2006). In the United Kingdom, in Brazil and in many other countries, there was a similar 
process leading to the introduction of PPPs for private financing of infrastructure projects.  
After the Second World War and with the international repercussion of the 1929 
Great Depression in the United States, many Western countries tried to bring 
macroeconomic stability and reconstruction through increased government intervention in 
the economy, as well as through State production of goods and provision of services to the 
population. Between 1930s and 1980s, intervention received popular labels such as 
‘Welfare   State',   and   ‘Keynesian   State'   (Majone, 1997). In Latin America, this period was 
characterized by military dictatorships and, more specifically in Brazil, by the policy of 
‘national  desenvolvimentism’   and   import-substitution model, both based on strong State 
intervention in the economy (Gouveia et al., 2009). Over the years this approach lost 
international strength in many developed and developing countries. It was criticized for not 
achieving efficiency in the delivery of services and for substantially increasing the resource 
and administrative burden on the State, which culminated in the global crisis of the 1980s 
(Majone, 1997). In Latin America, in particular, there were strong pressures against State 
monopoly because in the 1980s many faced the end of military dictatorships and 
experienced a process of democratization. The fiscal crisis of the 1980s was intensified by 
increased demand from society for better social policies and for the allocation of public 
resources into services such as health and education, as well as by the need for investment 
in infrastructure to stimulate economic growth. This period was also characterized by rising 
unemployment and inflation rates (De Queiroz Pereira, 2006; Gouveia et al., 2009). The 
economic crisis occurred not only in Latin America, but also in Western developed 
countries, and highlighted the problems of State monopoly in the provision of 
infrastructure (Majone, 1997). 
As a result, in the 1980s, the international scenario was influenced by neoliberal 
ideas in response to fiscal problems, aimed at budgetary control and downsizing of public 
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service provision (Aucoin, 1990). These ideas were mainly associated with the 
administration of Margaret Thatcher (1979) in the United Kingdom and of Ronald Reagan 
(1980) in the United Sates. One of the main neoliberal arguments was that market-oriented 
policy instruments based on private competition, as alternatives to State monopoly, 
increased efficiency, reduced costs and decreased the price of service provision (Batley, 
1996; Hood, 1991). Neoliberal policy responses involved measures to privatize government 
operations and to deregulate private economic enterprises (Aucoin, 1990), as well as 
devolution of activities from central to regional and local governments (Ahmad, Devarajan, 
Khemani & Shah, 2005; Rondinelli, McCullough & Johnson, 1989; L. Torres & Pina, 2002).  
Several countries adopted neoliberal policy instruments involving private 
participation, such as the United States, Korea, the United Kingdom, Portugal, France, Brazil, 
Australia, Sweden, New Zealand, and Canada (Kaboolian, 1998). In Brazil, the process of 
decentralization had an early start in 1967 with the Decree-Law 200 that transferred 
responsibility for the provision of goods and services to autarkies, foundations, public 
companies and societies of mixed economy (Silva, 2011; Siqueira, 2012). With the end of 
military dictatorship and the publication of the 1988 Federal Constitution, the process of 
decentralization was intensified with devolution of responsibility for service provision from 
the central government to municipalities (De Queiroz Pereira, 2006). This process was 
followed by the 1990 National Programme of Destatization (PND), which promoted 
privatizations (sale of state-owned enterprises to the private sector) that occurred in 
sectors such as telecommunications, energy and transportation (Alvarenga, 2005; De 
Queiroz Pereira, 2006).  
Considering that privatization became increasingly criticized worldwide, especially 
in developing countries for failure to deliver effective results in some sectors, other policy 
instruments, based on competition in the form of contracting out, became increasingly 
adopted for delivery of infrastructure (Weaver, 2009). These more competitive types of 
policy instruments are still currently adopted in several countries and are characterized by 
private parties entering into competitive bidding processes for the construction of 
infrastructure and/or for the provision of public services on behalf of the public sector, 
which still maintains ownership of assets (Entwistle et al., 2007; S. Harris, 2004; Teisman & 
Klijn, 2002). Traditional contracting out, common concessions, and PPPs are examples of 
these types of policy instruments that followed privatizations with the advent of neoliberal 
ideas.  
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2.4 Advantages & Criticisms of the PPP policy instrument  
There are many perceived advantages of PPPs as policy instrument for the 
provision of infrastructure projects, which mainly involve three aspects: funding for 
infrastructure, innovation and risk transfer (World Bank, 2012b). PPPs are used as private 
financing for investment in infrastructure services to compensate for public budgetary 
constraints or to allow greater public investment in other policy priorities. In face of budget 
constraints, need for re-investment in ageing or poor infrastructure, and growing demand 
on public sector services, PPPs allow the public sector to avoid up-front capital costs by 
spreading these costs over the  project’s   lifetime   through  payments   in instalments to the 
private initiative (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; Kwak, Chih & Ibbs, 2009; World Bank, 2012b). It is 
generally acknowledged that infrastructure is under-funded worldwide, and private 
participation in such  projects  is  a  way  of  dealing  with  this  ‘funding  gap’  (S. Harris, 2004; M. 
P. Ribeiro, 2012a; World Bank, 2012b).  
Another advantage is greater innovation, efficiency and creativity through the use 
of private sector managerial and technical skills for the provision of infrastructure services 
(Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004). It is perceived that through private participation in competitive 
procurement processes, PPPs provide incentives for bidders to develop innovative 
solutions that increase the value for public money on infrastructure services, in terms of 
more-efficient, lower-cost and reliable services (HM Treasury, 2012; Kwak et al., 2009; 
World Bank, 2012b). It is also argued that the private sector can contribute with project 
and risk management expertise to assure high quality and shorter delivery time (HM 
Treasury, 2012).  From  the  perspective  of  innovation,  the  term  ‘value  for  money’  (VfM)  does  
not   necessarily   mean   ‘cheaper’   provision   of   services   through   the   PPP   instrument   in  
comparison to other policy implementation alternatives; VfM could also be achieved by 
“spending  a  little  more  than  a  conventionally  procured  solution  but  achieving  a  far  superior  
service  as  a  result”  (S. Harris, 2004, p. 10).  
Furthermore, PPPs are also perceived to provide advantages in risk sharing and 
transfer between public and private sectors (HM Treasury, 2012; World Bank, 2012b). It is 
often argued that Public-Private Partnerships as instrument for infrastructure provision 
allows the public sector to allocate to the private initiative the risks it can better manage 
(such as of construction, finance, and operation)-,   reducing   the   project’s   overall   cost   to  
government; while the public sector retain risks it can manage more efficiently, such as 
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regulation enactments and license approvals (FMI Corporation Locations, 2011; S. Harris, 
2004).   
There are also criticisms of PPPs for the provision of infrastructure. These include 
public  sectors’   lack  of  knowledge  and  skills  to  regulate  and  control  the  implementation  of  
long-term PPP projects, limited competition in bidding processes and high costs and 
difficulties of designing contracts, formulating bids and hiring advisors services (S. Harris, 
2004; HM Treasury, 2012; Kwak et al., 2009). Difficulties related to the process of 
structuring PPP projects are usually emphasized because of the complexity involved in 
these long-term contracts and the attempts to anticipate possible contingencies (Katz, 
2006). There are also criticisms with respect to the design of contracts. It is argued that lack 
of flexibility creates obstacles   for   alterations   to   reflect   the   public   sector’s   service  
requirements and that inappropriate risks have been transferred to the private sector 
resulting in a higher risk premium being charged to the public sector (HM Treasury, 2012). 
Furthermore, PPPs are also criticized based on the long term commitment of the public 
sector   in   projects   that   restrict   governments’   flexibility   with   future   expenditures   due   to  
fiscal obligations (S. Harris, 2004; World Bank, 2012b). Another criticism includes the 
perception that the private sector cannot borrow capital as cheaply as the public sector to 
finance projects, so PPP projects may not necessarily costs less through private financing 
than via direct government funding (Kwak et al., 2009). Moreover, there are also problems 
in relation to issues of accountability in terms of insufficient transparency on the returns 
made by investors, as well as on the future liabilities created by PPP projects to taxpayers 
(HM Treasury, 2012).  
2.5 PPPs around the world  
Despite criticisms, Public-Private Partnerships have been continuously used 
worldwide in the provision of infrastructure services. Based on the database of InfraPPP 
(online media with updated knowledge on infrastructure and PPPs) (2013), numerous 
countries are currently involved in different stages of PPPs, from design to contract 
execution. The United States, Australia and Canada are among the developed countries 
with the highest number of PPPs in planning or in tender and with projects awarded. 
Considering developing countries, Brazil is one with the largest number of PPPs under 
similar statuses (InfraPPP, 2013).  
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To exemplify the amount of investment flowing worldwide into PPP projects, 
between 1985 and 2004 in Europe, Asia, and the Far East there were more than one 
thousand infrastructure PPP projects worth US$ 450.9 billion of investment in areas such as 
road, rail, airport, seaport and water (Abdel Aziz, 2007). The United Kingdom has also 
demonstrated increasing interest in PPPs. In 2001, there were approximately 300 PFI 
projects signed in the UK, worth £12 billion (Akintoye, Beck, Hardcastle, Chinyio & Asenova, 
2001), and as of 2012 there were over 700 PFI closed deals worth around £55 billion (HM 
Treasury, 2012). Australia has also expanded its pipeline of PPP projects and announced the 
second phase of an A$60 billion investment program on road and rail infrastructure 
(Australian Trade Commission, 2013).  
Considering low and middle-income countries, according to the World Bank Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Database, between 1990 and 2012, there were nearly 3,500 
Greenfield projects that reached financial closure (PPI World Bank, 2013). Based on the 
World  Bank’s  definition,  Greenfield  projects  are  the  ones  that  closest  resemble  the  concept 
of PPPs used in this research, in which a private entity or a public-private joint venture 
builds and operates a new facility for the period specified in the project contract and then 
may return to the public sector at the end of the concession period (PPI World Bank, 2013). 
These projects represent over US$ 1 billion, in sectors such as transportation (airports, 
roads, railroads, seaports), energy (electricity and natural gas), telecommunications, water 
and sewerage (PPI World Bank, 2013). Among developing countries, China has identified 
PPPs as an innovative tool for financing large infrastructure projects to cope with the 
increasing urbanization growth (Chan, Lam, Chan, Cheung & Ke, 2010). From 1990 to 2011, 
there were more than 1,000 infrastructure PPP projects in China worth US$ 116.4 billion in 
sectors such as energy, telecom, transport, water and sewerage (Wang, 2013).  
2.6 PPPs in Brazil 
Considering the need for additional sources to complement the gap for investment 
in economic and social infrastructure, Brazilian governments at federal, state and municipal 
levels have also acknowledged that immediate private funding for long-term projects is an 
important investment alternative. It is in this context that Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
have become increasingly selected as policy instrument. 
The Brazilian government has attempted to increase upfront funding for 
infrastructure development, but the resources and incentives are not sufficient to meet the 
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needs. In 2011, the federal government announced the second Growth Acceleration 
Program (PAC2) for more investment in infrastructure, worth nearly R$ 950 billion until 
2014, in addition to the R$ 600 billion of the previous program (2007-2010) (Ministry of 
Planning, 2012). It has also complemented the Growth Program with other instruments to 
stimulate investment, such as reduction in energy costs, in interest rates and tax burden 
(Ministry of Finance, 2013; Waltenberg & Bronzatti, 2013). Furthermore, several states and 
municipalities in Brazil have also obtained additional funding from international banks such 
as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development – IBRD) and the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), a 
Latin American development bank, as well as from Brazilian federal banks such as Banco do 
Brasil (Serodio, 2012). However, this has not been enough to meet investment needs for 
economic and social infrastructure development.  
In terms of economic infrastructure, nearly 40 million people or nearly 21% of the 
Brazilian population do not have access to adequate basic sanitation facilities (World Bank, 
2012a). Moreover, the cost of electricity in Brazil is considered high due to the non-
sufficient level of public investment in the production and transmission of energy, including 
natural gas and petroleum refineries. The average price of electricity for the Brazilian 
industry is more than 130% higher than in countries in similar stages of economic 
development such as Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRIC countries) (FIRJAN, 2011). 
Moreover, the country needs massive investment in transportation infrastructure 
such as highways, railways and ports. Their precarious conditions decrease the national and 
international competitiveness of Brazilian industries. For example, railways have been 
abandoned for five decades and the unprepared situation of ports and airports and the 
poorly maintained conditions of highways compromise the efficiency and economic growth 
of a country that is a commodities exporter (Donato, 2013; A. Torres, 2013). Furthermore, 
based on the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum, Brazil ranked 
low in the 107th position among 144 countries that were assessed for infrastructure quality. 
Experts also argue that the difficulties Brazilian industries face with high transportation and 
energy   costs   have   a   negative   impact   on   the   country’s   economic   growth,   in   terms  of   job  
creation and productivity (D'Andrade, 2013; FIESP, 2013; Gallas, 2006). Considering these 
bottlenecks, the Brazilian government has accounted that the need for investment in 
energy, telecommunications, basic sanitation, transportation and logistics is approximately 
R$ 922 billion for the period between 2011 and 2015 (Mantega, 2013).  
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Furthermore, Brazil has a great need for investment in urban mobility to solve 
problems associated with an excessive number of vehicles on the streets leading to traffic 
congestions, with deficit of public transportation and expensive fare prices. In 2013, these 
problems mobilized numerous protests by the Brazilian population in all state capitals and 
many other municipalities. The federal government has allocated over R$ 20 billion of the 
Growth Acceleration Program to urban mobility, including for the improvement of public 
transportation infrastructure, construction of metro lines, Light Rail Transit (LRT) and bus 
lanes (G1 Brasil, 2012; Ministry of Cities, 2012).  
Considering social infrastructure, according to the Brazilian Institute for Applied 
Economic Research (IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada), as of May 2013 the 
housing deficit in Brazil had reached over 5 million dwellings (Furtado, Lima Neto & Krause, 
2013). Moreover, in the health sector, there is a deficit of nearly 2000 hospitals and an 
estimated need of R$ 118 billion in public investment for the construction of these facilities 
(Bitencourt, 2013). The government has also acknowledged the need for more investment 
in security infrastructure, especially considering the overcrowding of Brazilian prisons, 
where there are approximately 300 thousands places for more than 500 thousand inmates 
(Oliveira, 2013).   
Considering the need to complement public investment in infrastructure 
development, Brazilian governments have increasingly selected the PPP instrument to 
obtain up-front private financing. Nevertheless, the 50 projects that have reached PPP 
contract   signature   are   still   a   small   number   for   the   country’s   need   in   infrastructure  
development (Enei & Mundim, 2013), and considering that almost 10 years have already 
passed since the publication of the 2004 Brazilian federal law which introduced PPPs a 
policy instrument (Law n. 11079, 2004). At the federal level, only one PPP contract has 
been signed, which is the 15-year concession for the construction, operation and 
management of the digital Datacenter complex for two government-owned financial 
institutions, Caixa Economica Federal and Banco do Brasil (F&I, 2013). At the state level, 
there are only 18 contracts signed, and five of them refer to construction, operation and 
management of football stadiums for the 2014 World Cup (states of Ceara, Bahia, 
Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte and Minas Gerais) (Dias, 2013; Pereira, 2013). Most of 
the PPPs signed so far in Brazil are at the municipal level, represented by approximately 30 
contracts (Enei & Mundim, 2013). However, this number is still substantially small 
considering that in Brazil there are over 5,500 municipalities.  
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In the attempt to get additional PPP projects off the ground, governments in Brazil 
have adopted an approach for the design of such projects that transfer costs for PPP 
project formulation to the private sector, which is called the Procedure for Request of 
Interest (PRI). Nevertheless, the application of this mechanism has not been able to 
support many cases of PPP formulation beyond the pre-tendering stage. The PRI 
mechanism is discussed next.  
2.7 The formulation of PPP projects in Brazil: the Procedure for 
Request of Interest (PRI) 
Two aspects will be discussed in this section to introduce the use of the PRI 
mechanism for the formulation of PPP projects in Brazil: (1) the pre-tendering stage; and (2) 
the complexity of the process.  
2.7.1 The pre-tendering stage of PPP project formulation 
The Brazilian Federal Constitution determines that the procurement of public 
works and services by the government must be preceded by an official tendering process 
(article 37, item XXI, Brazilian Federal Constitution, 1988). The tendering process is aimed 
at assuring equal opportunity of participation to all interested parties and the participation 
of the highest number of competitors in the procurement of public works and services 
(Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts, 2010a). According to the Brazilian legislation, a 
tendering process is intended to ensure the compliance with the constitutional principle of 
equality, the selection of the most advantageous proposal for the administration and the 
promotion of sustainable national development, and it will be processed and judged in 
strict accordance with the basic principles of legality, impersonality, morality, equality, 
advertising, [and] administrative probity (article 3, Law n. 8666, 1993, own translation).  
As detailed in the Brazilian federal PPP Law, the hiring of private concessionaires 
for the provision of infrastructure PPP projects must be preceded by a competitive 
tendering process in accordance with the procedures of the traditional tendering law, n. 
8666 of 1993 (article 10, Law n. 11079, 2004). The process of PPP project design takes place 
in the pre-tendering stage or internal phase, which is prior to the official bidding process 
and to the PPP contract signature. The aim of the pre-tendering stage is the elaboration of 
projects to be used in the external phase, which corresponds to the competitive tendering 
process for the selection of a private concessionaire to implement the PPP project. Based 
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on the Brazilian federal PPP law, the dividing line between the internal and external phases 
is represented by the Public Consultation. This is a period of 30 days in which the PPP 
project is publicized to society for comments and suggestions in accordance with the 
principle of publicity of the Brazilian Federal Constitution (article 10, item VI, Law n. 11079, 
2004). According to the PPP Law, the Public Consultation period marks the end of the pre-
tendering stage, accompanied by publication of the final PPP project online and in 
newspapers of large circulation (local, state and national), as well as the publication in the 
Federal, State or Municipal Diary, depending on the level of the PPP project (article 10).  
In Brazil, there are two options for the elaboration of Public-Private Partnership 
projects: the traditional approach and the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) (Pereira, 
2011b; Schiefler, 2012). States and municipalities are increasingly opting for the PRI 
mechanism over the traditional approach due to its perceived advantages and to the 
challenges of using the traditional mechanism.  
Under the traditional approach, the public sector is officially in charge of 
elaborating the PPP project, including tendering protocol and contract drafts. In this case, 
the government specifies the type of infrastructure service or intervention and prepares 
the PPP project either using its internal capacity of civil servants or by hiring project 
structuring services offered by external consultants and organizations, such as the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) and the Brazilian Project Company (EBP) (Pereira, 2011b; M. P. 
Ribeiro, 2012a). Based on the traditional approach, the public sector pays for the project 
design, publishes it for Public Consultation as required by the PPP Law and organizes the 
Public Audience event, as required by Brazilian tendering norms (article 39, Law n. 8666, 
1993). Public Audience is one of the mechanisms of public participation and control which 
must be organized prior to any official tendering process for direct access to the opinions of 
interested parties on the project (Soares, 2002). After that, the government launches a 
tendering protocol inviting interested private parties to submit proposals for the 
implementation of the project.  
The traditional alternative in which the public sector pays for the formulation of 
PPP projects faces difficult challenges in Brazil. As M. P. Ribeiro (2012a) explains, the public 
sector, especially at the state and municipal levels, does not have the human and 
organizational capacity, based on training and experience, to prepare the sophisticated and 
complex projects required for concessions and PPPs, or even to arrange the processes for 
hiring external consultants to do so. In order to rely on its own civil servants for the 
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elaboration of PPP projects, the public sector must have capable human resources available 
to design complex studies required for the structuring of such projects. Alternatively, the 
government may also choose to hire external consultants or organizations, which requires 
public resources in order to pay for these services. However, the public sector usually does 
not have the budgetary flexibility to allocate resources for the elaboration of expensive PPP 
projects (Pereira, 2011b; M. P. Ribeiro, 2012a). Moreover, to outsource this responsibility, 
the public sector must follow contracting out procedures for hiring services, in accordance 
with the traditional tendering law (Law n. 8666, 1993). However, the tendering process is 
often bureaucratic and time consuming and selects lowest priced bids by external 
consultancies that often lack qualification to carry out the elaboration of complex PPP 
projects (Pereira, 2011b; M. P. Ribeiro, 2012a).  
In contrast, the public sector may opt to use the Procedure for Request of Interest 
(PRI), which has been increasingly selected by states and municipalities in Brazil for the pre-
tendering elaboration of PPP projects (Pereira, 2013; Pereira et al., 2012). The PRI 
mechanism was introduced by the common concession law and is also allowed for the 
formulation of these types of projects (article 21, Law n. 8987, 1995). However, in practice, 
it is mainly adopted for the design of PPPs, and sub-utilized for the formulation of common 
concessions (Loureiro, 2012b; T. Ribeiro, 2012b).   
Based on the PRI mechanism, the public sector invites private parties to manifest 
interest in formulating studies, surveys or investigations to be used in PPP projects, at their 
own risk, with no reimbursement from the government. The reimbursement obligation is 
transferred to the winner of the tendering process, which must repay the agency that 
designed the PPP project in the PRI pre-tendering stage. Experts and officials in Brazil often 
mention that the main advantage of the Procedure for Request of Interest for the public 
sector is the fact that the private initiative pays for the elaboration of complex and 
expensive PPP projects (Guimarães Neto & Batista, 2010; Loureiro, 2012b; Pereira, 2011b; 
PPP Unit - State Government of Minas Gerais, 2010; Schiefler, 2012).  
In the PRI mechanism, the interactions between public and private actors take 
place in the pre-tendering stage, prior to Public Consultation, which is different from the 
traditional approach. These interactions represent informal arrangements since no formal 
contract binds public and private actors in the PRI process of PPP project formulation. 
Although a formal contracting out relation must be established between the parties for the 
 26 
 
execution of a PPP project, the PRI pre-tendering stage is characterized by intense informal 
interactions between stakeholders.  
For both the traditional approach and the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI), 
the phases after Public Consultation follow the same procedures. Figure 1 next shows that 
the main differences between the two approaches take place at the pre-tendering stage 
(phase 1 of PPP project design). On one hand, under the traditional approach, PPPs 
resemble the BFOT format of partnerships, in which the private sector is not responsible for 
designing the PPP project, but for building, financing, operating and transferring back the 
facility to the public sector at the end of the PPP contract. On the other hand, under the PRI 
mechanism, the private sector is also responsible for designing the PPP project, and PPPs in 
this scenario resemble the DBFOT format of design, build, finance, operate and transfer.  
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Figure 1 - Phases of PPPs in Brazil: from design to implementation 
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2.7.2 Complexity of the PRI pre-tendering process  
The PRI arrangement in the pre-tendering stage is complex and highly dependent 
on interactions and relations between key stakeholders prior to Public Consultation. There 
are two aspects that influence the complexity of these arrangements. One element is 
directly related to the informal character of PRI pre-tendering processes, since there is no 
formal contract that legally binds public and private actors to the process. Although there is 
a formal Procedure for Request of Interest publication and authorization that allows the 
private party to prepare the PPP studies, actors are not formally obliged (in contract or by 
law) to carry on the preparation of the studies. The public and private sector are allowed to 
cancel and stop the preparation process at any time. Another influential element is the 
concept   of   ‘project   finance’   embedded   in   the   Brazilian   PPP   legal   framework,   because   it  
requires the involvement of several stakeholders for the elaboration of PPP projects, as 
discussed next.  
The requirement for the involvement of a high number of actors in the preparation 
of PPP projects is linked to the concept of project finance embedded in the Federal PPP 
Law of 2004. For this discussion, it is important to first define the concept of project finance, 
which is a financing technique for projects that requires large capital and operational 
investments such as in the case of infrastructure PPP projects. This is a method in which the 
project   is   ‘self-financing’   because   the   repayment   of   loans   obtained   with   financial  
institutions  depends  on  the  project’s  cash  flows  (Borges & Faria, 2002). Private companies 
usually rely on this technique as alternative to corporate lending, either when the 
companies are already highly indebted and have difficulties to obtain new loans, or as a 
way to prevent a company from using up all of its corporate borrowing capacity for a single 
project, allowing it to participate in several projects at the same time (Enei, 2007).  
In project finance, private companies become sponsors of a newly created Special 
Purpose Company (SPC) that borrows from financial institutions and implements the 
project. The SPC must be created for a single purpose, which is the specific object of the 
PPP contract, and any loans obtained through the SPC must be used exclusively as 
investment in that project. Sponsors usually inject 30-20% equity capital in the SPC, and the 
remaining 70-80% comes from debt capital obtained from financiers. In Brazil, the SPC is a 
limited liability company because, in case of default in loan payment, financiers have 
limited claims on the loan and do not have recourse to the assets of the sponsor company 
as in corporate finance. This is one of the main aspects that influence the risky character of 
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project finance interventions such as PPPs. The recourse of lenders is limited to other types 
of guarantees (i.e. bridge loans or a letter of credit) offered by private sponsors during the 
construction phase of capital investment, when the project is yet to generate revenue for 
the loan service (Borges & Faria, 2002). Depending on the completion of the construction 
phase, financiers may reduce requirements of limited guarantee for the remaining phases 
of the project and accept the  project’s  cash  flow  and  assets as the only claims on the loans, 
making the project  ‘self-financing’  (Giribola, 2013).  
In the case of Brazil, the PPP legislation implies the need for a project finance 
arrangement for the formulation of a PPP (Enei, 2007). This is mainly based on the legal 
requirement for the establishment of a project company or Special Purpose Company (SPC) 
for the delivery of the PPP service (article 9, Law n. 11079, 2004). These aspects introduce a 
high level of complexity in the pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects.  
The Brazilian PPP legislation requires the winner of the competitive tendering 
process to constitute an SPC, which is the entity that signs a PPP contract with the public 
sector for the implementation of the infrastructure project (article 9, Law n. 11079, 2004). 
Since the SPC is a brand new entity and has no credit history, in order for the private 
sponsor to obtain resources from financial institutions to invest in the PPP project, they 
cannot  use  the  SPC’s  balance  sheet  or  rely  on  its  credit  background,  which  are  non-existent. 
Instead, the private sector must rely on the strength of the PPP project itself, 
demonstrating to financiers that its cash flow has the capacity to earn enough return for 
the  repayment  of  loans  and  that  the  project’s  risks  have  been  allocated  by  a  well-designed 
network of contracts (Enei, 2007). Sponsors must have capacity to negotiate financial 
arrangements and also demonstrate to financiers their know-how in the sector of the 
project, and their ability to design, implement and manage the project (De Araújo, 2005). 
Since based on project finance principles the decision of lenders to provide financing rests 
on the perceived success and feasibility of the PPP project for which the SPC was 
specifically created, the PRI pre-tendering process must deliver a PPP project that is 
technically coherent, well-integrated   and   based   on   solid   premises   to   reduce   financiers’  
perceptions of default risk from the SPC (Chengwing, 2008). This is where it can be made 
the link between project finance and the high number of actors for the formulation of PPP 
projects.  
To formulate a PPP based on the concept of project finance substantially increases 
the complexity of the application of the PRI mechanism in practice, because it requires the 
elaboration by different stakeholders of a variety of studies, which must be interconnected 
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and coherent. For the PPP project, it is necessary to prepare technical, financial, economic, 
environmental and legal feasibility analyses, engineering studies, market analysis, and 
demand projections to obtain, among other aspects, (i) consistent estimates of the 
investments required over the PPP concession period, (ii) the operational arrangement of 
the services and (iii) the expected revenue. The formulation of the PPP project also requires 
an analysis for the identification of risks that must be accounted during the contract 
execution and successfully allocated through a network of contracts. In the PRI pre-
tendering stage, parties must also use this information to prepare the tendering and 
contract drafts to support a future tendering process (R. Torres & Aroeira, 2010). These 
elements are essential for negotiations with financial institutions in order to obtain capital 
finance for the PPP project. 
The elaboration of many feasibility studies and analyses, the decisions on project 
details and the construction of the network of contracts are negotiated between various 
actors during the pre-tendering stage. The macro-interdependencies between the public 
and private sector in the formulation of a PPP project reflect in practice various micro 
interactions in the pre-tendering process, often involving entities from the public sector 
(Secretaries, politicians, officials, civil servants, etc.), private actors (investors, consultants, 
advisors, etc.) and society. Based on the legal requirements of the Brazilian legislation, the 
participation of society during the pre-tendering stage is exerted through Public 
Consultation, and its involvement in dynamic interactions is context specific, depending on 
the PPP formulation case.  
Several stakeholders from public and private sectors are involved in PRI pre-
tendering processes. From the private sector, investors are important to guarantee 
resources for the formulation of PPP projects during the design stage, since the investment 
is made   at   the   private   sector’s   own   risk.   Interactions   with   financiers   also   take   place,  
considering that they are responsible for supporting the infrastructure investment during 
future project execution, by offering the short and/or long term debt part of the capital 
structure for the implementation of the project. The input of builders is important because 
of their participation in the construction of public infrastructure, and they are sometimes 
also interested in operating public services. Service providers are essential stakeholders in 
the formulation of PPP projects in Brazil, because for a project to legally qualify as PPP, it 
must be designed around the provision of public services (i.e. operation and maintenance 
of infrastructure). Insurance companies may also participate in the process of PPP design 
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for negotiations over risk coverage. Financial advisors prepare the appropriate mix of 
capital (long term loans, short term debt such as bridge loans, and equity investment) to be 
included in project models for loan negotiation with financiers. Legal advisors are 
responsible for elaborating contracts that include the network of arrangements negotiated 
during the pre-tendering stage, as well as for designing the tendering protocol for the 
bidding process. They are also necessary due to the Brazilian legal framework and project 
finance principles, which are heavily dependent on formal contracts and legal procedures.  
As for the public sector, there is the participation of stakeholders in several 
organizational levels and in several roles. As executor, it involves the head of the Executive 
and the Sectoral Secretariat for the specific infrastructure scope of the PPP. There are also 
members of PPP Units and Managing Councils, involving civil servants and Secretaries who 
are expected to participate in the pre-tendering process. As legislator, it includes elected 
officials who are responsible for elaborating and approving laws related to the PPP 
intervention. Public actors also participate as planners, solicitors, property owners, 
regulators and resource collectors. The role of Finance Minister or Secretaries is also 
important in assessing the project for its fiscal responsibility and for the financial capacity 
of the government budget to meet the pecuniary payment commitment with the project. 
Prosecutors at the federal, state and municipal levels (public sector attorneys) also 
participated in the assessment of PPP contracts and tendering protocols prior to Public 
Consultation and tendering processes. There are also external control bodies of the public 
administration that supervise public spending, which are represented, for example, by the 
Public Ministry, the federal and state Courts of Accounts and its civil servants.  
2.7.3 Summary of section 
The pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects based on Procedure for Request of 
Interest (PRI) mechanism is a complex process based on informal interactions since there is 
no formal contract that legally binds public and private actors to the process, and on the 
involvement of several stakeholders for the elaboration of PPP projects, which is a 
consequence of the project finance concept embedded in the PPP legislation. The 
Procedure for Request of Interest in Brazil has been increasingly selected for the 
elaboration of PPP projects because of its perceived benefits. However, many cases have 
failed or not yet completed the pre-tendering phase of project design. There is evidence 
that the four elements of the PPP Framework used to guide many PRI cases of PPP 
formulation in Brazil have not been sufficient to lead them towards Public Consultation. 
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Next section discusses these elements to provide a better understanding of the problem 
explored in this research, which is the fact that many cases of PPP formulation have not 
been able to reach completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage.  
2.8 The elements of the Brazil PPP Framework for PRI pre-tendering 
formulation of PPPs  
Four main elements characterize the Brazil PPP Framework for PRI pre-tendering 
processes: policy, legal, organizational and strategic. In Brazil, it is considered that most PRI 
cases have failed or not yet completed pre-tendering processes because they have lacked a 
combination of these aspects (Pereira, 2012b, 2013). Although substantial attention has 
been placed on implementing and strengthening this Framework, many cases that have 
been guided by its elements have not completed the pre-tendering process.  
2.8.1 Policy framework: PPP as priority instrument in specific infrastructure 
sectors   
In Brazil, public sector expression of willingness to get involved in specific policy 
initiatives involving the PPP instrument is considered an important element for the PRI 
pre-tendering stage (Goulart, 2012; R. Monteiro, 2013; Pinheiro, 2011; M. P. Ribeiro, 
2012a; Simionato, 2013). Recently, several states in Brazil have also legally adopted the 
alternative where the private sector can suggest areas and projects to be developed 
through the PPP instrument; however, this option initiated with the Sao Paulo PRI Decree 
is still incipient (Decree n. 57289, 2011). Although there is the perception that expressing 
interest in the PPP instrument and indicating priority policy areas for PPP projects is an 
important stimulus, many cases that have fulfilled these aspects have not yet completed 
the pre-tendering process. 
In Brazil, the public sector has demonstrated political will, interest and 
commitment for the formulation of PPP projects in specific sectors of infrastructure. The 
political will of the government is expressed through its attempt at improving the 
regulatory, economic, fiscal and financial circumstances to stimulate private interest in the 
design and implementation of PPP projects. Nevertheless, although certain sectors have 
been set as priority for PPP projects in several cases of PRI pre-tendering processes, many 
are still struggling to complete the preparation stage. With specific reference to Brazilian 
states, which is the only level where consistent information on PRIs is available, the 
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following table shows the number of incomplete cases that initiated PRI tendering 
procedures between 2011 and 2012, but have not yet completed the process (Pereira et al., 
2012). In fact, the report emphasizes the limited availability and transparency of 
information on PPPs at the federal, state and municipal levels and the difficulty in 
obtaining documents and public information regarding Procedures for Request of Interest 
(Pereira et al., 2012).  
Table 3 next shows that most incomplete PRI processes are in the sector of urban 
mobility, including train, metro and parking lots. There are also cases in the sectors of 
logistics, basic sanitation, health and security. The column labelled   ‘others’      include  
projects in a variety of sectors: 4 projects related to government facility infrastructure such 
as administrative centres, 2 in citizen services, 1 related to tourism infrastructure for the 
construction of a cultural complex, and 1 in education.  
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Table 3 - Procedures for Request of Interest (PRIs) - state level1 
States 
Total of PRIs 
published 
2011 & 2012 
PRIs 
2011 
PRIs 
2012 
Infrastructure sector of incomplete PRIs Incomplete PRIs 
Logistics Urban Mobility 
Basic 
Sanitation Health Security other 
2011-12: 39 PRIs  
2010: 2 PRIs: 
Total n. of PRIs 65 26 39 7 10 4 6 6 8 41 
Ceara 12 10 2 2 1   2 1 6 
Rio de Janeiro 6 0 6  1 1 1  1 4 
Distrito Federal 7 5 2  2 1    3 
Sao Paulo 9 2 7  1  1 1 1 4 
Minas Gerais  4 1 3 2 1 1   1 5 (one 2010 PRI) 
Pernambuco 4 2 2 3     1 4 
Rio Grande do Sul 2 1 1       0 
Mato Grosso 4 0 4    2 1  3 
Bahia 1 1 0       0 
Espirito Santo 2 1 1   1   1 2 (one 2010 PRI) 
Alagoas 3 0 3  1   1 1 3 
Goias 2 1 1     1  1 
Rondonia 2 0 2    1   1 
Santa Catarina 2 1 1  1    1 2 
Parana 4 1 3  2  1   3 
Rio Grande do Norte 1 0 1       0 
                                                          
1 Note. Adapted from Pereira, B. R., Vilella, M., & Salgado, V. (2012). Procedimento de Manifestação de Interesse nos Estados: Relatório sobre projetos de PPP em 
fase de estruturação via PMI [Procedure for Request of Interest in the states: Report on PPP projects currently being formulated via PRI]. São Paulo, Brazil: 
PPPBrasil - O Observatório das Parcerias Público-Privadas. Adapted with permission.  
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Table 3 shows that most PRI cases that have not yet finished PRI pre-tendering 
processes are in the urban mobility sector. These PRIs are struggling to complete the 
process despite the stimulus provided by the urban mobility aspect of the Growth 
Acceleration Program (PAC) launched in 2011 with a focus on projects related to collective 
transportation (Portal Brasil, 2011). The stimulus gained greater support when the federal 
government reinforced the commitment and announced the National Policy for Urban 
Mobility in 2012, to improve the accessibility and mobility of people in municipalities (Law 
n. 12587, 2012). The impulse for PRIs in this sector was also reinforced when the federal 
government announced in April 2012 an increase in investment level, making R$ 32 billion 
available to 18 states and 51 municipalities, for the construction of metro lines, Light Rail 
Transit (LRT) and bus lanes in cities with more than 700,000 inhabitants (G1 Brasil, 2012; 
Ministry of Cities, 2012). For projects in this sector, PPPs have been indicated by federal 
and state governments as the preferable instrument of policy delivery (Carnaúba, 2013). 
Nevertheless, as the table shows, eight states are still struggling to complete PRI pre-
tendering processes even though these cases are in a priority sector for PPP projects. For 
example, the PRI for the Metro Line 3 was published by the state of Rio de Janeiro in June 
2012, and it has not yet completed pre-tendering processes (Pereira et al., 2012; State 
Government of Rio de Janeiro, 2012). 
The sector of logistics is also priority for PPP projects, but as the previous table 
shows several cases have not yet completed the PRI pre-tendering stage. The president of 
Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, announced the importance of PPPs for delivery of logistics 
infrastructure and said that the Brazilian government recognized partnerships with the 
private sector as essential to continued and accelerated growth. She mentioned the 
government was engaging in partnership to expand the country's infrastructure, to benefit 
its population and the private sector, to pay off a debt of decades of delay in investment in 
logistics, and, above all, to ensure the lowest logistics cost possible without monopolies 
(Casa Civil, 2012, own translation).  
These processes obtained greater support and attention after the federal 
government launched in 2012 the Logistics Investment Program, providing R$ 133 billion 
for logistics investment in highways and railroads (Casa Civil, 2012). However, three states 
that have engaged in at least two PRIs of logistics have not yet completed the process. 
Minas Gerais, for example, published a logistics PRI in 2008, which has not yet reached 
Public Consultation (Quelotti, 2010).  
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Basic sanitation is another sector in which PPPs have been set as priority for policy 
implementation; but many cases have struggled to complete pre-tendering processes. In 
Brazil, this sector has received particular attention and incentives, especially considering 
the National Policy of Sanitation (Law n. 11445, 2007) and the National Policy of Solid 
Waste (Law n. 12305, 2010). Both determine national guidelines in sanitation and 
management of solid waste and urban cleaning, as well as targets and planned actions to 
be taken by federal, state and municipal governments. For example, by August 2014 
municipalities must implement alternatives to replace non-sustainable garbage dumps by 
sanitary landfills of solid waste (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). In face of this 
requirement, PPPs have become a preferable alternative for policy implementation, and 
many states and municipalities adopted PRIs for the formulation of PPP sanitation projects. 
However, despite this, many basic sanitation PPPs at the state and municipal level failed or 
have still not completed the pre-tendering stage. Four PRIs at state level, as Table 3 shows, 
and numerous others at municipal level have not been able to complete pre-tendering 
processes (Pereira et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, PPPs in social infrastructure, such as health and security sectors, have 
also been prioritized. The states which have engaged in health PRIs have clear PPP 
frameworks and great incentive for the process, resulting from the positive evaluation and 
repercussion of the first Brazilian PPP of a public hospital in the state of Bahia, which 
started service operations in 2010 (Figueiredo, 2012; Kroehn, 2012; Loureiro, 2012a). As 
for the security sector, all the states with incomplete PRIs in this sector introduced PPPs as 
preferable policy instrument in security after the state of Minas Gerais signed a PPP 
contract for a prison complex in 2011 (Quelotti, 2013). However, there are 12 PRIs in social 
infrastructure that have not completed pre-tendering processes: 6 state PRIs in the health 
sector and 6 in the area of public security (Pereira et al., 2012).  
2.8.2 Legal and regulatory framework: legal rules and conditions  
In the context of Brazil, the PPP Framework also includes legal rules and conditions 
based on laws and decrees which set the criteria and conditions for the design of PPP 
projects during pre-tendering stage. There are arguments in Brazil that clear PPP legal 
frameworks facilitate the process of formulating PPP projects, leading to Public 
Consultation and to implementation (BRAiN, 2011; Miquelino, 2012). However, most cases 
that are struggling to complete PRI pre-tendering processes already had legal rules and 
conditions prior to the process.  
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The legislation on PPPs in Brazil provides the formal basis for the elaboration of PPP 
projects in terms of conditions for the tendering process and contractual clauses that must 
be considered in the technical and legal design of a PPP project. This formal approach for 
guiding PRI pre-tendering processes in Brazil receives the influence from the bureaucratic 
model of public administration introduced in the 1930s during the period of State 
monopoly (Silva, 2011).  
The bureaucratic model of hierarchies, rules and regulations was dominant during 
the period of strong State intervention from the 1930s until the 1980s, before neoliberal 
ideas and managerial principles were introduced, but still continued to influence the public 
administration in Brazil afterwards. The bureaucratic model adopts a linear thinking 
approach based on the use of procedural and hierarchical structures and rigid contractual 
clauses for organizing PRI processes. It assumes that this approach can be replicated to 
other cases, based on the idea that if it works in one environment, the approach can be 
applied successfully in other similar environments (Haynes, 2003). Therefore, it introduces 
context-independency for the organization of PRI pre-tendering processes by focusing on 
ex ante contractual conditions and standardization of processes and procedures, on the 
basis of one-system-fits-all-cases (Demir & Nyhan, 2008; Haynes, 2003).  
The PPP Laws at the federal, state and municipal levels determine very similar 
aspects, considering that the federal law is a direct influence on the format of the other 
PPP Laws in Brazil. They determine legal criteria for a PPP project and, among many 
aspects, they describe the types of projects that qualify under PPP, such as contract value 
above R$ 20 million and contract period between 5 and 35 years (i.e. articles 2 of federal 
PPP Law). PPP Laws also determine the various clauses that must be included in a PPP 
contract with respect, for example, to allocation of risks between public and private 
sectors (i.e. articles 5-7) and the types of guarantees that can be provided by the public 
sector in support of the pecuniary payment (i.e. article 8) (Law n. 11079, 2004).  
Other rules and conditions for PRI pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects are 
the  following  guidelines  in  article  4  of  the  federal  law:  “I  - efficiency in carrying out tasks of 
the  State  and  employment  of  society’s  resources;  II  – respect for the interests and rights of 
users of services and for the interests of private entities in charge of executing them; III – 
non transference of regulatory and judicial functions and of exercise of police power, as 
well as other activities exclusive of the State; IV- fiscal responsibility in the celebration and 
execution of partnerships; V – objective division of risks between the parties; VI – 
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transparency of procedures and in decisions; and VIII- financial sustainability and 
socioeconomic  advantages  in  partnership  projects”  (Law n. 11079, 2004).  
In summary, three main rules and conditions for PRI pre-tendering process of PPP 
formulation are included in most PPP Laws:  
1. Fiscal responsibility; 
2. ‘Value  for  money‘  (financial  accountability) 
3. Transparency and social accountability. 
The federal PPP Law determines that the studies of the PPP must demonstrate the 
project’s   fiscal   responsibility.   For this, it must be considered the annual and multiannual 
fiscal impact of the PPP contract value on the public budget. The assessment of fiscal 
responsibility must also evaluate the impact of the government commitment with 
pecuniary payment and its respective guarantees (article 10, Law n. 11079, 2004). The 
public entity responsible for managing government budgets, usually the Finance Ministry at 
federal level or Secretariats at state and municipal levels, must write an official opinion 
assessing   the   PPP   project’s   adequacy   with   these   requirements   and   expressing whether 
pecuniary payment commitments are compatible with the federal law of budgetary 
directives and with the law of annual budget. The official opinion is a requirement for the 
completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage.  
With   respect   to   ‘value   for  money’,   the   federal   PPP   law   also   determines   that   the  
completion of the PRI pre-tendering process depends on the preparation of a technical 
study that demonstrates the appropriateness and convenience of the procurement, upon 
identification of the reasons justifying the choice for the instrument of public-private 
partnership (article 10, item I, a, Law n. 11079, 2004, own translation).   The   ‘value   for  
money’   is   a   demonstration   of   the   PPP   project’s   cost-effectiveness and comparative 
advantage with respect to other tools available (i.e. traditional tendering and common 
concession). It must demonstrate that it is cheaper and more efficient to execute the scope 
of the policy via the PPP instrument than through other policy delivery tools. This 
demonstration must also account  for  an  ‘objective’ allocation of risks between the parties, 
which must be included in the terms of the PPP contract (articles 4 and 5, Law n. 11079, 
2004). The expectation of the legislation is to assure financial accountability and secure 
evidence   of   the   private   sector’s   efficiency   in   carrying   out   tasks   of   the   State   and  
employment   of   society’s   resources,   as well as evidence of   the   project’s   financial  
 39 
 
sustainability and its socioeconomic advantages (article 4, Law n. 11079, 2004). On the 
other hand,   the   federal   PPP   law   does   not   detail   the   format   of   the   ‘value   for   money’  
document, which only in some cases is explained in manuals of best practices published by 
the public sector. The   format   and  methodology   of   the   ‘value   for  money’   assessment   is  
often at private sector discretion.  
Another rule of the PPP legislation is related to the social accountability and 
transparency of the process. In article 10, the federal PPP law requires the publication of 
PPP project technical studies (including tendering protocol and contract drafts) for a 30-day 
period of Public Consultation, in online media, in newspapers of large circulation and in 
Federal, State of Municipal Official Diary. These publications must include: the justification 
for PPP procurement, the identification of the object or scope of the contract, the duration 
of the contract term and its estimated value, usually represented by the financial 
commitment of the public sector in terms of pecuniary payment (article 10, Law n. 11079, 
2004). 
The legal and procedural steering principles discussed in this section have been 
adopted by all of the states in Brazil which have engaged in at least one PRI pre-tendering 
arrangement, but are still struggling to complete the process. In Brazil, state and municipal 
PPP laws are almost a copy of the federal PPP Law. The federal PPP Law was published in 
2004, followed by the publication of PPP laws in several states. Subsequently to the federal 
publication, various municipalities also used the federal or state laws as models for their 
own PPP municipal legislations. Although municipalities and states have adopted similar 
legal rules and procedures for the formulation of PPPs projects; they are facing difficulties 
to complete pre-tendering processes. Considering the state level, for example, most state 
PPP legislations were published between 2003 and 2009, several years before their main 
engagement in PRI publications between 2011 and 2012 (PPP Brasil, 2012). When states 
engaged in the PRI pre-tendering processes, they had already been consolidating their legal 
PPP frameworks. For example, the states of Ceara and Sao Paulo, which have published the 
highest number of PRIs in Brazil, are currently struggling to complete several PRI pre-
tendering processes of PPP, as shows in Table 3 (Pereira, 2013; Pereira et al., 2012).  
2.8.3 Organizational framework: organizational and human capacity  
Another element of the Brazil PPP Framework includes the roles of organizations in 
the public sector, as well as the capacity building of civil servants to conduct the 
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elaboration of PPP projects. The bureaucratic model of public administration also 
influences the organizational approach of the framework, which assumes that for the 
formulation of PPP projects well-qualified (‘neutrally  competent’)  actors can apply a set of 
clear and formal laws and hierarchically controlled administrative procedures. These are 
assumed to be mainly concerned about carrying out their assignments and following 
legislative intentions (Demir & Nyhan, 2008; Evans, 1989; Figueiredo, 2012; Greiling, 2006). 
The organizational framework in Brazil is represented by the internal control of Managing 
Councils and PPP Unit teams in the public sector, by external control bodies, and by 
trainings and seminars to build the capacity of civil servants.  
The organizational inputs in the framework are directly linked to the PPP Law, 
which determines not only the legal criteria that must be considered in the pre-tendering 
formulation of a PPP project, but also the public bodies for managing and controlling the 
process of design and implementation of PPP projects. This is aimed at evaluating the legal 
adequacy   and   ‘value   for  money’   of   the   final projects prepared for publication in Public 
Consultation and official tendering competition.  
These inputs include Managing Councils (or Committees) and PPP Units (or 
Technical Groups), which are formally created by PPP Decrees and represent internal 
bodies of management and control within the public sector. In Brazil, state and municipal 
PPP Decrees have a similar format to the federal decree (Decree n. 5385, 2005). PPP 
Decrees determine the Ministries (federal level) or Secretaries (state and municipal level) 
that are members of Managing Councils and the frequency of their meetings. According to 
the decrees, the Managing Council is usually responsible for defining the priority services 
for execution under the PPP instrument, for the opening of PRI pre-tendering processes, for 
assessing the legal, fiscal and technical quality of the PPP project, and for authorizing or not 
the publication of the final project and tendering protocol for Public Consultation and 
official tendering process. The legal role of the PPP Units is to provide technical support for 
the Managing Council, including during PRI pre-tendering processes, and the members of 
these Units are officially determined through the publication of administrative measures 
(another formal act used in the Brazilian legal system for nominations). PPP Decrees also 
determine the role of the sectoral body responsible for the PPP project (i.e. Ministry or 
Secretariat of Infrastructure, Transportation, Health, Education, etc.), which are temporary 
members of the Managing  Council  and  share  the  other  members’  attributions  during  the  
elaboration and execution of the specific PPP projects (Decree n. 28844, 2006; Decree n. 
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29801, 2009).   PPP   Decrees   also   mention   the   role   of   the   ‘expenditure   authorizer’  
(‘ordenador   de   despesas’),   which   is   usually   represented   by   Finance   Secretaries.   They 
authorize or not the investment of public resources in PPP projects by assessing the fiscal 
capacity of the public budget to assume a commitment with the PPP contract value (above 
R$ 20 million) and contract period (up to 35 years).  
While Managing Councils, PPP Units and the ‘expenditure   authorizer’ represent 
internal control bodies over the formulation process, there is also a role for external 
control bodies in the Brazil PPP Framework. They are responsible for evaluating whether 
PPP projects elaborated during the PRI pre-tendering stage are in accordance with legal 
conditions and guidelines of transparency, social accountability, and fiscal and financial 
responsibility, as previously discussed. The role of control bodies also reflects the influence 
of bureaucracies and hierarchical instruments of accountability present in the Brazilian 
public sector (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Mafra, 2005; Silva, 2011). According to Dutra 
(2006), the PPP Law embodies two types of control: internal control from inside the State 
administrative structure – i.e. Managing Councils and PPP Units -, and external control by 
bodies that are not within the administrative structure of the State. External control must 
be exerted by society through Public Consultation, as well as by judicial and legislative 
bodies and Courts of Accounts, which have representatives at the federal, state and 
municipal levels, and also by the Public Ministry, an independent body of public 
prosecutors at the federal and state levels. Based on the Brazilian legislation, external 
controllers are supposed to assess and report irregularities or illegalities practiced during 
the elaboration of PPP projects and request adjustments in or interruption of the process 
(Dutra, 2006). The Brazil PPP Framework relies on the role of internal and external control 
bodies to supervise the PRI pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects.  
It is often emphasized by experts and officials the importance of organizational 
inputs in place and well-trained professionals for a well-conducted PRI process (Dutra, 2006; 
Pereira, 2011b; M. P. Ribeiro, 2012a). Nevertheless, most states in Brazil that are still 
struggling to complete the PRI pre-tendering stage have already published PPP decrees, 
created PPP Managing Councils and implemented their PPP Units with clear roles and 
attributions to provide support in the PRI process.  Many have also engaged in more than 
one PRI process and have developed experience in the process. Moreover, they have 
promoted several trainings and seminars for civil servant capacity building in PPP 
preparation. For example, in 2004 and 2005, respectively, the states of Santa Catarina and 
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Minas Gerais, which are currently facing incomplete PRI processes, promoted technical 
seminars for training on PPP preparation (Ministry of Planning, 2011). In particular, the 
states of Ceara and Sao Paulo, which have extensively invested in building technical 
capacity of city servants in PPP procedures and published the highest number of PRIs in 
Brazil, are currently struggling to complete several PRI pre-tendering processes (Pereira, 
2013). Furthermore, the state of Santa Catarina created a company (SC Par) in 2005 
dedicated to PPPs and PRIs, but, despite this, the state has not been able to complete the 
two PRI pre-tendering processes in which it has engaged in 2011-2012.  
2.8.4 Instrumental strategic framework: PRI decrees and manuals of best 
practices  
Another element of the PPP Framework is the instrumental strategic approach 
generally adopted for PRI pre-tendering cases of PPP formulation in Brazil. An instrumental 
strategy is also called rational comprehensive planning (Hart, 1992; Hart & Banbury, 1994), 
planned strategy (Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and linear planning 
(Chaffee, 1985). An instrumental approach to project formulation involves a clear 
separation between means and ends (plan elaboration and implementation stages), and 
assumes stability, control and predictability of environment (Mintzberg, 1994). It seeks to 
be comprehensive in scope and requires a high level of information processing through the 
gathering of internal and external data (Hart, 1992). 
According to Mintzberg and Waters (1985), an instrumental strategy depends on 
the articulation of intentions in the form of a very detailed plan based on budgets, 
schedules and so on, to anticipated problems that may prevent its implementation as 
designed. It is often expressed in formal written strategic and operational plans with a 
detailed and inflexible course of action (Hart, 1992, p. 337). Moreover, this approach relies 
on formal controls to ensure exact pursuit of the plan since it assumes that the surrounding 
environment is controllable (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). As Hart (1992) explains, effective 
implementation of such plans requires top managers to monitor and control the activities 
of subordinates who are held accountable for their performance against the plan. He 
argues that predictability is ensured through structure and formal systems because 
organizational members are induced to behave in desired ways. It is also assumed that 
actors are capable of implementing exactly what the plan tells them to do (Mintzberg, 
1994). In the decisions to use instrumental planning and to believe that making such 
decisions is not a waste of time, Chaffee (1985) adds that  “one  must  assume  either  that  the  
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environment is relatively predictable or else that the organization is well-insulated from the 
environment”   (p.   90).   Rosenhead (1980) argues, however, that the emphasis of 
instrumental planning on prediction and certainty neglects problems that may arise from 
contingencies  and  from  human  fallibility  or  inconsistency.  For  him,  “the  need  for  flexibility  
is  nowhere  reflected  in  the  prescribed  routines”  (p.  210).   
The instrumental strategic approach for PRI pre-tendering processes in Brazil is 
influenced  by  the  rational  managerial  model  of  ‘how  to  do  things’  in  the  public  sector.  The 
instrumental approach was introduced in Brazil with the 1995 rational managerial reform in 
the public administration, and it was meant to overtake the rigidity and formalism of the 
procedural bureaucratic model through rational-instrumental plans, management 
techniques of decision-making, measurement of performance and focus on targets and 
outputs. However, as demonstrated in the previous sections on legal and organizational 
frameworks, public-private relations in Brazil are still influenced by the bureaucratic model 
even with the introduction in the 1980s of the managerial principles of public 
administration (Capobiango, Nascimento, Silva & Faroni, 2013; Drumond & Silveira, 2012; 
Gomes, 2006; Mafra, 2005; Silva, 2011; Siqueira, 2012). In the Brazilian context, the 
rational managerial model and bureaucratic model operate simultaneously and influence 
the PRI process of PPP formulation. Silva (2011) asserts that the  Brazilian  public  system  “is 
affected by a kind of hybridism through the juxtaposition of the various models of 
management and, therefore, depending on the policy applicability, it makes parallel use of 
these   models”   (p.   22).   Consequently,   the   Brazil PPP Framework for PRI pre-tendering 
processes is also influenced by both models.  
The instrumental procedures for the formulation of PPP projects are embedded in 
decrees of Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI), in the PRI publications, proposals and 
authorizations that follow the instruction of the decrees.  They are also present in manuals 
of best practices that have been elaborated by states and municipalities for strategic 
instructions for PRI processes. These elements of the Brazil PPP Framework adopt 
principles of instrumental strategic planning based on the following aspects:  
x formal written instrumental strategy and inflexible course of action;  
x control of plan implementation, activities, results and performance through: 
o internal and external bodies;  
o requirements for participating in PRI pre-tendering process of PPP 
formulation. 
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The instrumental strategic approach for PRI pre-tendering processes requires 
separation between means (plan elaboration) and ends (plan implementation). For this, it 
also requires pre-definition of rigid strategic details for the process, such as scope, budget 
limit, activities and/or deadlines for project preparation, which are expected to be followed 
during the PPP formulation stage. Moreover, actors are subject to performance monitoring 
by internal and external control bodies during the process (articles 2, 4 and 9, Decree n. 
5977, 2006).  
PRI decrees and manuals of best practices also indicate that the private sector is 
the one that proposes the format of the instrumental strategy for the PPP formulation 
process. Decrees and manuals have embedded managerial ideas of principal-agency 
strategies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The public sector as the principal is expected to 
delegate responsibility for elaboration of a formal and written strategy to the agent, which 
is the private sector. To exemplify, in article 3 of the federal PRI Decree, it is established 
that PRI proposals submitted by the private sector must detail the activities to be carried 
out, considering the scope of projects, studies, surveys or investigations defined in the 
request, including the presentation of a schedule indicating the dates of completion of each 
stage and the final date for delivery of the work (article 3, IV, Decree n. 5977, 2006, own 
translation). 
In addition to that, the instrumental strategic approach assumes actors can follow 
the rigid and specific details of the plan in a predictable way and that PRI pre-tendering 
process can be controlled by internal coordinators and internal and external control bodies 
through the organizational and legal frameworks created for public and private interactions. 
It also assumes that through its control mechanisms the instrumental strategic approach 
can account for distortions that can be caused by opportunistic behaviour, conflict of 
interests and information asymmetry (Ferris & Graddy, 1998; Terry, 1998), which may 
happen when the agent (the private sector) uses information advantage in its own interest, 
deviating from the objectives of the informal commitment agreed upon with the principal 
(public sector) (Ferris & Graddy, 1998; Terry, 1998). 
The Framework tries to deal with information asymmetry through performance 
monitoring and by enabling a strategy based on the evaluation and validation of the PPP 
technical premises and documents by governmental bodies during and at the end of the 
PRI pre-tendering stage. This option is foreseen in PRI decrees and PPP laws, which enable 
Managing Councils, PPP Units and external control bodies (i.e. legislative bodies, Court of 
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Accounts, society) to supervise the elaboration and assess the quality of the PPP project, 
verifying the adequacy with legislation and the existence of implicit opportunistic 
advantages for the private sector (article 9, Decree n. 5977, 2006; Law n. 11079, 2004). 
These aspects represent the strategic basis for the relations between public and private 
sectors during pre-tendering processes.  
As mentioned, the PPP Framework assumes that it can guide actors during the PRI 
process through rigid specification of scope, activities, budget and deadlines, through 
control by internal and external control bodies, but also though the ex-ante requirement of 
actors’  expertise   in   the  attempt  to  monitor   the  effort  actors  puts   into   the  elaboration  of  
the PPP project. PRI decrees determine that PRI publications must establish participation 
criteria in the pre-tendering process and request private actors to present in their 
proposals a full list of qualification and experience in the PPP project sector as condition for 
the authorization to elaborate the studies for the PPP project (article 3, Decree n. 5977, 
2006). It is expected that these ex ante proof of qualifications can contribute to the 
elaboration of adequate PPP projects and to the completion of PRI pre-tendering processes.  
Considering the aspects discussed, the instrumental strategic approach of the Brazil 
PPP FRAMEWOK is mainly represented by PRI Decrees, with standard legal procedures for 
application of instrumental strategies and control over the process. PRI Decrees also 
provide guidelines for submission of PRI proposals, requesting the elaboration of an 
instrumental strategic plan for the pre-tendering process. These are aimed at establishing a 
given arrangement capable of guiding actors through the pre-tendering stage towards 
completion.  
In Brazil, many states and municipalities have published their PRI Decrees, 
following the model of the federal government (Decree n. 5977, 2006). Many municipalities 
also use the example of PRIs published by states or by other municipalities as model to 
their PRI publications. Nevertheless, many cases of pre-tendering PPP formulation in Brazil 
have published PRI decrees and PPP decrees; but they still failed or have not yet completed 
the process. For example, the state of Ceara published the PRI decree in 2010 with clear 
instrumental strategic guidelines, but it currently has 6 incomplete PRIs. Moreover, the 
states of Minas Gerais and Alagoas also published PRI decrees in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively, but they are also struggling to complete pre-tendering processes.  
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The strategy of PRI decrees is complemented by the instrumentality embedded in 
manuals of best practices and in the use of evidence and previous experience (Davoudi, 
2006; Sanderson, 2002). These are also used as strategic guidance in many PRI cases in 
Brazil that have not completed the pre-tendering stage. Some states have manuals of best 
practices with the instrumental strategic procedures for pre-tendering stages and with 
guidelines for PRI publications, based on which the private sector prepares proposals with 
plans and strategies. They also have detailed techniques and methods for public sector 
monitoring of PRI pre-tendering processes. These manuals complement PPP laws and 
decrees and are supposed to be used as standard guidelines for PRI cases by trained teams 
of civil servants. The state of Ceara, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, for example, have 
elaborated manuals of best practices, but have many incomplete PRI cases as shown in 
Table 3 (State Government of Ceara, 2009; State Government of Minas Gerais, n.d.; State 
Government of Rio de Janeiro, 2008). Furthermore, the strategic instrumentality of the 
Brazil PPP Framework is also reflected in databases that provide evidence of previous 
experience available from other projects, such as publicity of examples of PRI publications, 
which are expected to serve as example for other cases (Pereira, 2012b). Databases are still 
limited, but some states have been using them, such as Ceara, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, 
which are among the federative units in Brazil with the highest number of incomplete PRI 
pre-tendering processes (Pereira, 2013).  
2.8.5 Summary of section 
In Brazil, it is assumed that the combination of the four elements of the PPP 
Framework, drawing from bureaucratic and rational managerial influences, can guide PRI 
pre-tendering processes towards Public Consultation. The linear means-ends framework 
discussed in this section has been generally adopted in Brazil for PRI processes, but it has 
been unable to support many cases towards completion of the pre-tendering stage. The 
first element represents the policy framework and implies that the PPPs must be 
designated as priority instrument by the public sector. It is argued that prioritization of 
PPPs as policy instrument through regulatory, economic, fiscal and financial measures is 
essential for delivery of infrastructure in specified sectors (M. P. Ribeiro, 2012a). Another 
element is represented by implemented organizational frameworks and trained civil 
servants, which are perceived as rule-oriented, well-motivated and capable of controlling, 
guiding and coordinating the process. The Framework is also composed of legal and 
regulatory elements based on rules and conditions, standardized procedures and criteria 
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established in PPP Laws and decrees. Finally, there is the instrumental strategic framework, 
which assumes that the application of rational-linear and rigid plans assessed for 
performance are sufficient to reach the expected outcomes of the PRI process, in terms of 
PPP projects that result in value for money and that can be published for Public 
Consultation. Even though many cases of PRI pre-tendering formulation in Brazil have 
adopted the elements of the PPP Framework, many have failed or are still struggling to 
complete the pre-tendering process.  
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter contextualized in more detail the motivation, aims and objectives of 
this research, based on the following aspects: introduction of the concept and use of 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) as policy instrument for infrastructure development 
worldwide and in Brazil; background of the PPP instrument and its perceived advantages 
and criticisms. Considering the need for additional investment in infrastructure in Brazil, 
this chapter also explained the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism, which 
federal, state and municipal governments have increasingly selected for the formulation of 
PPP projects. It was explained that, unlike the traditional approach of public project 
formulation, the PRI mechanism requires intensive informal interactions between actors at 
the pre-tendering stage. It was also clarified the complexity of the process related to the 
concept of project finance and the large number of interdependent stakeholders involved 
in the formulation of several technical studies. In the last section of the chapter, it was 
explained that there is a PPP Framework in Brazil, based on policy, legal, organizational and 
strategic elements, which has been insufficient to support many PRI pre-tendering cases of 
PPP formulation towards completion of the design stage (phase 1).  
Considering that most PPP projects in Brazil have not been getting off the ground 
and the strong indications that significant problems are at the pre-tendering stage, the 
formulation of such projects based on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI), as the 
preferred mechanism used by governments in Brazil, deserves a better understanding. 
Based on an examination of the literature on Public-Private Partnerships, next chapter will 
obtain insights on elements affecting public and private actors in the processes of PPP 
formulation. These elements will be used for exploring the dynamics of actor-relations in 
the formulation of PPP projects for infrastructure development in Brazil. Two main aspects 
will be highlighted in the next chapter: the role of external forces and the dynamics of 
public-private interactions. 
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Chapter 3 - Public and private actors in Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) projects  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a review of aspects that influence public and private actors in Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) projects according to the literature on the topic. The insights 
obtained will be used to explore the pre-tendering dynamics of relations between public 
and private actors in Brazil, as well as the elements that may influence their interactions for 
the pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects based on the Procedure for Request of 
Interest. It is important to consider, however, that there is limited literature on the design 
stage of PPP projects, which is the focus of this research. Consequently, this review also 
includes insights from the literature that focuses on the entire PPP process, which often 
make reference to the formulation stage  
The literature on PPP for infrastructure development can be divided in two main 
groups. While most authors evaluate PPPs from a formal contracting out perspective 
focusing on formal elements and external issues that influence the process of project 
formulation, there are others who focus on the role of formal and informal dynamics of 
public private interactions for the elaboration of PPPs. The ones who are more structurally 
oriented examine the preparation of PPPs considering aspects such as cost-efficiency, 
performance and critical success factors for evaluating and proposing improvement for the 
formulation of PPP projects (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; Chan et al., 2010; 
FMI Corporation Locations, 2011; C. Harris, 2003; S. Harris, 2004; Jefferies, 2006; Li, 
Akintoye, Edwards & Hardcastle, 2005; Qiao, Wang, Tiong & Chan, 2001). The elements 
suggested by this body of the literature are similar to the aspects covered by the Brazil PPP 
Framework discussed in the previous chapter.  
On the other hand, there are studies that consider PPPs from a perspective of 
inter-organizational relations, networks or mode of governance, but not discarding PPPs as 
a policy instrument for infrastructure development (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Koppenjan, 
2005; Noble & Jones, 2006; Teisman & Klijn, 2002). Under this perspective, PPPs are more 
loosely defined as special arrangements for formal and informal public and private 
cooperation or long-term commitment for the joint development of products and services 
(Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Noble & Jones, 2006; Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). Studies under 
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this perspective tend to emphasize the dynamics of actor-relations when proposing 
approaches for PPP formulation.  
Moreover, some of the studies considered in this review are based on empirical 
work in several countries. For example, Jacobson and Choi (2008) and Abdel Aziz (2007) 
focus their studies in the United States, while Dixon, Pottinger and Jordan (2005), Li et al. 
(2005) and Ahadzi and Bowles (2004) use information from PPPs in United Kingdom. Noble 
and Jones (2006) study PPPs in Australian and United Kingdom, while Khan (2005) focuses 
on projects in Sweden. The studies by Klijn and Teisman (2003), Teisman and Klijn (2002) 
and Koppenjan (2005) explore PPPs in the Netherlands, while Jefferies (2006) presents an 
Australian PPP case. As for specific studies in developing countries, Chan, Lam, Chan, 
Cheung and Ke (2010) analyze critical success factors for PPPs from a Chinese perspective, 
and Jamali (2004) provides insights of success and failure mechanisms of PPPs in the 
Lebanese context. Zhang (2005b) gives a more comprehensive perspective as he focuses on 
infrastructure development PPPs in several countries, including Australia, Hong Kong, India, 
Japan, Peru, Malaysia, South Africa and the United Kingdom. 
The first section of the chapter will discuss the external forces that are suggested to 
influence PPP preparation processes. The main argument considers that problems and 
opportunities for the formulation  of  PPP  projects  are  external  to  actors’  interactions  within  
the process. S. Harris (2004, pp. 19-20) highlights several external forces which are also 
mentioned by other authors, so his overall approach will be used to organize the discussion 
in the next section: 
x Familiar legal and contractual frameworks; 
x Administrative and organizational structures in place and local technical capability; 
x Clear standard procedures and practices as strategic guidelines; 
x Prioritization of the policy instrument in terms of clear definition of scope for 
potential projects and a committed and structured approach from the public sector 
to PPPs, as well as bankability   of   the   PPP   investment   and   country’s   good   credit  
ratings (economic, commercial and financial environments);  
x Manageable political sensitivities and political environment of stability (political 
culture). 
The review in this chapter will also consider the other perspective which highlights 
the dynamics of public-private interactions during the process of PPP design. The literature 
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suggests that these dynamics are influenced by both formal and informal interactions 
between  actors,  by  actors’  capacity  to  learn  and  adjust  perceptions,  opinions  and  practices,  
as well as by the role of context in these adjustments and in the influence of external forces 
in processes of PPP formulation. These two perspectives (external forces and dynamics of 
interactions) will provide additional insights on the elements that may influence actor-
relations in the pre-tendering process of PPP formulation in Brazil. 
3.2 The external forces 
The literature on PPPs generally highlights the importance of a favourable external 
environment to support the formulation process of PPP projects (S. Harris, 2004; Zhang, 
2005a). This section will review the main elements discussed in the literature as 
constraining and enabling external elements for the formulation of PPP projects. In line 
with S. Harris’ (2004) perspective, it is sub-divided in five groups of external forces, which 
are also supported by several authors in the literature. Many argue that the most crucial 
elements influencing PPP project formulations are related to (1) the formal legal and 
regulatory arrangements, (2) organizational/administrative structures and (3) strategic 
aspects of how to organize and control the formulation of PPP projects. It is also frequently 
mentioned the importance of (4) policy elements, in terms of prioritization of PPP policies 
and the promotion of economic, commercial and financial environments to stimulate 
interest in such projects, as well as to (5) political elements, such as political instability, 
level of corruption and of public opinion support.  
3.2.1 Legal and regulatory elements 
According to Pongsiri (2002), PPPs require effective government regulation on 
property rights, contracts, disputes and liabilities. For Abdel Aziz (2007), a major 
impediment for the formulation of such projects is the absence of PPP legislation. 
Insufficient and inadequate legal definitions of government guarantee types and 
procedures for selecting the most appropriate type of PPP scheme are also considered 
impediments (Li et al., 2005; Zhang, 2005b). Many authors also emphasize that the 
problems are related to the complexity of the decision making process, which require the 
need for standardization of PPP practices, procedures and contracts to improve 
negotiations, as well as the systematization of responsibilities for actors to perform 
assigned tasks (Abdel Aziz, 2007; S. Harris, 2004; Zhang, 2005a, 2005b). Examples that are 
considered to facilitate the PPP formulation process include laws that authorize highway 
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tolls (Abdel Aziz, 2007), and concession and tendering laws, which according to S. Harris 
(2004) can guarantee competition and  possible  financiers’  approval  for  long-term loans.  
3.2.2 Organizational and administrative structures 
The literature indicates that problems in the stage of PPP formulation can also be 
linked to the high level of bureaucracy in the public sector decision-making process (Abdel 
Aziz, 2007; Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004), as well as to lack of distinction between practice 
guidance and restrictive regulation, leading to excessive standardization in contractual 
clauses and conditions that actually impede the PPP design process (Ahadzi & Bowles, 
2004). Some authors also argue that problems related to organizational and human 
capacity can interfere with the application of the legal requirements and strategic plans for 
the formulation of PPP projects. Under this approach division of responsibilities between 
public and private actors and external advisors invited to participate in the process are 
often considered imprecise aspects that must be clarified to improve the formulation of 
PPP projects (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Zhang, 2005b).  
Clear roles and responsibility, and well-defined communication procedures among 
all stakeholders are also suggestions to improve public and private sector participation in 
these processes (Zhang, 2005b). Another problem is the absence of project parameters and 
comprehensive output and scope specifications of the services required from the project 
(Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004). Other problems that have been identified include lack of public 
and private experience and skills for coordination, structuring and management of PPP 
formulations (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Qiao et al., 2001; World Bank, 2012b; Zhang, 2005a, 2005b). 
A study conducted by Asenova, Beck, Akintoye, Hardcastle and Chinyio (2002) proposes 
suggestions for this. Based on the perspective of 68 public and private interviewees with 
involvement in PRI processes in Great Britain, the authors argue that these aspects can be 
handled through the involvement of managers with previous experience or qualified 
technical consultants, as well as through staff training and upgrading of skills and 
competencies (Asenova et al., 2002, p. 12).  
3.2.3 Strategic approach 
Authors often suggest that problems with PPP formulation are related to the 
strategic arrangement for the process and mention that solutions are needed to provide 
more appropriate control and guidance mechanisms over the design process (Abdel Aziz, 
2007; Li et al., 2005). According to the literature, a clear instrumental strategy is needed, 
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based on performance specification and methods for assessment of the costs and benefits, 
as well as for the development of methodologies to produce output-based specifications 
(Abdel Aziz, 2007; Li et al., 2005). Some authors stress as impediments the absence of risk 
allocation and management procedures to guide public and private actors in the contract 
negotiations and in the value for money elaboration and assessment during the 
formulation stage (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; Asenova et al., 2002; Li et al., 2005; World Bank, 
2012b; Zhang, 2005b).  
Other issues related to the instrumental strategic approach for the formulation of 
PPPs include lack of clear upfront government PPP objectives (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Ahadzi & 
Bowles, 2004; Asenova et al., 2002; Dixon et al., 2005; S. Harris, 2004), as well as cost and 
time overruns during the pre-contract stage (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; Asenova et al., 2002). 
As solution, Dixon et al. (2005) and S. Harris (2004) mention that output, quantity and 
quality of infrastructure and services must be clearly specified ex ante, and preferably 
based on the inputs from end-users of services during the preparation of the project.  
It is also mentioned that strategic problems can be overcome through a collection 
and provision of historic data on obstacles and risks already managed in other projects (i.e. 
national database) (Asenova et al., 2002). For many authors there is lack of evidence-based 
‘best  practices’  to  guide  PPP  formulation  processes  (Abdel Aziz, 2007; S. Harris, 2004; Qiao 
et al., 2001; Zhang, 2005a, 2005b). Zhang (2005b) argues that it is essential the 
“development  of  pathfinder  projects  in  selected  key  sectors  that  can  be  used  as  models  for  
future projects through the dissemination of standardized tender documents and model 
contracts,  and  best  practice  guidelines”  (p.  175).   
3.2.4 Policy elements 
Besides considerations over legal and regulatory arrangements, organizational and 
administrative capacity and strategic aspects there is also reference in the literature to the 
importance of a policy framework, which includes financial aspects and the economic and 
commercial environment for the formulation of PPPs. Considering the policy setting, many 
authors argue that the definition of priority PPP areas before actors’   engagement   in   the  
formulation of projects is an essential element, and that poor definition of sectoral scope 
by the public sector is a major impediment (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; Asenova et al., 2002; S. 
Harris, 2004; Zhang, 2005a, 2005b). As S. Harris (2004) expresses based on his study in the 
United Kingdom, the government is the one responsible for prioritizing projects in the early 
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stages of PPP programmes, prior to the process of project formulation (p. 19). There are 
also comments with respect to level of political support, such as encouragement of 
government bodies and stability of political culture (Zhang, 2005a). Several authors also 
mention the importance in the clarity level of policies with specific reference to the sector 
in which the PPP is aimed at (Abdel Aziz, 2007; S. Harris, 2004; Li et al., 2005; Pongsiri, 2002; 
Qiao et al., 2001; Zhang, 2005a).  
For some authors, the promotion of a favourable environment for the prioritization 
of PPPs depends on financial aspects, such as the existence of financial engineering 
techniques and of strong capital markets (Zhang, 2005b). For Akintoye, Beck, Hardcastle, 
Chinyio and Asenova (2001), new financing opportunities stimulate the interest of private 
sector in PPP projects. Financial aspects that are considered to create obstacles for the 
formulation of PPPs include lack of funds for these infrastructure projects and long delay in 
reaching financial closure, because of long negotiations with banks (Qiao et al., 2001; Zhang, 
2005b). As Akintoye et al. (2001) mention, this is essential because during the initial stages 
of the PPP process private actors approach different banks and must obtain letters 
confirming that the project is feasible and that banks are willing to back it up. Several 
aspects they mention to influence negotiations with financiers include: adequacy of the 
cost coverage; credit worthiness of the parties; track record of the private companies; the 
importance placed on the project; technological reliability; and sufficient revenue 
generation for loan repayment (p. 363).  
Other aspects include favourable economic and commercial conditions for PPP 
formulation, such as a stable macroeconomic scenario to provide confidence for the 
private sector; appropriate project identification; promising economy; long-term demand 
for project and services; profitability to attract investors; and the perceived ability of users 
and/or the government to pay for the cost of the new investment (S. Harris, 2004; Li et al., 
2005; Qiao et al., 2001; Zhang, 2005a). On the other hand, the literature also refers to 
economic and commercial impediments, such as uncertainties in the economic climate in 
case of poor prospects for economic growth of the local economy and uncertainties in the 
demand and supply related to the object of the PPP contract (Zhang, 2005b). 
3.2.5 Political culture 
Another element the literature suggests is political culture. It refers to aspects such 
as national and political institutions, electoral periods and pressure from interest groups 
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and public opinion, which may influence policy experts in framing problems, selecting PPP 
as instruments and designing project interventions (Béland, 2005; Kingdon, 2002). There 
are also references to positive or negative public opinion on the PPP and also community 
support, which according to the literature must be persuaded in order to facilitate the 
formulation of these projects (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; S. Harris, 2004; Li 
et al., 2005; Zhang, 2005a). Some authors mention as political impediments the level of 
political instability in terms of general corruption, untrustworthiness of public officials and 
low credibility of government policies (World Bank, 2012b; Zhang, 2005b). Another aspect 
include the cultural philosophical and ideological differences between public and private 
sectors on the ways of thinking and acting (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Zhang, 2005b). For S. Harris 
(2004), the public sector must create and stimulate favourable environment (i.e. political, 
legal, economic and commercial aspects) for the formulation of  PPP  projects:   “politicians  
need to provide a political lead, promote cultural change, explain and defend the policy 
and  broker  compromises  to  reflect  political  reality”  (p. 15).  
3.2.6 Summary of section 
Different external enablers and constraints on PPP formulation were considered in 
this section. A summary of the external forces is presented next, which according to the 
literature are influential in derailing or enabling the formulation of PPP projects. 
Legal and regulatory framework 
x Constraining aspects: absence of PPP legislation; insufficient definition of 
government guarantee types, of procedures for selecting the most appropriate 
type of PPP scheme; but also excessive standardization in contractual clauses and 
conditions. 
x Enabling aspects: standardization of PPP procedures and contracts to improve 
negotiations, and the systematization of assigned responsibilities for actors to 
perform allocated tasks. 
Organizational and administrative capacity 
x Constraining aspects: high level of bureaucracy in the public sector decision-making 
process; lack of public and private experience and skills for coordination, 
structuring and managing of PPP. 
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x Enabling aspects: trained technical and organizational PPP Units with capacity for 
the application of legal requirements and strategic plans; collection and provision 
of historic data on previous projects (database). 
Strategic approach 
x Constraining aspects: inability of actors to establish project parameters and 
prepare comprehensive output and scope specifications of services; lack of 
appropriate control and guidance mechanisms over the process. 
x Enabling aspects: standardization of PPP practices and instrumental methods; risk 
allocation and management procedures to guide actors in contract negotiations 
and  in  ‘value  for  money’  elaboration for cost-effectiveness assessment. 
Policy elements 
x Constraining aspects: low clarity level of policies aimed at PPP sectors; lack of 
political will and poor definition of sectoral scope; uncertain and weak economic 
climate and in the demand and supply related to the object of contract; poor 
prospects for economic growth; lack of funds for financing infrastructure projects 
and long delay in reaching financial closure because of long negotiations with 
financiers. 
x Enabling aspects: prioritization of projects in the early stages of a PPP programme; 
political support and encouragement of government bodies; stable macroeconomic 
scenario; appropriate project identification; promising economy; long-term 
demand for project and services; profitability to attract investors; perceived ability 
of users and/or the government to pay for the cost of the new investment; strong 
financial engineering techniques and capital markets. 
Political culture 
x Constraining aspects: cultural and ideological differences between public and 
private sectors; political instability in terms of corruption, untrustworthiness of 
public officials and low credibility of public policies. 
x Enabling aspects: favourable national and political institutions, pressure of 
electoral periods and from interest groups and society; positive public opinion and 
community support. 
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Based on the previous discussion, the main aspects that influence the formulation 
of PPP projects are in the formal legal, procedural and organizational/administrative 
arrangements, in the financial, economic, commercial and regulatory environments, as well 
as in the political culture. These aspects do not place much emphasis on the interactions 
between public and private actors during the process of PPP project design. Joyner (2007) 
criticizes the dominant structural tendency in the analysis of PPPs – or P3 as she calls it - 
and appeals for  more  attention  to  a  ‘socialized’  approach: 
A strong bias toward economic and structural perspectives is a feature of the P3 
literature  (…).  I  assert that the literature would be enhanced by theories which help 
to explain the particular as well as the general. This would embrace the view that 
there are structural constraints of individual action, that these are social as well as 
economic, however that this constraint is not inevitable. How actors work within 
and transform these structures is a rich vein with the potential to add depth and 
texture to a somewhat sterile field (p. 208).  
Next section provides a review of the literature that focus more on the social 
relations to which Joyner (2007) refers. It considers the dynamics of interactions between 
actors involved in the formulation of PPP projects, the influence of actors in the process 
and the role of social context.  
3.3 The dynamics of public-private interactions 
Another body of the Public-Private Partnership literature emphasises the 
importance of the relations between public and private actors in processes of PPP 
formulation. Authors who adopt this perspective argue that such processes are similar to 
“patterns of social relationships between interdependent actors which take shape around 
policy problems and/or clusters of resources and that are formed, maintained and changed 
by   an   ecology   of   games”   (Teisman & Klijn, 2002, p.137). Joyner (2007) argues that this 
approach is important, but the focus on formal cultures and external structures has taken 
the attention away from the influence of formal and informal relations on the process of 
PPP   design.   She   says,   “While understanding P3s as public policy instruments, we lose a 
detailed understanding of the particular social dynamics which arise from the coming 
together of the private and public sector” (p. 208). The approaches previously discussed to 
public-private interactions are mostly related to traditional contracting out initiatives, in 
which the government hires the private sector for infrastructure and service provision 
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based on formal arrangements, but with no joint decision-making or lengthy negotiations 
prior to tendering competition (Bovaird, 2004; Klijn & Teisman, 2000). However, the PPP 
literature also emphasizes that the social arrangement of public-private interactions 
influences the PPP formulation and that important factors to be explored in an analysis of 
the process include how different strategies and ways of thinking come together in formal 
and informal interactions and arrangements (Klijn & Teisman, 2003, 2005; Koppenjan, 2005; 
Teisman & Klijn, 2002). This will be explained in more detail in the next sub-section, 
followed by a review of the discussion in the literature that highlights the role of actors as 
creative leaners with capacity to influence the formulation process of PPP projects. The last 
subsection reviews the role of social context in PPP formulations, which accounts for the 
influence of specific time and space in the process, such as the contingency of external 
forces, arrangement of interactions and adjustments in preferences and practices. 
3.3.1 Formal and informal dynamics of actor-relations 
Some authors say that for an arrangement to be a public-private partnership, the 
private sector should not simply formally contribute with financial resources or receive 
from the public sector specifications for the service provision and for the desired output in 
a typical principal-agent relationship (Bovaird, 2004; Klijn & Teisman, 2000; Teisman & Klijn, 
2002). Instead, it is argued that PPPs must involve the public and private sector working 
together in setting both input and output specifications through interactive relations based 
on mutual trust and mutually determined rules for interaction (Bovaird, 2004; Teisman & 
Klijn, 2002). From this perspective, the formulation of PPPs involve both formal and 
informal interactions between actors 
Bovaird (2004) excludes from the definition of public-private partnerships relations 
between organizations which are simply traditional contracts or legally binding agreements 
with detailed specifications, such as contracting out arrangements which emphasizes a 
principal-agent relationship. Klijn and Teisman (2000) also make a distinction between 
public-private partnerships and formal contracting out relationships. They argue that while 
partnerships involve the public and private sector working together from the earlier stages 
of the decision making process to achieve effectiveness and synergy, contracting out refers 
to the public sector defining the problem and specifying the service to be provided by the 
private sector (Klijn & Teisman, 2000).  
This perspective is directly related to the governance approach to public-private 
partnerships. From a governance perspective, McQuaid (2010) say that PPPs represent a 
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complex arrangement based on formal and informal interactions between public and 
private actors. Accordingly, Klijn and Teisman (2000) argue that Public-Private Partnerships 
are a reflection of a complex and interactive process of relations, not as straightforward as 
in contracting out, in which the government, as the organizer of the planning process, 
defines the problem, specifies the rules and goals, and selects a private company to deliver 
the solution. Klijn and Teisman (2000) also say that partnerships as networks of 
interdependent actors depend on the informal rules and organizational arrangements that 
can be developed over time in a process of interaction and communication, as actors adjust 
expectations and perceptions. These dynamics and interactive relations between actors in 
public-private partnerships are clearly reflected in the literature on networks, on public 
governance, as well as on relational and inter-organizational collaboration, discussed next.   
From the perspective of the networks literature, the social arrangement between 
public and private actors may influence the formulation stage of PPP projects through the 
distribution and control of knowledge and resources needed for achieving outcomes, as 
well as through the complexity of interactions and negotiation processes between actors 
with different resources, perceptions and strategies (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Teisman & Klijn, 
2002). In the governance literature on networks, Public-Private Partnerships are mainly 
analysed in view of complex governance settings involving networks of interdependent 
actors (Meier & O'Toole, 2010). For Teisman and Klijn (2002), partnerships are a network 
form of governance, in which the public sector must consider its mutual dependency with 
other actors and try to make joint decisions in order to solve complex problems through 
cooperation. They argue that governments understand the need for partnerships due to 
the   increasing  complexity  of   the   societal  demands  placed  upon   them,  also  called   ‘wicked  
problems’  (Bovaird, 2004; Clarke & Stewart, 2003). This complexity is characterized by the 
involvement in networks of a variety of actors, the need for several resources and the 
existence of different perceptions and strategies (Teisman & Klijn, 2002). Klijn and Teisman 
(2000) also say that as public and private sectors become increasingly interdependent, both 
governments and firms function in networks, with more reliance on relational contracting 
than on hierarchical forms of operation (Klijn & Teisman, 2000). These network interactions 
increase the complexity of negotiations and decision-making processes, requiring 
adjustments and cooperation between the various actors (Klijn & Teisman, 2000). 
Authors in the network literature on PPPs also argue that while public and private 
actors bring their different perceptions and strategies of rules and constraints from their 
own domains, they are interdependent and rely on synergy and joint development to work 
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successfully for PPP design (Klijn & Teisman, 2005; Koppenjan, 2005; Teisman & Klijn, 2002). 
The different domains are the public-private different ways of thinking and doing things 
(culture, ideologies, political views, decision-making procedures and mechanisms), which 
can create barriers to the process of PPP formulation (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Teisman & 
Klijn, 2002). Authors in this body of literature defend that public and private sectors have 
different perceptions on risks, cultural orientations and strategic choice mechanisms that 
carry on to their network interactions for PPP formulation and may create challenges 
(Joyner, 2007; Klijn & Teisman, 2003, 2005; Koppenjan, 2005; Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Van 
Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). For Teisman and Klijn (2002) the obstacles for designing PPP 
projects are represented by institutional barriers against cooperation created by strict lines 
of responsibility and different ways of thinking (Teisman & Klijn, 2002). For example, 
Teisman and Klijn (2002) and Klijn and Teisman (2005) mention that governments have a 
tendency to use hierarchical decision-making mechanisms, while the private sector is 
generally market-oriented; and that these two ways of doing things cannot be merged 
without problems for the formulation of PPPs. 
Besides rules and constraints brought to interactions from public and private 
existing domains, the literature on networks also emphasizes that the process of PPP 
formulation may require   adjustments   in   actors’   perceptions,   in   the   arrangement   of  
interactions and in the rules and constraints driving relations in the process. For this, it is 
suggested the use of process management to deal with the influence of rules and 
constraints on actors’   interactions,  as  well  as  the  introduction  of  new  actors  or  the  use  of  
existing ones in the network (Klijn & Teisman, 2003, 2005).  
Klijn and Teisman (2005) mention that decision-making in PPP preparation 
processes can only progress if the perceptions and strategies of the different parties 
involved in complex PPPs are coordinated to some extent, which is difficult to clearly 
delineate in advance. It is also argued that due to the actor-interdependency aspect 
present in PPP formulation arrangements, mutual adjustment of these perceptions and 
strategies is an essential prerequisite (Teisman & Klijn, 2002). Process management reflects 
the building of commitment, trust and joint image which are perceived as important to 
sustain the continuity of the process (Koppenjan, 2005; Waddock, 1989).  
Furthermore, Klijn and Teisman (2005) also argue that the scope of PPP project can 
be constructed during the process, but this is not often realized by the actors because of 
the focus on formal elements of structural arrangements and given scopes. Similarly, 
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Koppenjan (2005) stresses that the specifications of a PPP project are not merely givens, 
but also the products of perceptions and processes. For him, assuming given political 
frameworks or public-private formal agreements on problems and instruments are 
simplistic solutions. Others also argue that the interaction between actors is essential for 
the construction of policy problems and selection of policy options, such as the PPP 
instrument (Béland, 2005; Kingdon, 2002). Similarly, Teisman and Klijn (2002) indicate that 
the specifications of the PPP scope undergo constant change through cyclical process 
during the stage. They argue that constant alterations in inputs and desired outputs require 
an on-going learning process and a willingness from public and private actors to look on a 
mutual basis for solutions and adjustment in project specifications. For Waddock (1989), it 
is important to have a common vision and goal at the outset, but these often need 
reshaping during the formulation process.  
According to Harding (1998), public-private partnerships depend on a persistent 
and slow process of mutual learning and adjustment between the partners and in the 
continuing  faith  on  the  partnership’s  future  benefits.  For  Bovaird (2004) accountability and 
decision-making have to be shared within partnerships and networks, implying trust-
building and capacity-building. He adds that goals have to become integrated and partners 
must show mutual adjustment capacity, as well as the appreciation for long-term 
reciprocity, rather than require immediate returns (Bovaird, 2004). Koppenjam (2005) 
argues that prior to the creation of a formal partnership, public and private actors engage 
in  an  interactive  negotiation  and  assessment  process  to  “define  the  content  of  the  project,  
investigate possibilities and risks, arrive at agreements on the distribution of costs, benefits, 
risks and responsibilities, and decide upon the arrangements that will govern their 
cooperation”   (p.  138).  Waddock   (1989) suggests that for the formulation of PPPs there is 
the  constant  “need   for  hooking  and   rehooking  partners   into  the  partnership  process” (p. 
96). She adds that for this it is important the role of individuals who can make on spot 
decisions and with networking capabilities to bring the commitment of partners to the 
process. This is supported by the perception that management, leadership and supervision 
capacity of policy officials and other stakeholders is important to guide and coordinate 
actors’  interactions  in  the  project  formulation  process  (Guimarães, 2011; Jardim, 2013 ; V. 
Monteiro, 2012; Moraes, 2012; Oliveria, 2013 ; M. P. Ribeiro, 2011a; Siqueira, 2012). Some 
authors also emphasize that management, leadership and creativity can be internally 
developed by stakeholders in their interactions (V. Monteiro, 2012; M. P. Ribeiro, 2011a). 
For this, partnerships may rely on actors that are already involved as part of the 
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arrangement of interactions, but may also invite others with that capacity to participate in 
the process.  
Similarly, in the literature on relational and inter-organizational collaboration, 
Huxham and Vangen (2000) argue that Public-Private Partnerships are characterized by 
processes such as managing aims, managing language and culture and managing trust and 
power. In relational strand of literature, partnerships are also related to the concept of 
synergy. For Vangen and Huxham (2010), synergy can be created through joint working. For 
Lasker et al. (2001), synergy is defined as the capacity to merge the perspectives, resources, 
and skills of individuals and organizations. They add that synergy is not simply the exchange 
of resources, but the ability to create added value through group interaction, resulting in a 
whole that is greater than the sum of its parts (Klijn & Teisman, 2000; Lasker et al., 2001; 
Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; J.  Pierre, 1998a). According to Pierre (1998b), through 
collaborative efforts and interactions, the partnership created includes both the 
capabilities of the partners and also those derived by the fusion of the inter-organizational 
leverage. Lasker et al. (2001), add that synergy enables diverse partners to obtain creativity, 
as well as comprehensive, practical and transformative thinking, in order to tackle complex 
problems. For them, synergy is the contribution of different perspectives and knowledge by 
partners and can be seen in the actions and reasoning that emerge from the collaborative 
efforts. For Imperial  (2005), voluntary inter-organizational collaboration relies on politics, 
bargaining, negotiation, and compromise, in which the exchange between actors are not 
guided by formal processes, but dependent upon communication, personal and 
organizational relationships, mutual interests, and reputation. Imperial (2005) also 
mentions that collaboration can take the form of a network, involving interdependence 
between multiple organizations in formal and informal stable relationships and leading to 
the development of shared norms and expectations.  
3.3.2 Actors as creative learners 
While the previously discussed literature on networks, public governance and inter-
organizational collaboration focuses more on relations and on institutional and 
organizational levels for the analysis of the formal and informal dynamics of public and 
private interactions, other authors focus on the role and skills of actors during these 
dynamic relations. A body of literature on networks and inter-organizational relationships 
highlights that active managers in public-private interactions can also influence the social 
arrangement and the way rules and constraints are enacted and developed in the process 
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of PPP formulation. It is emphasized that the public-private partnership formulation is 
increasingly complex because actors can influence the process through constant 
sensemaking, reflexivity and adjustment of expectations (Joyner, 2007; Koppenjan, 2005; 
Noble & Jones, 2006). As Joyner (2007) argues, one of the main challenges in PPP design is 
for competent leaders to manage a diversity of competing dynamics “by recognising 
ideological distortions, or assisting in reframing inhibiting factors, to ensure that balanced 
analysis  or  opportunities  takes  place”  (p. 211). Nevertheless, the literature that focuses on 
the importance of active actors with learning and influential capacity in the PPP process is 
still limited (Joyner, 2007). 
In their empirical study of ten Australian and UK PPPs, Noble and Jones (2006) 
stress the importance of managers in identifying obstacles and responding to them during 
interactions for the formulation of a PPP project, by challenging pre-conditioned mind-sets 
that reflect public or private cultural barriers. The study focuses on the changing 
managerial attention and perceptions during the process and on the types of challenges 
managers face prior to the implementation stage of PPP projects. Noble and Jones (2006) 
demonstrate that in each stage managers employ strategies to overcome challenges, 
ensuring the progressive evolution of the PPP, through leadership roles, identifying 
resources (actors with expertise, partners for the PPP) and adapting managerial mind-sets. 
The study by Noble and Jones demonstrate that actors are important for the construction 
of a path of interactions based on changing expectations and mind-sets for the process of 
PPP formulation. 
Moreover, the study conducted by Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy and Forbes (1996) 
shows that it is essential the construction of perceptions and expectations for the 
formation of alliances. Based on a set of in depth interviews with alliance partners in the 
United States and Europe, they conclude that conscious attempt at adjustment in 
expectations can influence the development of a common vision that represents a driving 
force  for  actors’ formal and informal  interactions.  
Kumar and Nti (1998) and Das and Kumar (2007) also highlight the role of changing 
perceptions through differential learning processes which influence interactions in 
partnerships. They say that partners have different abilities to appropriate new knowledge 
generated from their collaborative relationships, which the authors call ‘absorptive 
capacity’.   In   their   study,   absorptive   capacity   is   reflected,   for   example,   in   partners’  
collaborative strategies being influenced by other  partners’  expression  of  satisfaction  with  
 63 
 
the relationship. The authors acknowledge that the arrangement of interactions influences 
the absorptive capacity of actors; and this arrangement includes aspects such as 
competence and quality of human assets, organizational culture, availability of resources 
and management systems. For Kumar and Nti (1998),  “the way the partners interact with 
each  other  determines  alliance  outcomes  as  well  as  the  partners’  feelings  of  psychological  
attachment to the relationship” (p. 365). 
3.3.3 The role of social context 
According to the social relations perspective on PPPs, it is important to explore 
beyond the role of external rules and constraints for the formulation of PPP projects. This 
body of knowledge emphasizes that the interactions themselves must be understood in 
order to determine, manage and adjust the rules that stimulate or hinder the PPP 
formulation process. Authors mention that the structure of resources and network of 
actors can influence the process, and also stress that coordination and guidance can be 
constructed case by case to influence PPP project design. The role of social context in the 
formulation of PPPs has been associated with case by case specificities of time and space (C. 
Scott & Thurston, 2004). Reflecting on the contextual role of external forces over PPPs, 
Joyner (2007) argues   that   “unforeseen   change   [in] events result from the complex and 
shifting political, social and economic environment in which these projects are being 
implemented, and are often  not  within  the  control  of  the  alliance  parties”  (p.  214). 
Koppenjan (2005) also stresses that context influences the complexity of PPP 
formulation processes and must be considered in the analysis of obstacles and 
opportunities for the formulation of PPP projects. For him, it is important to understand 
each   case   because   “each   project   has   its   own   unique   composition   of   success   and   failure  
factors so that solutions which are successful in one project will not necessarily work in 
other   projects”   (Koppenjan, 2005, p. 153). From a similar perspective, Van Ham and 
Koppenjan (2001) also mention the importance and challenge of strategies that emerge 
from actor-relations in different contexts of PPP project formation: 
There is no blueprint at present for the procedural format of partnership and the 
question is whether this ought to be attempted. The situation is different for each 
project and also depends to a great extent on the creativity and the willingness of 
the parties. By definition this calls for a tailor-made approach (pp. 614-615). 
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In a similar way, Khan (2005) argues that understanding context is important to 
deal   with   the   changing   dynamics   of   project   nature,   actors’   roles   and   relations   during  
routine activities for project formulation (Khan, 2005). For him, flexible strategies for PPP 
design   are   essential   because   just   as   context   changes   from   project   to   project,   “the  
organizational design and the form of decision making, and the type of issues that will have 
to   be   dealt  with   during   the   planning   process”   also varies (Khan, 2005, p. 128). For Khan 
(2005), social relations influence the need for flexibility and adaptation in strategies to 
reflect adjustment in preferences for project elaboration in different contexts. He says that 
“during  the  planning  process,  goals and plans inevitably have to be changed due to factors 
such as new information, unexpected events, changes in preferences and the outcomes of 
negotiations  between  actors”  (Khan, 2005, p. 128). Moreover, as Khan (2005) defends, the 
complexity involved in the formulation of PPP projects is intensified because the 
“differences   between   projects   make   it   difficult   to   develop   universal   management  
guidelines  and  handbooks  that  will  be  relevant  for  all  projects”  (p.  128).    
3.3.4 Summary of section 
The PPP literature focusing on the dynamics of public-private relations highlights 
three main sets of influential aspects on the process of PPP formulation:  
x Formal and informal dynamics of actor-relations: patterns and arrangements of 
social relationships; variety of interdependent actors with difference strategies and 
different access and control over knowledge, skills and resources; cooperation and 
collaborative efforts based on commitment, joint working, flexible strategies, 
communication, relationships, mutual interests, reputation and trust; embedded 
public-private cultural domains and ways of thinking and doing things;  
x Actors   as   creative   learners:   the   influence   of   process   management   and   actors’  
conscious sensemaking, reasoning, reflexivity and adjustment of practices, opinions, 
perceptions and expectations in their interactions for PPP formulation;  
x Social context: the influence of time and space on actor-relations and 
arrangements for PPP formulation; contextual role of external forces; the need for 
flexibility and adaptation in strategies to reflect contextual adjustment in 
preferences.  
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3.4 Insights into the Brazilian context for pre-tendering PPP 
formulation under the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) 
mechanism  
The PPP literature has revealed the importance of the formal and informal 
dynamics between public and private actors and the influence of external environments for 
PPP formulation. From the review this research has obtained additional insights about the 
Brazilian context for exploring the pre-tendering dynamics of relations between public and 
private actors and the elements that influence their interactions for the formulation of PPP 
projects under the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the elements of the PPP Framework which 
have been used to guide the formulation of PPPs in Brazil do not clearly consider the 
complexity involved in these processes. Only some of the aspects suggested by the 
literature are considered in the Framework, which are the formal elements (legal and 
regulatory,   administrative/organizational   and   strategic   procedures   and   ‘ways   of   doing  
things’)  and  the  external  policy environment (financial, economic and commercial aspects). 
On the other hand, the PPP Framework has neglected two elements suggested by the PPP 
literature. First, it neglects the influence of complexity and informal public-private relations 
in the process, which characterize the pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation under the 
Procedure of Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism, as already discussed in Chapter 2. The 
Framework also neglects the role of political culture. Based on the insights from the 
literature,   the   ‘political   culture’   aspect   may   contribute   to   the   complexity   involved   in  
designing PPP projects in Brazil and must be considered in an in-depth exploration of actor-
relations in the pre-tendering process of PPP formulation.  
The literature on external forces suggests that political cultural aspects can 
influence the formulation of PPPs, such as pressure from interest groups, positive or 
negative public opinion, philosophical and ideological differences, as well as level of 
political stability, corruption, trustworthiness of public officials and credibility of 
government policies (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004; S. Harris, 2004; Kingdon, 
2002; World Bank, 2012b; Zhang, 2005a). Moreover, the literature on the dynamics of 
formal and informal relations suggests that differing ideologies and political views can 
create barriers to the process of PPP formulation (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Teisman & Klijn, 
2002).  
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In Brazil, there is a political culture that has long influenced traditional public-
private relations, which can also influence pre-tendering arrangements (Marques Neto, 
2013; M. P. Ribeiro, 2011a, 2012a; Veríssimo, Cucolo & Froufe, 2012; Zanini, 2007). Since 
PPPs and the PRI mechanism are new topics in Brazil, some experts understand that 
external influences are brought to the PRI pre-tendering process from more traditional 
ways of public-private interactions in the country. Despite the fact that public and private 
sectors have worked together for decades in the provision of services and infrastructure in 
Brazil, their social interactions are frequently guided by insecurity and scepticism, which is 
only reinforced as they continually interact (Nunes Pinto, 2004).  
Experts argue that traditionally there is a culture of distrust in their interactions (E. 
Odebrecht, 2009).  The  private  sector  distrusts  the  government’s  commitments  to  meet  its  
payment obligations on time, and the managerial and operational competence of public 
sector human resources (Nunes Pinto, 2004). On the other hand, the government is 
suspicious that the private sector will not honour its contractual obligations or deliver the 
object of contracts in due time (Nunes Pinto, 2004). These perceptions may hamper the 
dialogue between the two sectors and the potential opportunities for cooperation during 
pre-tendering arrangements of PPPs (Johannpeter & Unger, 2009). It is argued that these 
existing cultural and political barriers can strongly influence cooperation, information 
sharing and negotiations in the PRI process (Marques Neto, 2013; M. P. Ribeiro, 2011a, 
2012a; Veríssimo et al., 2012; Zanini, 2007). For Marques Neto (2013), PPPs still face 
resistance, especially in the areas of the public administration and control bodies. For him, 
this resistance is due to an unreasonable and anachronistic attachment to the traditional 
regime of public procurement, which leads people to proclaim in PPPs the same problems 
of the traditional tendering approach. According to Marques Neto (2013) this confusion has 
an unfavourable effect for the formulation of PPP projects because of a resistance 
eminently ideological and of traditional roots which is contrary to the delegation of public 
services to the private sector and which already occurs in the common concessions 
(Marques Neto, 2013, own translation).  
As it is understood, external influences from traditional perceptions of public-
private relations in Brazil may impose challenges to the PRI formulation of PPPs, requiring a 
long and complex process of negotiation between public and private actors during the pre-
tendering stage (Barros Neto, 2006; Marar, Aragão & Santos, 2004; Nunes Pinto, 2004; 
Percio, 2011). This scenario increases the complexity of the process and may require 
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adjustments in the formal and informal practices and perceptions during the PRI process 
due to its high dependency on interactions. Therefore, the external influence of the 
political culture must be accounted for in the analysis of PPP formulations in Brazil.  
3.5 Summary and conclusion 
The literature indicates several formal and informal aspects that influence the 
formulation of PPP projects. As Joyner (2007) argues, for a better understanding of the PPP 
formulation process, all of these aspects must be taken   into  consideration:  “If  we  accept  
the complexity of these  forms  we  may  need  to  think  analytically  about  a  ‘larger  chunk’  of  
the   phenomenon   by   considering   a   wider   range   of   explanatory   factors”   (p.   214).   These  
aspects have been grouped in two categories. One emphasizes the influence of external 
forces represented by legal and regulatory arrangement, organizational and administrative 
capacity, strategic approach, policy framework, involving financial, economic and 
commercial environments and also political culture. The other category highlights the 
internal complexity of the formal and informal dynamics of actor-relations in the process of 
PPP design, considering actors as creative learners and the influence of social context. To 
understand a PPP formulation process accounting for all of these elements, this research 
will adopt an institutional theoretical approach, which is explained in the next chapter. The 
theoretical perspective chosen provides tools for an in-depth exploration of the research 
topic. These analytical tools will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5, which sets out 
the conceptual framework of the research. This framework will be used to guide the 
analysis of the case study based on the research strategy and qualitative methods adopted, 
as presented in Chapter 6. The research findings will be presented in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, 
based on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that will be explained in the next 
chapters.  
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Chapter 4 - Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction  
This research adopts an institutionalist theoretical approach for exploring the pre-
tendering formulation process of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) projects in Brazil. The 
use of institutional theory for analysing the formal and informal dynamics of actor-relations 
in the formulation of PPPs is  an  innovative  approach.  There  is  a  ‘blind  spot’  in  the  literature  
on Public-Private Partnerships concerning the institutional analysis of dynamic processes. 
Although not directly related to PPPs, this topic has received some attention in the 
management literature (D'Aunno & Zuckerman, 1987; Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987; Phillips, 
Lawrence & Hardy, 2000; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). In the literature on institutional 
economics (and on new economic sociology) studies on processes and relations among 
organizations tend to adopt a general theoretical perspective mainly concerned with the 
relations between firms in the market (Granovetter, 1990; Stinchcombe, 1997). In the 
literature  on  planning  theory,  some  authors  acknowledge  the  existence  of  a  ‘black  box’  in  
the study on the dynamics of governance processes and practices because most focus 
instead on the outcomes of governance performance or on the input-output approach to 
policy analysis (González & Healey, 2005; Healey, 2006), but this has not been developed in 
the context of Public-Private Partnership studies.  
Moreover, the formal and informal interplay of actor-relations, which is the focus 
of this research, is not addressed with enough emphasis in the literature on PPPs. On one 
hand, the literature focuses on the formal contractual arrangements and legal frameworks 
that   guide   actors’   interactions   through different financial contracts and legal procedures 
for the delivery of public services (Akintoye et al., 2001; Pongsiri, 2002). On the other hand, 
some authors focus on the informal agreements and structures that drive and are 
constructed by the relations between actors, which is mainly addressed by the governance 
literature on networks (Keast, Mandell, Brown & Woolcock, 2004; Klijn & Teisman, 2000; 
Teisman & Klijn, 2002) and on inter-organizational collaboration (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; 
Mandell, 1999). Nevertheless, most studies of Public-Private Partnerships do not integrate 
formal   and   informal   actors’   interactions in their analysis to assess the simultaneous 
occurrence of formal and informal processes involved in the formulation of PPP projects.  
Two broader theoretical perspectives were considered for this research based on 
the insights from the literature on PPPs (external forces and dynamic relations). On the one 
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hand, theories mostly based on structural perspectives, such as urban regime and network-
structure, would help to understand the role of external forces, but were not adequate on 
their own for exploring the autonomy of actors in formal and informal dynamics of 
interactions. Nevertheless, as Lowndes (2001, p. 1963) and Davies (2003, p. 266) argue, 
some authors who have adopted structural theories have also attempted to provide a more 
‘inward-looking’   perspective   on   actors   (i.e. Lauria, 1999; J. Pierre, 1999; Rhodes, 1997). 
Even Rhodes (2007), who is an advocate of a network-structure perspective in governance, 
asserts that new directions for governance theory should focus on actors’   “beliefs, 
practices,   traditions   and  dilemmas”   (p. 1243) as   the  new  alternative   for   “conceptualizing  
the institutions, actors and processes   of   change   in   government”   (p.   1259).   However, 
structural approaches still tend to keep an analytical focus on external forces, which is not 
appropriate to unpack actor-relations in the formulation of PPP projects that also seem to 
be largely influenced by actors as creative learners in dynamic interactions. Although these 
theories were not selected for this research, it was acknowledged that any other 
theoretical approach would have to take into account the role of external forces, especially 
based on insights from the PPP literature and considering the structural tendencies of 
organizing the formulation of projects in Brazil.   
Alternatively, the other theoretical perspectives considered mostly emphasize the 
role of actors and their relations. In view of other aspects highlighted as influential in 
processes of PPP formulation (in Chapters 2 and 3), such as complexity, interdependency of 
numerous stakeholders and formal/informal relations, two approaches were considered 
relevant   for   exploring   this   research’s   topic:   complexity   theory   and   institutional   theory.  
Complexity theory may be useful for exploring some aspects identified in the PPP literature, 
such as the interactions and relations between actors. On the other hand, the unit of 
analysis of complexity theory is the system, comprised of numerous interacting parts 
behaving in accordance to rules, laws or forces (Klijn, 2008). The system has emergent 
properties that influence network-relations, which actors can only manage, but not 
intentionally control (Anderson, 1999; Wagenaar, 2007). For example, in a study on 
complexity theory from a network perspective, Klijn (2007) asserts that  in  the  system  “[t]he 
possibilities for institutional design, and consciously influencing and changing institutional 
characteristics of networks (…) is   hardily   possible”   (p.   272).   Moreover, for complexity 
theory, external forces are assumed to affect the system in unexpected and contingent 
ways, but actors respond to these forces in accordance with systemic emergent properties 
(Klijn, 2008). 
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Consequently, the assumptions of complexity theory limit the extent to which 
constructed preferences and expectations can deliberately influence the design of formal 
and informal systemic rules and responses to the contingent effect of external forces in the 
pre-tendering process. Complexity theory studies that attempt to introduce a more active 
role for the deliberate influence of actors on the network or system have used the rational 
choice approach of new institutional theory in order to complement the limitations of that 
theory (Blom-Hansen, 1997; Koppenjan & Groenewegen, 2005). However, as it will 
discussed later in this chapter, rational choice assumptions defend that actors have fixed 
preferences, which is also not in line with the idea of actors adjusting decisions and 
preferences (an insight obtained from the PPP literature review). Institutional theory, on 
the other hand, provides tools for exploring the role of actors as creative learners and 
capable of influencing the context of their relations, as well as tools for considering the 
influence  of  external  forces  and  actors’  reflexive  ways  of  adjusting  to  them.  Nevertheless, 
using institutional theory to account for all of these elements requires a combination of 
assumptions from different strands of institutionalism, because old and new approaches 
alone provide insufficient tools.  
This chapter will review both old and new institutional theories, since assumptions 
from   both   will   be   incorporated   into   this   research’s   theoretical   framework.   It   will   first  
address the rational choice strand of new institutionalism and discuss its limitations for this 
research. Second, it will introduce the sociological-organizational perspective, consider its 
strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of this research and explain how the strengths 
will be incorporated into the theoretical framework. In the last section, old institutionalism 
will be introduced as the main theoretical foundation adopted. It will consider its strong 
points and explain how its limitations will be addressed, especially its weakness in 
addressing the role of external forces. The theoretical framework discussed in this chapter 
will provide the general concepts that will be operationalized in more detail in the next 
chapter, which explains the conceptual framework of this research.  
4.2 Institutional theory  
Institutional analysis of Public-Private Partnerships focuses on the complexity of the 
multiple internal and external dynamics involved in the relations between actors (Healey, 
2007). As Eisner (2011) asserts, for institutional analysis, the public and private sector are 
not opposing forces, but institutionally intertwined (p. 14). The workings of the private 
sector are influenced by a wide range of institutions, both formal and informal, and not 
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simply governed by profit-making mechanisms and laws of supply and demand (Chang, 
2002). For Eisner (2011), public sector operations are also influenced by institutions, in 
which rules, roles and procedures define the inner workings of organizations, influencing 
public policy decisions and shaping the relation between public and private actors (p. 14). 
Besides helping in understanding the influence of institutions on public and private sectors, 
institutional theory provides tools for exploring a gap in the empirical analysis of PPPs, 
which has neglected the influence of the dynamics of public-private actor-interactions on 
institutions. This dual approach is in line with old institutionalism.  
Institutionalism is in fact interdisciplinary and disagreements can be found in the 
literature (DiMaggio, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Healey, 2007; Samuels, 1995). New 
institutionalism is often criticized for giving primacy to either institutions through norm-
governing behaviour (sociological-organizational perspective) or to individual actors’  
strategic action (rational choice approach) (Lowndes, 1996). However, a general agreement 
in the institutionalist literature is the understanding of institutions as a constraint and 
enabler on the behaviour of actors, but also as a product of human action, even if more 
emphasis is placed on either side of this dialect relationship in different perspectives 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Lowndes, 1996). Different approaches to institutionalism will be 
reviewed next, in order to specify that this research will adopt a perspective that is in line 
with old institutionalism, but still obtains complementary insights from the sociological-
organizational approach of new institutionalism.  
4.2.1 New Institutional theory  
The new institutionalist approaches reviewed in this research include the rational 
choice institutionalism and the sociological-organizational institutionalism. Both recognize 
the role of institutions as formal and informal rules and constraints on actors and relations. 
The rational choice institutionalism perceives institutions as stable in time and space, and 
focus on the role of rational maximizing actors who make strategic choices within the 
boundaries of institutions. On the other hand, the sociological-organizational approach 
perceives institutions are less fixed in time and space, but still relatively stable, and focus 
on the norm-governed behaviour of actors, which is determined by their cultural-cognitive 
institutional frames. However, new institutionalism approaches fall short in explaining the 
shaping of actors preferences through relations and the possible dynamic influence of 
actors and their interactions on rules that guide actors’ behaviour. The two perspectives 
are discussed next. 
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Rational choice institutionalism   
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that the formal and informal rules 
(institutions) influence actors   in   a   predictable  way,   based  on   actors’   expected   behaviour  
and according to their fixed preferences, expectations and interests. This approach is 
mostly based on the institutional work of Douglas North (1989) and Oliver E. Williamson 
(1985, 1998). North (1989) sees formal and informal institutions as incentive structures 
that influence individuals’  utility  maximizing  behaviour. Williamson (1998) focuses on the 
study of the institutional environment in which institutions are efficient organizational 
frameworks, which are represented as markets, hybrids or hierarchic forms (Lowndes & 
Skelcher, 1998; Williamson, 1998). Rational choice institutionalism sees individual as having 
bounded rationality (limited information) and given preferences, as well as strategically 
using a calculus approach to maximize their benefits and seeking to reduce uncertainties 
about transaction costs (Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
According to rational choice institutionalists, actor-relations are the sum of 
predictable individual actions, and these actions are seen as minimally affected by social 
context. They   adopt   a   methodological   individualist   approach   in   which   the   individual’s  
strategic choices are the main unit of analysis (Hodgson, 1998, 2000; W. Scott, 2004). 
Actors are assumed to have fixed preferences and make decisions by comparing costs and 
benefits of alternative options either to create institutions considered efficient or to make 
decisions when bounded by them. Based on this perspective, actors apply the logics of 
efficiency or consequentiality and compare expected costs and benefits of choices in order 
to choose strategies that provide optimal consequences given their interests (Alexander, 
2005). All of these assumptions are not testable hypothesis, and a research based on 
rational choice institutionalism should take them as the starting point of the analysis (Cole 
et al., 1991; Wendt, 2001).  
Nevertheless, the assumptions of the rational approach limit the extent to which 
the categories suggested by the PPP literature can be explored. Its assumptions are in 
contradiction with the suggestion in which actors’   changing   preferences   for   the  
construction of rules and constraints may also affect them in the process of PPP 
formulation. Moreover, if rational approach assumptions were taken into consideration 
from the start of this research, the behaviour of actor and their interactions in the process 
would become predictable; leaving not much else about actor-relations to be explored. The 
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focus   would   be   on   the   outcomes   of   those   relations   and   not   on   the   process   of   actors’  
interactions.  
Rational choice institutionalism provides useful insights into concepts of formal and 
informal rules as institutions, which are important for this research. For North (1989), 
institutions   can   be   defined   as   “rules,   enforcement   characteristics   of   rules,   and   norms   of  
behaviour that   structure   repeated   human   interaction”   (p.   1321).   Formal   rules   are  
constitutions, statute and common laws, and contracts (North, 1989), but also contracts, 
administrative hierarchies, legislative and decision-making procedures, budged 
mechanisms and bureau types (Williamson, 1998). Informal rules are institutions of 
governance and represented by norms, codes of conduct, taboos, standards of behaviour, 
experience or ideologies (religions, social and political values, etc.) (North, 1989, p. 1322). 
On the other hand, a rational choice approach for understanding actor-relations based on 
"undersocialized”   explanations   of   atomized-actors (Granovetter, 1985, p. 483) does not 
seem applicable for this research because it limits the exploration scope of dynamic 
processes in the analysis of PPP formulation.  
Sociological-organizational institutionalism 
Sociological-organizational institutionalism assumes a more autonomous role for 
formal and informal rules (institutions), in which the individual is not the unit of analysis, 
but the institutions that govern the behaviour of actors in their social relations (Lowndes, 
1996; Sanderson, 2000). It tends to adopt an "oversocialized" perspective in which formal 
and informal social structures constrain actor-relations (Granovetter, 1985, p. 483). 
Supporters of this approach advocate that formal and informal rules embedded in social 
structures work as symbols and myths that constrain behaviour in relational networks. The 
myths are either applied because of internalized or embedded prescriptions that specify 
them as the appropriate means to pursue a purpose, or because they have been 
institutionalized and are taken for granted as legitimate, but not necessarily because of 
efficiency evaluations as in the rational choice approach.   
The sociological-organizational approach to institutions is useful for understanding 
the category obtained from the PPP literature that suggests a role for the influence of the 
formal and informal rules and environmental constraints on actors and their interactions. 
However, similar to the limitations of rational choice institutionalism, this approach 
provides limited analytical   tools   for   exploring   the   dynamic   influence   of   actors’   changing  
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preferences and their interactions for the conscious construction of rules and constraints 
that affect them in the process of PPP design. As Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) argue, new 
institutionalists from the sociological and organizational strand have not effectively linked 
change and creation of institutions to the activities of individuals and organizations. 
Moreover, advocates of this perspective recognize this limitation; as DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991) assert,  “neoinstitutionalists  tend  to  reject  socialization  theory”  (p.  15).   
From a sociological perspective, Campbell (1998) distinguishes the rational choice 
approach to institutionalism from historical institutionalism, advanced by some political 
sociologists and political scientists, and from organizational institutionalism, supported by 
organizational sociologists. In historical institutionalism, according to political scientists Hall 
and Taylor (1996) and to sociologist Campbell (1998), formal and informal institutions 
provide  ‘scripts’  and  ‘road  maps’  for  interpretation  and  for  political  and  social  action,  which  
are institutionally determined and constrained by frames of ideas, symbols, and routines 
that influence a course of action. According to historical institutionalists, institutions are 
also considered the consequences of interactions among political actors that have lasting 
effects across time (Thelen, 1999, p. 388). Organizational institutionalism, often associated 
with DiMaggio and Powell (1991), also stresses the importance of routines and habits in 
actors’   underlying   cognitive   framework,  which   are   ‘taken   for   granted’   scripts   and   almost  
invisible to the actors themselves. Nevertheless, some organizational institutionalists argue 
that actors can deliberately manipulate culturally-cognitive given concepts to tackle 
problems (J. Campbell, 1998). 
Another type of institutionalism discussed by political scientists Hall and Taylor 
(1996) is the sociological institutionalist approach, similar to new institutionalist sociology 
or social constructivist neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio, 1998; Nielsen, 2001). Based on this 
perspective, culturally constructed conceptions or cognitive scripts guide human action 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996). Advocates of this approach also argue that besides affecting the 
strategic calculation of social actors, institutions help to constitute their identities and 
preferences. For Hall and Taylor (1996), although in some instances supporters of this 
strand say that institutional practices arise from more interactive processes, in which actors 
share with each other ways of interpreting and solving problems, these supporters still 
believe that individuals are rational and goal-oriented, but in a sense that the rational 
action is socially constituted and bounded up with interpretation, in which behaviour is 
influenced  by   individuals’  worldview (Hall & Taylor, 1996). They also tend to focus at the 
macro level of processes, leaning towards a methodological collectivism often 
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characterized   by   ‘action  without   agents’,   and   also   to   emphasize   the   constraining   role   of  
institutions   (‘taken   for   granted’   scripts)   over   the   bounded   rationality   of   actors   (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996).  
a. Actors as rule-followers 
In general, for sociological-organizational institutionalists, institutions are symbolic 
templates, taken for granted beliefs and culture which are incorporated through cognition 
by actors from their field or sector and based on which they responds to stimulus. 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), standardized cultural forms, typifications and 
cognitive models lead new institutionalists to adopt level of industries, sectors, professions, 
nation-states and societies as the environment that affect actors. Their basic unit of 
analysis are the embedded rules and practices, identities and roles, normative and causal 
beliefs, and resources, drawn from their macro-field, sector or society (Olsen, 2007). 
Although this approach recognizes that institutions are created by human action, it 
does not focus on the active role of actors in consciously creating institutions through their 
interactions. In fact, the core assumption is that institutions represent an enduring 
collection of rules and practices embedded in “structures of meaning and resources” which 
create order and predictability, have durable and independent effects towards individual 
actors and environments, and are “relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals 
and changing external circumstances”  (Olsen, 2007, p.2).  
According  to  the  ‘logic  of  appropriateness’  advocated  by  March  and  Olsen  (2006), 
actors associate certain actions with situations by rules of appropriateness and act in 
accordance to embedded practices of collectivity and mutual understandings of what is 
true, reasonable, natural, right, and good for a specific situation (Olsen, 2007). For this, 
actors try to meet the obligations and duties of a role, an identity, and a membership in a 
political community by following the rules considered adequate for the task at hand (March 
& Olsen, 2006). For March and Olsen (2006), rules of appropriateness are relatively stable 
and difficult to change. They argue that in scenario of ambiguity and conflict among 
alternative concepts or prescriptions on ways of thinking and doing, what most likely varies 
is the way embedded rules are translated into behaviour, and not the rules themselves.  
b. The role of rules as constraints: adjustment and reproduction 
As explained by March and Olsen (2006), this approach considers that changes in 
embedded practices and discourses (adjustment in rules) occurs when an existing order, 
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the rules of appropriateness and collective understandings no longer make sense and are 
challenged by new experiences, which become difficult to account for in terms of existing 
‘ways  of   thinking  and  doing   things’. When embedded practices and discourses no longer 
provide adequate answers to what is appropriate behaviour, the search begins for new 
approaches   to   provide   legitimate   answers   coherent   and   standard   responses   in   actors’  
understandings (March & Olsen, 2006). This learning process of new cognitive frames may 
be triggered by “disasters, crises and system breakdowns”, characterized by changes where 
established orders are questioned and no longer considered legitimate for failing to give 
appropriate answers (March & Olsen, 2006, p.700). 
The new institutionalist approach of DiMaggio and Powell (1991) adopts a similar 
perspective to  March  and  Olsen’s   (2006) on the prescriptive and rigid character of rules. 
For them, institutions are created through the process of isomorphism or homogenization, 
in which an organization either mimics another that faces a similar set of environmental 
conditions in scenario of uncertainty and ambiguity, or is constrained by formal or informal 
coercive pressures exerted by other organizations or cultural expectations for the adoption 
of certain types of standard responses. In mimetic isomorphism, the copied institutional 
environment gives legitimacy on what is best for   the  organization’s   survival   (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991). An organizational follows the myths of the environment and borrows the 
source of practices from others in order to define the conditions and methods of their own 
work. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) explain that this happens when goals are ambiguous, 
when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, or when an organizational faces 
unclear solutions. Institutional myths are considered so strong that they lead to 
isomorphism among different organizations, where similar structures and homogenization 
drives change, leading to institutional reproduction (Lowndes, 1996). According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991), institutional isomorphism happens even in the absence of 
evidence that it increases efficiency, because organizations model themselves after similar 
ones in their field which they perceive as more legitimate, reputable and successful. For 
example, they may   copy   “administrative categories that define eligibility for public and 
private grants and contracts”  in  order  to  facilitate  transactions  between  organizations  with  
‘similar-minded’  ways  of  acting  (p. 73).  
As for coercive isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that pressures 
from government mandate, political influence, common law and regulatory requirements, 
as well as the imposition of standard operating procedures and legitimated rules, lead to 
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homogenized structures, methods and procedures around rituals of conformity to wider 
institutions. For DiMaggio and Powell (1991), the existence of a common legal environment, 
for  example,  affects  many  aspects  of  an  organization’s  behaviour  and  structure   in   similar  
ways. They mention the system of contract law – such as the one used in Brazil - which 
requires certain organizational controls to honour legal and technical commitments and 
requirements of the state, such as variations of the budget cycle, fiscal and annual reports, 
and financial reporting requirements that ensure eligibility for the receipt of federal 
contracts  or  funds.  Both  mimetic  and  coercive  isomorphism  assume  that  “compliance  with  
taken for granted beliefs about how to best organize, and towards what ends, become 
more important than the actual efficacy of dominant structures and  practices”   (Lowndes, 
1996, p.185). 
The work of March and Olsen (2006) on the logic of appropriateness and DiMaggio 
and  Powell’s   (1991) institutional isomorphism emphasize the rule following behaviour of 
actors, as well as the rigidity of the rules that influence actors. This sociological-
organization  perspective   is  often  associated  with  Bourdieu’s  concept  of   ‘habitus’   in  which  
people are not necessarily considered conscious with respect to the influences on their 
behaviour (Burke, Joseph, Pasick & Barker, 2009; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). However, 
Bourdieu (1990) goes a step further than this   ‘taken   for   granted’   new   institutionalist  
approach and shows a concern with conscious agency in transforming the application of 
‘habitus’  in  practice.  As  Bourdieu  (1990) argues: 
“It is, of course, never ruled out that the responses of the habitus may be 
accompanied by a strategic calculation tending to perform in a conscious mode the 
operation that the habitus performs quite differently, namely an estimation of 
chances  presupposing  transformation  of  the  past  effect  into  an  expected  objective”  
(p. 53).  
The theoretical approach adopted for this research is in accordance with this 
perspective,  in  which  ‘habitus’  may  influence  actors  but  may  also  be  deliberately  changed  
by them in their interactions in practice. 
c. The sociological-organizational approach in this research 
Some assumptions from the sociological-organizational perspective will be 
incorporated into this research framework, but considering actors not only as rule-
followers. It will also account for actors as creative learners, capable of reflecting upon and 
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changing embedded rules and practices in specific events of interaction. As Hodgson (1998) 
stresses, when  “a  conception  of  the  individual  agent  is  involved,  it  is  one  which  emphasizes  
both   the  prevalence  of  habit  and   the  possibility  of   capricious  novelty”   (p.  173).   It  will  be  
assumed in this research that institutional myths can be incorporated into actor-relations 
through embedded beliefs and culture leading to the replication of institutional practices 
and structures. This research also agrees that actors may follow rules of appropriateness, 
by enacting the internalized practices that they consider most appropriate for the 
circumstances. However, different from DiMaggio and Powell and March and Olsen, it does 
not   assume   that   actors   take   these   rules   mostly   as   ‘facts’   and   apply   them   in   a   rather  
automatic way without any reflection. Although new sociological-organizational 
institutionalists accept that institutions are the products of  human action, their rejection of 
intentionality  stresses  the  “unreflective,  routine,  taken-for-granted nature of most human 
behaviour and views interests and actors as themselves   constituted   by   institutions”  
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 12). This research, on the other hand,  does  not  assume  actors’  
preferences to be simply shaped by taken for granted cultural-cognition or prescribed rules 
of appropriate behaviour. It assumes, instead, that actors have the capacity to learn, adjust 
and improvise, as well as choose to follow or not existing practices and routines in their 
social interactions.  
Furthermore, this research does not adopt the sociological-organizational focus on 
the influence of the macro-level of sector, field or society on the institutional frames 
internalized by actors and which drive their interactions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; March 
& Olsen, 2006; Olsen, 2007). Instead, it adopts a micro-level perspective, in which it is 
through  actors’  interactions  that  it  explores  institutions  that  are  socially  constructed  either  
through the enactment of embedded practices, opinions and assumptions from macro-
level or through improvisation from micro-level social relations. Therefore, unlike the new 
institutionalist approach, this research also presumes the possibility of dynamic 
institutional  change  arising   from  actors’  autonomy   in   their   interactions;  but   it  also  allows  
scope for institutional reproduction of scripts through the consciousness of actors in social 
relations. This is important in order to account for the suggestion from the PPP literature in 
which  there  may  also  be  an  important  role  for  actors’  changing  preferences, expectations 
and opinions during the process, as well as for the conscious influence of actors on the 
construction and selection of formal and informal institutions that in turn influence their 
interactions during the formulation of PPP projects. A more dynamic institutional 
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theoretical approach is discussed next, which is the old institutional theory and its social 
constructivist perspective of the world.  
4.2.2 Old Institutional theory 
The theoretical approach of this research is based on the social construction of 
institutions  and  on   the   influence  of   social   relations  on  actors’   preferences  and  decisions;  
not on the behaviour of rational, self-interested atomized actors (rational choice approach), 
and not on the structural influence of taken-for-granted cultural   rules   that   limit   actors’  
capacity to make conscious choices and adjust preferences (sociological-organizational 
approach). Old institutionalism does not consider the methodological individualism of 
rational choice perspectives, in which institutions are related to the actions of given and 
self-interested individuals. It is also not limited to a methodological collectivism of some 
strands of sociological institutionalism, in which the behaviour of an individual is entirely 
explained or shaped by institutional   circumstances,   leading   to   a   ‘top-down’   structural   or  
cultural determinism (Hodgson, 1998, 2000; W. Scott, 2004). Old institutionalism is 
interested in the dynamic process of construction of institutions (Granovetter, 1992), 
without neglecting individual autonomy and agency, but accounting for both upward 
effects (influence of actors on institutions) and downward effects (influence of institutions 
on actors) (Hodgson, 2000). As Gonzalez and Healey (2005) mention, institutional analysis 
focuses on interactions, not as a one-way relation, but as in interactive processes that are 
“both  shaped  by  their   institutional   inheritance  and  help  shape   it,   in  mutually  constitutive  
and   generative   processes”   (p. 2058). According to Healey (1999), the forces structuring 
actor-relations  are  both  formed  and  changed  by  “processes  of  acting,  seeing  and  knowing”  
(p.113). 
Old institutional theory provides the main theoretical   basis   for   this   research’s  
conceptual framework, although some insights on the role of embedded rules were 
adopted from the assumptions of sociological-organizational perspective in new 
institutionalism. It is a useful theory for exploring the possibility that in the PPP formulation 
process solutions and opportunities may be in actors’  capacity  to  adjust  and  change  their  
own interactions in the process, which has limited relevance in the other theoretical 
approaches reviewed in this chapter. Old institutional theory focuses more explicitly on the 
dialectic and dynamic influence of formal  and  informal  actors’   interactions  on   institutions  
and vice-versa.   
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The approach adopted is in line with social constructivist new institutionalism 
(Coaffee & Healey, 2003; González & Healey, 2005; Healey, 2007) that relates to the 
perspectives of new economic sociology (Granovetter, 1985, 1992), old institutional 
sociology (Selznick, 1996; Stinchcombe, 1997), as well as to the structuration theory of 
Giddens (1984). In the field of planning,   even   though   Healey’s   (1999, 2006, 2007) 
perspective is sometimes characterized as sociological new institutionalist, she clearly 
expresses old institutionalist tendencies, especially when she acknowledges her social-
constructivist   position,   and   argues,   from   a   planning   perspective,   that   “the   systemic 
relations  within  an  urban  region  cannot  thus  be  taken  for  granted”  and  that  “systems  are  
not given, but are made, in a complex interaction between the imaginary and the material 
world”  and  constituted  in  social  relations  embedded  in  particular  social contexts (p. 113). 
a. The interaction between actor-relations and institutions 
The emphasis of old institutionalism on social dynamics indicates its orientation 
toward the analysis of social institutions, which are manmade and changeable (Samuels, 
1995). Under this approach, institutions cannot be merely considered a boundary in which 
rational actors make optimal and individualist decisions based on their intrinsic tastes, 
independent from the rules and resources that are present in the social networks 
surrounding them (Granovetter, 1992; Hodgson, 2006). The unit of analysis of old 
institutional theory is the network of individuals embedded in a social context, in which 
social, cultural and political factors can shape actors´ preferences and behaviour, but can 
also be influenced by social actors (Cole, Cameron & Edwards, 1991; Dugger, 1979; 
Granovetter, 1992; Hodgson, 2006). This perspective is not possible under the 
methodological individualism of rational choice approach or under the “oversocialized” 
perspective of the sociological-organizational strand (Granovetter, 1985, p. 483; 1992).  
Old institutionalists do not accept the assumption of institutions as autonomous, 
emerging automatically in response to needs and operating independently of human action 
and control, which is the determinism argument of the sociological-organizational 
perspective (Granovetter, 1992; Samuels, 1995). On the contrary, they emphasize that 
institutions are socially constructed and not inevitable, and that human action should 
always be situated in their social context and not analyzed simply based on the intentions 
of actors (Granovetter, 1990). In line with old institutionalism and from an organizational 
perspective, Scott (2004) argues that a discussion about institutions should not focus solely 
on their institutional effects on individuals, but on the processes that reflect the 
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interactions between actors in the social construction of institutions, which, in turn, 
influence   the   behaviour   of   actors.   He   argues   that   as   actors’   behaviour and motives are 
constructed, actors also have the potential for reconstructing the rules, norms and beliefs 
that guide their actions (W. Scott, 2004, p. 15). 
The influence of institutions on individual action is often referred in the rational 
choice literature on institutional theory as regulative or bounding, in which institutions 
constrain or regularize self-interested behaviour; or cultural-cognitive, in which compliance 
with external cultural frameworks that shape behaviour are followed because they are 
‘taken  for  granted’  as  the  way  to  do  things  (Dequech, 2002; W. Scott, 2004). On the other 
hand, some authors criticize the cultural-cognition role, by saying that under this 
perspective actors cannot develop different way of acting because of institutionalized 
constraints on thinking (Lizardo,   2010,   p.   3)   and   “adhere   slavishly   to   a   script  written   for  
them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen   to   occupy”  
(Granovetter 1985, p. 487), overlooking the fact that institutions are also social 
constructions. According  to  new  sociological  institutionalism,  once  individuals’  social  class,  
sector or society is identified, their behaviour is automatic presumed because they are 
considered “oversocialized”   (Granovetter, 1985, p. 483), making the study of on-going 
social relations irrelevant.  
Consequently, in contrast to the regulative/bounding and cultural-cognitive 
perspectives, the approach adopted for this research is that of the normative role of 
institutions, in which the formal and informal normative systems that constrain social 
behaviour also empower and enable social action (W. Scott, 2004). From this perspective, 
humans  are  seen  as  “creative  learners,  actively  adjusting  and  adapting  to  new  situations”,  
being able to make choices within their structured and social embeddedness, and, in turn, 
maintaining, modifying or transforming the structural forces that shape their lives (Healey, 
1999, p. 114). Based on the normative perspective mainly adopted by old institutionalists, 
“institutions  exhibit  an  inherent  duality:  they  both  arise  from  and  constrain  social  action”,  
which is different from the regulative or cultural-cognitive  roles  that  focus  on  “institution’s  
capacity  to  constrain”  (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 95).  
In accordance with old institutionalism, for institutions to become visible, it is 
necessary the dynamic process of institution design or building, not as in a process that 
operate in its own, but in a dynamic and social process of interaction in which people build 
and run institutions (Stinchcombe, 1997). As Granovetter (1992) and Barley and Tolbert 
(1997) argue, institutions are socially constructed and maintained by the on-going 
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networks of inter-personal relations. For Broom and Selznick (1973), the process of 
institution building can be defined as "the emergence of orderly, stable, socially integrating 
patterns,  out  of  unstable,  loosely  organized,  or  narrowly  technical  activities”  (p.  232). Ring 
and Van de Ven (1994) argue that institutions are a result of the interactions among 
organizations that unfold to shape and modify the terms of those relations over time. For 
Alexander (2005, 2006), institutional design is the production and reproduction of 
institutions as a result of collective interactive processes in a reflexive-dialogic way, aimed 
at   the  agents’  own   institutional  context   through  processes  of   ‘microconstitutional  choice’  
as  well  as  ‘innovative  intentionality’. 
a. The role of external forces: addressing limitations of old institutional theory 
In addition to the observations previously discussed, according to some advocates 
of old institutional theory, the focus of an institutional analysis should not only be placed 
on the influence of actor-relations on institutions and vice-versa, but also on how external 
forces impact   the   formal  and   informal  dynamics  of  actors’   interactions   in   the  production  
and reproduction of the structures and institutions.   Selznick’s   (1996) argues that the 
emergence of institutions is traced from processes and strategies of interaction and 
adaptation, but also as responses to internal and external environments (p. 271). As 
Hodgson (1998) argues, institutions are formed though the interaction of individuals, 
whose purposes or preferences are also shaped by socio-economic conditions. For Healey 
(2007) and González and Healey (2005), the emphasis of institutional analyses in urban 
planning should be placed on the contextual interplay between exogenous and 
endogenous forces, in which the former refer to contingent external   forces  “arising   from  
economic dynamics, political changes   or   environmental   pressures”   (Healey, 2007, p.67), 
while the latter represent the active role of agency as creative transformers in changing 
institutions through social interactions, innovations, tensions, contradictions and struggles. 
From a social constructivist perspective, the influence of external forces on the internal 
formal and informal dynamics of relations is context specific. As Healey (2007) argues, the 
outcomes   of   the   flow   of   complex   events   “are   the   situated   product of inherently 
unpredictable  encounters  between  many  powerful  driving  forces  and  specific  contingencies”  
(p. 127). 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of external forces in an old institutionalist theoretical 
framework is an often disregarded approach. Lowndes (2001), González and Healey (2005), 
Healey (2007) and Pierre (1999) acknowledge that institutional approaches seldom 
 83 
 
combine formal and informal dynamics with the influence of external forces. As González 
and Healey (2005) assert, social constructivist (old) institutional theory lacks an explicit 
connection to wider driving forces which give exogenous momentum to endogenous 
dynamics. For Pierre (1999) and Lowndes (2001), an institutional approach must also 
account for the role of the political economy as wider forces. Pierre (1999) argues that 
“although institutional theory has become a leitmotiv in much of mainstream political 
science,  the   institutional  dimension  of  urban  politics  remains  unclear  and  ambiguous”   (p.  
373). For Huxley and Yiftachel (2000),   approaches   that   focus  on   the   ‘micro-processes’  of  
daily routines (which is the case of old institutional theory) can lead to detailed studies of 
practices  and  discourses  “at  the  expense  of  wider  social  and  economic  contexts” (p. 333), 
especially failing to account for the contingent production of space (Yiftachel & Huxley, 
2000, p. 910). They mention that understanding practices is important but these studies 
tend   to  “gloss  over”  contextual  explorations  of  “material   interests,  of  discourses  and   the 
constraints of the taken-for-grantedness  of   the  world”   (Huxley & Yiftachel, , p. 337). As a 
suggestion for improvement, Huxley and Yiftachel (2000) mention that a research must 
account for the context in which these practices take place, in terms of the local influence 
of wider structuring forces, as well as demonstrate the effects of such practices especially 
with  respect  to  the  objects  under  study  (i.e.  “spatial  processes,  land  development,  the  built  
environment”)  (p.  337).   
Many authors also support this combination between external forces and internal 
dynamics to deal with the limitations of an institutional approach. As González and Healey 
(2005) and Healey (2007) argue, it is important to include in a framework based on 
institutional theory, which usually focus on processes and interactive dynamics, an element 
that covers the influence of a wider social context. Similarly, for Pierre (1999), a 
combination between the two perspectives is essential. He argues that theories of urban 
governance that focus on the urban political economy (or external forces as the term 
adopted in this research) can actually be complemented by institutional theoretical 
contributions:  
[O]ne cannot understand urban governance unless these value dimensions are 
brought into the analysis. It is here that institutional theory   (…)   offers some 
analytical assistance. Although theories of governance conceptualize processes of 
public-private resource mobilization, institutional theory is thus a vehicle for 
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understanding the values and objectives that give these processes direction, 
objective, and meaning (p. 373).  
In old institutional theory, however, the influence of external forces is not a 
working   stimulus   that   simply   structures   and   dictates   actors’   interactions   in   a   system.  
According to González and Healey (2005), the interplay between exogenous forces and 
endogenous systemic forces is complex and lead to diverse changes which are contingent 
in time  and  space.  They  argue   that   this  approach   locates  “policy  actions  and  practices   in  
geographically specific  governance  contexts”  and  connects  “the  phenomenology  of  micro-
practices to wider structuring forces”  (González & Healey, 2005, p. 2057).  
This research, therefore, has made the attempt to account in the theoretical 
approach and conceptual framework (which will be presented in Chapter 5, next) for the 
limitations of using old institutional theory to explore actor-relations in the pre-tendering 
process of PPP formulation. The possible influence of external forces and of embedded (or 
taken-for-granted)   assumptions   brought   also   as   external   forces   into   contingent   actors’  
interactions will be explored in addition to internal dynamics of relations, which is the focus 
of old institutional theory.  In  response  to  criticisms  that  theories  of  ‘fine-grained’  processes  
fail  to  consider  “what  is  to  be  done  about  cities”,  the  focus  placed  on  actors’  capacity  and  
‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  in  the  analysis  of  the  case  study  will  also  be  connected  to  the  
contingent  external  “causes, constraints, and substantive  outcomes” (Fainstein, 2000, pp. 
455-456) of decision-making with respect to the infrastructure PPP project under study (a 
city centre urban mobility project to be explained in Chapter 6). Furthermore, as it will 
become clearer in the Analysis Chapters (6, 7 and 8), to account for the spatial processes 
that may influence the built environment, an analysis of the specific technical aspects of 
the formulation of an infrastructure PPP project will be related to the contingent 
interactions and actor-relational dynamics. 
4.3 Conclusion  
This research is interested in actor-relations in the process of PPP formulation. For 
this, it adopts insights from new institutional theory on the embeddedness of practices, 
opinions and expectations. Because only insights from the sociological-organizational 
strand   are   included   in   this   research’s   theoretical   and   conceptual   frameworks,   hereafter  
new institutionalism will refer only to the sociological-organizational perspective. Although 
considering some new institutionalist insights, the conceptual framework presented in the 
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next chapter will mainly adopt a social constructivist perspective of old institutional theory, 
in which processes of reinforcement or overcoming of embedded assumptions and biases 
are possible through actor-relations in contingent ways. This research also adopts a social 
constructivist concept of institutions in which they represent contextually produced and 
reproduced practices, opinions and expectations of actors which influence them in their 
formal and informal social interactions. It also includes the possibility that external forces 
can influence the process of PPP formulation, but in contingent ways.   
The selection of old institutionalism as the main theory of this research resulted 
from a review of broad theoretical approaches. Theories were considered based on their 
overall tools for exploring the insights obtained from the review of the literature on Public-
Private Partnerships (external forces and dynamics of actor-relations). Based on the general 
pros and cons of a structural approach and of a perspective focusing on actor-relations, old 
institutional theory was selected as adequate for an in-depth exploration of actor-relations, 
but as long as its limitations are addressed. This was attempted in the last section by 
accounting for the role of external forces and also earlier in this chapter, when assumptions 
of   new   institutionalism   on   the   embeddedness   of   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’   were  
introduced as part of the theoretical framework.  
Both new and old approaches to institutional theory were considered. However, in 
new institutionalism, the rational choice approach introduces assumptions that are not in 
line with this research, such as focus on outcomes and not processes, and actors with fixed 
preferences and opinions. On the other hand, the sociological-organizational perspective 
offers important insights which can complement the theory chosen for this research. With 
respect to old institutional theory, it is useful for exploring the influence of institutions on 
actor-relations and vice-versa. Yet, its limitations must be acknowledged and addressed, 
and the effort will also be made in the next chapter that presents the conceptual 
framework. It will be used to operationalize the theoretical ideas discussed in this chapter 
in order to guide the research design of Chapter 6 and the analytical process in Chapters 7, 
8 and 9. The framework focuses on the processes in which shared practices, opinions, 
perceptions and expectations are produced and reproduced, reflecting actors as active 
learners and the institutions that influence the process of PPP formulation. Additionally, 
the institutional relations between public and private actors are considered to happen in 
both formal and informal dynamic interactions, but also under the influence of contingent 
external forces and embedded  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’.   
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Chapter 5 - Towards a Conceptual Framework 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 The social system  
The focus of this conceptual framework is to understand how actors mobilize and 
overcome assumptions and biases in their interactions, the influence of external forces, the 
networks linking actors, the areas of agreement and common interests upon which 
collaboration and reconciliation are developed, as well as the disagreements and diversity 
of perspectives that can make this process difficult. In this research, these processes are 
assumed to happen in the social system.  
Different from new institutionalisms, old institutional theory highlights the role of 
actors embedded in social relations. As Granovetter (1985) argues,  embeddedness  is  “the  
argument that the behaviour and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing 
social relations that to construe them  as   independent   is  a  grievous  misunderstanding”  (p.  
482). For Granovetter (1992), institutions  “are  constructed  by   individuals whose action is 
both facilitated and constrained by the structure and resources available in social networks 
in which they are embedded”(p.7). Granovetter  calls   ‘social  relations’  or   ‘social  networks’  
what Giddens (1984) calls  ‘social  systems’.  This  research  adopts  Giddens’  (1984) concept of 
social  system  in  which  actors’  interactions  are  embedded  in  the context of their own social 
relations.  
Giddens’  (1984) structuration theory is in line with old institutionalism because he 
sees institutions and agency as mutually constitutive and rejects the dualism that separates 
structure and agency (Jessop, 2001). One of the main innovations in his model is the 
introduction of time and space into institutional analysis (Jessop, 2001). According to 
Giddens (1984), in the social system, context matters. It is also in the social system that 
institutions become identifiable, which are considered the system’s  concrete features. For 
Giddens (1984), institutions are practices situated in time and space which reflect the use 
of abstract rules and resources in the system. This contextual perspective of a system is 
also adopted by González and Healey (2005), influenced by the Giddens’ work. For Giddens 
(1984), social elements only have virtual existence; they are abstract unless instantiated in 
the   systemic   time   and   space.  Giddens’   (1984)   social   system   is   composed  of   the   context-
specific activities of human agents, which are produced and reproduced in interactions. For 
this research, therefore, it is inside the contextual social system that actors undertake the 
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formulation of the PPP project. The central focus of the conceptual framework is on the 
contextual formal and informal relations that lead to the construction and enactment of a 
‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  which  influence  actors’  pre-tendering interactions. The 
framework also considers that individuals can change and reinforce  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  
acting’,   and   also   be   shaped   by   these   aspects   in   their   relations   for the construction and 
enactment  of  a  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’.    
5.1.2 Research questions 
The primary aim of this research is to understand why many cases of PPP project 
formulation are not finishing the pre-tendering stage based on the Procedure for Request 
of Interest (PRI). For this, it aims to unpack the yet unclear actor-relations in the process, by 
focusing on the formulation of an infrastructure PPP project that completed the pre-
tendering stage, but in more complicated circumstances, since it lacked the elements of the 
Brazil   PPP   Framework   prior   to   actors’   engagement.   From   this   analysis,   the   research   also  
aims to inform recommendations for the PRI pre-tendering formulation process of 
infrastructure PPP projects in Brazil. Considering these observations, the conceptual 
framework to be discussed will be used to answer the following research questions (linked 
to a set of sub-questions to facilitate the analysis). The objective of identifying actors and 
their relations in the formulation process will also be addressed through the following:  
1. How  did  actors’  construct  and  enact  a  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  through  
their relations? How did it influence actors in the completion of the PPP 
formulation process in the PRI pre-tendering stage? 
a. How   were   actors   and   their   relations   influenced   by   existing   ‘ways   of  
thinking  and  acting’?  How  did  they  mobilize  or  overcome  existing  ways? 
b. How were actors and their relations influenced by new and innovative 
‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’?   
c. How did actors and their relations influence the process? 
d. How did external forces influence the process? 
2. What are the lessons learned for the formulation of infrastructure PPP projects in 
Brazil in the PRI pre-tendering stage? 
a. What are important aspects that have been neglected by the Brazil PPP 
Framework? 
b. What are important aspects about the Brazil PPP Framework that were 
neglected in the process? Why? How could they be better acknowledged? 
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5.1.3 Introduction to the conceptual framework 
This research will use a social constructivist approach in line with old institutional 
theory for analyzing actor-relations in the process of PPP formulation.  The conceptual 
approach for conducting the research is interested in a perspective that accounts for the 
influence of internal dynamics as well as external forces in the process.  It is composed of 
two main aspects: systemic processes and analytical concepts. It considers that three 
processes happen simultaneously inside the social system for the formulation of a PPP 
project. The systemic processes of the conceptual framework are: 
1. The  production  and  reproduction  of  a  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’; 
2. The   reproduction   of   embedded   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’   (assumptions   and  
biases); 
3. The production and reproduction of innovative ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’  
(overcoming of assumptions and biases).  
Since this conceptual framework will not be used to analyze these systemic 
processes individually, it accounts for the interplay between them. This dynamic interplay 
sets the stage for actor-relations in the processes of production and reproduction of the 
‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   in the completion of the formulation of PPP project. 
The following analytical concepts will also be considered simultaneously for exploring the 
social systemic processes, which are explained in the next section: 
x The influence of external forces; 
x Contextual dynamics of formal and informal actor-relations;  
x ‘Ways  of  thinking  and  acting’.  
A diagram of the conceptual framework for this research is presented in Figure 2, 
next. It demonstrates the connection between processes and analytical concepts in the 
systemic institutional arrangement, which is assumed to result from interplay of actor-
relations   in   the  production  and   reproduction  of   ‘ways  of   thinking  and  acting’   for   the  PRI  
pre-tendering formulation of an infrastructure PPP project. By exploring actor-relations 
based on the conceptual framework proposed here, this research intends to foster a better 
understanding  of  the  complexities  involved  in  the  interactions  by  eliciting  actors’  ‘ways  of  
thinking  and  acting’   in   terms  of  needs,   interests,   perceptions,  opinions and expectations, 
attitudes, skills and strategies, as well as embedded biases emerging from previous forms 
of interactions that can hamper the process of negotiation, and innovative practices that 
influence the PPP formulation process (Healey, 2007).  
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5.2 Diagram of the Conceptual Framework  
 
Figure 2 - Diagram of Conceptual Framework 
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In this chapter, the analytical concepts are explained first in the following order: 
external forces, the contextual dynamics of actor-relations and   ‘ways   of   thinking   and  
acting’.  The  following  section  provides  explanations  of  three  systemic  processes  which will 
be  analyzed  in  this  research:  the  construction  of  a  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’,  the  
reproduction  of  embedded  assumptions  and  biases  and  the  production  of  innovative  ‘ways  
of   thinking   and   acting’.   This   section   will   also   consider   how   lessons learned from the 
research for informed recommendations will be derived, which requires clarification on 
how institutions from a system are assumed capable of stretching across time and space to 
different contexts as indicated in Figure 2. 
5.3 Analytical concepts  
5.3.1 External forces 
In  this  research,  the  concept  of  external  forces  in  the  system  is  similar  to  Giddens’  
(1984)  definition  of  structure.  He  argues   that  “structure  has  no  existence   independent  of  
the knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day  activity”   (p.  26).  
Gidden’s   structure   will   be   called   in   this research the external forces that influence the 
social system in particular ways specific to a context. For the purposes of this research, 
external forces are assumed to be empirically observable only in time and space, and only 
become visible constraints or enablers within the social system if enacted by actors in their 
interactions. It is through the interactions among actors in practice within the social system 
that external forces and institutions are revealed or produced. This conceptual framework 
assumes the abstraction of external forces, which will only be seen within the systemic 
context   of   production   and   reproduction   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   and  
institutions. These external forces are also considered universal and available in a different 
time and space for enactment in other systems through formal and informal dynamics of 
actor-relations specific to a context (Moos & Dear, 1986, p. 240). 
It is important to take external forces into account in the analysis because they may 
represent problems and opportunities for internal dynamics of actor-relations in the pre-
tendering process of PPP project formulation as suggested in the previous chapter of 
literature review on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). In this research, therefore, the 
analysis of external forces considers that the system is embedded in a broader scenario, 
which can influence the PPP formulation process in its concrete time and space (Lowndes, 
2001). Therefore, evaluation of the wider context will include an analysis of the exogenous 
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driving forces that trigger and create obstacles and opportunities for internal systemic 
processes and leads to transformation and innovation pressures (Healey, 2007). As 
Lowndes (2001) argues, external forces are normatively and historically embedded and 
include aspects such as electoral systems, tax and benefit systems, cabinet decision-
making, arrangements for budgeting or policy-making, intergovernmental relationships, or 
contracting rules (p. 1957). In this research, these forces are expressed through the 
contextual influence of formal structures and procedures, as well as the dynamics of 
political, social and economic activity, shifts in socio-cultural activities and aspirations and 
initiatives arising from civil society mobilisation (Healey, 2007),   but   also   through   “tacit  
understandings and conventions that span organisational boundaries—both inside and 
outside  the  public  sector”  (Lowndes, 2001, p. 1957). These tacit understandings represent 
concepts of embedded  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  which were obtained as insights from 
new institutional theory. These will be discussed later in this chapter.  
This conceptual framework consider as external forces the aspects suggested by 
the review of literature on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Four of these elements are 
also considered in the Brazil PPP Framework, which has failed to guide many pre-tendering 
processes of PPP formulation towards completion. These include policy, legal, 
organizational and strategic elements. Another aspect is political culture, which is the 
missing element in the Brazil PPP Framework. The following Table 4 summarizes the 
external forces that will be considered in this research, making a parallel with the elements 
of the Brazil PPP Framework. The influence of external forces will be analyzed in terms of 
their embeddedness in the social systemic context in which actors engage for the PPP 
formulation.  
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Table 4 - External forces (Conceptual Framework) 
External forces in the conceptual 
framework 
Existing Elements of the Brazil PPP 
Framework used as initial drivers for PRI 
process of PPP formulation  
The fiscal, financial, economic and 
commercial scenario for public-private 
partnerships 
Policy Framework: clear influential 
environment promoted for use of PPP policy 
instrument in specific sectors as expressed 
through political will, economic stimulus, 
favourable investment scenario 
Legal and regulatory, procedural, 
organizational, administrative and 
strategic elements, including the 
existing bureaucratic and managerial or 
instrumental   ‘ways   of   thinking   and  
acting’  in  the  public  and  private  sectors 
Legal Framework: existing PPP legislation (law 
and decrees) that sets legal boundaries, 
conditions, criteria and standardized 
procedures for the structuring of PPP projects 
through PRI mechanism 
Organizational Framework: organizational 
frameworks in place, generally created by PPP 
Decrees and represented by Managing 
Councils (or Committees) and PPP Units (or 
Technical Groups). Seminars and trainings 
promoted, teams with specialized (sectoral) 
knowledge, background and experience in 
PPPs 
Strategic Framework: PRI decrees in place 
with pre-designed strategic guidelines, as well 
as availability of manuals of best practices  
Political culture:  
the influence of traditional ways of 
public-private interactions in the 
country, considering ideological aspects 
such as insecurity and scepticism, 
distrust, as well as resistance against 
PPPs from society, media and actors in 
the public administration and external 
control bodies. 
Non-existing element in the Brazil PPP 
Framework  
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5.3.2 Dynamics of formal and informal actor-relations 
In this research an analysis of the formal and informal dynamics of actor-relations 
in the formulation of PPP projects is based on the idea that even though some actor-
relations may be based on formal contracts, the levels of commitment among them go 
beyond contractual arrangements, including actively constructed relations and mutual 
dependency (Bovaird, 2004). In Brazil, despite the existence of PPP legislations, project 
finance and other structuring elements setting legal and network boundaries, there is no 
legal requirement binding actors in the PRI pre-tendering stage. It is mainly an informal 
process of interactions and public and private actors may cancel the process at any time. 
Therefore, during the dynamic and complex interactions of the informal PRI pre-tendering 
stage, several stakeholders construct circumstances that maintain them engaged or not in 
these interactions for PPP formulation. These may also operate as informal rules and 
conditions influencing their interactions. 
The way the different stakeholders engage, as well as their permanence or not in 
the PRI process, relies on formal elements but also on their interdependencies and own 
creativity to construct the path that leads (or not) to the formulation of the PPP project, as 
well as on the influence of the external environment in which the interactions take place. 
As Peters (1998) mentions, institutions provide the grounds for interaction based on 
mutually agreed rules, shared   values   and   common   policy   goals,   which   “may   be  
promulgated formally, but more often there is a set of tacit understanding about the 
appropriate   behaviour”   (Peters,   1998,   p.16).  González and Healey (2005) also argue that 
institutions  are  “expressed   in formal rules and structures, but also in informal norms and 
practices,   in   the   rhythms   and   routines   of   daily   life”,   as   actors   are   linked   in   formal   and  
informal social arenas of collective action (p. 2058). 
Therefore, this conceptual framework considers both formal and informal 
relational elements. Formal aspects include legally binding contracts with specific 
objectives and actions; while the informal elements include unenforceable agreements to 
cooperate in which actors build relations and share information based on aspects such as 
trust, motivation, commitment, collaboration and tolerance (McQuaid, 2000, p. 15). To 
understand informal arrangements, it is important to analyze the context in which actors 
take action, the kinds of interactions and expectations from others and the mechanisms 
that join actors together in on-going interactions (Klijn & Teisman, 2000; McQuaid, 2000). 
Consequently, the analytical concept of formal and informal actor-relations will allow the 
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contextual identification of actors involved in the process.   Besides   identifying   “who”  
interacts  with  “who”,  there  will  be  an  analysis  of  the  reasons  actors  relate  to  each  other,  
such   as   motivations   and   interests   (“why”),   as   well   as   the   strategies   adopted   (such   as  
forming coalitions, attacking, supporting, challenging or opposing). It is important to 
mention that these links may reflect both positive (collaborative, cooperative) and negative 
(conflictual) relations. According to Klijn and Teisman (2000), to analyze a network of 
relations, it is important to understand its structure (actors and connections), 
preconceptions and rules that operate in the network, and conflicting assumptions. For 
Klijn and Teisman (2000),  networks  consist  of  all  kinds  of  different  relations,  “some  of  them  
weak, some of  them  strong”,  in  which  the  weak  relations  can  evolve  into  strong  ones  over  
time (p. 93). 
The analytical concept of formal and informal relations has also a dynamic sense 
which is important for an analysis of change in actors-relations, assumptions and biases. 
This is essential for understanding how  actors’  embedded  assumptions  and  biases  influence  
their relations in face of pressures for change and for innovation in practices, opinions, 
perceptions and expectations. For this, it will be considered the way they draw on such 
assumptions to form their strategies of interaction, and the extent to which these 
assumptions foster or hamper relations and negotiations. Klijn and Teisman (2000) argue 
that for existing fear of exploitation and opportunism, for example, some actors may not 
decide to interact with each other.  
It  will   also   be   addressed   the   extent   to  which   actors’   biases   and   assumptions   are  
overcome or reinforced in their relations, considering whether   actors’   common   grounds  
and agreement on interests influence changes in their perceptions, expectations and 
opinions. According to Healey (2007), it is not only important to address the embedded 
frames that structure how people make sense of their relational world, but also whether 
and how these frames (assumptions and biases) are questioned and changed (innovative 
practices and opinions). Consequently, in view of a scenario of interaction reflected in the 
interplay of systemic processes, there is the reinforcement of embedded assumptions or 
production of innovative  ones.  Actors’  strategies  may  be  initially  influenced  by  embedded  
relational biases and assumptions, but during the interaction actors may either reinforce 
these  embedded  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  or  may  learn  to  challenge  and  change  them  
in innovative ways (Healey, 2007; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998).  
Consequently, this dynamic analytical concept will be useful for exploring the 
possibility that actors may make adjustments in their assumptions as they build coalitions 
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and mobilize support, which may result in changing perceptions about each other, on the 
recognition of the value of integration, and on the adjustments of cultural practices (Keast 
et al., 2004). These considerations lead to a concern over the extent to which changes in 
assumptions affect the negotiations between actors. This analysis will focus on the way 
changes  or  adjustments  in  assumptions,  as  actors’  reinforce  or  overcome  biases,  contribute  
to areas of agreement and common interests that may lead to progress in the process of 
PPP formulation, as well as the way they result in diverging interests and areas of 
disagreement that could hamper the process. Although actors have their own individual 
perspectives, they can acquire a new set of values and a new way of thinking that inspire 
them to work together for a common mission (Keast et al., 2004). For Keast et al. (2004), 
even though actors might initially refrain from engaging with other actors, based on 
perceptions that may interfere with their relations (i.e. distrust, disagreements, frustrations, 
etc.), these perceptions may eventually change allowing actors to collaborate. This 
analytical concept, therefore, will be mainly used to understand whether  actors’  capacity  to  
reach agreements and reconcile interests is a result of adjustments in their perceptions, 
opinions and expectations about the PPP formulation process, their relations and each 
other.  
5.3.3 ‘Ways  of  thinking  and  acting’   
In her approach to transformational governance processes, Healey (2004) mentions 
that   an   analysis   of   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   ways   of   acting’   focus   attention   on   actors,  
interactive practices and networks, as well as on the formation and dissemination of 
discourses and practices, the relation between deeper cultural values and specific episodes 
of governance, and the interaction of the activities of specific actors and wider structuring 
forces   (p.  14).  Based  on  these  observations,   this   research  adopts  the  concept  of   ‘ways  of  
thinking   and   acting’   in   which   “ways   of   dealing   with   old   and new challenges interact in 
multiple ways and at all kinds of scales, in a complex landscape of interacting social 
trajectories”  (Healey, 2005, p. 303). It also considers that this complexity creates challenges 
as  people  who  are  used  to  relatively  ﬁxed  ways of acting have to adapt to new situations 
(González & Healey, 2005).   In  the  conceptual  framework  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  are  
represented by two analytical concepts:  
x Practices, opinions, perceptions and expectations; 
x Attitudes, strategies, resources and skills (reflected in practices) 
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Practices, opinions, perceptions and expectations  
In this research, the processes of production and reproduction of institutions as 
shared   practices,   opinions,   perceptions   and   expectations   through   actors’   interactions   is  
based  on  Giddens’  (1984)  idea  of  practical  and  discursive consciousness. Garud, Hardy and 
Maguire (2007) say  that  “actors  are  knowledgeable  agents  with  a  capacity  to  reflect  and  act  
in ways other than those prescribed by taken-for-granted social rules and technological 
artifacts”  (p.  961).  For this research, therefore, actors’  capacity   to  reflect and act will not 
only be considered in terms of discursive explanation of opinions and expectations, but also 
practice expressions. New institutionalists argue that people are not aware or conscious of 
their behaviour if there is no justification, reflection or explanation on their practices 
(March & Olsen, 2006 544). However, awareness is not only demonstrated through 
discursively expressed opinions and expectations, but also through practices. Giddens 
(1984)  argues  that  “all  human  beings  are  highly learned in respect of knowledge which they 
possess, and apply, in the production and reproduction of day-to-day   social   encounters”  
and  that  “the  vast  bulk  of  such  knowledge  is  practical  rather  than  theoretical  in  character”  
(p. 22). From a similar perspective, Pescosolido (1992) asserts that the construction of the 
‘self’  through  scripts  can  be  combined  with  people consciously choosing to following scripts 
through   their   practices.   For   her,   “people   are   not   unconscious;   they   are   knowledgeable,  
skilful actors   with   ‘practical   consciousness’   that   allows   them   to   both   improvise   and  
routizine”   (Pescosolido, 1992, p. 1103). Based on Giddens’  work,  Dyck  and  Kearns   (2006) 
define discursive consciousness   as   “what people can put into  words  about   their   actions” 
and practical   consciousness  as  “what actors know about how to do things in a variety of 
contexts of social life, but may  not  be  able  to  put  into  words” (p. 87). Consequently, actors 
are viewed as “creative  learners,  actively  adjusting  and adapting to new situations”  (Healey, 
1999, p. 114), by reflecting and giving justifications and explanations for their practices 
(discursive) or by simply enacting actions during interactions (practical).  
It is also important to consider that practical and discursive consciousness may lead 
to unintended institutionalization processes because human knowledgeability is always 
bounded, that is, actors are not always aware of the consequences of the activities in which 
they engage (Giddens, 1984). Therefore, in this research systemic processes will be 
explored based on the assumption that actors are practically and/or discursively conscious 
in the production and reproduction or practices, opinions, perceptions and expectations for 
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the   construction   and   enactment   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   in the pre-
tendering stage of PPP formulation.   
Attitudes, strategies, resources and skills  
This research will also use in the analysis two sets of factors from the literature on 
‘capacity’   for  exploring   ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’. It adopts the definition proposed by 
Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) and Morgan (2006) and Land, Hauck and Baser (2009), in 
which capacity is the combination of attitudes, resources, strategies and skills mobilized for 
a  certain  task.  Some  may  be  existing  ‘ways  of  acting  and  doing  things’,  while  others  may  be  
endogenously created in social processes.  
One set include hard elements in terms of formal rules and conditions, rigid 
organizational structures, and instrumental or bureaucratic strategies, which can also be 
called functional, technical/technocratic and hierarchical. These hard aspects are in line 
with the elements of the Brazil PPP Framework. As explained in Chapter 2, since similar 
aspects have been widely used for the formulation of PPPs in states and municipalities in 
Brazil, it is important to acknowledge that these elements may exert an influence in the 
way   actors’   interactions   take   place   for   the   formulation   of   PPPs   around   the   country,  
including in the case study used for this research.  
The other set refers to generative, non-technical and less instrumental factors, 
which are not considered in the Brazil PPP Framework, but suggested by the literature 
review on PPPs. In this second set there is a higher focus on socially constructed rules, 
processes   as   outcomes   and   on   the   ‘capacity   of   what’,   instead   of   ‘capacity   for   which  
outcomes’  (Morgan, 2006, p. 17). Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) explain that the capacity 
related  to  the  second  set  can  be  called  ‘emergent’,  as in undirected processes of collective 
action leading to increased capacity. The two sets of   ‘capacity’   factors  are  summarized   in  
the following Table 5. They will help to make a distinction between hard and soft elements 
influencing actor-relations in the process of PPP formulation. 
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Table 5 - Capacity factors: hard and soft elements2 
 Hard elements: 
instrumental and/or 
bureaucratic  
Soft elements: 
generative or 
emergent 
Strategic 
approach  
Based on formal plans: clear 
definition of inputs, actions, 
outputs and outcomes and 
instrumental execution of 
standard procedures 
Not formally designed and based 
on learning and interaction 
Dynamics of 
strategy 
Rigid, hierarchical, formal Flexible, non-hierarchical , informal 
More outcome-oriented 
Capacity is inputs as means to 
reach outcomes with efficiency 
and effectiveness; the use of 
incentive and external pressures 
to increase accountability and 
obtain value for money of 
results 
More process-oriented 
Capacity is ability to act over 
resistance, to overcome 
constraints and to develop 
commitment to move forward and 
obtain results  
Coordination 
skills   
Management by control; 
training and teaching 
Transformational leadership: 
symbolic and values-based  
incentives to shape commitment 
and motivation; bridging and 
linking (developing formal and 
informal alliances) 
Resources  Technical know-how, ‘best  
practices’,  plans,  procedures,  
structures, technologies, 
financial assets  and resources 
Motivation, commitment, trust, 
tolerance, confidence, security, 
process ownership, relationships, 
legitimacy 
Attitudes 
towards change 
Focus on resources and 
activities that can be used for 
change. It addresses lack of 
resources and trainings, 
technical skills, equipment, 
knowledge and technologies 
Resilience, confidence, innovation, 
collaboration, adaptiveness, 
courage, imagination, aspiration, 
self-perception 
                                                          
2 Note. Adapted from Land, T., Hauck, V., & Baser., H. (2009). Capacity Change and Performance: 
Capacity development: Between planned interventions and emergent processes. Implications for 
development cooperation. Policy Management Brief n. 22. Maastricht: ECDPM; and from Morgan, P. 
(2006). The concept of capacity. Study on Capacity, Change and Performance, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM). Adapted with permission. 
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5.4 Systemic processes  
This conceptual framework includes three systemic process that will be 
simultaneously  explored  in  the  analysis:  (1)  the  production  and  reproduction  of  a  ‘systemic  
institutional  arrangement’  that  influence  actor-relations in the PPP formulation process; (2) 
the  reproduction  of  embedded  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  (assumptions and biases); and 
(3)   the   production   and   reproduction   of   innovative   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’  
(overcoming of embedded assumptions and biases). These are explained next.  
5.4.1 Systemic   process   1:   production   and   reproduction   of   a   ‘Systemic  
Institutional  Arrangement’ 
For   this   research,   the   ‘institutional   arrangement’   is   different   from   the   PPP  
Framework that has been adopted in Brazil to guide the PPP formulation based on the 
Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism. The institutional arrangement is 
systemic, socially constructed and depends on context, while the PPP Framework is 
universal and has been used as an external influence to guide different PRI cases of PPP 
formulation in Brazil. This approach for the institutional arrangement has been adopted in 
order to highlight the systemic aspects that influence actor-relations for the formulation of 
a PPP project. In this research, the analysis of the production and enactment of the 
‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  will  be  in  terms  of  the  four  elements  of  the  Brazil PPP 
Framework,   but   from   a   social   constructivist   perspective.   The   elements   of   the   ‘systemic  
institutional   arrangement’   include:   (1) policy arrangement; (2) legal arrangement; (3) 
organizational arrangement; and (4) strategic arrangement.  
The   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   is   assumed   to   be   a   concrete   and  
observable set of rules and resources that directly influence activities in the context of the 
social system (Edvardsson, Tronvoll & Gruber, 2011). Since actors are seen in this research 
as capable of enacting but also of designing institutions in their interactions, these are both 
considered observable and socially constructed in specific systemic contexts.  This research 
adopts a dialectic approach between actor-relations and institutions in which it does not 
attempt  to  give  primacy  to  one  or  the  other.   It  assumes  from  the  start  that  the  ‘systemic  
institutional   arrangement’   and   actors   through   their relations co-create and co-influence 
each other.   
Moreover, in this research the   construction   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional  
arrangement’  by  actors   in  their   interactions  depends  on  the  production  and  reproduction  
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of   embedded   and   innovative   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’,   and   on   how   they   influence  
actors in the process of PPP formulation. Institutions here both influence the construction 
of institutional arrangement and reflect its application in practice. The conceptual 
framework adopts the assumption proposed by Giddens (1994) in which institutions are 
properties  of  the  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  reflected  in  the  social  actor-relations. 
Therefore, the focus of the analysis will be on the interplay in social processes between 
external forces and formal and informal actor-relations  that  lead  to  a  ‘systemic institutional 
arrangement’,  which in turn influence these social processes (Coaffee & Healey, 2003), but 
also in such a way that the arrangement is constantly made and transformed in these 
dynamics of social relations (Healey, 1999, 2006).  
For   the   production   and   reproduction   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’,  
two other processes will be simultaneously explored in this research. One is the routinized 
or cognitive process in the system in which   embedded   ‘ways  of   thinking   and   acting’   are  
reproduced in the interactions between actors. The other involves the processes in which 
innovative ways are produced and reproduced, leading to the overcoming of embedded 
assumptions and biases and to the creation  of  new  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’. These are 
explained next.  
5.4.2 Systemic   process   2:   production   and   reproduction   of   embedded   ‘ways   of  
thinking  and  acting’  (assumptions  and  biases) 
The processes of production and reproduction of embedded assumptions and 
biases in actor-relations  are  a  reflection  of  actors’  internalized  cultural  and  relational  ‘ways  
of   thinking   and   acting’,   but   in   a   socially   constructed   way.   These   processes   represent  
symbolic, procedural or standard responses; but they are still considered socially 
constructed in this framework because the institutional action that reflects their 
application in the system is specific to time and space. Although the new institutional 
literature consider that actors incorporate into practice internalized taken for granted 
scripts from existing fields, old institutional assumptions makes it possible to view actors as 
interpreters of ambiguous symbols and constructors of meaning (Garud et al., 2007, p. 959).  
These routinized-type of processes have already been discussed in the previous 
chapter in the sociological-organizational section of new institutional theory. It was 
explained that these processes represent the production and reproduction of institutional 
myths and rules of appropriateness. In this conceptual framework, the introduction of 
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routinized  myths  and  rules  in  the  contextual  system  can  be  done  through  actors’  decisions  
to follow existing standard responses with the perception that they give legitimacy or 
guarantee survival and successful behaviour. Therefore, in this research, the concept of 
legitimacy   is   seen  as  “both  a   source  of   inertia   and  a   summons   to   justify  particular forms 
and  practices”  (Selznick, 1996, p. 273). The routinized processes may also refer to rituals of 
conformity to wider forces due to perceptions of threat of coercion or formal sanctions; as 
well as to the adoption of myths from the external environment that borrows the source of 
practices from others in order to define the conditions and methods of internal work 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Actors can also choose to follow existing scripts because they 
are perceived as the appropriate thing to do, based on embedded rules and practices that 
specify what is normal, what must be expected and can be relied upon, and what makes 
sense in a specific context (Olsen, 2007).  
However, different from the new institutional approach, this research does not 
adopt the assumption that cultural cognition leads to a direct process of imitation; instead, 
it assumes that innovation takes place especially because of contextual differences. This 
research, therefore, will analyse the production and reproduction of shared routinized or 
cognitive   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’   internalized   by   actors   and   expressed   in   their  
relations, but in a socially constructed way. Embedded assumptions and biases could be a 
result of past experiences, events, relations or predominant modes of governance. They 
could also include embedded cultural practices such as instrumental, hierarchical, 
contractual   or   bureaucratic   ‘ways   of   acting’,   preconceptions   and   discourses   such   as  
inefficiency  of   the  state,   inability   to   trust   the  other  actor,  private  sector’s  greed,  etc.   It   is  
also   important   to   identify   possible   existing   ‘pockets   of   trust’   between   actors   that   have  
worked together in the past, which may influence the process of interaction (Keast et al., 
2004).  
Embedded assumptions may constrain innovation attempts that challenge 
mainstream practices, creating difficulties for interactions and spread of new ideas through 
negotiations for the process of PPP formulation (Healey, 2004). On the other hand, since 
such assumptions are not fixed, they may be adapted and re-formulated as a result of 
actors’  interactions  in  their  struggle  during  the  process,  influencing  the  promotion  and  flow 
of new discourses and practices across the network of actors (Healey, 2006).   
In summary, this conceptual framework assumes that actors may draw on 
embedded cultural underpinnings (practices and discourse) and relational assumptions to 
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engage in relations with other actors in face of their willingness to complete the PRI pre-
tendering process. They may refer to these assumptions in order to decide what to do, who 
to approach, why approach and what strategies to use (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). It is also 
assumed in this research that even if actors have previously developed expectations and 
perceptions about each other and about the PPP formulation process (i.e. based on past 
experiences and embedded cultural practices), these assumptions are not necessarily 
introduced into the system in the original format, but may continuously change as actors 
engage in new interactions.  
5.4.3 Systemic   process   3:   production   and   reproduction   of   innovative   ‘ways   of  
thinking  and  acting’  (overcoming  of  embedded  assumptions  and  biases) 
In the conceptual framework, the dynamics of interactions may also lead to 
innovative   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’.   The   emergence   of   pressures   for   innovation   are  
imposed on mainstream practices and their main characteristics, which may arise from 
tensions, contradictions, inventions and struggles within internal dynamics of interactions 
or from the influence of wider external forces (Healey, 2007).  
In this research, the analysis of these processes of innovation will focus on several 
aspects: the identification of new actors proposing new ideas, new arenas and forms of 
interaction and communication; the analysis of new strategies and emergent discourses 
and practices for the elaboration of PPP projects, which reflect actors’  new  discourses  and  
attempts to change practices (explicitly or implicitly) in their interactions; the identification 
of   the   challenges   imposed   on   mainstream   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’ such as 
bureaucratic, traditional, instrumental and managerial approaches to politics, policies and 
procedures; and, finally, the analysis of the influence of wider external forces arising from 
economic, fiscal, financial and regulatory dynamics and political aspects, which may include 
fiscal problems, changes imposed by the national government, society, control bodies, etc. 
(Coaffee & Healey, 2003; González & Healey, 2005; Healey, 2006, 2007).  
An important concept that refers to endogenous institutional change, which may 
apply to the introduction of innovative practices, is the idea of ‘institutional  
entrepreneurship’  undertaken  by  embedded  agency in an institutional context (Garud et al., 
2007; Leca, Battilana & Boxenbaum, 2008). For this research, the concept of entrepreneur 
agency is represented by actor-relations and/or actors involved in the introduction of 
innovative practices. The conceptual framework adopts a definition of institutional 
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entrepreneurship in which actors have the capacity to innovate through their relations 
even if their own beliefs and actions are influenced by the institutional environment they 
wish to change (Leca et al., 2008, p. 4 ). Although Garud et al. (2007) argues that it is 
unlikely that entrepreneurial outcomes and processes will be readily embraced by actors 
committed to existing ways of acting in a particular   field”   (p.  960),   this   research  will   also  
account for the possibility that innovative practices can become well accepted and 
reproduced through actor-relations leading to the overcoming of embedded assumptions 
and biases. Mutch (2007) and Leca et al. (2008) argue that the link between institutional 
determinism and agency as creative learners and innovators are in need of explanation, 
and for this it is important to explore actors’   “propensity to come into collision with 
established practices and to seek  to  change  them”  in  their  embedded  institutional  context  
(Mutch, 2007, p. 1123).    
Considering the question posed by Mutch (2007),  in  which  he  asks  “how  is  it  that,  
in   a   shared   institutional  environment,   some  appear   to  be   the   instigators  of   change?”   (p. 
1123), this research adopts insights from the review of Leca et al. (2008) on  ‘institutional  
entrepreneurship’   for   exploring   the   possibilities   in   which   there   is   the   overcoming   of  
embedded biases and assumptions and the introduction of innovative practices.  
In   a   comprehensive   review   of   the   literature   on   ‘institutional   entrepreneurship’,  
Leca et al. (2008)  examine 67 research studies on the topic published since 1988 in the 
fields of management, organization studies and sociology. From their review, two broad 
questions were identified, which are useful for exploring the process of production and 
reproduction  of  innovative  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  in  this  research.  The  two  questions  
are: 
1. Under what conditions is an actor likely to become an institutional 
entrepreneur? 
2. How does the process of institutional entrepreneurship unfold? 
Considering the enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship, Leca et al. 
(2008) identify three categories: (i) field-level   conditions,   (ii)  actors’   social  position   in   the  
field,  and  (iii)  actors’  specific  characteristics.  The  field-level conditions include aspects that 
are  related  to  the  concept  of   ‘external   forces’  used   in   this   research,  such as precipitating 
jolts and crises, in the forms of social upheaval, economic and political crises, technological 
disruption, scarcity of resources, competitive discontinuities or regulatory changes, which 
disrupt the socially constructed field-level consensus and contribute to the introduction of 
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new ideas. Another field-level condition is the presence of multiple and contradictory 
institutional orders, which Leca et al. (2008) call degrees of institutionalization and 
heterogeneity. On one hand, a high level of institutional incompatibilities and 
contradictions can to  produce  an  unstable  tension  in  a  given  system  that  “enables  a  shift  in  
collective consciousness that can transform actors from passive participants in the 
reproduction of existing institutional  arrangements  into  institutional  entrepreneurs”  (p.  8).  
Moreover, studies also suggest that low institutionalized fields, characterized by 
unstructured, unorganized or uncertain institutional order, provide opportunity for 
institutional entrepreneurship. On the other hand, it is also argued that lower 
heterogeneity and high institutionalization across the field reduces uncertainty and the 
need to preserve stable predictable rules and norms, allowing actors to engage in 
innovative strategic action (Leca et al., 2008).  
According to Leca et al. (2008), the studies reviewed also suggest that social 
position  influences  actors’  perception  of  the  field  and  their  access  to  the  resources  needed  
for institutional entrepreneurship. Based on their review, there is contradictory 
information  regarding  actors’  position  because  some  argue  that  the  ones  in  the  periphery  
or margin of the field are more likely to act as entrepreneurs, while others mention that 
actors at the centre of fields can also exert this role.  The agreement, on the other hand, is 
on the relevance of their social position in a network, in terms of the set of stakeholders to 
whom entrepreneurs are linked, because this can facilitate resource mobilization and the 
accepting of innovative ideas based on perception of legitimacy in the eyes of other actors 
(Leca et al., 2008) 
Considering  the  third  aspect,  the  role  of  actors’  specific  characteristics,  Leca et al. 
(2008) review studies that focus on enabling conditions at the individual-level. In this sense, 
institutional entrepreneurship relies on socially skilled actors in terms of empathy and 
value congruence. Socially skilled actors with empathy are able to introduce new ideas 
because they can relate to the situation of others and persuade them to cooperate with 
new ideas and practices. Others can create a connection between the values of their causes 
and  people’s  personal identities stimulating shared understandings as a force for change 
(Leca et al., 2008). 
The second question covered by Leca et al. (2008) is about how the process of 
institutional entrepreneurship unfolds. They explain that entrepreneurs must mobilize 
actors as allies such as professionals and experts and develop alliances and cooperation. 
They divide their review in three processes: (i) using discursive strategies, (ii) mobilizing 
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resources, and (iii) designing institutional arrangements. The use of discursive strategies 
involves framing the institutional project in such a way that it will resonate with the 
interests of potential supporters and gain legitimacy over existing institutional 
arrangements, which are in turn framed for their drawbacks.   
The process of mobilizing resources implies that the success of institutional 
entrepreneurship  depends  on  actors’  capacity  to  access  and  leverage  critical tangible and 
intangible resources (Leca et al., 2008). Tangible resources include financial assets to 
overcome sanctions and unpopular action, as well as to gain support in favour of a project 
and to build coalitions with other players. These can be complemented with the hard 
elements   related   to   the   concept   of   ‘capacity’   discussed   earlier   in   this   chapter,   such   as  
formal and instrumental plans and technical know-how.  
Intangible resources include cultural and symbolic dimensions such as social capital, 
legitimacy and authority. Social capital means ability to draw political support and influence 
others’   actions;   legitimacy   means   “the   extent   to   which   an   entrepreneur’s   actions   and  
values are viewed as consistently congruent with the values and expectations of the larger 
environment”  (p.  16);  and  formal  authority  means  actor’s   legitimately  recognized  right  to  
make decisions, such as official positions (Leca et al., 2008). These resources can be 
complemented by soft capacity elements including support, motivation, commitment, 
networking and leadership.  
The final process covered by Leca et al. (2008) is the designing of institutional 
arrangements.  They mention that entrepreneurs use discursive strategies and mobilize 
resources in order to design regulative and normative institutional arrangements. The 
regulative types include legal provisions that render new practices mandatory; while the 
normative type refers to the introduction of aspects such as professional codes and identity, 
rituals and establishment of standards (Leca et al., 2008). The concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship reviewed by Leca et al. (2008) proposes useful analytical insights for 
exploring actor-relations in the formulation of a PPP project, considering the production 
and reproduction   of   innovative   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’   in   overcoming   embedded  
assumptions and biases. 
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5.5 Approach to the second research question (lessons learned to 
inform recommendations)  
In order to answer the second research question (“What are the lessons learned for 
the formulation of infrastructure PPP projects in Brazil in the PRI pre-tendering stage?”),  an 
aspect  deserves  clarification.  Although  the  social  construction  of  the  ‘systemic  institutional  
arrangement’ for pre-tendering PPP formulation is contextual to the system of actor-
relations, this does not mean that its institutional properties cannot affect other systems. 
The contextual institutional arrangement may affect other systems through the stretching 
out across time and space of the institutions that represent it.  
Although socially constructed in one system, when these institutions cut across 
contexts, they become external forces of another system and may be incorporated into 
that  system’s  time  and  space  as  embedded  assumptions  and  biases.  Since  the  theoretical  
approach of the research considers that actors may draw   existing   ‘ways   of   thinking and 
acting’   from past experiences, events and relations, the lessons learned from the case 
study can also turn into existing practices, opinions, perceptions and expectations 
reflecting abstract properties of a system that may cut across time and space (Giddens, 
1984). Granovetter (1992) argues that institutions reflect the properties of social networks 
and asserts that, even when networks no longer exist, the institutions take a life of their 
own and become locked in, turning into congealed social networks (p. 7). Consequently, 
this research considers that institutions produced or reproduced in a specific social system 
can influence other systems and also be enacted as institutional myths, standard responses 
or rules of appropriateness in different contexts.  
5.6 Summary of Conceptual Framework 
Based on the discussions in this chapter, the elements of the conceptual framework 
used in this research are summarized next:  
x The systemic formulation of PPP project in the pre-tendering stage under the PRI 
mechanism involves: 
o The  construction  and  enactment  of  the  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’; 
o The  production  and   reproduction  of  existing  and  new   ‘ways  of   thinking  and  
acting’.   
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o Actors’   interactions situated in time and space take place through systemic 
processes for the formulation of a PPP project; 
o Empirically observable institutions, which reflect the socially constructed 
properties of the system during the process of PPP formulation; and 
o Institutions that may stretch out across time and space and affect other 
systems.  
x The systemic formulation of PPP project in the PRI pre-tendering stage also involves 
simultaneous systemic processes: 
1. The production and reproduction of ‘systemic institutional   arrangement’,  
composed of: 
 Policy arrangement 
 Legal arrangement 
 Organizational arrangement 
 Strategic arrangement 
2. The  production  and  reproduction  of  embedded  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  
(reinforcement of assumptions and biases through institutional myths and 
rules of appropriateness): 
Formal or informal institutional myths can be incorporated into actor-
relations through existing beliefs and cultures leading to the replication of 
existing practices. Institutional myths are usually replicated but with specific 
contextual characteristic based on perceptions of coercion and/or legitimacy. 
Actors may also follow formal or informal rules of appropriateness, by 
enacting existing practices that they consider most appropriate for the 
contextual circumstances. 
3. The  production  and  reproduction  of   innovative   ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  
(the overcoming of embedded assumptions and biases).  
The   development   of   new   systemic   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’   and   the  
overcoming of embedded assumptions and biases through interventions of 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
x Analytical concepts for exploring the interplay between systemic processes:  
o The influence of external forces, which will be accounted through the 
embeddedness of policy, legal, organizational, strategic and political 
cultural elements in the social systemic context in which actors engage for 
the PPP formulation; 
o Contextual dynamics of formal and informal actor-relations;  
o Ways   of   thinking   and   acting’:   (i)   practices,   opinions,   perceptions   and  
expectations; and (ii) attitudes, strategies, skills and resources.  
This chapter presented the analytical tools for exploring actor-relations in the pre-
tendering formulation of PPP projects in Brazil. These are mainly based on the old 
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institutional theory, but complemented with insights from new institutionalism (embedded 
‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’)  and  by  the  contingent  role  of  external  forces  as  an  attempt  to  
deal with the limitations of old institutional theory. The next chapter will explain the 
strategy and methods used to implement the research. It will explain the qualitative 
approach to inquiry, the case study selected for the research, and the data collection 
methods primarily based on 34 in-depth interviews with public, private and technical actors. 
It will also detail the process of data analysis and explain how issues of validity and 
reliability were addressed in this research. The three subsequent chapters (7, 8 and 9) will 
present the research findings based on the analytical concepts discussed in the conceptual 
framework. 
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Chapter 6 - Research Strategy and Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the qualitative strategy adopted for the research, and the 
underlying philosophical assumptions guiding the approach to inquiry, data collection and 
analysis. It explains the selection of a holistic single case-study to analyze actor-relations in 
the pre-tendering formulation of a PPP project based on the Procedure for Request of 
Interest (PRI). This chapter also describes the process and methods used for data collection, 
which include documents, meeting observation and interviews; and the process of data 
analysis. Finally, it discusses how validity and reliability were approached in the research 
process.  
The qualitative research strategy adopted is an innovative approach to policy 
analysis in the Brazilian context. In a recent and groundbreaking compilation about policy 
analysis in Brazil, Andrews (2013) argue that the approaches to policy analysis are mostly 
based on econometric models and other quantitative methods. This has been the dominant 
paradigm since the first years of the military dictatorship in Brazil, when the Institute for 
Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisas Economics Aplicadas, IPEA) was found in 
1964. IPEA has continuously produced several Discussion Papers on the analysis of policies, 
focusing mainly on cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit approaches. According to Andrews 
(2013), only 5% of the Papers published between 2010 and 2011 involved the use of 
qualitative methods. In Brazil, the qualitative approach is still incipient and lacks 
methodologies and even applied empirical studies based on systematic direction (Vaitsman 
et al., 2013). Therefore, this research has a methodological contribution to make because it 
highlights the role of actor-relations and process based on qualitative methods. This 
research takes an interpretive approach to policy analysis and is not so much concerned 
with whether the PRI process achieved intended results and outcomes, but more with how 
actors completed the process through their relations and how the process achieved 
intended results or not.  
6.2 Philosophical Background  
The main motivation for this research is to understand why many cases of PPP 
project formulation in Brazil are not finishing the PRI pre-tendering stage. More specifically, 
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this research aims to study actor-relations in the pre-tendering formulation of a PPP project 
based on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism.  
The philosophical assumption adopted for this research is that the process of PPP 
formulation is socially constructed by actors-relations, as it influences the production and 
reproduction of the institutional arrangement that guides actor-relations in the process 
(Hodgson, 2000). As actors engage in social relations, they shape processes and are also 
influenced by them in their choice of behaviour and strategies (W. Scott, 2004). As 
Granovetter (1992) argues, actors are embedded in social relations that constrain and 
shape their behaviour; but as actors interact, they also learn from their social relations and 
are capable of constituting and changing the arrangements that guide their behaviour 
(Healey, 1999). This research, therefore, focuses on the social construction of an 
institutional   arrangement   by   actors’   interactions   and   on   the   influence of these social 
relations  on  actors’  preferences  and  decisions.   
In the Brazilian context of PPP project formulation, to understand a world that is 
socially constructed by actors through their interactions, this research will consider the way 
actors understand and perceive each other and their relations, which reflects on their 
assumptions and biases and affects their behaviour and choice of who to interact with. 
Based on these ideas, several aspects provide the basis for the approach to this research 
design. First, institutional arrangements are dependent on the activities they shape, in 
which   actors’   experiences   in   social   relations   affect   their   understanding   about   the  
arrangement that influences their behaviour (Furlong & Marsh, 2010). Second, institutional 
arrangements   are   not   independent   from   agents’   views   of   their   behaviour   in   social  
interactions; and third, these arrangements change as a result of the action of agents in 
social interactions (Furlong & Marsh, 2010).  
Consequently, the socially constructed world of actors must be understood from 
their perspectives to account for the variations across time and space, and for the changes 
taking place as actors live their experiences and interact with other actors. This process of 
understanding the complex  world  of  lived  experience  must  be  done  from  the  actors’  point  
of view because the world of lived reality and practice and situation-specific meanings that 
create the object of investigation is thought to be constructed by social actors themselves 
(Gregor, 2005)  
This research, therefore, considers that actors are conscious and capable of self-
considering their actions in their relations with others in the social context under study, 
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especially taking into account that actors still possess the autonomy to choose their 
strategies of action within constraints, representing an institutional arrangement that is 
contingent, inconsistent and changeable (Kemp, 2010). Actors not simply act in face of such 
constraints, but they are able to critically think about the consequences of their actions and 
relations with others (Kemp, 2010). In view of these observations, the results of this 
research will reflect an interpretation of the social relations constructed by actors from 
their perspectives, in face of constraining but also changing social interactions and 
institutional  arrangements,  by   focusing  on  the  meaning  actors’  attach  to  their  behaviour,  
considering  that  actors’   reasoning  and   intentions   in  those   interactions  are the ground for 
social action (Furlong & Marsh, 2010).  
Since this research is interested in studying the social construction of a constantly 
changing reality based on interpretations and meanings, the use of quantitative methods 
could produce misleading data due to the fact that they are aimed at producing 
explanations of objective realities given certain conditions. The proposed research, 
therefore, will not pre-consider actors as having given tastes and will not focus on the 
application of a mathematical model, based on statistical and quantity data, to make logical 
deductions   from   individuals’   supposedly   predictable behaviour (Dugger, 1979). The 
conceptual framework developed for the research will be used to analyze the data 
collected through different qualitative sources (interviews, document and meetings) 
(Dugger, 1979). In order to demonstrate that the conceptual framework corresponds to the 
socially constructed reality of actors, it will be carried out an analysis based on their 
interpretations and understandings, and not based on statistical data for making 
predictions (Dugger, 1979). 
Quantitative research may help in explaining the mechanisms, outcomes and 
linkages of a process, but qualitative research is needed to understand the   ‘how’,   the  
construction of people’s   choices   which lead to processes, as well as to understand the 
deeper thoughts and behaviours that govern their responses (Creswell, 2007). The use of 
qualitative methods for data collection helps in establishing and interpreting the way 
people understand the reality in which they are embedded, not through direct and 
objective observation, but through social construction. Additionally, a qualitative approach 
to the research will assist in unpacking and understanding the problem at hand, rather than 
relying on predetermined (existing and observable) information that does not reflect the 
socially constructed reality that constitutes the object of study. For this, it relies on 
individuals’  expressions  and  their  voices,  within  their  contexts  and  settings,  allowing  for  the  
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clarification of any misinterpretations and incorrect assumptions by the researcher 
(Creswell, 2007).  
6.3 Brief review of research topic & case study location  
This research is a study of actor-relations in the pre-tendering formulation of an 
infrastructure PPP in order to understand why many cases of PPP project formulation in 
Brazil are not finishing the pre-tendering stage based on PRI mechanism. The municipality 
of Fortaleza has been selected as a case study for the study of the complexity of actor-
relations in the negotiations that take place in the pre-tendering stage. Fortaleza is located 
in the state of Ceara, in the Northeast of Brazil and has approximately 2.5 million 
inhabitants (The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 2010). It is the 5th largest 
municipality in population, and has an urbanization level of 100% (The Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics, 2010; The Ceara State Institute for Economic Research and 
Strategy, n.d.). The next figure shows the location of Fortaleza in the map of Brazil.  
 
Figure 3 - Location of the municipality of Fortaleza in the map of Brazil.   
Adapted from The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) (2000). Divisão 
política-administrativa do Brasil [Political-administrative division of Brazil]. Gismaps. 
Retrieved  from http://gismaps.com.br/divpol/divpol.htm. Adapted with permission. 
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Considering the topic of this research, the case of Fortaleza is important because 
actors engaged in the formulation of an urban mobility infrastructure PPP project in a 
scenario that was more complicated than the other PRI cases, especially because it lacked 
the elements of the Brazil PPP Framework prior  to  actors’  engagement  in  the  PRI  process.  It  
is also important because actors completed the pre-tendering stage which is the first step 
towards the use of the PPP instrument for infrastructure development in Brazil. Therefore, 
through an investigation of the dynamics of actor-relations, this case will provide 
information on elements that influence the formulation of infrastructure PPP projects and 
lessons for PRI pre-tendering processes in Brazil 
Although it is possible to estimate the level of complexity involved in formulating a 
PPP project, little is known about the variety of intertwining processes that link actors 
together in the pre-tendering process. Consequently, the object of analysis for this research 
is not suited for a quantitative and statistical approach, which would be aimed at revealing 
observable  “facts”,  but  not  at  understanding  the  social-construction  of  such  “facts”  based  
on  actors’  interpretations  of  behaviour,  beliefs  and  practices resulting from their relations. 
This last aspect, however, is possible under a qualitative case study line of inquiry. 
6.4 Approach to inquiry: case study 
The approach adopted in this research was the holistic single case-study. It was 
based on the interactions between public, private and technical/consultancy actors in the 
PRI pre-tendering stage for the formulation of an urban mobility infrastructure PPP project. 
The PPP was part of the city centre re-ordering policy in the municipality of Fortaleza, Brazil. 
The study undertaken was holistic because it considered all possible identifiable and 
relevant relations among these three groups of actors within the context, for an in-depth 
exploratory and descriptive analysis of the case, which was intrinsic in nature considering 
that the main interest was to better understand its particularities (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). 
Some critics argue that the holistic approach can lead to an abstract analysis, but since the 
scope of this case was focused and clearly specified, the holistic approach assisted in 
understanding the complexity of actor-relations in the process (Yin, 2003).  
A case study was the best approach to address the exploratory questions for this 
research. Yin (2003) mention five approaches to inquiry: experiment, survey, archival 
analysis, history, and case studies. Based on an analysis of research questions, he says that 
of these five approaches, case studies, histories and experiments are useful for answering 
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“how”   and   “why”   research   questions.   In order to identify the appropriate approach, Yin 
(2003) mention that it is necessary to determine the need to exert control over and to 
access actual behavioural events. Histories are used when there is no access or control, 
such as in the case of past events; but when it considers contemporary events and there is 
the possibility of access and control, it overlaps with case studies. Experiments, on the 
other   hand,   are   used   when   the   investigator   wants   to   manipulate   behaviour   “directly, 
precisely and systematically”   (Yin, 2003, p. 8). Yin (2003) adds that if the aim of the 
research   is   to   know   “how”   or   “why”   a   process   works   (or   not),   case   studies   or   field  
experiments are the most appropriate approaches.  
Since experiments require manipulation of behavioural events, which is not the aim 
of this research, it is possible to conclude that case study is best suited for the analysis, 
which, according to Yin (2003), is preferred for the study of contemporary events, when the 
focus is not to manipulate behaviour and for a set of events which the researcher has little 
or no control over. Yin (2003) also justifies the use of case studies when contemporary 
contextual conditions are believed to be highly pertinent to the phenomenon under study 
and when phenomenon and context are not easily distinguishable, which is the situation in 
this research.  
The municipality of Fortaleza was initially selected as the single case-study for its 
representativeness and uniqueness, and for its revelatory nature. A single case-study 
approach was initially chosen because the selected case was representative (Yin, 2003). The 
pre-tendering process of PPP formulation based on the Procedure for Request of Interest at 
the federal, state and municipal levels include similar types of private, public and technical 
actors. Public sector actors usually include secretaries, politicians, officials and civil servants; 
private actors are investors who usually form a consortium involving service providers and 
builders; and technical actors are consultancy, advisors and specialists in the variety of 
areas required for PPP project elaboration, including specialists in the field of infrastructure, 
which may vary depending on the type of policy intervention. Laws, decrees, PRI 
publications and legal and administrative procedures are also similar at the federal, state 
and municipal levels. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Brazilian municipalities use PRI 
publications of state governments as model for their own PRIs. This is a tendency that 
started with the elaboration of PPP Laws. The Federal PPP Law was published in 2004, 
followed by the publication of PPP laws in several states, which were almost identical to 
the Federal Law. Subsequently to the federal publication, various municipalities, including 
the municipality of Fortaleza, also used the federal or state laws as models for their own 
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PPP municipal legislations. A similar tendency occurs in Brazil with respect to the PRIs. 
Municipalities use the example of PRIs published by states or by other municipalities as 
model to their PRI publications. Some states and municipalities have also published PRI 
decrees, using the federal PPP Decree as model, in which PRI regulatory procedures and 
norms are detailed.  Moreover, informal and formal actor-relations in the PRI process 
happens at all three levels, as well as the complexities and interdependencies. The 
embeddedness of project finance principles in the pre-tendering process is also present in 
municipal PPP legislations, which are very close to federal and state laws. Therefore, it is 
important to consider the representativeness of the municipality of Fortaleza in the 
Brazilian context.  
The representativeness of the case was also considered in terms of the scope of the 
PPP project, which was an urban mobility infrastructure project as part of a re-ordering 
policy for the city centre of Fortaleza. As indicated in Table 3 of Chapter 2, the urban 
mobility sector is one of the main areas of PPP formulation in Brazil which are having 
problems with the pre-tendering stage. Considering the re-ordering scope of the project, it 
indicates the uniqueness of the case in the context of Brazilian municipalities (Flyvbjerg, 
2001; Yin, 2003). The PPP project used for the case study is the first PPP at the municipal 
level in the North and Northeast of Brazil to complete pre-tendering stage for an urban re-
ordering or regeneration intervention. Besides Fortaleza, only Rio de Janeiro (Southeast) 
and Porto Alegre (South) are municipalities that have also decided to adopt PPP projects 
for regeneration or reordering of an urban area. The re-ordering urban mobility scope of 
the infrastructure PPP project in the case study included a traffic and transportation 
element and a social infrastructure element for the ordering of both street commerce and 
parking in the central area of Fortaleza. Several other municipalities in the North and 
Northeast of Brazil face similar urban mobility problems in central areas involving parking 
issues, traffic congestion and illegal occupation of public spaces by street commerce. There 
are also indications that they have been considering alternative policy instruments, such as 
the PPP, to traditional procurement methods, but have not taken concrete steps forward. 
At this point, it is relevant to provide a brief introduction of the case study context, which is 
presented next.  
As of 2006, in the municipality of Fortaleza urban mobility problems were already 
major topics. Mobility in the city centre was disruptive for most users of the area, as 
pedestrians complained about the irregular occupation of sidewalks by street vendors and 
drivers faced problems when trying to park vehicles (Diario do Nordeste Newspaper, 2006; 
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Wanbergna, 2006). Despite these problems, there was an increasing number of vehicles 
and consumers going to the city centre on a daily basis. In this context, the scope of the 
PPP in Fortaleza involved an urban mobility initiative to re-order the city centre, especially 
considering parking and street commerce.  
The parking aspect was aimed at resolving an urban mobility issue caused by 
severe traffic congestion in the area and shortage of approximately 7,000 parking spaces, 
and also to deal with the situation of over 250 irregular parking lots in city centre. The 
aspect of Popular Commercial Centres was aimed at the construction of facilities in the city 
centre for the relocation of informal street vendors - estimated at 4,000 people –who 
irregularly occupied public and private areas in the city centre without permission. The 
conditions of this occupation were inappropriate for the commercial activities and transit 
of citizens and consumers. Several problems resulted from the disorganised occupation of 
sidewalks, streets and squares by street vendors, such as congestion of vehicles, lack of 
safety for pedestrians and street vendors, excessive waste in the streets and squares, etc. 
However, a solution was not aimed at prohibiting but at organizing the activities of street 
vendors in the city centre. Not only local business owners and associations, but also city 
centre consumers, local residents and municipal authorities openly recognized that the 
activity of street vendors was a matter of family survival and that they represented an 
important cultural aspect of the city centre of Fortaleza.  
The scope of the PPP in the municipality of Fortaleza involved the construction and 
operation of parking lots and Popular Commercial Centres (PCCs) in the city centre of 
Fortaleza. It was an urban mobility infrastructure project to solve issues that many other 
municipalities in Brazil are currently facing. However, Fortaleza is the only municipality in 
the North and Northeast to have adopted the PPP instrument for regeneration or re-
ordering of urban areas. The other two which have used PPPs for similar purposes, Rio de 
Janeiro and Porto Alegre, are located in the Southeast and South, respectively.  
Considering the other municipalities, Rio de Janeiro decided on the PPP instrument 
for the revitalisation of the harbour area, for restructuring the road and transport system, 
rearranging the use and occupation of land, as well as promoting the recovery of historical 
heritage (Odebrecht, 2011). Porto Alegre signed a contract in 2007 for the construction of 
Popular Commercial Centres in order to solve urban mobility problems in the city centre 
related to the illegal occupation of public areas by street vendors; but it did not involve 
from the start the parking lot element which was added a year later to the project because 
of requests from vendors and consumers. Since the PPP contract signature has already 
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taken place in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre, this aspect excludes these cases from the 
scope of the research, considering that the negotiation process prior to contract signature 
has already happened. This limited the scope of this research, because on-going 
interactions in the pre-tendering process could no longer be explored.  
Another aspect that demonstrates the relevance of the municipality of Fortaleza as 
a single case is its critical nature (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Yin, 2003). Unravelling the dynamics of 
on-going actor-relations in a case that completed the PRI pre-tendering stage made the 
case study even more significant.  However, prior to field research, it was not yet known 
that the process would reach completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage. The dynamics of 
actor-relations were explored in the research as interactions took place in the pre-
tendering process to take advantage  of  the  ‘fresh  memory’  of  interviewees  in  the  on-going 
case   and   at   the   possibility   to   ‘close   in’   on   real-life situations and explore the social 
construction of the process as it unfolded in practice (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 82). The study was 
initially aimed at a better understanding of these on-going dynamics, as well as to learn 
lessons on how the process achieved completion or not of the stage. Since the workings of 
actor-relations in the pre-tendering  stage  of  PPP  formulation  in  Brazil   is  still  a   ‘black  box’,  
the descriptive analysis alone was meant to make the case a revelatory one (Yin, 2003). 
Besides that, supposing the case did not complete the pre-tendering stage, the knowledge 
on the problems that derailed the process would have been highlighted. On the other hand, 
since the case study completed the PRI pre-tendering process, it also became a critical case, 
considering that many processes of PPP formulation in Brazil have failed or are still 
struggling to complete the PRI pre-tendering stage. Moreover, actors were able to 
complete the PRI process in a scenario that was more complex than the other PRI cases 
because it initially lacked the elements of the Brazil PPP Framework.  
This is in line with Flyvbjerg (2001) argument that single critical case studies are 
important   for   ‘falsification’.   For   him,   this   is   one   of   the  most   rigorous   tests   on   scientific  
propositions because if one observation does not fit the proposition, it cannot be 
considered   generally   valid   and  must   be   revised   or   rejected.     He   uses   the   example  of   ‘all  
swans   are  white’,   but   the   observation   of   a   single   black   swan   can   falsify   the   proposition.    
Therefore, since the case study completed the PRI pre-tendering process without the 
guidance of the elements of the Brazil PPP Framework, it is a critical case that draws 
attention not only to the dynamics of actor-relations in the process, but also to possible 
problems with the PPP Framework that has been generally adopted in Brazil. Considering 
that officials and experts in Brazil have continuously supported the Brazil PPP Framework 
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as the mainstream approach for guiding the formulation of PPP projects, according to this 
perspective since the case study for this research lacked the elements of the Brazil PPP 
Framework,  it  was  ‘most  likely’  to  fail  the  completion  of  the  pre-tendering stage (Flyvbjerg, 
2001). However, since the case study succeeded in this scenario, important lessons were 
derived with respect to other major elements that may influence  actors’  interactions  in  the  
process.   
In this context, the case study selected is a critical case to understand the elements 
that influence the dynamics of actor-relations towards completion of the pre-tendering 
stage of infrastructure PPP project formulation. The selected case is relevant because it is a 
leading case in the context of Brazilian PRI cases, and the identification of the problems and 
conflicting views and interests preventing and fostering cooperation in this case provide a 
useful initial guide for other cases that may decide in the future to formulate and 
implement PPPs for infrastructure development. This analysis identified types of relations 
that deserve more attention to foster and improve the important dialogue and interactions 
between actors for the shared decision-making process of PPP formulation. The relevance 
of the selected case is also a result of the empirical analysis, leading to a reflection on the 
applicability of research design and on the lessons for policy and practice. This also makes 
the municipality of Fortaleza a revelatory case because in Brazil this is not a common type 
of policy analysis inquiry, which investigates the dynamics of actor-relations in the pre-
tendering stage of PPP formulation.   
6.5 Approach to data collection  
Before discussing the procedures for data collection, it is important to mention that, 
as Creswell (2007) points out, the research design for a qualitative approach can be 
emergent and cannot be tightly prescribed, since the phases of the process may change 
once the researcher begins to put it into practice, including set of questions, forms of data 
collection, and the individuals studied. Mason (2002 ) supports this assertion and says that 
design and strategy in qualitative research may change with the on-going process of the 
research itself. 
6.6 Data collection  
In view of the philosophical approach adopted for this research, it is appropriate to 
mention that since this research was mainly interested in people’s   interpretations,  
perceptions, meanings, reasoning and understandings, these aspects represent the primary 
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data source for this research (J. Mason, 2002 ). Consequently, interviews were the main 
source of evidence for the case study, which were best reported and interpreted through 
the  “eyes  of   specific   interviewees”   (Yin, 2003, p. 92). Moreover, documents and meeting 
notes and observations were  used  as  secondary  sources,  and  interpreted  based  on  people’s  
individuals or collective meanings (J. Mason, 2002 ).  
6.6.1 Documents  
As secondary source of data, documents were used as one method of collection of 
evidence in this research. This source of information was important in supporting and 
expanding evidence from interviews. The documents were used to identify the explicit 
formal relations between the actors, their explicit agendas, their explicit perceptions and 
opinions about other actors, as well as their explicit interests in negotiating (or not) the 
issue with other actors. Indicative information of implicit relations, perceptions or interests 
were clarified, confirmed or rejected during the interviews, along with discussions for 
confirmation on explicit information identified in the analysis of documents. The interviews 
also helped to confirm impressions transmitted by third parties or information (opinions) 
exposed in the press. It is also important to consider that the analysis of documents, 
especially   in   the   collection   of   indicative   information   of   actors’   perceptions,   opinions   and  
interests,   were   not   treated   as   a   direct   representation   and   reflection   of   ‘reality’   or  
straightforward  ‘factual  records’  (J. Mason, 2002 ). Based on the theoretical assumption of 
this research, documents were interpreted in the social, cultural or political context in 
which they were created, rather than as sources of facts about particular events and 
individuals.  
In view of the actors involved in the negotiations, and the formal links and 
procedures required by the PRI pre-tendering formulation process of a PPP project, data 
was collected from legal documents, such as laws, decrees, resolutions, etc., which formally 
establish the procedures that actors are supposed to follow in their interactions from the 
beginning of the negotiation process. Other documents such as independent studies and 
newspaper articles were used to complement this analysis, especially with respect to the 
initial stages of the process which had to be covered retrospectively since they took place 
before the fieldwork. The range of documents also assisted in determining crucial events or 
information, which were mentioned to the interviewees to encourage a discussion about 
their perceptions, interests and opinions.  
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Besides that, documents elaborated and that became available during the research 
period were of great importance especially prior to interviews, such as technical studies 
and legal documents. An analysis of these documents helped to provide the appropriate 
‘prompts’   to  elicit   interviewees   in   recording   relations  and other information they did not 
easily recall, especially considering those with a vast network of interactions (Carrasco, 
Hogan, Wellman & Miller, 2008). There were no problems with respect to accessibility of 
documents, neither in finding the materials nor in obtaining permission to access and use 
them. Several of the documents were already available online. For the ones that were not 
accessible, the interviews were used to request these documents and to obtain indications 
of other documents. The documents used in this research are listed in Appendix 1.  
6.6.2 Meetings 
Observation of meetings was not a method initially intended prior to the fieldwork. 
However, during the research process, participation in meetings as observer became an 
option of data collection. Notes taken and recordings of some of the meetings were used 
as secondary data to understand the on-going behaviour of actors and the process and to 
see the unfolding of events as they took place. Stakeholders involved in these meetings 
were   informed  of  the  researchers’  participation and gave consent for either not-taking or 
recording of the discussions undertaken. The meetings were arranged as the process 
happened, so it was not possible to prepare a schedule for observing meetings a priori. This 
method was also important to validate and triangulate information, and to use as source 
for discussion during the interviews and also to confirm and check documents and aspects 
discussed in other meetings. In total 11 meetings were observed during the fieldwork. The 
types of actors involved in each of the meetings are detailed in Appendix 2. The meetings 
used as observations included daily work routine in which it was possible to observe the 
internal technical dynamics of the PPP formulation process, as well as special meetings 
between consultancy directors and technical actors; meetings between private investors 
and consultancy and technical actors; and meetings between private and public actors. 
Information on other meetings in which the researcher was not able to participate were 
obtained through written meeting minutes, reporting the main issues considered by the 
actors involved.  
6.6.3 The collection of interview data 
According to Yin (2003), interviews are one of the most important sources of 
information for case studies, especially the guided conversations rather than structured 
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questions. The interviews for this research were based on focused open-ended topic or 
questions, which are most advisable for case studies (Yin, 2003). They were based on a 
conversational and fluid approach but still following a consistent set of questions that met 
the   research’s   line  of   inquiry.   The   use   of   ‘one-size-fits-all’   structured   approach   similar   to  
formal surveys and based on the standardization   of   questions   to   minimize   ‘bias’   (as   in  
social interaction between interviewer and participant) would not have created the 
opportunity for the interpretation of constructed knowledge specific to each interview (J. 
Mason, 2002 ). Additionally, since this research was based on a holistic case study aimed at 
in-depth  understanding  of  the  topic’s  complexity,  surveys  or  structured  types  of  interviews,  
which provide surface patterns, would not have been able to give the adequate 
information about the social construction of explanations and arguments (J. Mason, 2002 ). 
Consequently, in order to understand the research topic from the philosophical approach 
adopted,  it  was  necessary  to  understand  people’s  contextual  experiences,  and  not  to  focus  
on a superficial and broad analysis of responses to standard questions provided by a large 
number of people (J. Mason, 2002 ). 
a. Preparing for interviews 
Before the interviews, a protocol (or schedule) was prepared with guiding open-
ended topics to help in the organization of the ideas and on items such as opening and 
concluding the interview, and thanking the respondent (Creswell, 2007). Since interviews 
were open-ended and resembled conversations, only a general interview schedule is 
available in Appendix 3 with a sample of guiding topics/questions. Moreover, it was 
important to account for the order in which to approach actors to be interviewed for this 
research. Contact was initially established with participants who were considered most 
likely to open the door for other important interviews and sources of evidence. This was a 
successful   approach   since   there   were   no   incidents   of   ‘hostile’   participants;   and no 
interviewee tried to create interferences (blockages) for access to other people. However, 
there were some obstacles in the process which are mentioned later in this section.  
As Creswell (2007) mentions, one of the biggest challenges to interviews is 
convincing people to participate in the study, building trust and credibility, and getting 
people to respond. In this context, the credibility of the researcher was essential in opening 
doors   to   key   stakeholders.   It   was   important   to   present   the   researcher’s   academic   and  
professional background, as well as to demonstrate a level of understanding on the subject, 
but not to a point so as to inhibit the participant from opening up to the conversation. 
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Gender issues were considered, since the researcher is a woman and most interviewees 
were men in high senior positions, except for some of the Secretaries and technical actors.  
Prior to each interview, consent forms and information sheets (considering issues 
like disclosure of information, direct attribution, confidentiality, etc.) were forwarded via 
email to interviewees when possible, in compliance with the requirement of the University 
of Sheffield. These are presented in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5. When email addresses 
were not available, interviewees received the consent form and information sheet prior to 
the start of the interview, and participants were given time to read and reflect on the forms. 
It was explained to participants the contents, emphasising the importance of their 
contribution, but also explaining the confidentiality of the process (Creswell, 2007). The 
importance  of   respondents’  participation   in  generating   fairer  and   fuller   representation  of  
their perspectives was emphasized (J. Mason, 2002 ). Permission for recording was asked 
prior   to   the   interview,   but   reassurance   whether   the   information   shared   ‘on   the   record’  
could be used in the research was also obtained after the meeting.   
b. Interviews collected 
Interviews were chosen because it was a way of asking key participants to 
contribute with their insights on the subject, and to suggest additional topics for further 
inquiry, other persons to be interviewed and other sources of evidence, as well as to 
provide access to documentary sources. However, this research did not rely solely on 
specific interview informants, and other interviews were also used as sources to confirm 
information and to search for contrary evidence in an effort at triangulating the data.  
A list of initial interviewees was based on a purposive sample. Since the sampling 
strategy is not aimed at selecting a strategically representative sample, a purposive 
sampling approach was used to identify respondents that were representative of the actors 
who interact with each other for PPP formulation processes considering the context and 
issue that was being studied. If a random sample of interviewees in this scenario had been 
selected, it would have detracted from the initial goal of holistically studying the case. The 
criteria for mapping actors and selecting interviewees was based on their positions as 
individuals or as representatives of organizations involved in the negotiation and decision-
making process, considering also their level of accessibility and specific or general 
knowledge about the issue.     
The initial approach was intended to include all possibly identifiable actors and 
relations in the context of the case study. However, during the research process, this 
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approach was considered impracticable because it would result in too large a scope for this 
research and create difficulties for the in-depth exploration of actor-relations in the pre-
tendering process. Figure 4 ahead portrays the initial picture of actor-relations in the case 
study prior to fieldwork, which was reduced to include the interactions between all 
internally involved public, private and technical/consultancy actors. The following groups 
were not included in the data collection: media, local business owners, property owners, 
street vendors, society. Appendix 6 provides more detailed information on the 
interviewees by job title and type of organization. An important issue in selecting the case 
study also involved practical issues of accessibility of evidence and availability of research 
resources, which were relevant aspects for making the process feasible (Curtis, Gesler, 
Smith & Washburn, 2000, p. 1003). Considering that Fortaleza is my hometown and place 
of work, it was taken into account the competencies of the case study as important 
elements for the feasibility of the research process, such as ability to access participants 
and their experiences for data collection throughout the pre-tendering process of PPP 
formulation. In total, 34 interviews were collected during the research process with all the 
actors from these three groups involved in the pre-tendering stage: (1) 
Consultancy/Technical actors: 14 interviews; (2) Public sector actors: 11 interviews; and (3) 
Private investors: 9 interviews 
 
Figure 4 - Groups of interviewees 
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Considering the location for the interviews, they were conducted on a neutral place, 
always where interviewees felt comfortable and relaxed to share their views and 
interpretations.  Interviewees were always asked to suggest the place for the interview. It 
was also taken into consideration that the location was secure and quiet, aiming at the 
safety of both participants and at an efficient note taking and digital voice recording, which 
was consented upon by every interviewee.  
The interviews were carried in Portuguese, because it was the native language of 
all interviewees. There was no challenge related to language communication problems, 
since   the  researcher’s  native   language   is  also  Portuguese.  Therefore,   the  dynamics  of   the  
interviews was not affected by lack  of  language  skills  of  the  researcher  in  the  interviewees’  
native languages. The fluency of the research in Portuguese also assisted in the translation 
of  key  aspects   into  English   in  order   to  express  participants’  observations   in   the  best  way  
possible. Moreover, even though some of the actors in senior positions were fluent in 
English, the interviews were undertaken in Portuguese since these interviewees argued 
that they expressed themselves better in their native language.  
c. On the information collected 
The interviews were used to identify actors involved in the process, and also to 
confirm the relevance of other actors. During the interview process, special attention was 
paid to new names of potential participants mentioned by the interviewees. Interviews 
were used to confirm explicit formal and informal relations and to unravel implicit relations 
between the actors, as well as to identify their opinions, interests and perceptions and the 
extent  to  which  these  changed  with  actors’  interactions  in  the  pre-tendering process of PPP 
formulation. For this, some key participants were interviewed more than once for 
comparison and in order to capture changes in perspectives during the process. The 
interviews were aimed at understanding major aspects related to actor-relations in the 
context  of   the   case   study   including,   for   example:   actors’   views   and   interpretation   of   the  
PPP   formulation   process   and   of   their   interactions   with   each   other;   actors’   perceptions,  
expectations and opinions of the process and of other actors;   actors’   interests   in  
interacting  with  each  other;  actors’  biases  and  assumptions  towards  the  process  and  other  
actors;  and  actors’  intentions  for  engaging  in  the  PPP  formulation  process.   More details on 
the handling of the data collected will be addressed ahead in section 6.7. 
 
 125 
 
d. Obstacles during data collection 
The complexity of the interactions in a pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation 
required the identification of new interviewees that got involved as the process unfolded. 
Within the same organization (public sector, consultancy) or among the same group 
(private investors, technical actors), the actors identified first were the ones involved in the 
beginning of the negotiations. As the process unfolded, other actors joined the process as 
project manager, coordinators, technical actors, private investors, which were also 
contacted for interviews. It was made the attempt to directly contact interviewees via 
phone calls. In most cases, there were no problems accessing interviewees, especially civil 
servants and technical actors, and even some actors in senior positions (public officials, 
Secretaries, senior investors and directors). Some asked for a more in-depth explanation on 
the research topic and intentions in the same phone call, while others requested more 
details to be sent via email. However, the mayor of Fortaleza was not available for 
interviews; direct contact was not possible, so her secretary explained the interview would 
not   be   possible   due   to   the   mayors’   busy   schedule with political commitments. As an 
alternative, other respondents provided relevant perspectives on the similar issues and on 
meetings in which the mayor participated, which were important for the PPP formulation 
process in the case study. The role of the mayor was accounted for through the perspective 
of interviewees, as well as through press statements in media publications. For this 
research,  ‘cabinet decision-making’  was  considered  as  an  external  force  that  influenced  the  
process of PPP formulation (Lowndes, 2001).  
In other circumstances, it was difficult to obtain access for interview in the first 
attempt. Some potential senior participants were contacted more than once and interviews 
had to be re-scheduled a few times (including due to participants’  no-show), which made 
the process more time-consuming than expected. In a few instances, it was necessary to 
use personal connections and resort to the role of my sponsor to obtain cooperation from 
interviewees. It was acknowledged that this approach could have resulted in bias or 
interviewees’   reluctance   to   share   information   in   comments   and   answers, especially 
considering the participation of the sponsor in the case study as consultant and his position 
in the local context with connections to both public and private potential interviewees 
involved in the case study. Another aspect worth mentioning was my position as a 
consultant. I work for the same private consulting firm that provides services to both public 
and private organizations, which was involved in the interactions for PPP formulation in the 
case. 
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Potential interviewees from these organizations might not have been able to 
differentiate my position as a researcher from consultant. In order to counterbalance 
possible negative effects on reliability or validity of the data, the effort was made to 
emphasize my credibility as researcher and ethical commitments to confidentiality. It is 
hard to know whether interviewees omitted opinions because of this, since none refused 
to participate, or openly refused to comment on any of the topics. Furthermore, they 
neither asked to keep  information  ‘off  the  record’,  declined  to  allow  the  digital  recordings  
or to sign consent forms. On the other hand, the non-sharing of secretive information or 
comments concerning illegal issues such as bribery and corruption could have been a result 
of reluctance that information could be leaked, publicly revealed or misinterpreted by the 
researcher (Creswell, 2007).  
Moreover, as an alternative to the intervention of the sponsor, personal 
acquaintances of mine with a vast social network in the municipality of Fortaleza, but not 
with a relation to the case study, contacted interviewees in senior positions and facilitated 
accessibility. Additionally, in the effort to avoid biases, the researcher tried as much as 
possible to avoid tendencies of aligning interview discussions to intentionally foster 
sympathetic behaviour from participants. Despite all of this, for example, when documents 
were obtained from an interviewee, I was asked not to mention to other participants who 
had provided the documents, but I was allowed to comment on and use these materials in 
subsequent interviews; the participant only asked to remain anonymous (although the 
name would not have been mentioned anyways due to confidentiality commitments). 
There were also instances in which some interviewees commented on specific events but 
refused   to   give   out   names   or   actors’   positions;   instead,   reference   was   similar   to   ‘some  
private/public  actor  involved  in  event  X  …’.  Later, these events were either used as cues or 
brought up in subsequent interviews, and based on the events and dates, it was possible to 
identify the omitted participants through interview transcript cross-checking. Civil servants 
and technical actors were more reluctant to share names than participants in senior 
positions. 
During the interviews, there were some problems when collecting the data, such as 
legal terminology and project finance concepts, which were clarified by the researcher on 
the spot. There was also the challenge of differentiating between the personal opinion of 
an interviewee and the opinion reflecting his or her organizational role, as well as whether 
the comments about third parties reflected his or her perception of an organization or the 
individual who represented that organization. 
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e. Ethical considerations  
To avoid any ambiguities in relation to the use of the data provided by interviewees, 
great attention was given to clarifying to respondents what they would be giving consent to 
by signing the form (J. Mason, 2002 ). Signature of consent form was obtained after the 
interview. In the analysis of the interviews, evidence was only used in the research after 
assessing no potential harms to interviewees. The issue of informed consent was taken 
seriously in this research, in order to assure the adoption of a rigorous moral practice, the 
confidentiality of respondents and the safety of both researcher and participants (J. Mason, 
2002 ). However, as mentioned, there was no sensitive information disclosed by 
interviewees, such as bribery or corruption.  
Another ethical issue considered in the interview was power relations, especially 
because several interviews were undertaken with people in senior positions. However, 
interviewees in these positions did not try to control the agenda through intimidation, for 
example; so it can be said that power relations were equilibrated in the interviewing 
process. Even considering the novelty of the PPP topic in Brazil and in the context of 
Fortaleza as a case study, during the interview the dynamics of positionality and power 
were balanced and interviewees were comfortable to share their perspectives and opinions. 
This reflected a rich exchange of information between the interviewee – with more 
practical knowledge and experience - and the researcher – with more disciplinary and 
academic knowledge on the subject (J. Mason, 2002 ; Smith, 2006).   
6.6.4 Timeframe of data collection 
The next table presents the timeframe for the fieldwork, making a parallel 
between data collection and the pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation in the case 
study.   
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Table 6 - Timeframe of data collection 
CASE  
STUDY   
PRE-TENDERING  STAGE  (PHASE  1  –  PPP  project  formulation) 
Agenda  Setting   
(unofficial  stage  
of  interactions) 
Official  stage  of  interactions,  but  no  legally  
binding  contract    (approx.  1  year  of  process  until  
completion  of  project  design  and  Public  
Consultation  in  June  2012)   
2005 – June 2011 
2011 2012 
July – December  January – June 
FIELD  
RESEARCH   
Late  October  2011 
Beginning  of  field  research 
Early  July  2012 
End  of  field  research 
– Case study 
period (2005 – 
June 2011) 
covered 
through 
document 
collection and 
analysis; 
– Period covered 
retrospectively 
in interviews 
Case study period 
from July to 
December 2011: 
– 2 interviews 
(repeated later on 
in the fieldwork); 
– Transcription of 
interviews; 
– Document 
analysis. 
Case study period from 
January to June 2012: 
– Most interviews were 
collected in this period;  
– 32 interviews, covering 
the current period and 
the previous Episodes 
in retrospective; 
– Second round of 
interviews with key 
actors in Jun-July/2012 
after completion of 
pre-tendering stage; 
– Transcription of 
interviews; 
– Document analysis.  
 
3 meeting 
observations 8 meeting observations 
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6.7 Data Analysis  
6.7.1 Data management: storing, transcribing and translating (the case study 
database)  
For the documents collected and interviews undertaken, an annotated bibliography 
was prepared to facilitate storage and retrieval. A short summary (after coding and analysis) 
of the key information of each document and interview was attached to it in order to 
facilitate later identification (Jackson, 2001). A list of the interviews was also kept with clear 
specifications  of  time  and  place,  and  initials  of  participant’s  name  and  reference  to  his  or  
her organization, which were used to protect their anonymity (Creswell, 2007). Digital data 
was downloaded and paper documents were scanned for digital storage in external drive, 
which was periodically backed up and stored in a password safe computer for security 
purposes. All written material, such as notes and signed consent forms, were scanned and 
digitally stored in the same way as the recordings.  
Transcripts were prepared for every session undertaken using the software NVivo 
for qualitative data analysis. The use of transcripts facilitated the review, coding and 
interpretation of the data for an in-depth understanding of the way in which people 
articulated their ideas, so as to reveal explicit and implicit aspects, and not just the 
substance of their opinions (J. Mason, 2002 ). The transcription process involved 
simultaneous translation of the interview records from Portuguese to English, which was 
essential for the combination of the data analysis with the elements of the conceptual 
framework adopted for this research. Although the analysis was undertaken in English, 
there was constant re-engagement with the interview records in Portuguese to account for 
changes in interpretations for translation with the progress of data analysis. During 
transcription, important terms/sections were kept in both English and Portuguese; relevant 
observations were made about idiomatic expressions; and the main guideline adopted was 
‘readability’,   in   order   to   account   for   the   spoken  words   of   interviewees   in   a  way   to   help  
readers understand the perception of informants in the best light possible (Wolcott, 1994). 
Therefore, unless felt that procedural points, pauses and interjections could communicate 
something revealing, these aspects were edited out of the translated transcripts. Prior to 
field research it was also taken into consideration that transcribing was time consuming; 
and that information obtained an analysed during the transcription process could be useful 
for further interviews. Therefore, most transcription was undertaken during the fieldwork.  
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The processes of data coding and analysis involved three steps, some of them 
simultaneous: familiarization (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994), description and analysis (Wolcott, 
1994). These are discussed next. 
6.7.2 Familiarization: organizing and coding the data 
The stage of familiarization was an immersion in the case study database to gain an 
overview of their range, depth and diversity, while listening to recordings, preparing and 
reading transcripts and reviewing documents (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). This stage also 
involved coding and organization of the material, and it started during the fieldwork.  
When organizing and coding the documents, interview transcripts and meeting 
notes, a few questions were considered: what people, relations, events or situations are 
mentioned?; What are the meanings attributed to events?; What are the main (explicit or 
implicit) perceptions, opinions, interpretations being mentioned?; What new speculations, 
ideas or guesses about relations, actors or opinions are being suggested?; Where should 
the researcher focus more attention during future interviews?; and what sort of 
information and documents should be gathered for further analysis? (Silverman, 2000, p. 
245) 
The process of coding in the familiarization stage was divided in two sequential 
steps. First, from the review of transcripts, codes were assigned to interviewees’  key  words  
or sections, representing the type of comment (explicit or implicit opinions, biases, 
interpretations, perceptions, expectations, motivations and interests) and comments about 
other actors. There was also specification about type of relation between actors, if formal 
or informal, and especially specific episodes of interaction actors referred to or participated 
in during the pre-tendering process. For coding, the software Nvivo was used, which 
facilitated the categorization of themes, events and groups of interviewees, as well as the 
retrieval of specific and relevant themes through Nvivo’s search engine. Manual coding of 
the data was also used.  
The initial focus for the organization and coding was the events to which actors 
referred. The primary frame for the organization and coding – and then carried on to the 
descriptive narrative and analysis stages – was the entire episode that enclosed the actions 
surrounding events (Pescosolido, 1992, p. 1105). In this way, it was possible to identify the 
patterns, combinations and sequences of decisions over the course of main episodes of 
interaction. An important focus for the description and analysis became how these 
episodes were socially constructed and organized.  
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Consequently, all the material was organized in chronological order, including 
pieces of transcripts, laws and other documents made available during the field research. 
This way it was possible to find the events and episodes that were mentioned by most 
people, most of the time. The chronological organization and coding approach started as 
the material was being collected during the process. It minimized the need to constantly re-
read within and across the interview transcripts and documents to find and typify relations 
between actors and their ideas, opinions and interests (Jackson, 2001). However, in some 
instances, it was necessary to go back to the entire source for a better clarification of the 
meanings given by interviewees. Familiarisation was followed by description and analysis, 
which were also in chronological order. For these stages, it was taken into consideration as 
a constant reminder an observation by Wolcott (1994) that description and analysis are 
neither independent of each other nor mutually exclusive and that both involve some level 
of interpretation (p. 63).  
6.7.3 Description 
The description stage referred to the construction of a narrative of the case study, 
including all complexities and contradictions found in the data collected during the field 
research. For the description, the data was studied, not merely skimmed, but it was not 
much transformed, keeping as close to the original sources as possible. The focus at this 
stage was on “What   is   going   on   here?”, according to the data collected and coded. It is 
important to mention that there was not the possibility of providing pure description since 
this is an interpretivist research. However, an attempt was made at being as truthful as 
possible to the original spoken word by interviewees so as to report the data based on the 
participants’  perspectives.   
The description process was organized in chronological order linking comments, 
documents and actors into networks of relations for each episode of interaction mentioned 
in the transcripts and meeting recordings. All of the identified connections were described 
based on the references interviewees made to each other, the formal and informal 
relations identified, as well as the links based on commonalities or divergence of interests, 
biases, perceptions, expectations, etc. This chronological mapping process helped later to 
identify aspects in which actors reconciled interests or collaborated for a specific time, as 
well as diverging aspects which made the negotiation process more difficult. Since the 
focus of the research is on actor-relations, the chronological approach adopted reflected 
relational and not individual information. A focus on a single actor independently from the 
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others was meaningless in terms of a conceptual framework aimed at understanding actor-
relations in an on-going process (Dempwolf & Lyles, 2011, p. 7).  
The result of this process was a thick descriptive narrative of the case in 
chronological order which provided a comprehensive summary of the events based on the 
meanings participants attributed to these events. Five Episodes were derived from this 
process as shown in the table ahead: 
Table 7 - Descriptive Episodes of Interaction 
Episodes of Interaction Periods 
Episode 1: Previous informal negotiations leading to scope 
definition and selection of the PPP as policy 
instrument  
2005 - January 2011 
Episode 2: Period leading to official start of the PRI pre-
tendering process  
Jan 2011 – June 2011 
Episode 3: Formal period authorized for the formulation of 
the PPP project  
July 2011 – Nov 2011 
Episode 4: Period allocated for adjustment in the PPP studies   Dec 2011 – Jan 2011  
Episode 5: Towards completion of the PRI pre-tendering 
process 
Jan 2011 – June 2012 
6.7.4 Analysis 
In the analysis, the focus was placed on the incontrovertible (Wolcott, 1994). This 
was the stage in which some information was considered worthy, while others were 
pushed to the background. In the analytical mode, the process of analysis became more 
selective than in description as some of the data received more attention than others. The 
details of the description included in the analysis were subjected to a critical judgment on 
whether they were relevant and sufficient to the account. According to Wolcott (1994), 
“our field data themselves, contradictory, subjective, unruly, partial as they invariably are, 
provide little basis for knowing the certainty. Subjecting them to rigorous analysis offers a 
way  to  achieve  credibility”  (p.  26). The analysis was aimed at making sense of the data in 
order  to  understand   ‘what  was  central’  and  ‘what  was  peripheral’   (Wolcott, 1994, p. 21). 
The main distinction between description and analysis was the handling of the material 
rather than simply putting the data together in chronological order; it involved the 
“breakdown   and   recombination   of   data”   (Sandelowski, 1998, p.376). However, the 
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separation between description and analysis was not clear cut. It was an interactive process 
which led to the melting between the two. It was through a careful examination for 
contradictions and evidence from all the available sources (notes, transcripts and 
documents) that the descriptive data was turned into a descriptive-analysis.  
The description focused on linking chronological events and their meanings as 
perceived by different actors; however there was no guaranteed meaning or purpose from 
this description. The analysis, on the other hand, gave the explanatory structure for linking 
these events based on the conceptual framework adopted for the research. For different 
episodes   of   interaction   and   for   different   elements   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional  
arrangement’   (policy,   legal,   organizational   and   strategic),   it was possible to identify on 
what aspects actors agreed or disagreed with, their differences, commonalities, etc. This 
process   went   a   step   further   to   include,   for   each   specific   episode,   the   researcher’s  
interpretation   of   the   type   and   association   between   actors’   comments,   such   as  
contradictory or confirmatory (information and actions versus shared thoughts and 
opinions),  conflicting/diverging  or  supporting  (actors’  diverging  interests,  perceptions,  etc.),  
common (opinions, perceptions, expectations, interests), etc. At this stage, the researcher 
systematically checked for connections between actors and their perceptions, motivations, 
interests, etc., which were made explicit by the respondents or derived from implicit 
associations uncovered in the process (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). It was also at this stage, 
after analytical scrutiny, that multiple voices were gathered within the same group of 
actors (public, private, and technical/consultancy).  
Some of the communication between the data and the reader was done through 
the   ‘eyes’  of   the  researcher,  according  to   the  researcher’s   interpretation,  with  the  use  of  
the theoretical and conceptual lenses and filters explained in Chapters 4 and 5 (Creswell, 
2007; J. Mason, 2002 ).   ‘Raw   data’   from   interview   transcripts   were   interpreted   and   not  
always made available in the body of the text as quotations, unless there was compelling 
reason to do so, such as the need for evidence to support arguments. As Wolcott (1994) 
points out,   passing   ‘raw’   rather   than   ‘cooked’   data   and   over   burdening   readers   can   be  
considered a cop-out on the part of a researcher who relies too tightly on the belief that 
data speak for themselves. As Sandelowski (2010) asserts, in qualitative research, “data 
never speak for themselves” and the researcher is not behaving unethically for interpreting 
them, as long as he or she does not avoid rigours and takes on the responsibilities and risks 
of interpretation (p. 79) 
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After this process, the five descriptive Episodes were compacted into three 
descriptive–analytical Episodes. At the end of each Episode, a summary of the account was 
provided   for   each   element   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   (policy,   legal,  
organizational and strategic).   
Table 8 - Descriptive-Analytical Episodes of Interactions 
Episodes of Interaction Periods 
Episode 1: From initial informal negotiations to official start of 
the PRI pre-tendering process 
2005 - July 2011 
Episode 2: Formal period authorized for the formulation of the 
PPP project  
July 2011 – Nov 2011 
Episode 3: Towards completion of the PRI pre-tendering process Dec 2011 – Jun 2012 
6.7.5 Interpretation 
The previous stages of description and analysis also involved some level of 
interpretation in order to make sense of the data, but the attempt was made to remain as 
close as possible to the meanings attributed by participants to the events, relations, 
concepts and processes described and analysed. Another level of interpretation was also 
used in this research, which involved new meanings created by the researcher and 
explicitly shared in contributions and general implications presented in the Conclusion 
(Chapter 10). For this it was taken into account that final interpretative contributions do 
not have to be as tied to description as the analytical account, but it may also involve 
speculations about implications with a discernible link to the case study (Wolcott, 1994).  
6.8 Validity and Reliability  
6.8.1 Reliability: dependability  
Reliability generally concerns the dependability and consistency of the research 
findings. It refers to the ability of another researcher to reach similar findings if the 
research is conducted based on the same methods and procedures. It is important to 
consider, however, that an interpretivist approach on a research allows for different but 
equally valid findings from different perspectives on the same phenomenon. Therefore, 
reliability in this qualitative and interpretivist research refers to the dependability of the 
data collection, analysis and interpretation that was undertaken by this researcher. The 
 135 
 
data collection process based on interviews, meeting observations and documents, as well 
as the process of data analysis and interpretation, was documented in detail in this chapter 
to demonstrate consistency of the findings obtained. Additional information is also 
provided in the APPENDICES on meetings and interviews, including the dates on which they 
took place.  
In order to account for the changing context in which the study took place, one of 
the strategies adopted was sampling saturation during the field research process. All public, 
private and consultancy/technical actors involved in the pre-tendering process were 
interviewed as the process unfolded, and some were interviewed more than once during 
the process. In addition to that, collecting, coding and analysing data happened 
simultaneously in a mutually interactive and repetitive way. Preliminary ideas, information 
and findings emerging from the data - as interviews were transcribed and analysed, 
meeting notes collected and documents reviewed – guided additional data collection and 
were constantly checked and re-checked by the new data obtained in the subsequent 
interviews. In this way it was possible to obtain additional information for cross-checking 
and to assure the consistency of the data. 
Triangulation through the combination of methods was another strategy for 
assuring reliability (and also validity). Multiple methods, such as meeting observation, 
documents and interviews were used to assess the reliability of data obtained during the 
research process, but also in understanding the diverse construction of realities by the 
actors involved. The details that survived triangulation through the confrontation of 
complementary methods were carried on from description to analysis. The interactive 
approach of data collection and analysis and the selection of an on-going case study 
allowed for the tracking of the social construction of reality as the process unfolded. This 
was complemented by the recruitment of new interviewees as they joined the process and 
by the second round of interviews, in which changes in perceptions and opinions were 
accounted for.  
6.8.2 Internal Validity: credibility  
Internal validity is about rigor and credibility in the research; it refers to the 
research design and to the role of interpretation. In this research, validity was not about 
pursuing objective truth, but it was a matter of faithfulness to the socially constructed 
reality as described by participants involved in the case study.  
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Considering the research design, methodological coherence was achieved by 
finding congruence between research questions and the types of the methods used. As 
explained in this chapter, the theoretical perspective and research questions match the 
methods, which in turn match the data obtained and the procedures for analysis which 
were informed by the conceptual framework adopted. Moreover, since this research aim 
was to engage in a deeper understanding of a phenomenon, a holistic single case study 
allowed this approach.  
Another aspect worth mentioning is the iterative rather than linear character of the 
qualitative inquiry. The researcher followed suggestions proposed by Morse, Barrett, 
Mayan, Olson and Spiers (2002) and engaged in constant monitoring, confirming and 
verifying to assure rigour, in which it was necessary to move back and forth between design 
and implementation to ensure the fit of data with description, analysis and interpretation 
and to ensure congruence among research questions, literature review, interviewee 
recruitment, data collection strategies, and analysis. This approach was essential 
considering the fact that prior and during the field research it was not yet known that the 
process would reach completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage.  
As for the role of interpretation, the use of qualitative research imposed a 
challenge for the researcher who interpreted interviewees’  understandings  of  their  realities,  
because she had to be aware of her biases and take those into account when interpreting 
interviewees’   comments   and   views.   Considering the result from the interpretation of 
interview transcripts, recordings and documents, the aim was to make a coherent analysis 
of the material in view of the initial concerns of the research about actor-relations. The 
researcher engaged in a reflexive process in order to make valid inferences from the data 
and to make sure that the account was as close as possible a reflection of the meanings 
given by participants. Actors told their versions of the story in the interviews, the 
researcher wrote the account based on what she heard and transcribed and on what the 
stories meant to her, but keeping   interviewees’   own   words   and   concepts   as much as 
possible and based on the theoretical and conceptual lenses adopted. The attempt was 
made to maintain the voice of participants as the dominant ones in the account so as to 
avoid  a  distortion  of  participants’  own  meanings  by  the  effort  at  analysis  and  interpretation  
(Polkinghorne, 2007).  
In  addition  to  that,  the  ‘thick descriptive-analysis’  approach  adopted  for telling the 
account was an attempt at supporting claims through arguments based on the evidence 
 137 
 
collected, but also to allow readers to shape their own thinking about the account and to 
assess its plausibility and accuracy. In this research, the descriptive part of the account 
referred to the voice of the participants; the analysis part was the voice of the participants 
through the eyes of the researcher. Nevertheless, as Polkinghorne (2007) argues,   “the  
claim need not assert that the interpretation proposed is the only one possible; however, 
researchers need to cogently argue that theirs is a viable interpretation grounded in the 
assembled  texts”  (p.  484).  Therefore,  even  in  face  of  a  well-supported documented account, 
considering the interpretivist character of the research, it is possible that another 
researcher could have interpreted the data in a different way and told the story differently.  
6.8.3 External Validity: transferability  
External validity is about whether the findings obtained from this research can be 
transferred to a wider context. This was approached in this chapter with respect to the 
holistic single case-study of the municipality of Fortaleza, Ceara, Brazil. It is a representative 
case because the PRI pre-tendering process of infrastructure PPP formulation at the federal, 
state and municipal levels includes similar types of private, public and technical actors, 
similar legislations and legal and administrative procedures. Moreover, in all three levels 
there is embeddedness of project finance principles in the pre-tendering process in PPP 
legislations. The findings from the study of the case can also inform several municipalities 
in the North and Northeast of Brazil that face similar urban mobility problems in central 
areas involving parking issues, traffic congestion and illegal occupation of public spaces by 
street commerce. In addition to that, since the PPP project used for the case study has 
completed the pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation, from its revelatory nature lessons 
can be drawn to other cases that are still struggling to complete the process and to future 
processes based on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism. This research 
will only attempt to transfer lessons from elements of the case that can be applicable to 
the formulation of PPPs in Brazil at the federal and state levels, as well as in other 
municipalities. This research will not attempt to transfer context-dependent elements of 
the case study. Contextual particularities will be used to exemplify, emphasize and shed 
light on the process-related aspects of project formulation, which are similar at federal, 
state and municipal levels in Brazil.  
6.9 Brief summary of the chapter 
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This chapter explained in detail the research strategy and methods used in this 
qualitative research. It covered the following aspects: the philosophical background of this 
research, the case study approach to inquiry, data collection (34 in depth interviews as 
primary method; documents and meetings as secondary), the data analysis process and 
issues of validity and reliability. The research designed and the data analyzed were aimed 
at answering the two research questions set out in Chapter 5 (section 5.1.2.): 
1. How  did  actors’  construct  and  enact  a  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  through  
their relations? How did it influence actors in the completion of the PPP 
formulation process in the PRI pre-tendering stage? 
2. What are the lessons learned for the formulation of infrastructure PPP projects in 
Brazil in the PRI pre-tendering stage? 
The three chapters that follow present the findings from the research process, 
which are divided in three chronological Episodes of interaction (next table), to show the 
results of the in-depth exploration of the dynamics of actor-relations in the formulation of 
an infrastructure PPP project, using as case study the PRI pre-tendering process in the 
municipality of Fortaleza, Brazil.  
Table 9 – Link between Chapters and Phases of Interactions in the Case Study 
Chapters Phases 
Chapter 7: EPISODE 1  
Actor-relations in the initial pre-tendering 
stage of a city centre PPP formulation: the 
construction  of  the  ‘systemic institutional 
arrangement’ 
Period between the 2005 (beginning of the 
first administration of the mayor in office 
during the case study) until July, 2011, when 
there was the official kick-off meeting that 
marked the beginning of the process. 
Chapter 8: EPISODE 2  
Actor-relations in the enactment and 
adjustment  of  the  ‘systemic institutional 
arrangement’ 
Period between July 2011 (kick-off meeting) 
until the submission of the PPP project design 
to the local government in November, 2011.  
Chapter 9: EPISODE 3 
Actor-relations in the re-adjustment of 
the  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’ 
Period of adjustments in the technical studies 
of the PPP project. This period started in 
December 2011 and finished with the 
publication of the PPP project for Public 
Consultation, in June 2012. 
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Chapter 7 - Descriptive-Analysis of EPISODE 1 
Actor-relations in the initial pre-tendering stage of a city centre PPP 
formulation: the  construction  of  the  ‘systemic  institutional  
arrangement’ 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter is a descriptive-analysis of EPISODE 1 of the case study, covering the 
period between the 2005 municipal administration of Fortaleza until July, 2011, which 
officially marked the beginning of the PPP formulation process with a kick off meeting. It 
was during this period that public and private actors constructed the foundations of the 
‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  for the formulation of the city centre re-ordering PPP 
project, which was complemented in EPISODE 2. The discussion of this chapter is based on 
the four elements of the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’,   following   a   chronological  
order: policy, legal, organizational and strategic arrangements. The last section is a 
summary of the main aspects of the analysis of EPISODE 1, focusing on the embeddedness 
and  innovation  in  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’.  The  summary  is  organized  around  the  same  
elements  of  the  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’.  
7.2 Policy arrangement: prioritizing PPP as policy instrument for the 
city centre urban mobility project  
This section analyzes the agreement on the infrastructure scope for the city centre 
re-ordering PPP, which happened before the selection of the PPP as policy delivery 
instrument. Two aspects are discussed in this section. First, it analyzes the construction of 
the policy scope, involving the urban mobility aspect of parking lots and the social 
infrastructure element of Popular Commercial Centres (PCCs) to allocate street vendors 
who irregularly occupied public spaces in the central area.  Second, since the infrastructure 
scope was constructed prior the selection of PPP as policy instrument, this section also 
analyzes  actors’  decision  to  use  PPPs  as  delivery tool for the city centre intervention. 
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7.2.1 The construction of policy scope: external influences and conciliation of 
interests 
In EPISODE 1, public and private actors agreed on the scope of the urban mobility 
policy for the city centre intervention based on complementary interests and awareness of 
interdependencies. The external forces that influenced the definition of the scope were 
policy and political priorities to solve the irregular occupation of central areas by street 
vendors and the urban mobility problems associated with increased traffic congestion in 
the city centre, irregularity of parking lots and absence of alternative parking options. It 
was also influenced by the economic and business scenario which attracted the interest of 
local businessman to investment in parking lots in the city centre. The policy and political 
forces were the city centre re-ordering (Reorganization) plan, pressures from control 
bodies, the media and society, the coming of municipality elections which required an 
improvement  in  the  local  administrations’  credibility,  especially  due  to  its  failure  to  deliver  
previous projects and lack of resources to implement the re-ordering plan.  
For several years, the municipality of Fortaleza faced policy problems in relation to 
the city centre. Since the 1970s, the illegal occupation of public spaces by street vendors 
was a major issue approached by different local administrations (Dantas, 2005). Although 
they attempted to find solutions, it was never completely solved. When a mayor of 
Fortaleza was elected in 2005, she inherited the problematic situation of the central area 
and throughout her two administrations (2005-2008 and 2009-2012) a solution to the 
occupation of public spaces was strongly placed in the agenda as a priority. 
The local government, through the City Centre Secretariat – the municipal body 
responsible for the administration of the central area–, tried to implement several 
organization initiatives, and also considered alternatives to build commercial centres to 
allocate street vendors. These alternatives were part of the re-ordering (reorganization) 
plan   of   the   City   Centre   (‘Plano de Reordenamento do Centro da Cidade’). Among the 
actions of the Re-ordering Plan, there was a focus on tackling the illegal occupation of 
public spaces by street vendors. Between 2008 and 2010, the local government tried to 
implement a solution through the construction of a commercial centre, known as the 
Centre for Small Businesses (Beco da Poeira). This solution received several criticisms from 
society, the media, street vendors and public sector actors. There were numerous 
problems with the new facility, such as a 40% decrease in sales of street vendors, 
inadequate physical infrastructure for the circulation of pedestrians, poor cleaning services 
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despite the maintenance tariff paid to the local government, security complaints and the 
robbery   of   street   vendors’   products   (O Povo Newspaper, 2010; W. Ribeiro, 2011b). In 
October 2011, of the nearly 2100 boxes available in the Centre, 1600 were not occupied, as 
several vendors returned to the streets (W. Ribeiro, 2011b). Therefore, the main attempt 
to implement the Re-ordering Plan by organizing the situation of street vendors failed with 
the unsuccessful experience of the Centre of Small Businesses.   
Interviews revealed that private and consultancy actors also perceived a clear 
political interest of the public sector in a city centre intervention for organizing the 
situation of street vendors. Those interests were directly related to local  administration’s  
attempts to improve its credibility with society considering that 2012 was a municipal 
election year. Perceptions in the local context that the local administration had failed to 
deliver promised projects and to solve city centre problems had already reduced the 
administration’s   credibility with society. The media published several newspaper articles 
about the problems the local administration and street vendors had been facing with the 
Centre of Small Businesses. The City Centre Secretary mentioned in interview her opinion 
about this: “There   is   already   this   example   of   the   Centre   of   Small   Businesses,  which   is   an  
unsuccessful example. The local government spent a lot of money to construct it, to operate 
it, and it  gives  a  lot  of  headaches”.  
The political interest was also influenced by pressure from control bodies on the 
local government for an urgent solution to deal with city centre problems. The notifications 
received by the local government were frequently covered by the media, which had been 
highlighting   the   issues   in   the   central   area   over   the   years,   as   well   as   the   municipality’s  
incapacity to find a long term solution. Moreover, in September 2009, control bodies 
notified the City Centre Secretariat to solve the illegal occupation of public spaces by street 
vendors in the city centre, which was infringing the local urban legislation (municipal Law of 
Land Use and Occupation) (Law n. 7987, 1996). Interviewees acknowledged the pressures 
from control bodies, the media and society on the local government.  
In addition to that, because 2012 was an election year, private and consultancy 
actors were aware of the increased political interest of the local administration to engage 
in a project that was recognized as priority by the local society, in order to help improve its 
credibility   and   the  chances  of   the  mayor’s   successor  being  elected. They reflected in the 
interviews on the importance of the city centre project to the local government, especially 
to the mayor and city councillors. As a result, there was a perception that the political 
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interest of the local administration was aimed at capitalizing on a policy intervention not 
only to solve city centre issues, but also to improve its local credibility near an electoral 
year. These actors perceived that since society had long expected policies to discipline the 
situation in the city centre, the government visualized a political opportunity with the PCCs.   
According to the interviews, the political will of the local government was initially 
directed at commercial centres. This perception resulted from the social orientation of the 
local   administration   of   the   Worker’s   Party,   which   was   politically   committed to street 
vendors (as both electors and citizens). Therefore, a solution to the illegal occupation of 
public   spaces   was   considered   an   issue   that   the   ‘city   claimed   for’, which had become a 
policy and political priority.  
Consequently, following pressures from control bodies and society and with the 
proximity of the election year, the local government increased the focus on trying to find 
financing alternatives for the construction and operation of new popular commercial 
centres. After receiving notifications from control bodies in 2009, the municipal 
government started to mobilize to solve the situation. In several occasions, as covered by 
the local media, the mayor expressed the need to acquire properties for the construction 
of commercial centres, her commitment to city centre business owners and that the 
operation of PCCs would most likely happen via concession to the private initiative in order 
to reduce the financial burden on the local administration (Moscoso, 2010). 
The public sector interest in the policy intervention with the participation of the 
private sector was influenced by the need for additional sources of funding for constructing 
PCCs, because the resources available through tax collection or federal government 
transfers were insufficient. The City Centre Secretary expressed this in interview:  
The idea was due to government lack of resources. Since the Brazilian State has a 
responsibility for providing basic services [i.e. health, education], this is heavy on 
the State's budget, especially considering the need to split resources among cities, 
and it's worse for the urban aspect. Cities are poor. Whatever the local government 
gets from tax collection is not enough to fund its basic public policies and to pay for 
the structure of the state. So for the urban public policy there is even less money 
available.  (…)  The  municipal  government  has  a  scope,  which  is  to  provide  the  social  
welfare of the population; but in order to do this the money has to come from 
somewhere. 
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While since 2005 the local administration faced increased pressure from society, 
the media and control bodies, an increased interest from local businessmen started to 
develop for a business opportunity in the city centre involving parking lots. The shortage of 
parking spaces and the high number of vehicles circulating in the area attracted the 
attention of local private investors with experience in the operation of parking lots. It was 
common knowledge in the local context that the urban mobility situation in the city centre 
was problematic, that the existing parking lots in the city centre were irregular and that it 
was a profitable business.   
For the public sector, it was also politically important to solve the situation of 
parking lots. The media constantly covered the difficulties the municipality faced with the 
irregularity of parking lots in the city centre. Most of these lots operated in precarious 
conditions, did not have the necessary municipal operation licenses, did not follow local 
legislation for parking facilities and did not pay the required taxes to the municipal 
authority. In 2009, the City Centre Secretariat also received notifications from control 
bodies to solve problems related to accessibility and mobility in the city centre, including 
the situation of irregular parking lots in the area, which were infringing the local urban 
legislation (municipal Code of Works and Postures) (Law n. 5530, 1981). Since 2006, the 
media had frequently covered mobility problems in the city centre as the population 
complained about the irregular occupation of sidewalks by drivers and insufficient number 
of parking spaces (Diario do Nordeste Newspaper, 2006; Wanbergna, 2006). At that time, 
the municipal government, under the first administration of the mayor (2005-2008), 
guaranteed that it would address these demands. Nevertheless, with no effective solutions 
from the local government, these problems only got worse over time.  
The local government considered the situation of irregular parking lots complicated 
to solve. The City Centre Secretariat was aware that it could only notify and close those lots 
if it could provide parking alternatives to the population. It was difficult for the local 
government to intervene and close the irregular lots because they attended – and were 
even insufficient for – the high parking demand in the area, despite their inadequacy and 
irregularity. Public sector interviewees explained that the provision of regular parking 
services would create the appropriate conditions for the local government to close 
irregular parking lots in the central area.   
A group of local businessmen, who became private investors for the city centre PPP 
formulation, visualized parking lots as a lucrative business opportunity. From their 
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international experience of observing parking lots in city centres worldwide, they had an 
embedded perception that it could be a solution to the shortage of parking spaces in 
Fortaleza’s  city  centre, as the next quote illustrates:  
One or two years ago, I took two trips, one to Berne on the way back from China, 
and the other to Zurich. In both cities, I parked in underground parking lots, one 
below a square and the other in a building next to a train station; very expensive, 
but  very  modern.  And  then  I  thought  about  Fortaleza,  I  thought:  ‘In  Fortaleza  there 
aren't  parking  spaces  in  the  city  centre.  It's  very  complicated.’ So I kept that idea in 
mind (private investor 1).  
The group of local businessmen also understood that the majority of parking lots 
were irregular. They were also aware that the local government had not taken the initiative 
to close them because of the lack of alternatives. Therefore, they proposed to the 
municipality a solution that involved the provision of regular parking services in compliance 
with local urban legislations (the municipal Code of Works and Posture3) (Law n. 5530, 
1981). 
Public and private actors recognized that they were involved in a situation of 
mutual dependency. Local businessmen knew that they needed the political will of the local 
government in favour of private investment in regular parking lots. For this, the 
municipality made it clear that their policy priority for the PCCs was an important pre-
requisite. Based on mutual interests and awareness of their interdependencies, actors 
decided to join PCCs and parking lots as the project scope of a policy intervention in the city 
centre. They relied on the dependency of the private sector on the political will of the local 
government and on the dependency of the public sector on private finance for the 
implementation of a city centre re-ordering project. The scenario presented next reflects 
actors’   conciliation   of   interests   for   the   inclusion   of   PCCs   and   parking   lots   in   the  
infrastructure scope for the city centre urban mobility intervention. 
                                                          
3 Article 1 - This Law legislates on the execution of public and private works in the Municipality of Fortaleza, on 
measures of administrative police under the jurisdiction of the municipality. It legislates with respect to the 
public order, hygiene, installation and operation of equipment and activities in view the following objectives: I. 
to ensure proper conditions to basic activities such as housing, circulation, recreation and work. II. To improve 
the environment, ensuring minimum conditions of comfort, hygiene, safety and public welfare, on buildings or 
any works and facilities within the municipality. Article 2 - This Law refers to urban postures and requirements 
applicable to works in general in the municipality, without prejudice to the provisions set forth in Law of Land 
Use and Occupation (Law n. 5530, 1981, own translation).  
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Conciliation of interests between actors was the main socially constructed 
institution that influenced the preference for the PPP instrument. The analysis of the 
perceptions, opinions and interactions of public and private actors involved in the case 
study demonstrate that through informal interactions public and private actors were able 
to reconcile interests, overcome biases and assumptions, and reach an agreement on the 
urban mobility infrastructure scope of PCCs and parking lots for a city centre intervention.    
Actors perceived the PCCs and the re-reordering plan as the initial point for the 
definition of the city centre intervention scope, but through informal interactions with 
actors in the local government, private actors were able to demonstrate their interest in 
investing in regular parking lots in the central area to help solve urban mobility problems. 
Since the public sector had PCCs as a priority in the agenda, local businessmen were 
persuaded of the need to invest in the construction and operation of PCCs as well, in order 
to secure the political will of the municipality for an intervention that involved the 
provision of parking services.  
In 2011, a group of local businessmen of different companies informally contacted 
the City Centre Secretary and confirmed that the public sector had the interest to 
implement a city centre policy with the participation of the private sector. The interviews 
revealed that through informal interactions, local businessmen, the Secretary and the 
general director of a local consultancy exchanged ideas that led to conciliation of interests 
and   agreement   on   a   policy   scope   that   responded   to   actors’   interests   and  
interdependencies. The following comment by a private investor clarifies this aspect: 
It first started with the commercial centres. I have a good contact with the City 
Centre Executive Secretary, and she told me about the problems related to the 
street vendors. She was already emptying a few areas, and the municipal 
government does not have the money to do this. The Secretary already knew the 
general director of the consultancy, and they started talking, and one conversation 
led  to  another,  and  that's  how  the  idea  came  about.  (…)  So,  I  believe  that  it  started  
from several people approaching the municipal authority about this intervention, 
and the idea started to grow (private investor 2).  
Local businessmen expressed to public actors that they understood the importance 
of the PCCs for the municipality, especially considering the responsibility for answering to 
the demands of street vendors. The next interview comment by a private actor shows their 
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awareness with respect to the political importance of PCCs to the local government and the 
expected result of a policy intervention for the city centre: 
No municipal authority will want to break ties with street vendors, since they are 
electors.   (…)  So   I   think, ‘can  you  remove  them?’  No.  So   if  you  can't remove them, 
you must organize them. You must create conditions for them to work, to become 
formal workers. In this way it is possible to have a more organized city   centre”  
(private investor 1). 
The interviews with private actors show that they knew the importance of 
commercial centres for improving credibility of the local administration with society near 
an electoral year. They were aware that the media, society and control bodies were 
publicly demanding the completion of unfinished projects and a solution for city centre 
problems. For private actors, the mayor could take advantage of the city centre 
intervention to overcome negative perceptions of her administration and help in the 
election of her successor. The next comment reflects this perception: 
The important thing is the public sector must buy the idea; and the mayor bought 
the idea. She wants this because she knows it is politically good. She will soon start 
the  ‘Beira-Mar’  project,  but  won't  finish  it.  She  started  the  ‘Santa  Terezinha’  project,  
and stopped. (…)  But  people forget the past if she delivers projects even if delayed. 
And   then   she'll   say:   ‘The   solution   for   the   street   vendors   is   here’ (…). She is really 
good at selling the idea (private investor 1). 
As a result, private actors promptly agreed with the inclusion of the PCCs because 
they recognized the importance of obtaining cooperation from the local government for 
the approval of parking lots in the scope. For private actors, developing public sector 
political will in favour of parking lot intervention was a crucial aspect. The following quote 
exemplifies private interviewees’   understanding   that   political   will   was   an   important  
mobilizing factor: “I  think  that  political  will  comes  in  first  place.  In  reality  if  it  weren't  for  this  
political will, we would not be where we are today. The idea would have died in the 
beginning”   (private   investor   5). Investors interpreted the joint scope as an exchange of 
interests that would benefit both sectors. The following comment from a private 
interviewee reflects this perception: 
I think the discussion over where to put street vendors has been exhausted, one day 
‘let's put them here’,  the  other  day  ‘let's put them there’. Obviously, it came at the 
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right moment. Both projects are complementary. For the municipality, it is very 
important that the situation of the street vendors become regularized. In parallel, 
the city centre needs parking lots, because the ones working there today are all 
irregular, no security. So it is good for the municipality and for the private sector 
(private investor 4).  
Moreover, according to private interviewees, they considered the construction, 
operation and management of the PCCs a  “small business”,  easy   to  be   implemented  and  
administered, while the parking lots was perceived as a more complex but highly profitable. 
They also knew that there was an interest from the local government in the parking lots 
due to the chaotic mobility situation of the city centre. Private investors mentioned in the 
interviews that the inclusion of the PCCs in the scope was “a  means   to  an  end”   (private 
investor 1) and a way to avoid confrontation with the public sector and to “prevent   the  
municipal authority  from  creating  any  difficulties”  (private investor 2).  
Since private actors agreed with the PCCs, the local government also accepted the 
inclusion of parking lots in the infrastructure scope of the city centre policy. Interviewees 
from the public sector recognized that the local government used the parking lot aspect of 
the scope because it needed to find a way to attract private resources for the construction 
of PCCs. As the interviews showed, public actors wanted to combine parking lots and PCCs 
so that the private initiative could earn enough financial return from the profitable parking 
lot business in order to compensate for the smaller return from PCCs. They knew there was 
an official and legal rent ceiling on the amount the private initiative would be able to 
charge from street vendors for a space or box in PCCs (set at R$ 104 (or approximately £ 30) 
(Decree n. 12848, 2011). They also knew that the parking lot tariffs would be determined 
based on more flexible market prices, which had already attracted the interest of the 
private initiative.  
Consequently, the public sector considered that the inclusion of the profitable 
parking lot business in the policy scope would reduce the need of a complementary 
compensation from the local government to make the intervention financially feasible. 
Besides that, it was also an alternative to the irregular parking lots operating in the city 
centre under precarious conditions and not paying taxes to the municipality. For the public 
sector, reducing the burden on the municipal budget, solving the city centre mobility 
situation and finding alternatives for the irregularity of parking lots was a complementary 
aspect to the construction of commercial centres for the implementation of the re-ordering 
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plan. For them, it was, a ‘bonus’, or the ‘cherry   on   the   cake’, as interviewees from the 
public sector emphasized. The PPP Unit Secretary also explained this:  
It was noticed that to fulfil a necessity of the municipality, which was the removal of 
the vendors from the streets, there would be no private investor interested in only 
that,  ‘how  would  they  pay  that  bill?’; and we have the idea to reduce the payment 
burden on the municipal government. So it also came from the existing city demand 
for parking spaces. It's very complicated, because all the parking lots are 
inadequate, irregular. So there is a demand in the city centre for parking spaces, 
and there was a business opportunity. By adding the revenue from both projects, 
from the parking lots and from renting boxes in the PCCs, it would develop private 
interest in constructing PCCs and parking lots. So it was based on a demand from 
the municipal government, and they saw the business opportunity. They visualized 
this. 
The inclusion of parking lots in the scope also involved the persuasion of the mayor. 
Actors were certain that the mayor was mainly interested in the PCCs and that she had to 
be convinced that the construction and operation of only PCCs would not make the 
intervention attractive to the private initiative. However, it was clear from the interviews 
that public actors were convinced that for the mobilization of private financing, which was 
essential to make the policy intervention feasible, it was crucial the inclusion of parking lots 
in the scope. Actors also mentioned that the mayor understood this argument. The 
following comment from an interview with a private investor illustrates this: 
The mayor, in the beginning, only wanted to implement the PCCs; but it was shown 
to her that the private sector would not be only interested in the PCCs, because the 
private initiative would spend a lot of money to implement it, but it would charge a 
‘social   amount’.   (…) On the other hand, when you charge an amount the market 
accepts, it's easier to earn profit and also to pay for the costs of the PCC, in which 
you will also have to invest (private investor 1).  
As the interviews revealed, awareness of mutual interests and interdependencies 
led to conciliation of interests and joint construction of the infrastructure scope for the city 
centre intervention.   Based   on   public   and   private   actors’   capacity   to   conciliate   their  
interests, the city centre policy scope was generally defined as the construction, operation 
and maintenance of PCCs and parking lots. During the time of these initial discussions, the 
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possibility of using the PPP instrument for policy delivery was still not specifically being 
considered. 
7.2.2 The selection of the PPP as policy instrument: overcoming biases and the 
use of rules of appropriateness  
Actors selected the PPP instrument because of its perceived advantages to meet 
their interests over the traditional policy delivery tools available. It was obvious to 
interviewees that the municipality had urgency in solving the situation of street vendors, 
but lacked the necessary resources for the implementation of PCCs. Contracting out via the 
traditional procurement method (traditional bidding 8666 Law and common concession 
8987 Law) was ruled out by public actors due to perceptions of it being a highly 
bureaucratic process, and more costly to the local government than the PPP instrument. 
The analysis in this section shows that the selection of the PPP instrument was based on 
the overcoming of existing biases and lack of experience, as well as on the influence of 
embedded rules that indicated the PPP instrument to be more appropriate for the situation 
at hand than other options available. 
For the local public sector, among other alternatives the PPP instrument was 
preferable because it allowed the private initiative to invest in the construction and 
operation of PCCs and parking lots in a single operation, which was a way to accelerate the 
contracting out process for the implementation of the project. The traditional method, on 
the other hand, separated the procurement for construction from the procurement for 
service provision, such as operation and maintenance of facilities. Under the traditional 
procurement instruments, the public sector would have to separately hire a private builder 
to construct the new PCCs and parking lots through the traditional tendering law (8666 
Law). As for the operation and maintenance; the local government had already expressed 
its unwillingness to directly provide these services due to the unsuccessful experience of 
the Centre of Small Businesses. Consequently, it would have to engage in another bidding 
process to hire a private company for operation and maintenance of the facilities. The 
interviews revealed that actors recognised that facing two separate bureaucratic bidding 
processes would take longer than desired by local public actors. For private and 
consultancy actors, this   was   influenced   by   the   administration’s   need   to build up its 
credibility with society near the election year of 2012. Interviewees also realized that the 
federal PPP Law of 2004 could be used as an instrument that permitted to hire the private 
company in a single bidding process for service provision and construction of public works.  
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Public interviewees also acknowledged that under the traditional 8666 instrument 
for hiring the construction of the facilities, the local government would have to pay for the 
public works immediately after the completion of the PCC facility, absorbing the entire 
capital expenditure costs of construction and increasing the burden on the already 
constrained municipal budget. Under the PPP instrument, however, these costs could be 
transferred to the private sector, which would obtain its financial return – also for 
construction costs - throughout the contract execution for parking and PCC service 
provision. Moreover, under the PPP, the local government would only need to pay any 
pecuniary compensation after the beginning of service delivery, delaying immediate public 
expenditures with the initiative. As the following quote by the City Centre Secretary 
illustrates, interviewees from the local government involved in the discussions understood 
that the traditional procurement instrument would be burdensome on the municipality: 
If we were going to try to do it through the 8666 Law, it would be impossible, 
because the local government would have to be in charge of everything, of 
construction, compulsory purchase. Imagine a municipality like Fortaleza absorbing 
a financial burden from an activity that has to be necessarily explored by the private 
sector, because this is not the responsibility of the public sector, to operate parking 
lots or rent boxes in centres of commerce. So then the local government absorbs a 
very high burden. It is impossible; without the participation of the private initiative, 
this project will not happen! It won't because the municipality of Fortaleza won't 
get such a large amount to invest in this activity.  
The local government wanted to reduce as much as possible its short-term financial 
burden and expected the financial return of the private initiative to come mostly from the 
tariffs charged to users of parking spaces and tenants of boxes at PCCs. However, public 
and private actors were aware that to use the Federal PPP Law as policy instrument for its 
perceived advantages, the government would have to partially compensate for the service 
provision by the private sector. As explained in Chapter 2, the PPP legislation determines 
that the instrument can only be used for the delivery of non-self-sustainable projects, in 
which pecuniary compensation from the government is completely or partially required to 
cover the costs of service provision. If public and private actors had decided to design a 
policy in which all the private compensation would come from tariffs charged to users of 
PCCs and parking lots, they would not be able to use the PPP instrument. Consequently, 
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actors agreed that some compensation from the local government would be included in 
the project design so that actors could take advantage of the PPP instrument. 
Even though the actors involved in the discussions selected the PPP as policy 
instrument, it was a common aspect in the interviews that public and private actors lacked 
experience in PPP.  However, they were able to overcome their inexperience and 
insecurities due to lack of knowledge and agreed on the use of the PPP instrument. 
According to the interviews, most private actors lacked experience in either PPPs or public-
private relations prior to this involvement. They commented on their lack of PPP 
knowledge or lack of experience in public-private relations, which were overcome as they 
decided to continue in the process. Common remarks included: “It’s  complicated  for  me  to  
evaluate   this,   since   I’m   new   at   this” (private investor 5) and “I can't speak much of it 
because I don't have much experience. This has also been my first PPP, so I want to see 
what  will  happen  afterwards”  (private  investor  4). There were also comments such as “I’m  
still   learning  about  the  public  sector”  (private investor 8); or even “I’ve  never  worked  with  
the   public   sector,   and   I   don’t   understand   about   the   public   sector”   (private   investor   2). 
However, this did not prevent actors from deciding to engage in the PPP policy formulation. 
As the interviews demonstrate, private actors believed that the PPP instrument was the 
best fitted selection for this context. This interview comment by a local businessman 
reflects this perception: “I'm  not  praising  the  PPP  because  I'm  part  of  one  now,  but  it's  the  
only way I see it, because the government doesn't have the capacity, especially our local 
government,  to  manage  construction  works”  (private investor 1).  
The interviews also reveal the perception that the general director of the local 
consultancy acted as an institutional entrepreneur and was essential for the introduction of 
the PPP theme in the political agenda through his persistence over the years in trying to 
‘sell’   the   advantages   of the PPP instrument in the state and local governments. The 
consultancy general director considered the PPP Law an important public policy tool; a 
mechanism to help the public sector mobilize complementary resources and capacity for 
the provision of services, as well as a way of providing interesting business opportunities to 
the private sector. An interviewee expressed this in the following comment: “To  be  honest  
with  you,  investors  didn’t  get  interested  in  this  PPP  intervention  because  they  knew  PPPs.  It  
was because the general director showed them that it could be interesting. It was based on 
discussions,  talks”  (private  investor  6).  
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The director of the local consultancy had been trying to introduce the ideas of PPPs 
in the local government agenda even before the decision to use the PPP instrument for the 
implementation of the city centre re-ordering policy. He had tried to incorporate the PPP 
theme in the local agenda since the first administration of the current mayor (2005-2008). 
In 2005, he prepared a document entitled the PPP Regulatory Framework with general PPP 
guidelines for the local administration, which received the political support from the local 
Finance Secretary and the Secretary of the Municipal Management Unit (which later 
became the PPP Unit). In 2009, his company also contributed in the pre-tendering 
preparation of the first PPP project of the Ceara state government, the football stadium; 
and   elaborated   the   state   government’s   PPP  Manual,   with   guidelines   and   procedures   for  
PPP project formulation. An interviewee from the private sector shared his perception of 
the consultancy director in helping to introduce a culture of PPPs in the local context: 
The consultancy director in my opinion was pioneer. I tell him, 'You have been the 
pioneer and almost a lonely preacher, trying to show people that this was a very 
interesting tool that could bring several gains, not only economic, but in terms of 
growth and development to transform the municipality and the state in top 
managers   (…)   This  PPP  was   a   result   of   the  work   of   some   time,   perhaps   years,   in  
which the general director was pressing on the same key, doing seminars, meetings, 
not wasting any opportunity to talk to people.  
Public and private actors focused on the perceived benefits of the use of the PPP 
instrument to overcome their own insecurities from lack of experience in PPPs. This was 
not only the first involvement of private actors with the PPP instrument, but it was also the 
first attempt of the municipality to use PPPs as policy delivery tool. As the interviews 
showed, there were also insecurities from the side of the public sector. The following quote 
from the interview with the City Centre Secretary illustrates this:  
Even within the administration, there are difficulties to overcome in relation to the 
understanding that the PPPs cannot suffer biases. (…) Some  say   ‘Oh  my  God,   I'm  
scared   that   we   are   inviting   the   private   sector.’   So   there   are   still   obstacles   to  
overcome, regarding the acceptance of the instrument.  
Interviewees also  mentioned  that  due  to  ‘the  novelty  of  the  PPP’ theme, actors still 
resisted the innovation of PPP procedures because of comparisons with the bureaucratic 
procedures of the traditional 8666 Law. This is demonstrated by the following comment:  
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Another thing is the novelty of the PPP. There is no PPP practice. Today people walk 
on eggshells to authorize this, to understand it, but they don't understand it. They 
often associate it with the 8666 Law. They are thinking in this context, but they 
always base their ideas on the 8666. And the 8666 only complements some of the 
PPP procedures. The PPP is much freer, much more comprehensive than the 8666 
(private investor 6). 
Despite insecurities and perceptions of resistance, actors thought they could 
overcome them based on the political will in favour of the city centre intervention and the 
lack of public resources to implement the policy without private financing. Private investors 
relied on their own perception of the necessity of policy solutions to the problems of the 
city centre to overcome feelings of insecurity. The following interview comments show that 
private actors were certain of the priority of the city centre intervention for the local 
government and society. Perceptions of urgency motivated private actors to continue in 
the process despite insecurities created from   lack   of   experience   in   PPPs:   “Why is it that 
everyone is scared of an unknown business? We are not as scared as before because it's a 
business   that   the   city   needs.   ‘No   park,   no   business’,   no   arguments   against   that!   (private 
investor 1). Another investor confirmed this perception:  
Wherever you go, if you go to the Chamber of Business Leaders [a city centre 
association of business owners], to the people who actually go to the city centre, 
the city wants this. So it is not enough if you only have the political will, the business 
will, but it is something that the city doesn't claim for (private investor 5). 
The interviews show that it was expected that the policy priority and the 
interdependence between the public and private sectors would help actors deal with 
insecurities during the formulation of the PPP policy. Public and private actors recognized 
their sources of insecurities and tried to overcome them early in the process in order to 
continue with the formulation of the city centre PPP project. This process of overcoming 
insecurities continued throughout the entire pre-tendering process.   
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7.2.3 Summary of Section 
Although public and private actors lacked experience in PPPs, this did not prevent 
their decision to continue with the PPP formulation.  Public  and  private  actors’  conciliation  
of interests for the agreement on a social and urban mobility infrastructure scope was 
influenced by their complementary interests and awareness of interdependencies. The 
public sector priority on PCCs was perceived as response to the pressures from control 
bodies and a way to improve its credibility with society near an electoral year. However, for 
the implementation of a city centre policy, the municipality depended on alternative 
sources of funding, so the participation of private financing started to be highly considered. 
The private sector, in its turn, had developed a specific interest for the parking lot business 
in the central area, and had made its interest clear to actors in the local government.  
Actors were able to conciliate their interests and agree on the urban mobility scope for the 
city centre intervention. They were also able to overcome insecurities and lack of 
experience in public-private relations in order to select the PPP instrument as policy 
delivery tool. As next section will show, after choosing the instrument, actors decided on 
the Procedure for Request of Interest as the mechanism of project formulation.  
7.3 Creating the legal arrangement for the process of PPP 
formulation 
The municipality of Fortaleza had no PPP legal framework or PRI Decree when the 
local government decided to use the PPP instrument and the PRI mechanism for the urban 
mobility city centre intervention. After actors agreed on the scope of the city centre PPP 
project, they also agreed that the PPP instrument was the most appropriate tool for policy 
implementation. As a result, they mobilized for the improvisation of a local legal framework 
that allowed them to use both the PPP instrument and the PRI mechanism for the 
formulation of the city centre re-ordering project.  
This section will discuss the selection of the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) 
perceived as the appropriate mechanism for public and private actors. The decision was 
influenced by perceptions of the following aspects: (1) difficulties imposed by the structure 
of federal resource distribution for the elaboration of public projects; (2) bureaucratic 
procedures of the public administration for the elaboration of projects; and (3) culture of 
distrust between public and private sectors in traditional tendering procedures. This 
section will also show the improvisation of a local legal PPP framework preceding the PRI 
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publication, which invited private companies to express interest in formulating the PPP 
project. Since the case study was the formulation of a municipal PPP, it was more 
complicated than state and federal cases because it required the publication of an 
additional law authorizing the concession of services to the private sector prior to the 
official start of the pre-tendering process. The mobilization happened before the official PRI 
publication on March 25, 2011. The selection of the PRI as mechanism for the city centre 
PPP policy formulation is analyzed next.  
For public sector actors, the PRI mechanism was an important alternative to deal 
with difficulties to access projects by local governments for policy implementation. The 
interviews with public actors reveal that these difficulties were mainly related to the 
structure of federal resource distribution and to bureaucratic procedures of the public 
administration. Due to impediments in obtaining projects of quality, it was argued in the 
interviews that local governments commonly relied on outdated projects. 
According to embedded perceptions of interviewees, local governments usually 
receive federal resources directed to the municipality by elected officials in Congress, but 
these resources are strictly tied to specific interventions of public works, selected by these 
officials and cannot be used for any other policy intervention. On the other hand, those 
resources frequently return to the federal budget because the local governments lack 
adequate projects to implement the policies to which the federal resources are tied. 
Several interviewees mentioned that it was common for entities in the local government to 
choose any project (outdated, of poor quality), not to lose the federal funds, preventing it 
from returning to the federal budget.  
Interviewees also mentioned that local governments in Brazil had to deal with the 
bureaucracies of the public administration that made access to projects difficult. Actors 
explained in the interviews that these procedures were time consuming for obtaining 
projects to be used in bidding procedures for contracting out public works. According to 
interviewees, the public sector had to either internally prepare the projects or hire through 
public procurement a company for the preparation of each project. The municipality of 
Fortaleza, for example, tried to solve these bureaucratic impediments by hiring a project 
office for the entire municipality. However, the high demand for new projects within the 
local administration often resulted in some departments not being attended to, so they 
had to rely on outdated projects for tendering processes. Therefore, as the interviews with 
public actors show, the PRI mechanism was perceived as an important alternative for the 
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preparation of policy projects. In interview, the legal specialist advisor of the City Centre 
Secretariat elaborated on the relevance of the PRI for the municipal administration: 
Everything is an impasse; in the public administration, nothing is so easy because 
the big problem in the public administration is related to the studies, the projects. In 
fact, sometimes we have the resources to do certain public works, but we don't 
have  the  resources   to  do  the  project.  So  we  become  hostage  of   this  situation.   (…)  
The PRI would be able to solve, to facilitate this issue related to projects, which for 
us is very important, because it would help us through a huge effort to get things 
done here (…)  From this perspective, the PRI is the "light in the end of the tunnel", 
because you are able to select a company to prepare all the studies, the entire 
feasibility of that initiative, including the projects, which is the most difficult part. 
This is included in the cost of the PPP. This is an important advantage of the PPP.  
For public and private actors, the selection of the PRI mechanism was also 
perceived as a way of overcoming distrust in the relations between the public and private 
sectors with respect to public procurement projects. As the interviews made it clear, actors 
perceived that the PRI mechanism allowed a more open debate with the public sector 
during project preparation to discuss   the   details   of   the   project’s   budget,   costs   and  
spreadsheets in comparison to the traditional 8666 Law. According to the traditional 
tendering law, there can be no joint negotiation over project scope and preparation 
between the public sector and possible tendering competitors. This law also determines 
that if a company is responsible for preparing a policy project or public work project, it 
cannot participate in the tendering competition for the execution of that project (article 3, 
items I and II, Law n. 8666, 1993). Based on the traditional tendering Law, the public sector 
prepares the project and publishes it for public procurement, and the winner of the 
tendering competition must execute the project previously elaborated by the public sector; 
there is no joint construction. 
Nevertheless, based on the PRI mechanism for PPP formulation, there can be 
communication between the parties in the pre-tendering stage. The private company 
investing in the project formulation and interacting with the public sector may also 
participate in the official tendering process (article 31, Law n. 9074, 1995). This possibility 
was perceived by interviewees as a transparent process and as a way of overcoming 
distrust between public and private actors in relation to projects. Moreover, because public 
and private actors perceived the PRI mechanism as a favourable alternative for project 
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preparation, it also contributed to the overcoming of insecurities and to their increasing 
commitment to using the PPP instrument as delivery tool for the city centre policy.  
According to the interviews, private actors were motivated by the PRI because they 
could be responsible for preparing the technical studies and projects in order to assess the 
feasibility of the PPP intervention. They associated this possibility with greater security, 
legitimacy and transparency compared to the traditional procurement procedures under 
the 8666 Law. The next interview quotes illustrate their perception in relation to the PRI:  
We see every day in traditional tendering processes the government presenting 
basic projects which give no condition for the private sector to prepare budgets. I 
think [the PRI] is extremely positive, because we have time to study, to prepare it. 
So the thing becomes very clear   and   defined.   I   think   it's   more   secure.   (…)   This  
condition of the PPP is extremely more secure for the companies that are 
participating (private investor 4). 
I think that in Brazil, the PRI legitimizes this relation between the public and the 
private in a way that is absolutely transparent. It is possible to legitimize a process 
that already used to happen as routine, which is the relation between the public 
and  private.  (…)  These  relations  used  to  be  constructed  in  a  very  obscure  way,  and  
now it is possible to manifest interest, to get approval to develop these technical 
studies and to participate in a tendering process, in which you can win or lose. In my 
opinion, this is the highest point of transparency (private investor 7). 
After actors agreed to use the PRI mechanisms for its perceived benefits, they had 
to publish a special law authorizing the concession of the city centre urban mobility 
services to the private initiative. Moreover, since the municipality had no local PPP law, the 
local administration took advantage of the possibility that Brazilian municipalities can use 
the national PPP law as a supplement. For the approval of the special municipal law 
authorizing the concession, public actors informally contacted the City Hall to accelerate 
the publication. The interview comment from the PPP Unit Secretary demonstrates this:  
The lawyers from the PPP Unit went there to talk to him, and I also talked to city 
councillors, to the president of the City Hall, and said, ‘President, it's necessary for 
you to sign this at the City Hall’. It was a general movement to arrive at the 
approval and at the publication of this law. 
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This law had to be published prior to any official procedure by the local 
government for hiring the private initiative for the formulation of the PPP based on the PRI 
mechanism. Therefore, on March 4, 2011, the City Hall passed the municipal Law 9741 
authorizing the “municipal Executive to contract, operate and maintain social and 
commercial infrastructure of public interest in the centre of Fortaleza, under the concession 
instrument”  (Law n. 9741, 2011). This law authorized the municipal government to use the 
PPP instrument exclusively for the construction and operation of parking lots and popular 
commercial centres in the city centre. At this stage, this was the only formal legislation in 
the case study arrangement, considering that the municipal PPP Law was only published on 
June 16, 2011 (Law n. 9783, 2011). 
On March 25, 2011, a few days after the informal mobilization with the City Hall, 
the local government officially launched the PRI publication that invited private companies 
to express interest in formulating the city centre PPP (PRI n. 01, 2011). The private initiative 
had fifteen days to prepare and submit a PRI proposal for analysis by the local government. 
The mobilization between public and private actors shows that the absence of a local law 
on PPPs was not an impediment for their continuity in the pre-tendering process of PPP 
formulation. Although actors were able to improvise a legal framework for the use of the 
PPP instrument and PRI mechanism, they engaged in the pre-tendering process under a 
fragile formal arrangement, without clear knowledge about legal rules and conditions for 
the formulation of PPP projects. This was also the case with respect to the organizational 
arrangement since the local culture on PPPs was still under construction and actors had 
limited information about roles and responsibilities in the process.   
7.4 The local organizational arrangement and human capacity for 
the PPP formulation 
The PPP organizational framework for the case study, with roles and procedures to 
orient public actors in the process, depended on the publication of a PPP Decree, which 
was still under construction during the pre-tendering stage. Despite the fact that the PPP 
Decree only officially created the PPP Unit in December 2011 (Decree n. 12886, 2011), the 
Municipal Management Unit of Fortaleza had started to informally embody the role of 
Municipal PPP Unit since 2005 and had been trying to develop a PPP culture in the local 
administration.  
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The team of the unofficial PPP Unit participating in the pre-tendering stage was 
composed of public servants with specialized knowledge on subject areas such as 
economics, engineering, law, etc. On the other hand, in EPISODE 1 the local PPP culture 
was still under construction, and public actors were developing the willingness to learn 
about PPPs and were not sure about their roles in the process. Although the PPP Unit 
gathered a team of specialists, they did not know how to monitor and follow the 
preparation of a PPP project. The decision to engage in the PRI pre-tendering process was 
not accompanied by a simultaneous cultural adjustment in the local administration, 
especially considering that the city centre intervention was the first PPP of the municipality 
and actors lacked experience. It was a recent initiative to try absorbing this culture in the 
local administration. A constant in the interviews with public actors was a perspective 
similar to the following: “In reality, like everything, this is a process that is happening for 
the first time, so in the municipality this  was  a  learning  process  for  us”  (private investor 1). 
Another interviewee from the public sector mentioned:  
In fact, we first started studying the subject, because we are initiating in the 
municipality of Fortaleza the area of Public-Private Partnerships. This is the first 
time that we are actually preparing a PPP, which will start with this one of the 
parking lots and PCCs in the city centre (PPP Unit legal specialist). 
The fragility of the local PPP (legal, organizational) arrangement influenced the 
reliance of public and private actors on the local consultancy for coordination and 
organization of the process of PPP formulation. The local consultancy had been helping the 
Municipal Management Unit to develop a PPP culture in the local administration, and also 
helped to train the team on PPP procedures and legislation. The experience of the 
consultancy was acknowledged by public and private sectors. Consequently, public and 
private actors also relied on the consultancy due to its perceived expertise, especially 
considering that in 2009 it contributed to the preparation of the first PPP project of the 
Ceara state government, the football stadium, and  it  prepared  the  state’s  PPP  Manual with 
guidelines and procedures for PPP formulation.  
During the first months of the PRI pre-tendering preparation of the city centre PPP, 
the group of private actors hired the consultancy as advisor, but it was also the informal 
advisor to the local administration in the process. The interviews with public actors also 
showed that they expected the consultancy to be committed to answering the demands of 
the public sector, even though it was hired by the private consortium. Public actors 
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assumed the consultancy would take into consideration their inputs because the local 
government would be the one responsible for approving or not the final studies for the city 
centre intervention. The PPP Unit Secretary expressed this perception in interview:  
Since we are talking about a PPP, we want to believe that the consulting company 
also thinks about the public sector, even though it is hired by the private sector; 
because they know that in the end we are the ones responsible for approving the 
studies. 
When local public and private actors that lacked know-how in PPPs decided to 
engage in a pre-tendering process of PPP formulation, they relied on the consultancy for 
guidelines due to its previous experience in PPPs. This helped to overcome initial 
insecurities and possible discouragement resulting from their lack of experience and know-
how in the topic. The participation of the local consultancy was essential in the elaboration 
of the initial strategy for the formulation of the city centre PPP project. The definition of 
the  strategic  approach  of  the  ‘contextual  institutional  arrangement’  is  discussed  next.   
7.5 The instrumental strategic arrangement: the influence of the 
Ceara  state’s  government approach 
In   this   Episode   of   the   case   study,   the   strategic   approach   of   the   ‘systemic  
institutional   arrangement’   was   similar   to   the   instrumental   strategy   of   the   Brazil   PPP  
Framework used in other PRI cases in Brazil (more details in Chapter 2). In the case study, 
the instrumental strategy was based on the rigid pre-definition of guidelines, activities 
budgets, timeframes and objectives for the formulation of a PPP project. It was initially 
influenced by Ceara   state   government’s   PRI   publications   and   PPP   Manual, which set 
procedures and best practices for the elaboration of PPP projects. In the case study, the 
guidelines from the state government influenced the local PRI publication and the PRI 
proposal prepared by the consultancy on behalf of private investors. The PRI publication of 
March 2011 had an embedded instrumental planning mentality since it was very similar to 
the PRIs used by the state government. Actors from the public sector perceived that the 
experience of the state government with the football stadium PPP was as successful 
example to be followed.  
In the municipal PRI publication, the “guidelines  for  submission  of  work  plan”  were 
almost a copy of the same item   in   the   state   government’s   PRIs   that   requested   private  
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parties to describe the technical approach, methodology and work plan for policy 
formulation. The instrumental planning tendency embedded in the guidelines for the work 
plan of the PRI is exemplified   below   with   an   extract   from   the   document:   “[the bidder] 
should propose the main activities of the services, content and duration, phases and 
relations between them, milestones (including interim approvals by the Executor of the 
public sector), and delivery dates of the reports”  (Municipal Official Diary 14514, 2011, p.9). 
Based on the work plan guidelines above, the PRI publication requested private parties to 
propose a plan for the formulation. It assumed that the private initiative had all necessary 
information and knowledge about the city centre issues and was capable of presenting in 
15 days a PRI proposal with a planned strategy for the formulation process, with objectives, 
activities, timetable and budget.   
By the deadline only one PRI proposal was submitted, which was prepared by the 
local consultancy on behalf of the local group of investors interested in the city centre 
parking lot business. Private investors with limited PPP knowledge relied on the local 
consultancy for the PRI proposal. The consultancy had extensive experience in planning and 
preparing projects based on the concepts and scientific procedures of project management 
techniques. However, the PPP formulation of parking lots and PCCs was the first process in 
which the local consultancy would be entirely responsible for planning, coordination and 
document preparation. Due to its limited practical know-how, when hired for the PRI 
proposal, the consultancy relied on its experience with the elaboration of the Ceara state 
government’s   PPP  Manual   and   on   its   expertise   in   project  management   procedures. The 
instrumental planning mentality  of  the  state  government’s  PPP  Manual  was  transferred  to  
the preparation of the city centre PPP through the influence of the consultancy. Therefore, 
for the PRI proposal, it was assumed that following the instrumental procedures of the 
state’s PPP Manual was adequate for the city centre PPP formulation.  
The  proposal  suggested  the  same  activities  of  the  state’s  PPP  Manual,  in  which  the  
private sector would discuss the details of scope for the preparation with the public sector, 
but mostly prepare the studies alone based on the instrumental plan, which would then be 
presented and submitted to the government for analysis, validation and approval. There 
were several other aspects of the PRI proposal that indicated the intention of adopting an 
instrumental strategy for the design of the city centre PPP. The proposal included clearly 
defined procedures and methodology for the definition of the objectives and for the 
elaboration of the instrumental plan to guide the project preparation process. The proposal 
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also described in detail each product that would be submitted at the end of the 
formulation period. The list of documents and elaboration guidelines was based on the 
Ceara   state   government’s   PPP   Manual   and   divided in three areas: Project Guidelines, 
Feasibility Studies and Modelling Studies. It also established a timeframe allocating number 
of days for the elaboration of each document. It proposed a period of 150 days for detailing 
of scope and objectives, planning the project preparation and enacting the strategy to 
design it. Prior to any engagement, it was assumed that the timeframe was sufficient for 
the PPP formulation process.  
The PRI proposal was submitted on April 8, 2011 for evaluation by the team of the 
City Centre Secretariat. Two departments from the City Centre Secretariat evaluated the 
proposal and issued official opinions that confirmed the legal and fiscal qualification of the 
private consortium. After approval of the PRI proposal, the City Centre Secretariat 
published a decree in June 2011 officially authorizing the group of private investors to 
design the city centre project based on the suggested instrumental approach. The decree 
adopted the same timeframe of the PRI proposal for the pre-tendering process, but with no 
justification or comments on its adequacy. The timeframe was set at 150 days and the 
submission deadline for the final PPP project documents was scheduled for November 11, 
2011 (Decree n. 12826, 2011). The Municipal PPP Law was published in June 16 2011, one 
day after the publication of the decree authorizing the private consortium to start the 
formulation of the technical studies. But the introduction of a municipal legislation was not 
accompanied by a simultaneous adjustment in the local culture about PPP legal procedures 
and rules. Public and private actors were still learning about the topic.  
When private investors were authorized to start working on the PPP formulation, 
the local consultancy took over the process and promoted training and seminars to level 
the knowledge of public, private and technical actors in PPP procedures. In early July 2011, 
it organized a kick off meeting which formally marked the beginning of the PPP formulation 
process, with the participation of consultancy, public and private actors expected to have 
some level of involvement throughout the process. There were also weekly meetings at the 
Municipal PPP Unit that worked as training sessions promoted by consultancy directors and 
coordinators, who perceived that public sector participants and consultancy technicians 
lacked knowledge in PPPs. These meetings were aimed at explaining in detail   the   state’s  
PPP Manual and kick off meeting guidelines for the PPP project formulation. 
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7.6 Summary of Chapter  
In the case study, the stakeholders involved in the PRI pre-tendering arrangements 
lacked a clear framework for the process. In the early stages of their interactions, actors 
were able to construct the basis of ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   which   was 
complemented in the next EPISODE of interactions. The summary of this chapter is 
organized   in   terms  of   the  elements  of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’  produced  
through  actors’   interactions   in   EPISODE  1.  The   summary  of   each  element   focuses  on   the 
interplay  between  embedded  and  innovative  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’. 
7.6.1 Systemic Policy Arrangement  
In the case study, prior to engagement in Episode 1, there was no clear or 
prioritized sectoral scope for use of PPP instrument; PPPs were not even a priority in the 
public sector agenda. However, through their interactions, actors were able to construct 
the policy scope first by mobilizing contextual elements, conciliating interests and defining 
the PPP instrument as tool for project delivery. The conciliation of interests on a PCC and 
parking lot scope was influenced by the local social policy and political scenario, as well as 
by a favorable local business and urban mobility context. The selection of the PPP 
instrument came after the definition of the scope and was based on the overcoming of 
embedded biases related to traditional public-private relations and of lack of experience, 
and on perceptions that the instrument was appropriate for the situation at hand. 
7.6.2 Systemic Legal Arrangement 
In Episode 1 actors were able to select the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) 
as appropriate mechanism for PPP design, which was influenced by the actors’ embedded 
perceptions of difficulties imposed by the structure of federal resource distribution; 
bureaucratic procedures of the public administration; and by the culture of distrust 
between public and private sectors in traditional ways of project formulation. In the 
absence of a local PPP legislation to go forward with the process, actors were able to 
improvise a local legal PPP arrangement for the official publication of the PRI inviting 
private companies to express interest in elaborating the city centre PPP re-ordering project. 
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7.6.3 Systemic Organizational Arrangement  
In the case study of Fortaleza, there was a fragile PPP organizational framework 
prior   to  actors’  engagement   in   the  pre-tendering stage. There was no officially published 
PPP Decree creating Managing Council and PPP Units, no background and experience in 
PPPs and PRI arrangements, and public and private actors had limited PPP training and 
technical knowledge. An informally created PPP Unit was still learning about PPP 
formulation procedures. The fragility of the local PPP (legal, organizational and cultural) 
arrangement influenced the reliance of public and private actors on the perceived 
experience of a local consultancy for coordination and organization of the PPP formulation 
process. The consultancy also promoted trainings and seminars for levelling the knowledge 
of public, private and technical actors on standard procedures of PPP design. 
7.6.4 Systemic Strategic Arrangement 
For the formulation of the city centre re-ordering PPP project, the municipality did 
not have a PRI decree; it also lacked manuals and guidelines or database of previous 
projects.  In order to formulate a strategy, the local government relied on the  consultancy’s  
experience and on the state   government’s   PRI publications and PPP Manual. Both had 
embedded instrumental procedures and best practice guidelines for the elaboration of PPP 
projects, which influenced the municipality in the elaboration of the PRI publication and 
the local consultancy in the PRI proposal, which it prepared on behalf of private investors. 
7.7 Conclusion  
In EPISODE 1, actors constructed the initial   basis   of   a   ‘systemic   institutional  
arrangement’.  Actors  were  able  to  agree  on  the  urban  mobility  policy  scope  and  select  the  
PPP instrument for the intervention, even though they had no experience on the topic and 
the instrument had not been a priority in the local policy agenda. The arrangement had 
instrumental strategic elements, similar to the suggestions of the Brazil PPP Framework, 
discussed in Chapter 2. However, its legal and organizational elements were fragile and 
followed improvisations to make possible the use of the PPP for the city centre re-ordering 
policy. The next chapter analyses EPISODE 2 of the formulation process, when actors 
complemented the initial systemic arrangement and readjusted its elements in their 
interactions. However, their attempts were not sufficient for completion of the PRI pre-
tendering stage in EPISODE 2. The following aspects characterize the systemic arrangement 
of the next EPISODE: 
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x Organizational arrangement: fragile role of municipal PPP organizations, transfer of 
coordination from public and private actors to the consultancy, difficulties faced by 
consultancy coordinators to guide the complex process of PPP formulation 
influenced by contextual factors and absence of internal control from PPP Unit or 
Managing Council; 
x Legal framework: the local PPP Law was published (June, 2011), but there was a 
fragile local culture on PPP  legislation  (actors’  had  not  internalized  procedures  for  
formulation of PPP projects), resulting in transfer of responsibility over legal 
concerns to a non-local specialized and experienced office in PPPs which did not 
actively and locally participate in the process to ensure legal accountability over 
decision-making processes; 
x Strategic arrangement: problems to implement an instrumental strategy for a 
complex and contextual process of PPP formulation, dependent on the interactions 
between a large number of stakeholders;   but   also   actor’s   initiative   to   overcome  
lack of guidance and coordination through development of soft capacity elements 
such as collaboration and flexible network for information-sharing; 
x Policy framework: actors continued committed to the scope initially defined (PCCs 
and parking lots); however, under lack of strategy coordination and fragile 
organizational and legal frameworks to oversee decision-making, actors engaged in 
the definition of technical premises for the infrastructure project based on 
mobilizations  for  ‘political  consensus  building’  to  prevent  resistances  to  the  project;  
this helped to keep them committed to the process, but influenced technical 
decisions that compromised project quality and legal accountability.  
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Chapter 8 - Descriptive-Analysis of EPISODE 2 
Actor-relations  in  the  enactment  and  adjustment  of  the  ‘systemic  
institutional arrangement’ 
8.1 Introduction  
According to the analysis of EPISODE 1, actors defined in their interactions the basis 
of  a   ‘systemic   institutional  arrangement’   for   the   case study process. In EPISODE 2, actors 
complemented the arrangement of the previous EPISODE by solidifying the instrumental 
strategy, but still working under fragile legal and organizational PPP guidance. As the 
analysis of EPISODE 2 will show, the ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  was enacted and 
readjusted during this EPISODE, but it was still insufficient to support actors’  engagement  
towards completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage. EPISODE 2 covers the period between 
the kick off meeting of July 2011 until the submission of the PPP project to the local 
government in November, 2011.  
In EPISODE 2, actors’   engagement for the formulation of the city centre PPP 
disregarded the complex characteristics of PPP projects in Brazil, which are based on 
dynamic  formal  and  informal  interactions  and  on  the  embedded  ‘project  finance’  concept  
of network of interdependent actors. It also disregarded numerous particularities of the 
local context of Fortaleza for project formulation,   including   Ievel   of   local   actor’s  
coordination capacity,   actors’   perception   of a resistant local political culture, and its 
influence on the technical specifications for the PPP project design. They were also not able 
to manage the influence of the diversity of relevant local factors that emerged during the 
formulation stage (i.e. property and legislation issues). Although there were some positive 
aspects as actors managed to stay continuously motivated throughout the process and 
improved the strategic approach for the PPP formulation, the fragility of legal and 
organizational arrangements, the influence of context, flexible strategy and lack of 
coordination compromised the quality of the city centre PPP project. Thus, the local 
government rejected the project in the deadline of November, 2011. This chapter analyses 
EPISODE 2 in three stages: 
1. Complementing the ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’:   actors’   attempted   to  
move forward with the instrumental strategy, but faced problems to prepare a 
technically and legally coherent project due to inadequate organizational and legal 
frameworks, as well as to the complexity of formulating the PPP project; 
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2. The   enactment   and   readjustment   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’: 
actors mobilized to overcome difficulties of progressing with the project using 
aspects that kept actors committed – (i) an emergent strategy of initiative, 
collaboration and flexible network relations, but with not control or coordination; 
and  (ii)  actors’  engagement   in  a  process  of  ‘political  consensus  building’  to  define  
technical premises in a way to prevent perceived resistances to the project; 
3. The submission of the city centre PPP project design: a discussion of the problems 
that remained at the end of EPISODE 2 and circumstances that led to its rejection 
by the local government.  
The last section is a summary of the main aspects of the analysis of this EPISODE, 
focusing  on  the  embeddedness  and  innovation  in  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  doing  things’.  The  
summary   is   organized   around   the   elements   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’:  
policy, legal, organizational and strategic arrangements.  
8.2 Complementing the ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’   
Three   elements   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   were   constructed   in  
EPISODE 2: the strategic framework, and the organizational and legal frameworks for 
strategy implementation. The scope of the city centre PPP project was the same as in 
EPISODE 1: the construction, operation and maintenance of Popular Commercial Centres 
and parking lots for the re-ordering  of  Fortaleza’s  city  centre; but the premises of this scope 
were defined in the interactions during EPISODE 2.  
8.2.1 Strategic Framework: elaboration of instrumental strategy  
The deliberate decision to use an instrumental approach for project formulation 
was embedded in the PRI publication of March 2011, which invited private companies to 
express interest in formulating the city centre policy. It was also embedded in the PRI 
proposal submitted on April 2011 by the private investors, but elaborated by the local 
consultancy.   Public   actors’   evaluation   of   the   PRI   proposal,   which   did   not   assess   its  
adequacy for the city centre context, also allowed actors to engage in the process under an 
instrumental strategy.  
After the kick off meeting in July, 2011 that officially launched the PRI pre-
tendering formulation process of the city centre PPP, actors engaged in the elaboration and 
implementation of the instrumental strategy. They initially produced a document entitled 
 168 
 
Project Guidelines that detailed the instrumental strategic plan to guide the PPP 
formulation, which had to be completed by the official deadline set at November, 2011. 
The instrumental plan was produced in meetings at the unofficial PPP Unit, perceived as 
the coordinator body of the local government for the city centre PPP formulation. The 
meetings promoted interactive discussions between actors for detailing the project plan, 
based on the established guidelines and best practices available, such as the model of the 
state   government’s   PPP  Manual.  Actors’   attempted   to   learn   from   the   evidence   of   other  
examples of PPP formulation to plan the strategic design of the city centre PPP intervention, 
but without considering its contextual specificities.   
The elaboration of the instrumental plan involved public actors and consultancy 
technicians, but the participation of private investors was limited. Several actors from the 
consultancy  and  many  other   technicians  hired   for   the  production  of   the   ‘project   finance’  
studies participated in the meetings for designing the instrumental plan, including 
architects, urban mobility and construction engineers, legal advisors, economists, etc. From 
the public sector, there was the City Attorney appointed for PPPs, legal specialists, 
architects, and other technicians from the City Centre Secretariat and PPP Unit. The City 
Centre Secretary, however, did not participate in any of the meetings. Consultancy 
directors and coordinators did not stimulate her participation and relied on the PPP Unit as 
the public sector coordinator. It was assumed that the PPP Unit would be able to articulate 
with other actors in the local administration and obtain necessary information for the 
scope definition and policy formulation planning. The PPP Unit team was dedicated in the 
meetings, but could not help with technical knowledge on the city centre for the scope 
clarification, as this was the responsibility of the City Centre Secretariat as the sectoral 
body responsible for the PPP. 
During the PPP Unit meetings, actors had instrumental guidelines, but did not take 
into consideration that the elaboration of a PPP project was challenging and complex, 
based on many formal and informal interactions, on a large number of stakeholders and on 
the need to coherently connect and reconnect several feasibility studies, technical and 
legal documents prepared by a network of actors. Moreover, due to lack of awareness on 
the influence of context in the PPP formulation process, actors were unprepared to 
evaluate beforehand the adequacy of implementing, in a dynamic environment, an 
instrumental plan with pre-set activities, assumptions of stability and of complete 
information. The possibility of discussions over potentially more adequate strategic 
 169 
 
approaches for the process was hampered by the instrumental planning perspective 
embedded in the meetings, in the PRI publication and proposal, in the guidelines obtained 
from the state government, as  well  as  in  actors’  mentalities. 
By August, 2011, actors had defined the instrumental plan for the process of PPP 
formulation and used instrumental techniques to validate objectives and detail activities 
and deadlines. One of these techniques was the S.M.A.R.T approach, used to define and 
assess the strategic objectives based on four criteria: if they were specific, measurable, 
attainable, relevant and timely. Actors also adopted a technique for risk assessment and to 
evaluate the feasibility of the objectives. They evaluated the risks based on the S.W.O.T 
Analysis,   a   technique   used   to   access   the   project’s   strengths   and   weaknesses,   but   also  
opportunities and threats. Finally, they created an instrumental plan of action to be 
followed during the pre-tendering formulation stage. The results from the discussions at 
the PPP Unit meetings were included in the Project Guidelines document, which was used 
as the strategic plan for the PPP formulation. At this moment, there was clear separation 
between strategic design and implementation, and the execution of the strategy was 
expected to take place in the following months.  
For the coordination of process of PPP design, actors expected to follow 
instrumental guidelines that set the details for the relations between the public sector, 
private investors and technical actors. Without prior considerations on the capacity of 
coordinators from the consultancy and from the public sector, it was assumed that the 
coordinators appointed for the job would be able to deliver the expected results and 
monitor the PPP formulation process by following the guidelines of the instrumental plan. 
The plan determined that the main interactions for the process would happen between 
public and private coordinators on a fortnight basis. It was assumed that the information 
would be easily accessed, transferred and available through the interactions between 
coordinators. Based on these guidelines, consultancy coordinators were placed in control 
over the process, while the local government and private actors trusted the consultancy 
capacity to manage it. As for the public sector, coordination was continuously assumed to 
be in the hands of the PPP Unit. For the implementation of the instrumental strategy, the 
role of coordination in EPISODE 2 is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
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8.2.2 Organizational Framework for strategy implementation: consultancy 
coordinators and detachment from public and private actors and 
consultancy directors  
A formal organizational arrangement for control and coordination of the PPP 
formulation at this stage did not exist in the case study. The municipality of Fortaleza had 
not officially created Managing Councils and PPP Units through the publication of a PPP 
Decree, and public sector entities had no clear information about their roles and 
responsibilities in the process. The PPP Decree formally creating these organizations was 
only officially published in December, 2011. As a result, the local organizational 
arrangement in  the  case  study  was  fragile  in  terms  of  public  actors’  awareness  of  their  roles  
and responsibilities in the process. On the other hand, in order to compensate for this 
fragility, it was assumed that the training promoted by the consultancy for the PPP Unit 
team, technicians and coordinators would create conditions for coordination and 
implementation of the instrumental plan. However, this section will show the absence of 
active coordination over the PPP formulation process. Public and private actors transferred 
coordination to the consultancy, which had difficulties to implement an instrumental plan 
for a complex project formulation.  
The absence of active coordination was in contradiction with the attempt to 
implement an instrumental strategy. Instrumental strategic approaches require not only 
previous comprehensive planning with pre-set procedures, but it also requires top-down 
control, monitoring and coordination to assure enactment of the formulated plan (Hart, 
1992). It is through these factors that instrumental plans are assumed to be able to impose 
control over actors’   behaviour   and  over   a  presumed stable and predictable environment 
for the pursuit of the object of planning (Rosenhead, 1980). This is the assumption behind 
the Brazil PPP Framework, which adopts the idea that well established organizational 
frameworks and trained actors will have the capacity to coordinate the instrumental 
formulation of PPP projects, regardless of the complexity and context in which the process 
takes place. However, in the case study, coordination and control faced difficulties to guide 
the city centre PPP formulation based on the guidelines of the instrumental plan.   
There were expectations that the instrumental plan elaborated during the PPP Unit 
meetings would be executed just as detailed. As a result, consultancy directors relied on 
the expectation that the appointed coordinators were capable of guiding the process. 
Consultancy directors also expected that Municipal PPP Unit 
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coordinator from the public sector and articulate within the local administration to gather 
the necessary technical information, which did not happen. Although the PPP Unit had not 
been officially created by decree, its attempt to learn about PPPs and the trainings 
provided by consultancy placed the   PPP   Unit   as   coordinator   in   actors’   perceptions.  
Nevertheless, no emphasis was put on the role of the City Centre Secretariat as the sectoral 
body in charge the municipal PPP project and with specific knowledge and information on 
the urban mobility scope of the city centre project.  
Although there were perceptions of the PPP Unit as coordinator from the local 
government, public and private actors transferred leadership to the consultancy and also 
failed to actively coordinate the preparation process. They limited their involvement to 
validating  main  decisions  and   collaborating  on  an   ‘as  needed  basis’. In EPISODE 2, public 
and private actors perceived the consultancy to be in control of the preparation and 
expected that a well-defined scope and instrumental plan were in place to orient their 
engagement. The following quote illustrate the trust of private actors  on  the  consultancy’s  
capacity: “Today I consider the background of the general director of the consultancy; also 
everybody else's, but especially him, because he's the mentor, the coordinator of the group 
of architects, engineers” (private investor 1).  
Public actors also expected the private consortium via the consultancy to take over 
the elaboration of PPP project documents, which would then be submitted for public sector 
evaluation. Although public and private trusted the consultancy’s  capacity  mostly  because  
of the experience of the directors, they did not exercise coordination and control, but 
transferred management over the process to trained consultancy coordinators. A quote by 
a  technical  actor  confirms  this  specifically  with  respect  to  the  general  director:  “The general 
director had little time. As the only person in the consultancy who could give a more 
objective   and   effective   orientation,   he   was   away  most   of   the   time”   (technical director). 
Although consultancy directors had been formally indicated as as key experts to be in 
charge of the PPP formulation, public actors did not check if directors were actually 
involved in the process. In practice, there was an overall detachment from consultancy 
directors, public actors (PPP Unit) and private investors as coordinators and leaders. The 
comment from an interviewee clarifies the lack of coordination from these groups during 
EPISODE 2 of the pre-tendering process: 
The public sector at a certain point was not interested in the process, the 
consultancy did not have the adequate team; and there was an alienated group of 
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investors, not knowing what was going on, because it was not in their area of 
expertise. Like this, the PPP  will  fatally  not  work  (…).  So  it  lacked  experience  in  the  
group of the municipality, in our group, which was conducting the studies, and a 
complete alienation of private investors (consultancy technical director).  
Instead, consultancy coordinators were in charge of managing the city centre PPP 
formulation based on assumptions that the instrumental plan was sufficient to guide 
technical actors and control the environment. Consultancy directors also considered that 
the technical team appointed for preparing the documents of the PPP project would be 
able to elaborate them based on the instrumental strategy and previous trainings. 
Technicians’  individual  specializations, sectoral experiences and know-how were prioritized 
and coordinators were expected to integrate the material produced. It was assumed that 
coordinators would be able to control the timeframe, activities, objectives and budget 
specifications of the instrumental strategy. The  guidelines  from  the  state  government’s  PPP  
Manual were given to individual technicians for preparing the Modeling and Feasibility 
Studies. However, technicians were working disconnected and independently even though 
the   ‘project   finance’   concept   embedded   in   PPP   projects   require   the   integration   and  
constant feedback between the networks of studies being produced. Meanwhile, 
coordinators did not monitor the document integration or technical and legal consistency 
of the decisions. They simply crossed the documents received from the checklist of the 
state government PPP Manual and stored for further submission. The following comment 
from a technical interviewee illustrates perception of problems with the elaboration of the 
PPP technical studies: 
There was a ball of activities, of actions not connected to anything, not sequential 
and without any logic. So in the middle of this ball, while in the consultancy nobody 
knew anything (…). I even went to some meetings, and I was completely shocked 
because the leader was coordinating in the place of the general director of the 
consultancy. He would present some nonsense spreadsheets. I remember that there 
was  in  a  risk  spreadsheet  the  ‘risk  of  brick  shortage’  and  ‘risk  of  cement  shortage’. 
Anything you could think of risk, you had to say it. Nobody at the consultancy knew 
about this PPP, the only one with experience was the general director. So this is the 
way we did it, when we had to do the PPP study (social specialist).  
This section showed difficulties with the organizational arrangement for the 
formulation of the PPP project. The transfer of coordination from private and public actors 
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to the consultancy was an attempt to compensate for the fragile formal PPP organizational 
culture. Local rules and procedures were in place as the local PPP Law had already been 
published (June, 2011); however, actors lacked awareness of their roles and responsibilities 
in the process. As next section will show, a similar approach was adopted with respect to 
the legal arrangement. Since public and private actors were still learning about PPPs, during 
the pre-tendering process they relied on the expertise of a legal advising office with 
experience in PPPs. The office headquarters was based in the city of Sao Paulo in the 
Southeast of Brazil, but it was hired by private investors as the main legal advisor for the 
formulation of the Fortaleza city centre urban mobility PPP. Although this alternative for 
the systemic legal framework did not derail the process, the existence of PPP rules and 
procedures were also not sufficient, as actors had not internalized the importance of 
considering them in practice.   
8.2.3 The Legal Framework for strategy implementation: Sao Paulo legal office 
In EPISODE 2, actors engaged in the PPP formulation process with limited 
knowledge on PPPs and based on a recently implemented PPP legislation (June, 2011). As a 
result, they relied on the expertise of a legal office from Sao Paulo which had extensive 
national experience in PPP preparations. It was hired by private investors based on the 
indication of consultancy directors and became the main legal orientation guiding the city 
centre PPP formulation. The involvement of a legal office influenced consultancy directors’  
perception that the team hired would be able to deliver legally consistent PPP documents. 
The following comment by a consultancy director demonstrates the confidence placed on 
the expertise of the legal office for the city centre PPP formulation:  
The   legal   office   was   our   partner   in   the   project   of   the   state   government’s   PPP  
Manual. We are working together in other projects, so their indication was natural. 
There is another thing; this legal office has experience and is preparing the PPP 
parking lot policy for the city centre of Sao Paulo (consultancy general director). 
Since the municipality of Fortaleza did not have PPP legislation and public and 
private actors were not familiar with PPP rules and procedures, the involvement of the 
legal office was an attempt to compensate this fragility due to its experience in PPP and PRI 
procedures. However, the members of the Sao Paulo office only sporadically travelled to 
Fortaleza for meetings. Most of their work was carried out independently, except for 
eventual meetings or Skype conversations with the consultancy team in Fortaleza. A local 
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lawyer was hired by the consultancy to help in the interlocution with the Sao Paulo office, 
but their exchange of information was limited. Moreover, still in the early stages of 
EPISODE 2, the lawyer was no longer a member of the consultancy team, and the Sao Paulo 
office was handling alone and from a distance all legal aspects related to the preparation of 
the project.   
The mobilization of the technical team and the expectations that coordinators 
would act as integrators also influenced directors’   security on the preparation of a 
technically and legally consistent project. However, as it will be demonstrated later, the 
absence of a clear PPP legislation, the cultural fragility on PPP procedures and this 
improvisation in the legal arrangement influenced inconsistencies in the PPP technical 
documents.  
8.2.4 Summary of section and concluding thoughts 
The legal and organizational arrangements for the city centre PPP formulation were 
respectively formed by the Sao Paulo legal office and coordinators in charge of a technical 
team. The strategic arrangement was based on an instrumental plan with pre-set goals, 
technical procedures, methodologies, guidelines, sequential plan and fixed timeframe. 
Public, private and consultancy actors had confidence in the guidelines and in the 
instrumental plan and thought the technical team hired would be able to follow its 
guidelines. They also relied in the appointed coordinators to guide the process, as well as in 
the office from Sao Paulo for legal instructions. Consultancy directors trusted the capacity 
of the Municipal PPP Unit to act as coordinator from the public sector, but did not take into 
account its limited experience and the fact that the PPP Unit was in fact relying on the 
consultancy for coordination. The following quote by one of the directors illustrates the 
perception that the process was under control: I think that before starting the studies we 
were able to map well all the issues we needed to study, everything we needed to gather 
(consultancy technical director). 
However,   the   strategic,   legal   and   organizational   elements   in   the   ‘systemic  
institutional arrangement’  were  not  adequate  to  orient  the  city  centre  PPP  formulation  in  
the PRI pre-tendering stage. As next section will show, the problems in the application of 
the instrumental strategy led to a readjustment. When actors faced coordination 
difficulties, especially considering the dynamics of formal and informal interactions and a 
network of interdependent actors which characterize the process, they changed the 
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strategic approach for the PPP formulation. The fragility of the legal and organizational 
arrangements, on the other hand, remained throughout EPISODE 2. 
8.3 Enactment   and   readjustment   of   ‘systemic   institutional  
arrangement’     
The ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  initially  produced  had problems, so it was 
reformulated during EPISODE 2. There were instrumental plans, procedures, 
methodologies that actors had difficulties to follow, lack of technical leadership, difficulties 
in integrating the technical team, difficulties in obtaining specific city centre information, 
unclear scope for technical studies and underestimation of the complexity of formulating a 
PPP project. However, these were not significant enough to cause the complete disruption 
of the PRI pre-tendering process, especially because actors were able to reformulate the 
approach through their interactions for project formulation.  
Based on the new approach, actors were able to overcome initial frustrations of 
slow progress and draw motivational elements that kept them committed to the informal 
PRI pre-tendering process despite no legally binding contract. The new framework was 
based  on  two  aspects  that   influenced  actors’   interactions   in  parallel.  One  aspect   involved  
technical   actors’   initiative   and   collaboration,   as   well as different groups of interaction 
working in parallel to determine project specifications and to accelerate the preparation of 
products for submission. The other aspect was the significant influence of the contextual 
political culture on actors’  interaction.  This  was  reflected  in  a  process  of  ‘political  consensus  
building’,   aimed   at   overcoming public   and   private   actors’   embedded   insecurities and at 
preventing perceived political, cultural and judicial obstacles and resistances from 
interfering with the process. Before  discussing  the  influence  of  ‘political  consensus  building’,  
the new strategy adopted is discussed next. It is important to highlight that these two 
sections are separated for analytical purposes only, but in practice they happened 
simultaneously. 
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8.3.1 Initiative, collaboration and flexible network relations in an emergent 
strategy  
In face of the inadequacy of the instrumental strategy, of coordination problems 
and detachment from public and private actors and consultancy senior directors, actors 
became frustrated with the initial difficulties and delays in the progress, but managed to 
adopt a new approach for the formulation of the city centre PPP. Since the instrumental 
plan was not a useful guide, actors were able to define the assumptions and premises of 
the project through another approach, based on different groups of interactions working in 
parallel. The new approach used in EPISODE 2 was unplanned and dependent on the 
interactions among the actors involved in the process. It resembled an emergent strategy 
in which interactions were dependent upon the autonomous and adaptive behavior of 
actors without top management coordination and leadership (Hart, 1992). In this scenario, 
actors acted as institutional entrepreneurs triggered by the inability of the instrumental 
plan to guide them in the process and motivated by their willingness to continue.  
As actors engaged in the technical preparation process, they faced difficulties to 
elaborate the documents based on the instrumental plan, which did not provide guidelines 
for the complex formulation of a project. Based on the initial guidelines from coordinators, 
technicians were set off to prepare the documents in isolation, but they had limited 
information, experience, time and network access to prepare the technical studies alone. It 
was a shared comment in the interviews that technical actors lacked experience and know-
how for the preparation; however, the problem was also in the inadequacy of the 
instrumental plan for the type of project and complexity involved. The initial difficulties and 
delay in progress resulted in insecurity and frustration which did not derail the pre-
tendering process, but actually enabled collective institutional entrepreneurship for the 
mobilization of a new approach for the PPP formulation.  
In EPISODE 2, actors did not acknowledge that there were problems with the 
strategic, organizational and legal frameworks constructed for the city centre PPP 
formulation, and blamed the consultancy and its coordinators for not being able to apply 
the instrumental strategy. They developed frustrated expectations with respect to their 
initial trust on the consultancy and on perceptions that the process would be easily 
implemented under the instrumental strategy. Public actors showed lack of capacity to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the instrumental approach for the PPP formulation context 
in which they engaged. The following comment by a local government interviewee 
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demonstrates a perception that the process was loose and uncoordinated, reflecting 
frustrations with the application of the instrumental plan, but not questioning the strategic 
approach:  
I thought that if I sell you a service, for example, a lawyer, and if you come to me 
and  say,  ‘I  want  to  get  a divorce’;  then  I  already  have  the  model.  I  will   insert  your 
information and your situation, but I'd already have the model. I would have a 
framework if I do this for more than 20 years, in which I would insert your 
specificities. In reality, I didn’t see this happening, not even for a moment. I saw 
things in certain moments and I would say to myself 'my God, I hope that I'm not 
understanding anything', because I thought the thing was kind of lost. And then 
there were discussions about the deadline not working. I started to feel scared (City 
Centre Secretariat legal specialist).   
Public actors had expectations that the implementation of an instrumental plan 
was appropriate and simple. They were not aware of the difficulties of implementing such a 
plan in a scenario of complexity. They became frustrated when the plan did not match the 
expectations, as illustrated by the following quote from an interviewee from the public 
sector: 
I had another expectation that everything would happen within what was 
determined in the PRI publication,  within  that  deadline,  in  that  timeframe.  (…)  I  was  
anguished because there was no closure of the entire thing. I was seeing the thing 
completely open and concerned that all would be lost. (…) I was very afraid that this 
would die in the middle of the way due to a lack of a larger consistency, due to lack 
of a stronger technical posture (City Centre Secretariat architect).  
Nevertheless, the process was not completely derailed by frustrations, absence of 
an adequate plan, lack of knowledge about real situation in which they were embedded, as 
well as lack of coordination with expertise in complex PPP preparations. In the case study, 
through their interactions actors adjusted the strategy in response to problems.  
They had clear interests to find a way to formulate the PPP within the deadline of 
November 2011, which kept them committed and collaborative despite constant 
frustrations and developed initiative capacity in some actors. Technical actors took the 
initiative to obtain the information they needed to prepare the PPP documents. Although 
there was no overall coordinator, some technical actors had the initiative to contact the 
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City Centre Secretariat (Sectoral Secretariat) to obtain more details on the city centre scope. 
Public sector actors were contacted on the  ‘as-needed’ basis, and were collaborative in the 
process. There were also important interactions between private investors and the 
technical team, as well as between investors and the Sectoral Secretariat for definition of 
financial  aspects.  Actors’  participation  and  perception  of  ownership  over  the  process  kept 
them constantly motivated and committed.  
Even though consultancy directors did not see that the City Centre Secretary and 
her team contributed to the technical preparation, their participation was essential for 
defining important criteria   for   the   studies,   and   for   private   actors’  perception of ongoing 
political commitment from the public sector. According to consultancy directors in 
interview, the Sectoral Secretary adopted the position of observer in EPISODE 2 for the 
elaboration of the technical studies. However, members of the technical team mentioned 
that she was helpful when asked for city centre information. Despite this divergence in 
perceptions, from investors’   perspective the Sectoral Secretary transmitted confidence 
from her political commitment to the city centre PPP formulation.  
The interviews reveal that the interactions between the City Centre Secretary and 
her Sectoral team, private investors and technicians were essential for the definition of 
premises for the studies. However, in EPISODE 2, neither the City Centre Secretary nor 
private and consultancy actors embodied the role of coordinator over the new emergent 
strategy for the PPP formulation. It was in a scenario of lack of coordination that actors 
defined the properties for the construction of commercial centres and parking lots and the 
technical inputs for the definition of facility specifications. The definition of these premises 
in EPISODE 2 was also influenced by embedded perceptions of judicial, political and cultural 
obstacles against the PPP project.   As   a   result,   actors   engaged   in   a   process   of   ‘political  
consensus  building’  to  prevent  resistances that influenced their commitment to the process 
and the technical decisions for the city centre PPP project. Based on this mobilization, 
actors developed a collective intention to overcome insecurities which kept them 
motivated despite initial frustrations with the progress of the pre-tendering stage. This 
process  of  ‘political  consensus  building’  is  analysed  next  in  three  approaches:   
x ‘Political  Consensus  Building’  in the selection of properties; 
x ‘Political  Consensus  Building’  in  PCC  and  parking  lot  facility  specifications;  
x ‘Political Consensus Building’  in  communication.  
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8.3.2 ‘Political   Consensus   Building’   in   the   selection   of   properties:   preventing  
judicial obstacles and resistance from street vendors  
The selection of properties for the city centre intervention was influenced by 
intentions to facilitate the process of compulsory purchase. In Brazil, compulsory purchase 
is an administrative procedure allowed by the 1988 Federal Constitution in which 
expropriation of property by the public sector is permitted for public necessity or for social 
interest with previous pecuniary compensation to the property owner (article 24, Brazilian 
Federal Constitution, 1988). In the case study of Fortaleza city centre, public and private 
actors were aware that the acquisition of those properties was needed for the approval of 
the policy design for Public Consultation and especially for its official tendering publication. 
Therefore, actors used criteria for selecting property locations so as to prevent constraints, 
legal delays and resistances from property owners, street vendors and the judicial system. 
This decision, however, compromised the quality of the demand studies which were 
supposed to provide consistent technical justifications for property selection.  
Actors understood the possibility of difficulties for the acquisition of properties and 
perceived, for example, possible resistance from the mayor to allow compulsory purchases. 
The following quote shows this perception: “Our mayor here, in my opinion, has a big 
obstacle with compulsory purchase of property. For her to acquire property this way, she 
thinks  200   times   before   doing   it”   (private investor 6). Actors were also insecure that the 
judicial system could block the acquisition due to pressures from property owners. 
However, interviews show that actors overcame insecurities because they trusted the 
embedded knowledge that the authority of the government would be sufficient to deal 
with obstacles to access to property. The following comment by a private interviewee 
demonstrates this: “Look,  there is one thing I've seen and learnt from, I've faced compulsory 
purchase before and when the public sector wants, get out of the way. Those who can, give 
orders; and those who are prudent, obey these orders”   (private investor 1). Another 
comment supports this perspective:  
There are underused properties, but the owner is looking at a future opportunity. 
He’s  not  going  to  want  to  give   it  up  very  easily.  But   if  the  public  sector  wants  the  
property, there is no way. If the property is determined of public use, the public 
sector   can   buy   it   through   compulsory   purchase   and   that’s   it   (urban mobility 
specialist).  
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Another way that actors used to overcome insecurities of resistance and obstacles 
to access to property was to select areas based on their empty, underused or derelict 
status. This was determined by the public sector, through the City Centre Secretariat. 
Investors agreed with this perspective and contributed with the selection of properties. The 
main premise was aimed at demonstrating that the city centre PPP would provide better 
use to derelict or empty properties, in case of resistance from judicial system in favour of 
property owners. From  actors’  perceptions,   if  the  properties  were  empty  or  underused,  it  
would  be  easier  to  argue  that  their  selection  was  in  the  ‘public  interest’. This understanding 
of actors throughout the process reflected a shared belief in the bureaucracies of the 
judicial system as a possible obstacle to the acquisition of properties. The following 
interview comment demonstrates this perception held by the private investors involved:  
There is the possibility of the judicial system getting involved, because the person 
who will be bothered will not cross the arms. He will try to do something. The 
[compulsory purchase] process takes some time so we need to have several options 
(private investor 4).  
A technician was initially hired to estimate the demand and study the feasibility of 
appropriate locations in the city centre that could create the condition for the policy 
intervention to meet the estimated demand. He took the initiative to contact the City 
Centre Secretariat in order to obtain information about possible locations for the policy 
implementation. From a list of 15 empty or underused properties provided, private 
investors and consultancy technicians selected properties for the construction of PCCs and 
parking lots. Private investors trusted their own knowledge of the property ownership 
situation in the city centre so as to select properties that would be more easily negotiated 
with their owners. In this way, they considered that their participation in indicating 
properties for the policy implementation was useful for the process:  
I have often met with the Secretary and discussed with her. Some properties I've 
indicated for her to visit. One day, a partner from the consortium and I walked 
around the city centre on a Saturday and analysed areas that could be part of this 
intervention, to construct the PCCs with parking lots. We've seen and indicated, the 
municipal authority indicated as well (private investor 2).  
Actors initially understood it was necessary to elaborate a demand study to justify 
the selection of properties for construction of PCCs and parking lots, but it was a political 
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approach instead that influenced the decision-making on this. During pre-tendering 
interactions, the technician responsible for the demand study received the pre-defined list 
and used information from a previous demand study obtained from the City Centre 
Secretariat to estimate the number of parking spaces and boxes to be provided through the 
city centre PPP intervention.  
Consequently, the political understandings that empty or underused property 
could facilitate the process of compulsory purchase had a heavier weight over the necessity 
of a demand study to technically indicate and justify the feasibility of the selected 
properties. Actors’ political perceptions on premises compromised the technical 
consistency of the demand study, and there was no active internal or external control body 
or coordination to point this out during the process. Interviewees acknowledged the 
political influence on technical decisions, such as the following comment by private 
investor:  “So to learn how to deal with the public sector is to understand that things must 
be done based on technical aspects, but the political aspects cannot be forgotten (private 
investor 5). Another interview comment demonstrates that private actors knew that 
properties  were  being   selected   so  as   to   reduce   resistance   from  property  owners:   “There 
was this political composition, and we understand that this is natural. I mean, the property 
owner  will  have  pressure  influence,  and  that  is  hard  to  go  against”  (private investor 6). The 
following comment also illustrates that, although actors understood that a technical 
procedure could be adopted for property selection, the approach used in the city centre 
preparation process was based on contextual knowledge about property derelict status: 
The one responsible for determining the parameters is the government, and it 
wants the private initiative to construct the idea. So it provides the location where 
the parking lots can be constructed, as well as the PCCs. The private sector will 
validate those locations and based on a demand study, it will say whether the 
location is feasible or not (…)  But  for  the  city  centre  [PPP  project], everything was 
done considering empty or underused property. The City Centre Secretary tried to 
make it that way. I’m  sure that based on a technical study these properties would 
not necessarily be the best locations (private investor 5).  
Another aspect that influenced the selection of property location was the policy 
commitment of the local government to maintain street vendors in the central area. This 
was aimed at preventing resistance from unsatisfied street vendors or from elected officials 
representing them in the local government. According to the interviews, it was generally 
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understood that staying in the central area was a demand of street vendors. Therefore, 
public and private actors decided to select areas in the city centre of Fortaleza, instead of 
simply removing vendors to any other distant neighbourhood in Fortaleza. 
After political decisions for the selection of property locations which compromised 
the technical justification of a demand study, another issue was left with respect to making 
the properties available for the city centre project. A legal requirement for the acquisition 
of the properties selected was the publication of a decree of compulsory purchase by the 
local government. This would have to be authorized and formally signed by the mayor. This 
is a requirement of the Brazilian regulatory framework, which demonstrates that the 
specificities of the city centre PPP were embedded in a wider regulatory context relevant 
for the case (Decree-Law n. 3365, 1941). The publication of the compulsory purchase 
decrees was essential to validate the city centre PPP project design for its official 
authorization for Public Consultation and completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage. 
Nevertheless, actors continued to rely on political and informal processes of decision-
making, which became important systemic rules, and managed to reach the completion of 
the pre-tendering process by waving compliance to this legal requirement. This non-
compliance problem was not addressed throughout the rest of the pre-tendering stage, 
especially considering the lack of internal control by participants and organizations – such 
as the PPP Unit and Managing Council – who were not active as coordinators to ensure 
compliance with requirements of legal accountability. Moreover, their roles were 
undermined as internal controllers to oversee accountability issues, an aspect which 
becomes more evident in the next Chapter (especially section 9.6), when actors adopt 
informal routes of interactions to overcome bureaucratic public administrative procedures 
for authorization of project publication for Public Consultation.  
The following section discusses another criteria defined   in   actors’   interactions  
based on perceptions of resistances in the local context. The discussions occurred directly 
between the Secretary and consultancy technicians responsible for designing the physical 
facility structure of PCCs and parking lots. Investors also participated in those discussions 
and contributed with opinions. Despite lack of coordination to monitor the emergent 
strategy for the PPP formulation, actors were motivated with the discussions and 
continued to define premises for the city centre PPP project. 
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8.3.3 ‘Political  Consensus  Building’  in  PCC  and  parking  lot  facility  specifications:  
preventing resistance from street vendors and public sector  
Accounting  for  street  vendors’  demands  on  PCC  building  specifications   
The City Centre Secretary presented another requirement of street vendors to 
prevent resistances. Based on previous demands collected from street vendors, the local 
government acknowledged their preference for staying on the ground floor in a PCC to 
facilitate circulation of consumers. This was also a result of complaints with respect to the 
Central of Small Businesses, constructed in the format of a shopping centre. According to 
the interviews, actors acknowledged that there was the possibility of resistance if the 
demands of street vendors were not taken into consideration, especially due to the fact 
that the municipal authority had failed with the previous attempt to implement a 
commercial centre.  
By accounting for the ground floor requirement, private investors suggested the 
idea of galleries, in which the PCC would be constructed on the ground floor in a 
transversal approach, crossing a block and linking two parallel streets. This approach was 
expected to stimulate the circulation of pedestrians across the PCC, preventing any box of 
vendors from being at disadvantage. 
Therefore, besides selecting properties located in the central area to answer to 
street  vendors’  demands,  actors  also  adopted,  as  PCC  building  specification,  the  demand  of  
street vendors to stay on the ground floor, represented by the idea of galleries. The 
consideration   of   street   vendors’   demands   was   perceived   as   an   instrument   of   political  
consensus building. The following interview quote by the consultancy technical director 
demonstrates the expectations of including their demands in the project: “I   can   tell   you  
that the urban and architectural solutions, and of mobility and accessibility, included the 
demands of street vendors. From that we understand that we will minimize their resistances 
against buying  this  idea”.  
Ignoring construction parameter limits imposed by the local urban legislation 
Another   premise   definition   that   involved   political   considerations   was   actors’  
decision to ignore the limitations imposed on facility construction parameters by the local 
urban legislation in order to reduce the financial costs and fiscal burden of the project. This 
was aimed at demonstrating to society and to control bodies that the PPP design was an 
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appropriate alternative to re-organize the city centre without representing a burden on the 
municipal budget, but also at securing a profitable business intervention for the private 
sector.  
Based on the format of the city centre PPP accorded by public and private actors, 
the private sector would be responsible for paying for the construction of commercial 
centre and parking lot facilities, as well as for up-front costs with compulsory purchase. The 
local government would then reimburse part of these costs during the contract execution 
term, while the rest of the private remuneration would come from tariffs and rent charged 
to parking and PCC users. In order to reduce the financial costs of PPP project and increase 
its profitability, without increasing the fiscal burden on the municipality, private investors 
and technicians tried to find alternatives to reduce the construction costs of the project. 
The solution adopted was to ignore the construction limits imposed by the local urban 
legislation, the Municipal Master Plan (Law n. 062, 2009). The initial design for PCCs and 
parking lots involved many above and underground floors, which were very costly to 
implement, especially considering difficulties involved in the construction of underground 
floors. Therefore, private investors and technicians decided to ignore the building 
parameter limits of the urban legislation, which were set at 60% for ground and above 
ground, and 70% for underground. They opted instead for 80% for each level in order to 
gain additional floor area and to construct more units per floor, reducing the number of 
above and underground levels per facility, and substantially decreasing construction costs.  
The decision of investors and consultancy technicians to ignore the limits of the 
local urban legislation was influenced by knowledge of the local context. They knew that 
there were discussions in the local government against the existing urban construction 
parameters. They learned that these parameters had already been questioned by the 
public and private sectors prior to the city centre PPP. The justification was that many 
buildings in the central area had been constructed based on parameters of 100%, and the 
lower limits of the urban legislation turned most existing buildings irregular. Moreover, 
considering the small size of property areas in the city centre, the lower parameters of the 
urban legislation froze new constructions, as well as most attempts at refurbishment and 
renovation of older buildings. In view of these observations, consultancy technicians and 
investors also found out that local elected officials had already been pressured to alter the 
parameters in the Municipal Master Plan (Law n. 062, 2009). All of these aspects built 
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expectations on the actors involved in the process that it was possible to disregard the 
limitations of the urban legislation.  
On the other hand, actors did not consider that if there was not an actual change in 
the Municipal Plan approving the 80% parameters they had adopted in the studies, the city 
centre PPP project design could be prevented from reaching Public Consultation and the 
official tendering stage, especially by federal, state and municipal control bodies. 
Accountability issues were a concern of some public sector interviewees, but not taken 
seriously in the technical studies. The following comment illustrates concern with 
accountability:  
“We try to minimize the number of steps so that in the end everything is agreed 
upon  (…).We have as much interest as the private sector, so we must fight for that. 
We must do everything right to avoid doing things politically wrong, because the 
Public   Ministry   can   get   involved;   so   everything   must   be   legally   right”   (PPP Unit 
Secretary).  
However, due to lack of control, coordination and integration in the decisions, the 
concerns of some public actors were not considered in the selection of the parameter for 
the PPP design. As a result, all of the technical studies were based on the legally 
inconsistent construction parameter of 80%.  
At this stage of the process, there was substantial exchange of information 
between the public and private sectors; but validation and control of decisions for technical 
and legal consistency of the PPP project was limited. There were no actors in the 
consultancy or public and private sectors to evaluate the integration and overall coherence 
of the decisions from a comprehensive perspective (the project design   as   ‘whole’).  
Consequently, despite some concern with accountability and despite the fact that actors 
wanted to prevent resistances during and for the Public Consultation, investors and 
consultancy technicians ignored the construction parameter limitations of the urban 
legislation for the physical design of PCCs and parking lots.  
8.3.4 ‘Political  Consensus  Building’  in  communication   
Another political mobilization that kept actors committed to the pre-tendering 
stage was their involvement in communication strategies. In the interviews, actors 
expressed that the PPP was a new theme in the municipal context, which could result in 
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cultural and political obstacles for the approval and publication of a city centre project 
based on the PPP instrument. Therefore, they highlighted the importance of constructing 
political will for their progress towards Public Consultation. In interviews, it became clear 
the collective vision to prevent obstacles for the process. As an investor mentioned, they 
perceived   that   ‘strong   political   ingredients’ were essential mobilizing forces in the 
preparation process. The following comment illustrates the perception that the local 
context in which the process was embedded influenced the complexity of formulating the 
PPP project: 
It is a whole that requires a lot, especially considering an unknown subject such as 
PPPs. It is not just a simple 8666 tendering process; it is a PPP that involves a high 
amount of investment; compulsory purchases that create problems because 
property owners will fight, they won't just accept it. So there are several things that 
happen that depend on the whole working together. It is also necessary a social 
assistant to persuade the street vendors that the project is the best solution for 
them. It is also necessary a communication group so that the information will reach 
the media correctly, not distorting the project in the wrong way. In my opinion, this 
whole was crucial for the progress (private investor 2). 
As the previous comment illustrates, a constant in the interviews with public and 
private actors was the concern with cultural resistance in the local context due to the 
novelty of the PPP instrument. This can also be illustrated by the following quote with 
respect to a general perception of PPPs in Brazil:  
Everything is too new. There are huge cultural obstacles that need to be overcome. 
Brazil is still very immature in this type of experience. If the federal government, 
which has a law dating back to 2004, is still maturing, I won't even mention the 
municipalities”  (City Centre Secretary).  
Interviewees from the local government commented on the need to engage in a 
process of persuasion not only to convince public actors and avoid reluctance, but also to 
explain the PPP instrument to improve the quality of discussions in the public sector 
especially with control bodies. Comments from interviewees show perceptions of obstacles 
for the process related to the lack of understanding of PPPs in the core of the public sector, 
as well as the common confusion between PPPs and privatization, as illustrated ahead:  
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 Our local businessmen, our politicians know very little. (...)The lack of knowledge is 
substantial. There is a lot of confusion between PPP and privatization. Almost 100% 
of the times when you mention PPP, they confuse with privatization; in both sectors, 
both politicians and business people.  (…)  So  we  notice  that  a  huge  debate  is  missing  
on the theme in the intellectual arena of the city, among opinion-makers, 
journalists, writers, in the economic arena, in the universities. I notice the debate is 
very  poor”  (consultancy technical director).  
Therefore, considering possibilities of resistance not only from actors in the local 
government but also from the media and society, selling the PPP idea and building political 
will in favour of the city centre PPP became a major focus of public and private actors 
during the period allocated to project design. However, the mobilization in response to this 
collective intention reduced the focus on formulating a PPP project that met legal 
requirements of fiscal and financial accountability and on monitoring its overall technical 
quality and coherence. Instead, preventing obstacles to overcome insecurities related to 
perceptions of resistance kept actors committed to the preparation despite lack of 
coordination and planning guidance. Therefore, the emergent politically-oriented strategy 
resulting from this process of engagement resulted in a technically deficient and legally 
inconsistent city centre PPP project.   
As the interviews show, actors deliberately engaged in the process of political 
consensus building to develop a general understanding of the expected benefits of the PPP 
in order to reduce political risks for the Public Consultation. Actors understood that society 
and politicians could resist the city centre PPP initiative, especially considering that 2012 
was an electoral year. In a interview,  a  private  actor  mentioned  his  perspective:  “You need 
the whole, because it involves the City Hall, the mayor and the secretaries; and the 
technicians underneath must be convinced as well, otherwise  this  can  turn  into  a  problem”  
(private investor 2). For  public  and  private  actors,  the  “political moment”  could  complicate  
the first municipal attempt to formulate a PPP policy. As the next quote from a private 
interviewee illustrates, actors were trying to prevent a “wave  against  the  project”: 
If the Public Consultation happens without this having been prepared, in my 
opinion, the opportunity will be lost, and this wave will come. So this preparation 
part before the Public Consultation is to make people understand the initiative, and 
prevent people who speak loudly from  persuading  that  it  doesn't  work  (…).  It  will  be  
that commotion, and in electoral year, the echo is extended, it reaches the podium. 
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Electoral year is potentially dangerous for any action of this nature, in my opinion, 
because it involves too much podium and persuasion, and the mayor does not want 
to lose points (private investor 6).  
Therefore, to build political will in favour of the city centre PPP, a local company 
was hired as communication advisor, and the political consensus activities lasted from 
October until December 2011. The local company had experience in mass communication 
for businesses and was hired to help public and private actors inform society of their 
involvement in the city centre PPP formulation process. When actors perceived several 
interests which could create obstacles for the city centre PPP formulation, they were 
acknowledging the complexity of interests involved in the city centre PPP intervention. 
Their strategy in face of this perception was to hire a communication advisor to help 
prevent obstacles from interfering with the process. The communication strategy for 
consensus building was not an attempt to obtain inputs from various stakeholders to the 
city centre policy scope; it was aimed at constructing a shared opinion in favour of the PPP 
so as to reduce the insecurities of the actors involved in formulating the project. 
In October, 2011, the communication advising company started its activities. There 
were several meetings between the technical team of the consultancy, the City Centre 
Secretariat team and the advising company, in which the details of the intervention and of 
the PPP instrument were explained. After the first meetings with the communication team, 
it was emphasized the need to “maximize  the  positive  effects  of  the  intervention”  (RM)  and 
to engage in a discourse construction strategy, based on which actors learned a new 
discourse to apply when communicating the PPP project to targeted audiences. In 
interview, the  City  Centre  Secretary  explained  this  strategy  of  ‘political  consensus  building’:   
This is a polemic topic. I had several discussions with the communication advisor, 
asking for guidelines and discourse tips on how to present this, on what’s  important  
to say to city councillors, to the press, to my team, to street vendors. There are 
several actors with whom you need to communicate so that they can communicate 
among themselves and accept the project. (…) Even if the project is economically 
and financially feasible, without communication it cannot go forward. 
Communication is the key. 
Based  on  actors’  interactions  and  agreements,  a  communication  plan  was  prepared,  
determining several actions to be implemented prior to Public Consultation. As one of the 
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activities, the communication team organized a workshop for discourse construction with 
private investors and consultancy actors. Another activity was a meeting with members of 
a city centre business association, in which the perceived benefits of the PPP intervention 
in the central area were communicated first-hand in order to obtain their approval and 
support. Public, private and consultancy actors also organized meetings with the two most 
influential communication groups in the state of Ceara operating in television, newspapers, 
internet and radio. After the implementation of the communication strategy to deal with 
perceived political culture obstacles, they regarded it as successful considering publications 
in the local media:  
Because of this [communication strategy], when the first news were published 
regarding the PPP in the city centre, people had more knowledge about it, there 
was little reaction, they were more positive. The communication agency started to 
follow everything that was happening in the media, and most of the news articles, 
maybe 95%, were positive, only a few criticisms (consultancy technical director).  
8.3.5 Summary of section  
This section showed that the emergent strategy from actor-relations based on 
initiative and collaboration was not influenced by a shared objective to formulate a 
consistent city centre PPP project. The following aspects characterize the emergent 
strategy: 
x It was influenced by a collective intention to prevent political, judicial and cultural 
obstacles against the project and its publication in Public Consultation; 
x It helped actors to define technical specifications for the project, which had not 
been clearly done under the instrumental plan, but it was based on political, non-
integrated and legally incoherent decisions as an attempt to prevent perceived 
obstacles; 
x Actors   became   absorbed   in   the   communication   strategy   for   ‘political   consensus  
building’   in   the   local  context,  while  the  studies  being  prepared   lacked   integration 
and legal consistency;  
x There was no overall coordinator on internal controller to oversee problems which 
were carried forward.  
Therefore, the nature of the emergent strategy without control and coordination 
and influenced by perceptions of contextual political and cultural obstacles compromised 
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the quality of the city centre PPP project submitted to the local government in November 
2011. For definition of project premises, actors applied embedded political decision-making 
practices which influenced their interest and commitment to the process. On one hand, 
this approach allowed the selection of property locations and actors’   technical 
specifications for PCC and parking lot facilities; but, on the other, it highlighted the role of 
politics overtaking the importance of technical consistency or justification for decisions, as 
well as the absence of internal and external control and concern for accountability issues. 
In this case, a balance between these aspects was not achieved.  
In EPISODE 2, actors seemed more concerned with making political decisions and 
building political consensus to facilitate the implementation and finish the pre-tendering 
stage than with building technical consistency in the documents. Some important technical 
aspects were not taken into considerations creating problems for EPISODE 3, such as 
ignoring legal requirements for compulsory purchase of property and legal construction 
constraints that would impose problems in the long-run. Other problems included the use 
of a demand study to justify a political selection of properties, as well as absence of an 
assessment of project risks during the formulation process. The impact of all these 
problems will be discussed in more detail in EPISODE 3.  
8.4 Submission of city centre PPP project design and rejection by 
the local government  
The process of ‘political consensus building’ for technical specification obscured the 
need to evaluate the quality of the material and created the shared imaged that the 
process was on track. However, there was no active coordination to identify that the 
intense focus on political consensus building and prevention of obstacles were detracting 
attention from monitoring the integration and coherence of the decisions being made. 
Actors’  failed  to  recognize the internal factors that were creating the environment for the 
process of formulation. The documents were submitted by the deadline of November 11, 
2011, and in the interview near the submission date, consultancy directors who were not 
controlling or coordinating the process explained that it was under control and that the 
studies had been successfully finalized:  “In November the PRI authorization period finishes. 
Today,  all  the  studies  are  ready”  (consultancy  general  director). Another director shared a 
similar  perception  on  November  4,  2011:  “You asked me if there was anything we did not 
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think of and that surprised us, in a positive or negative way. I'd say that we've been on top 
of  everything  that  has  happened”  (consultancy technical director). 
There was  also  no  consideration  that  the  ‘whole’  being  produced  through  arbitrary  
decisions were constructing a technically and legally incoherent PPP project for Public 
Consultation. Towards the end of EPISODE 2, consultancy actors decided to combine the 
independently produced documents for submission, without checking their integration or 
quality. This revealed that there was a greater focus on finalizing the products for 
submission than on guaranteeing their quality for approval or assessing whether the PPP 
was the most appropriate instrument for the policy intervention. In fact, the ‘value for 
money’ document, which was supposed to assess the cost-effectiveness of the PPP in 
comparison to other policy tools available, was not prepared, submitted or requested.  
In the November 11 deadline, the documents submitted were rejected by the local 
government based on the official justification that it was inconsistent with the local 
legislation. Public sector actors only evaluated the details of the documents after 
submission because they did not coordinate the formulation of the PPP project throughout 
EPISODE 2 and did not assess the legal and technical quality of the material while it was 
being elaborated. In interview, the City Centre Secretary, who was the public official in 
charge of evaluating the PPP studies, mentioned the reason for rejecting them: “First  of  all  
because they did not meet our expectations; we asked for more depth in a few aspects, such 
as the legal aspect”. As the legal advisor of the Secretariat pointed out in interview, the 
legal study in particular was ‘an  aberration’. She mentioned the study did not account for 
the specificities of the local urban legislation, demonstrating the embeddedness of the 
process in a regulatory context specific to the case study. She also emphasized problems 
with the informal reliance on the office from Sao Paulo as the foundation for the city centre 
PPP legal framework. In interview, the legal advisor of the Secretariat mentioned that the 
local government suggested the participation of local actors with expertise in the municipal 
legislation:  
There  are  cases  in  which  I  can  say  ‘Can  you  hire  my  friend,  she's  good,  and  you  can  
help her', but it is another thing if I say 'Hire person x, because she deeply 
understands a certain subject.' From the beginning, we said that there were people 
who already worked in this area of urbanism here in Fortaleza, in those same issues. 
But then an office from Sao Paulo? They did not know our reality here in no way 
possible.  
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However, the local government did not control or coordinate the elaboration of the 
city centre PPP and did not enforce its suggestions for the composition of the technical 
team, which was decided by consultancy directors on behalf of private investors.   
Furthermore, the City Centre Secretary and the advisor were lawyers and their 
professional background influenced the emphasis given on the lack of compatibility of the 
policy design with the local urban legislation. Although this was the explicit justification 
given by the public sector, there were other inconsistencies in the project design that made 
it unsuitable for Public Consultation, but which were not acknowledged by the official 
rejection of the local government. 
The exploratory analysis of the process highlighted other problems with the 
elaboration of the final PPP project. The final document failed to demonstrate that the PPP 
project designed would be able to respond to the urban mobility problems in the city 
centre, as these were the initial policy objectives of the municipality. This was a legal 
requirement indicated in the PRI publication and in the PPP Law. Moreover, for publication 
in Public Consultation, the PPP project was not well structured and consistent to attract 
private parties with an interest in investing in the city centre, especially because it did not 
clearly demonstrate the financial feasibility of the city centre PPP intervention. 
Furthermore,   the   final   document   did   not   present   a   ‘value   for   money’   assessment,  
demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of the PPP, as well as the comparative advantage of 
using the PPP instrument for the city centre policy intervention with respect to other policy 
delivery tools available. According to the PRI publication, this assessment was another 
criterion for the evaluation of the studies by the local government. The publication 
required a comparative analysis of economic feasibility and cost-benefit of proposed 
projects with alternative solutions (item 6.3.4., PRI n. 01, 2011), which was not submitted 
along with the other documents. 
Despite these problems, the main official concern of the City Centre Secretariat 
was the legal deficiencies in the final documents, and the local government formally gave 
the consortium of private investors an additional period for adjustments in the studies, 
which would run until December 12, 2011. In interview, when asked about the reasons for 
the adjustment period, the Secretary explained that even though the studies did not meet 
her expectations, she perceived the additional time as an improvement to the process. For 
her, the public sector had the responsibility to guarantee a well-designed city centre PPP 
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project to stimulate the competitiveness of the tendering process and to attract other 
private companies interested in implementing the project:  
I see it more as an improvement of the [PRI] mechanism so that when the tendering 
protocol is published we won't run the risk of no private sector becoming interested. 
We also have this responsibility, it's not a joke. We want this to go public via 
tendering process, and we want the private sector to become interested in this PPP 
(City Centre Secretary). 
Although the local government via the City Centre Secretary agreed to give an 
additional period for adjustments, she also failed to evaluate the appropriateness of the 
strategy that had been adopted for the formulation of the city centre PPP. There were no 
reflections that the instrumental approach initially selected was not in line with the 
complexity and contextuality of the process.  
8.5 Summary of Chapter   
This chapter showed some impediments which imposed obstacles to the 
formulation of the city centre PPP project, but did not derail the process in the case study. 
Although actors encountered some constraining issues in EPISODE 2, they were able to 
move past them   through   their   interactions.  On   the   other   hand,   actors’   continuity   in   the  
process despite impediments left consequences that were evidenced towards the end of 
EPISODE 2. The constraining elements included the contextual influence of legal and 
regulatory fragilities, organizational and coordination issues, perception of unfavourable 
political culture, as well as issues related to adjustment in relations, perceptions and 
opinions according to their contextual circumstances. The summary of this chapter is 
organized   in   terms  of   the  elements  of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’  produced  
through   actors’   interactions   in   EPISODE   2,   and   each   element   focuses   on   the   interplay 
between  embedded  and  innovative  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’.   
8.5.1 Systemic Policy Arrangement  
In the policy arrangement of EPISODE 2, public and private actors were capable of 
overcoming internal embedded perceptions of suspicion and distrust in their relations, but 
still perceived the existence of an adverse and suspicious political culture context against 
the PPP, which influenced their decision-making strategies. In the previous EPISODE, actors 
overcame embedded scepticisms and insecurities against public-private relations by 
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focusing on their reciprocal interests and interdependence in order to agree on the urban 
mobility scope for the city centre PPP intervention. However, the influence of political 
culture was carried over from agenda setting to EPISODE 2. This included perceptions of 
historical public-private distrust and suspicion which could lead to obstacles and 
resistances and the perception that PPPs as policy instrument had not been included in the 
political agenda of elected officials, media and society. Actors involved in the formulation 
internalized the prioritization of PPP as policy instrument for the urban mobility scope; but 
their embedded perspectives of an adversarial local political culture influenced a process of 
‘political consensus building’   to  persuade  society  to  also  accept  PPP  as  priority. However, 
this mobilization compromised the final quality of the PPP design.  
8.5.2 Systemic Legal Arrangement 
EPISODE 2 was characterized by a fragile systemic legal arrangement. It was 
formally based on the Municipal PPP Law, which had been published in June 2011, but it 
was not culturally internalized by public and private actors, who were still learning about 
PPPs. Actors overcame the fact that they did not have a solid PPP legal arrangement and 
lacked experience in PPP legal requirements by mobilizing the capacity of a legal office 
from Sao Paulo with perceived expertise in Public-Private Partnerships. However, the 
informal participation of the office did not guarantee legal consistency of the PPP project 
design, especially considering its long distance interaction. The office representatives did 
not check, for example, that the final documents lack of a   ‘value   for  money’  assessment.  
Moreover, the formal systemic legal arrangement was also composed of the local urban 
legislation, the Municipal Master Plan (Law n. 062, 2009), and by the federal decree-law on 
property expropriation for public utility (Decree-Law n. 3365, 1941). This demonstrates that 
the formulation process was also embedded in a local regulatory context. The Sao Paulo 
office did not emphasize the publication of compulsory purchase decrees as legal 
requirements for the acquisition of properties which were not yet owned by the 
municipality. It also lacked knowledge of the local urban legislation which resulted in 
inconsistencies in the technical specifications of the PPP project, considering that the 
construction parameters in the technical studies were not in accordance with the urban 
legislation (Municipal Master Plan). Legal problems in the end of EPISODE 2 also highlighted 
the absence of public sector coordination and control during the process to secure the legal 
adequacy of the documents being prepared. 
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8.5.3 Systemic Organizational Arrangement 
EPISODE 2 was also characterized by a fragile systemic organizational arrangement. 
The process at this stage lacked coordination from the public sector, private investors and 
consultancy actors. The public sector fragile organizational and technical capacity in PPPs 
and   investors’   lack   of   previous   experience   in   contracting   out   relations   with   the   public  
sector contributed to their complete reliance on the local consultancy for coordination of 
the PRI pre-tendering stage. However, consultancy coordinators were not able to exercise 
control over the activities based on the instrumental plan created for the process of PPP 
formulation. In a second moment of EPISODE 2, when the strategic arrangement was 
adjusted, the process continued without coordination and leadership, but it was not 
completely  derailed  because  of  actors’   initiative, collaboration and network-relations. The 
process of PPP formulation in EPISODE 2 lacked internal and external control, allowing 
technical premises to be influence by political decisions and compromising the quality, 
coherence and accountability of the project designed.  
8.5.4 Systemic Strategic Arrangement 
The analysis of EPISODE 2 showed the difficulties of using an instrumental strategy 
for the formulation of a complex project. The instrumental approach disregarded the 
network   of   interdependent   actors   (‘project   finance’   concept) and the dynamic of 
interactions needed for linking the numerous studies prepared for PPP project formulation. 
The analysis also showed that actors were able to engage in a more flexible emergent 
strategy which allowed simultaneous document elaboration and technical specification, for 
easier adjustments based on changes in decisions throughout the process. However, the 
analysis also emphasized that lack of coordination and control over a flexible strategy in a 
complex scenario which is influenced by contextual factors can lead to technical 
deficiencies in the PPP project. In EPISODE 2, there was no overall coordination or control 
to guide and integrate the process under the emergent strategy. Moreover, the lack of 
coordination and the contextual responses to political culture took over the process, 
influenced technical decisions and compromised project quality. 
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8.6 Conclusion    
The following aspects characterized actor-relations in EPISODE 2: 
x the replacement of an instrumental strategy with a more flexible approach 
to project formulation;  
x lack of coordination and control;  
x fragile legal arrangement and internal knowledge on PPP legal procedures; 
and 
x technical decision-making based on ‘political  consensus  building’.  
Although the construction, enactment and adjustment  of  the  ‘systemic  institutional  
arrangement’  was  not  enough  to  support  actors  towards  completion  of  the  stage  and  the  
process  of   ‘political  consensus  building’   compromised   the  project’s   technical   consistency,  
this EPISODE also provided positive lessons:  
x The interactions under an emergent   strategy   highlighted   actors’   capacity to self-
mobilize and improvise in face of obstacles (i.e. lack of an adequate plan and 
coordination); and  
x The  analysis  revealed  the  importance  of  ‘soft  capacity  elements’  such as initiative, 
collaboration and construction of a technical network for information-sharing and 
decision-making.  
As a result, the rejection of the studies at the end of the EPISODE was not sufficient 
to obstruct the continuation of actors in the pre-tendering stage. As the next Chapter will 
demonstrate, these   seeds  of   soft   capacity  elements  grew   into   ‘commitment  packages’   in  
EPISODE 3, which helped in overcoming frustrated expectations that the process would 
reach Public Consultation faster, especially after  the  municipality’s  rejection  of  the  project.   
However, although in this EPISODE public, private and consultancy actors increased 
participation and became more active coordinators, the problematic consequences of a 
fragile legal and organizational arrangement (especially lack of internal control) remained, 
such as ignoring legal requirements for property compulsory purchase and legal urban 
constraints on project premises (construction parameters of 80%).  
The next stage of the process, EPISODE 3, is analyzed in the following chapter. 
Actors adopted a new approach for PPP formulation which changed the ‘systemic  
institutional   arrangement’. The new approach, which deliberately considered complexity, 
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flexibility and involved more active coordination, helped to overcome frustrated 
expectations and was more appropriate for the characteristics of formulating a PPP project, 
which requires constant document adaptation and decision-making adjustments. The new 
approach was also able to support the process towards completion of the pre-tendering 
stage and lead to Public Consultation, but it left some problems for the long-run. As it will 
be discussed in the last section of Chapter 9 (item 9.6), the flexibility of informal decision-
making to overcome bureaucratic administrative procedures, along with fragile internal 
control   and   limited   knowledge   on   legal   requirements,   compromised   the   project’s   fiscal,  
financial and social accountability.  
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Chapter 9 - Descriptive-Analysis of EPISODE 3 
Actor-relations in the re-adjustment  of  the  ‘systemic  institutional  
arrangement’ 
9.1 Introduction 
In  EPISODE  3,  actors  adjusted  the   ‘systemic   institutional  arrangement’   in terms of 
the policy, organizational, legal and strategic approaches for finishing the city centre PPP 
project and the pre-tendering stage. This EPISODE covers the extension period provided by 
the local government after rejection of the studies at the end of the previous stage. This 
period started in December 2011 and finished with the publication of the PPP project for 
Public Consultation, in June 2012. This chapter analyses the EPISODE 3 in two stages: 
1. Adjustment  in  the  ‘systemic  institutional  arrangement’  with  respect  to  its  elements: 
o Policy Arrangement 
o Organizational Arrangement 
o Legal Arrangement 
o Strategic Arrangement 
2. Period towards completion of the PRI pre-tendering process leading to the 
publication of the PPP project for Public Consultation.  
In EPISODE 3 actors focused on overcoming the problems of the first two stages of 
the preparation process, especially after the rejection of the studies by the Sectoral 
Secretariat. In EPISODE 3, actors overcame frustrations and insecurities and created a new 
arrangement for the interactions. They built new connections and some actors took on new 
roles. They also invited new actors to participate, increased their own participation and 
coordination in the preparation process and designed new informal routes to overcome 
bureaucracies.   
9.2 Policy  Arrangement:  the  role  of    ‘commitment  packages’   
After the local government rejected the PPP project design at the end of EPISODE 2, 
actors had their initial expectations frustrated. Many interviewees highlighted the low 
quality of the documents and the difficulties faced in the formulation process. Despite 
acknowledging the problems in the process, actors were committed to making the 
partnership work, envisaging the future benefits of its success. To stay motivated despite 
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the absence of a legal contract binding them in the informal PRI process, actors relied on 
commitment packages they had been constructing and reinforcing, which were based on 
political, business and technical commitment elements. Public, private and consultancy 
actors were able to overcome frustrations, to increase participation and coordination over 
the process and to work together as they recognized their interdependences, as well as the 
adequacy and advantages of formulating the PPP project in order to meet their reciprocal 
interest. Actors’ commitment to the process was also influenced by perceptions that the 
obstacles   from  adversarial  political  culture  were  under  control  as  a   result  of  the   ‘political  
consensus  building’  strategy  in  EPISODE  2.  They  also  recognized  the  need  for  changes  in  the  
strategic approach, especially considering contextual particularities. Commitment was also 
influenced  by  actors’  acknowledgements  that  the  city  centre  PPP  was  the  first  of  public  and  
private actors, which represented a learning experience. A specific analysis on the three 
groups is presented next.  
9.2.1 Public sector   
Local government actors continuously expressed political commitment to the city 
centre intervention, which was important for keeping them and other actors engaged in 
the preparation process despite the initial problems. They acknowledged the municipal 
dependency on the involvement of the private sector, especially the need for resources for 
project formulation and for the implementation of the PPP initiative. Actors from the local 
government also increased their participation as coordinators and gave more inputs in 
technical and financial decisions on the PPP project. These elements inspired collaboration, 
persistence and tolerance from public sector actors despite initial frustrations.   
Interviewees from the local government acknowledged the complexity of the 
formulation and shared frustrated expectations that the PPP project would be easier to 
formulate. In EPISODE 3, they recognized they had underestimated the difficulties of 
formulating the city centre PPP. The following quote from the interview with the City 
Centre Secretary illustrates that for public actors the perceived benefits of using the PPP 
instrument influenced overcoming lack of experience and the problems of the previous 
EPISODE:  
The PPP has increased the resources available to the municipalities but based on 
many rules that culturally we will have to learn how to live with; both the public and 
private sectors. It is a big challenge. I confess that sometimes I get discouraged but I 
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think this instrument is so rich to construct a solid project. The construction of this is 
so complex. In the beginning we thought it would be easier to do it. In the beginning, 
we  had  the  expectation  that  it  would  be  fast  to  construct  the  lots  and  PCCs,  but  it’s  
not how it works. And we are only seeing this now as things are progressing; based 
on all the problems we have been facing.  
Moreover, actors from the local government also understood the importance of 
context for the formulation of a PPP project and learned that to simply copy the 
instrumental model of the state government was not ideal for the PRI formulation of the 
city centre PPP. They acknowledged the relevance of the specificities of the city centre PPP 
project. The City Centre Secretary, for example, commented in interview on the 
formulation of the football stadium and compared that PPP case with the contextual 
difficulties of the city centre formulation: 
The state government was able to do the PPP [of the Football Stadium], but the 
level of difficulty cannot even compare to ours. Why? The Stadium was already 
owned by the public sector. There was a very specific scope. There is the World Cup 
coming up; several other things. But for us, we are intervening in private property 
ownership; we need to increase the construction parameter in the city centre area, 
so many little things.  
Similar to public actors involved in EPISODE 3 of the pre-tendering stage, private 
investors also relied on their own commitment packages to stay committed and motivated 
despite frustrations and delays in the progress of the PPP formulation process.  
9.2.2 Private investors    
In EPISODE 3, investors had frustrated expectations that the process would reach 
conclusion quickly. They still had insecurities, especially in relation to their lack of 
knowledge of the PPP theme or in public-private relations. On the other hand, they stayed 
committed to the process by focusing on other aspects. They hired other actors with 
experience in PPPs to help in the process and increased their participation in discussions. 
They acknowledged that this was the first PPP of most public and private sector actors 
involved, which would require learning experience. An investor mentioned that it was a 
learning experience even for the consultancy general director, who was perceived as the 
person with the most PPP experience among the actors:  
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It's been the first PPP, and in life everything that comes first it's harder, it's more 
complicated.   The   consultancy’s   general   director   is   very   good,   but   for   him   the  
learning experience was also very good.   (…)   It's   different   when   you   read   the  
legislation on PPP and understand it from when you are actually going to put it in 
practice.  (…)  So  the  process  is  a  learning  experience  as  you  go  along.  You  get  to  see  
in practice what you've learnt in the books. PPPs are mostly in the books, because 
what's out there is insufficient (private investor 1).  
Investors also focused on the fact that the city centre intervention was a good 
business opportunity, which motivated their participation and commitment to the process 
despite the problems. Another aspect that contributed to their commitment was the 
interactions during EPISODE 3 with the public sector and organized by the consultancy, 
especially with respect to defining risks mechanisms to the business opportunity. Even 
though investors were constantly overcoming insecurities, their active participation in 
designing the PPP intervention kept them committed to the preparation. Throughout the 
EPISODE, investors also counted on the political commitment expressed by the public 
sector to the PPP intervention (mostly from City Centre and Finance Secretaries and the 
mayor), on perceptions that the intervention was a priority for the city, on previous 
implemented strategies of ‘political consensus building’, as well as on the dependence of 
the public sector on private resources. All of these aspects represent an energy that kept 
investors committed to the PPP preparation process. Comments from the interviews with 
private investors illustrate these perceptions shared by the group: 
There is the interest of the City Centre Secretary, and she has been very dedicated. 
So this has given a condition for it to flow better. And obviously this group of private 
investors is very engaged. I think we've been dedicated for over a year, constantly 
participating in meetings. And the work of the consultancy is also very good, which 
has been giving us a secure direction and to the process (private investor 4). 
I think that, one, there is the political will of the City Centre Secretary to make this 
happen; two, persuading the mayor; and, three, the group of private investors 
included strong political ingredients in order to make the local government really 
want to implement this (private investor 2).  
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Like public and private actors, consultancy directors also relied on commitment 
packages, especially considering the need to maintain the trust deposited in its expertise by 
the other groups.   
9.2.3 Consultancy  
The consultancy also had expectations frustrated at the end of EPISODE 3, which 
led to insecurities. The consultancy was perceived to have a high level of knowledge in PPPs 
and preparation process and the most comprehensive methodologies and plans. As a result, 
a main aspect that influenced the consultancy focus on improving the process was the need 
to maintain the credibility and trust it had developed mainly with investors, but also with 
the public sector.  
Despite insecurities due to the initial rejection, consultancy directors recognized 
that it was a learning experience, as the following comment from a director illustrates: “So 
everything  that  happens  to  be  the  ‘guinea  pig’,  the  first  process,  is  painful.   It was an initial 
mistake that everybody thought the  thing  would  be  much  more  fluid” (technical director). 
Directors also started to reflect on EPISODE 2 and recognized the problems, such as the 
deficiency  of   the  quality  of   the  material   submitted,  which   is   illustrated  by   this  quote:   “It 
was noticed that all the technical production in those 3-4 months was basically with no 
technical consistency, without any basis of information. It lacked expression. It had no 
consolidated   technical   foundation”   (general director). Directors also acknowledged the 
coordination problems in the process, which led to non-integrated and inconsistent PPP 
documents: 
In  several  studies  there  were  things  written  that  made  no  sense.  (…)  If  there  is  only  
one person that can do it and has knowledge to orient a team then the process goes 
well, but there wasn't anybody in the team structure. The person who was initially 
coordinating the process had no idea of what they were doing, and in the end we 
prepared this project without a solid basis, totally fluid (technical director).  
After the city centre PPP project was rejected at the end of EPISODE 2, consultancy 
directors developed motivation to adjust the material in EPISODE 3. They increased 
technical commitment and changed the focus from results to process performance in order 
to improve quality of the material. Directors were concerned about the credibility of the 
consultancy regarding their role in the market as specialists in PPP preparation processes. 
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This  led  actors  to  change  the  ‘way  of  doing  things’,  from  focusing  on  plans  and  products to 
intensifying  actors’  interactions  and  coordination.   
9.2.4 Summary of Section  
This section showed that despite recognizing the problems in the previous EPISODE, 
public and private actors and consultancy directors continued in EPISODE 3 with the PRI 
pre-tendering  formulation  of  the  city  centre  project  by  relying  on  ‘commitment  packages’.  
The previous difficulties did not derail the process despite the informal character of the PRI 
arrangement and did not change actors’  priorities  in  using  the  PPP  instrument  for  the  city  
centre intervention. A summary of the commitment of public and private actors and 
consultancy directors is illustrated by a comment from the interview with a consultancy 
director: 
The discussions started to improve from the moment we handed in the documents 
and studies, when the City Centre Secretary started to participate more effectively, 
and invited the technicians of the Finance Secretariat, with the participation of the 
Secretary.  (…)  The  consultancy  (…)  involved  people  who  had  more  experience,  more  
expertise, more knowledge, and this also improved the process a lot.  (…)  And  third,  
there was certain alienation of the authorized private consortium; they were the 
least  engaged   in   the  process.   (…)  But   it   is  better  now;   investors  decided  that  they  
needed to know the process better.  
The increased participation from private investors, public actors and consultancy 
directors influenced a change in the systemic organizational arrangement, which is 
analysed next.  
9.3 Organizational Arrangement   
In EPISODE 3, the new organizational arrangement for the city centre PPP 
formulation was influenced by a more active position adopted by directors, public and 
private actors to assure the overall quality and integration of the project material. 
Consultancy directors participated more actively as coordinators, which influenced 
improvements in the city centre policy design. Public and private actors also became more 
engaged in the discussions, not only providing inputs for the documents, but also with 
coordinating roles.  
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In EPISODE 3, the consultancy changed its way of interaction, especially with 
respect to the role of directors. Instead of assuming that technical actors and coordinators 
could conduct the process alone, senior directors took the role of coordinators. A comment 
from one of the directors demonstrates  this:  “We started to give a more effective response; 
there was a better orientation for the team. Our involvement helped to organize it better, 
more  from  a  management  perspective  than  technical”  (technical director). 
In EPISODE 3, the technical director was responsible for the interactions of the 
technical team with the Sectoral Secretariat, while the general director continued to the 
lead discussions between investors and the City Centre and the Finance Secretaries. The 
exchange of information between directors was then passed on to the technical team. This 
was a way of assuring that the inputs from investors and Secretaries would be included in 
the studies. In contrast to EPISODE 2, when the initial dialogue only took place with the PPP 
Unit, perceived as the main coordinator for the process, consultancy directors considered 
in EPIOSODE 3 the ideas and contributions of the Sectoral Secretary as the entity that 
would approve the studies. A consultancy director acknowledged the need for a change of 
organizational focus in interview:  
There is the technical Secretariat, the City Centre Secretariat, which was responsible 
for technically approving the studies, but most of the dialogue happened with the 
Managing  Council,  the  PPP  Unit,  in  which  there  wasn’t  any  specialist  with  technical  
knowledge on the problem to be solved (general director). 
In addition to that, the consultancy also assumed a clearer role to mediate the 
discussions between public and private sectors, focusing on answering to the interests of 
investors in order to guarantee their commitment, as well as to the demands of public 
sector actors, especially the Finance and City Centre Secretaries. It executed this role by 
promoting meetings between the two sectors. The consultancy perceived that for investors 
to continue in the preparation process, it was important to focus on designing a PPP 
intervention that was favourable in their perspective. Similarly, for maintaining the 
commitment of public sector actors, directors realized it was important to take their 
perspective into consideration as well.  
From the public sector, the City Centre Secretary and the Finance Secretary 
participated more actively and also exercised coordinating roles during the adjustment 
period. Public actors recognized the complexity of formulating a city centre PPP policy and 
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decided to participate more as coordinators, following the discussions more closely. After 
the submission of the documents at the end of EPISODE 2 (November 2011), actors from 
the City Centre Secretariat recognized their lack of capacity to evaluate all the PPP technical 
studies and decided to involve other actors from the local government in the interactions, 
especially the Finance Secretary. Interviewees from the public sector commented that the 
Finance  Secretary  was  “very  qualified  and  competent”   (PPP Unit Secretary). Actors in the 
public sector believed the Finance Secretary had the best technical capacity to evaluate the 
material in terms of its financial and fiscal adequacy to the municipality. To illustrate, the 
legal advisor to the City Centre Secretariat recognized in interview the importance of 
involving the Finance Secretary: 
I was worried because I thought we were creating a project of this size, basically me, 
the Secretary and a few other people from the Secretariat. We have a very fragile 
structure  here.  (…)  But  the  Finance  Secretary  will  be  able  to  give  a  financial analysis 
that will provide another vision and opinion on the level of financial and fiscal 
commitment from the municipality, on what it can give or not as guarantees. 
The group of private investors also became more participative. Although they 
acknowledged that they did not have extensive capacity to evaluate and conduct the 
preparation process, investors decided to be more actively engaged as coordinators. They 
hired local executives with prior experience in PPPs and PRIs to advise them in the process 
and to intermediate their dialogue with the local consultancy. This is illustrated by a quote 
from   an   interview  with   a   private   investor:   “We hired two Executives to audit the entire 
process, who are people with experience in tendering process, who understand public 
organizations, in order to take a look at the entire material and see if we are in the right 
and  secure  path,  and  to  hear  a  second  opinion”  (private investor 2).  
In addition to that, a private investor took leadership over the group, who is 
referred  in  this  research  as  the  ‘Entrepreneur’.  He  had  an  active  role  in  the  discussions  over  
demand risks, analyzed later in this chapter. He was an experienced businessman with 
investment participation in PPPs and parking lots businesses around Brazil. As the following 
quote from a consultancy technician involved in the adjustment period confirms, the role 
of the Entrepreneur was significant as the coordinator and leader among other private 
investors:
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He's the one who controls the process. Last meeting [March 12, 2012] we were 
questioned; me, the legal advisor and the technical director. They kept questioning 
and questioning us. I'm glad we took all the material to show them, the documents 
and everything.  And  all  of  the  questions  were  asked  by  the  Entrepreneur:  ‘and  this  
and  that,  what  if  you  make  it  this  or  that  way?’  All  of  the  questions  were  from  him  
(consultancy legal specialist).  
The analysis of this section showed that consultancy directors, public and private 
actors adopted more active roles as coordinators in EPISODE 3. Based on perceptions that 
difficulties involved in the formulation of a PPP project were neglected in the previous 
Episode, they adjusted their strategic behaviour for EPISODE 3. The coordinators over the 
process who also acted as institutional entrepreneurs in promoting and implementing the 
new approach included: 
x Public sector: City Centre (Sectoral) Secretary and Finance Secretary; 
x Private   sector:   ‘the   Entrepreneur’,   who   was   the   private investor with the most 
experience in large business ventures and public-private relations; 
x Consultancy: general and technical directors.  
9.4 Legal Arrangement 
In EPISODE 3, the formal systemic legal arrangement was composed by the 
Municipal PPP Law published in June 2011 setting rules and procedures, and by the PPP 
Decree published in December 2011, which formally created the PPP Unit and Managing 
Council. Nevertheless, since public actors lacked experience in PRI pre-tendering 
formulation of PPP projects and the legal PPP framework had only been recently 
implemented, actors continued to informally rely on the legal office from Sao Paulo for 
legal guidelines.  
In contrast to EPISODE 2, there was an improvement in the legal arrangement as 
the office acknowledged the problems in the long distance interaction with the consultancy 
team   and   hired   a   local   lawyer   as   the   office’s   representative   in   Fortaleza   to   follow   the  
process more closely. Interviewees mentioned that the ability to make connections with 
actors in the local government was essential for the progress of the PPP process, which was 
previously a non-fulfilled condition by the Sao Paulo office. This perception is exemplified 
by the next quote from a technical actor involved in the formulation process:   
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I  think  it  is  ‘ok’  for  them  to  be  from  outside  of  the  city,  but  it  is  important  for  them  
to have someone here. Considering the local and state governments, you need to be 
able to talk to someone; you need to have a relationship with someone. You need to 
know someone for things to progress (consultancy administrative coordinator).  
During EPISODE 3, although public actors increased coordination in the new 
approach, they did not control and coordinate the legal aspects of the PPP project design, 
which was in the hands of the Sao Paulo office. Throughout this stage, although public 
actors participated as coordinators and validated premises as the documents were 
elaborated, the Sao Paulo office held the main responsibility for assuring the inclusion of 
legal requirements in the PPP design. The local presence of the legal advisor facilitated the 
simultaneous adjustment in documents as premises were defined and modified during 
EPISODE 3. However, problems from the previous EPISODE continued as the office did not 
enforce or account for the contextual regulatory specificities of the city centre PPP. It was 
necessary knowledge about the local urban legislation for change in construction 
parameters and the adequacy of following the federal decree on procedures for property 
expropriation. This required publication of compulsory purchase decrees so that the 
municipality could have ownership of properties and legally used them in the project. 
Similar to the previous EPISODE, public actors failed to control these specific legal aspects, 
and the problems continued throughout the entire EPISODE 3.  
Furthermore, with respect to the overall legal arrangement of EPISODE 3, this 
chapter analyses later an adjustment in the arrangement. It mainly involved the 
participation of public actors in an informal route towards completion of the PRI pre-
tendering process and publication of the PPP project for Public Consultation. However, the 
legal problems that were carried on from EPISODE 2 stayed the same until the completion 
of the PRI pre-tendering stage and publication of the PPP project for Public Consultation.  
9.5 Strategic  Arrangement:  the  ‘learning  by  doing’  approach 
In EPISODE 3, actors engaged in a new strategic approach that will be called 
‘learning  by  doing’   in  this  analysis.  The new  strategy  was   influenced  by  actors’  reflections  
on the problems resulting from neglect of context in EPISODE 2, and new awareness of the 
complexity  involved  in  formulating  a  PPP  project.  It  was  also  influenced  by  actors’  improved  
coordination and participation. The   ‘learning   by   doing’   approach   involved   discovering,  
through the challenges created and perceived in their interactions, that complexity was 
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present   in   the   PPP   formulation   process.   Actors’   adjustment   in   opinions   and   decisions  
through their interactions was reflected in modifications in the PPP project and in the 
flexible strategic approach for the process. For example, during EPISODE 3 the public sector 
understood that the initial timeframe of the instrumental strategy was not adequate and 
extended the deadline until the premises were adequate and the project ready for Public 
Consultation. The following comment from the City Centre Secretary demonstrates this: 
We  are  trying  to  say  ‘private  sector,  please  come’,  and  a  good  business  opportunity  
is only good when it is good for both sectors. It cannot be different from a relation 
that happens between two companies in the private sector. And this equilibrium we 
are getting now with the studies. As long as we don't get this equilibrium, in which 
it becomes attractive to the private sector, getting this very rounded up, showing 
that it is a good deal for both the public and private sectors, it won't be published. 
Three  areas  demonstrate  actors’  engagement  in  the  ‘learning  by  doing’  strategy: 
1. Conciliation between public and private actors over pecuniary payment 
composition, demand risk and compulsory purchase costs;  
2. Concerns with political risks and agreement on the pecuniary payment guarantee 
arrangement to be offered by the municipality for the city centre PPP; 
3. Adjustment in the PPP project design after discussion with the mayor for validation.  
9.5.1 Conciliations between public and private actors over pecuniary payment 
composition, demand risk and compulsory purchase costs 
The analysis in this section will show that actors were able to reconcile interests 
and opinions on technical premises and adjust the PPP project design at the same time. It 
will demonstrate   that   flexibility   of   strategy,   actors’   capacity   to   compromise   and   active  
participation and coordination facilitated adjustment in premises and agreements during 
the process. These premises had been defined in EPISODE 2, but not validated between 
public and private actors. Although the pecuniary payment composition was defined in the 
previous Episode without the agreement with the local government, when public actors 
learned about the format in EPISODE 3, they were tolerant and committed to adjustments 
and compromise. However, the analysis in this section will highlight the problems left from 
the political influence on the elaboration of the demand study, which was used to justify 
the  selection  of  properties  based  on  the  need  for  ‘political  consensus  building’.     
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The financial model of the PPP project submitted at the end of EPISODE 2 included 
the assumption that during contract execution the private sector would assume the 
immediate costs of compulsory purchase, while the local government would reimburse the 
concessionaire through monthly instalments of pecuniary compensation over the contract 
period. In EPISODE 3, the City Centre Secretary and the Finance Secretary found out about 
another premise that was not validated with the local government because it had only 
been internally discussed between technicians and private investors in EPISODE 2. The 
premise determined that public pecuniary compensation was also a function of service 
provision. According to the model, besides paying property expropriation costs in 
instalments, the public sector would also be obliged to pay a complementary monthly 
amount for the number of parking spaces and commercial centre (PCC) boxes made 
available to users through the PPP intervention. When the financial model was analysed by 
the Finance and City Centre Secretaries in EPISODE 3, this portion of the pecuniary 
compensation was not validated. 
During meetings in EPISODE 3, Secretaries argued that payment from the 
municipality for service provision was not necessary because the city centre demand for 
parking spaces and boxes was already high enough to secure revenue for   the   project’s  
feasibility and financial return to investors. Therefore, the public sector required a 
modification in the financial model. In order for the city centre project to still qualify as PPP, 
in which compensation from the public sector is a legal requirement, actors maintained 
that the local government would be responsible for paying back the costs of property 
acquisition to the private sector.  
The adjustments requested by the local government influenced an increased 
participation of investors. After the requirements from the Secretaries, investors started to 
consider the financial sustainability of the project. Since the government refused to pay a 
complement for service provision, the service revenues for the project would have to come 
only from the parking tariffs and commercial centre (PCC) box rent to be charged from 
service users. This would have to be enough to guarantee financial return and cover the up-
front costs of compulsory purchase. Private investors understood that they would now 
have  to  assume  the  project’s  demand  risks  for  both  parking  and  PCC  service  provision.  As  a  
result, private investors and the consultancy reflected that in EPISODE 2 they did not pay 
attention to the quality of the demand study to assess the situation of the services for the 
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city centre PPP. They started to recognize the embeddedness of the city centre PPP in the 
economic context of Fortaleza.  
In EPISODE 2, the demand study was only used to justify the selection of properties 
based on their derelict and underused status to prevent judicial and political obstacles to 
their acquisition. In EPISODE 3, however, investors realized that the weak demand study 
could compromise the financial sustainability of the intervention, especially considering the 
municipality would not assume demand risks or pay for service provision. Private investors 
interviewed during EPISODE 3 showed concern with selecting properties that could not 
create demand for the services, as illustrated by the following quote:  
I think that definition of the properties is a key step because without the correct 
definition the process becomes fragile. If the selected area does not create the 
appropriate demand for parking spaces or even for the PCCs, the project won't 
happen. The areas are very important (private investor 4). 
Consultancy directors   acknowledged   the   consultancy’s   fault   for   not   having  
identified demand risks during the formulation process in the previous Episodes. They were 
aware that the risk analysis discussed during the PPP Unit meetings had not accurately 
identified the risks of the city centre intervention. According to the interview with the 
general director, the PPP project design should have included an assessment document 
with the risks of the project, including demand risks, indicating their allocation and 
suggesting mitigation mechanisms.  
In the absence of a risk assessment, private and consultancy actors found another 
way to mitigate demand risks and tried to allocate some of the responsibility to the public 
sector. The insecurity created with the poor demand study was overcome with this new 
alternative in the studies, with which the local government agreed. Different from what 
public actors had argued, directors and private investors asserted that demand for parking 
services was risky considering the number of irregular parking lots still operating in the city 
centre. For them, this represented competition for the parking services to be provided in 
the PPP intervention and could turn the project financially unfeasible. According to meeting 
memos and interviews, the government accepted the argument of private investors, which 
shows public sector flexibility and capacity to make concessions and compromise in order 
to reach agreements in project premises. A private actor shared in interview the argument 
used to convince the local government to partially assume the demand risk:  
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The success of the structured parking lots directly depends on the action of the local 
government. If it prohibits irregular parking lots and disciplines parking on the 
streets, the parking lot business will become feasible very rapidly, because people 
won't  stop  going  to  the  city  centre.   (…)  These   irregular   lots,  we  know,  will   involve  
the judicial system. The municipality will try to close them, and the judicial system 
will say not to. The [irregular] operator will probably have a provisory license; the 
judicial system will probably say he has a definite license to hold the thing. So it is 
also a very complex thing. It is not just an action. It is an action which will reflect in 
the judicial system. So, for that lot to be closed, it can take years. This is a direct 
competition to the structured parking lots. (private investor 6). 
In summary, according to the agreement reached, the local government would pay 
higher compensation for parking services and lower compensation for PCC services, since 
street vendor demand for boxes in commercial centres was considered high. However, to 
reduce the burden on the municipal budget, public actors decided to take over the 
payment of compulsory purchase, so the local government would no longer have to 
reimburse the private party for these costs during contract execution. By changing the 
object of public pecuniary compensation from property costs to partial payment for service 
provision, public actors reduced the burden on the municipal budget and showed capacity 
to adjust technical premises and find alternatives in order to compromise and keep the pre-
tendering process going.  
Public actors compromised and decided to take over costs of compulsory purchase 
because they found a fiscal alternative to pay for such costs. According to interviews and 
meeting memos, the local government was counting on the use of tax debt settlement to 
acquire the properties for the city centre PPP (Urban Real Estate and Land Property Tax or 
Imposto sobre Propriedade Predial e Territorial Urbana - IPTU). If owners had outstanding 
property tax debts with the municipality, depending on the market value of the properties, 
they could be acquired via debt settlement reducing even to zero the acquisition costs of 
some properties. In interview with the Finance Secretary, he explained the property 
outstanding   debt   situation   in   Fortaleza:   “We still have 35% of default with property tax 
[IPTU]. In the past we have reached 49%; so basically for every two properties, one was not 
paying IPTU;  and  today  it  is  still  a  lot”. In this discussion, it became clear the embeddedness 
of the PPP formulation process in a fiscal context which actually facilitated the negotiations 
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and compromise between actors. Private actors also commented on the changes required 
in the studies after this agreement, as the next quote illustrates:   
In the beginning, the private sector would give the money [for property acquisition]. 
Then the municipality said not to include it. Then the study was re-done without 
including in the pecuniary payment the cost of property acquisition because the 
Finance Secretary said that perhaps the municipality wouldn't even need to 
disburse anything. Since there were IPTU debts, he could acquire them through debt 
settlement. (…) This changed a bit, but it was a decision agreed with the local 
government (private investor 6) 
During these discussions in EPISODE 3, consultancy directors, public and private 
actors were constantly interacting with technicians for adjustments in the financial model 
and legal documents. Considering the discussions analysed in this section, the adaptations 
in the PPP documents included modifications in the contractual clauses for demand risk 
mitigation, compulsory purchase payment and pecuniary payment composition. Differently 
from EPISODE 2, public and private actors were validating the elaboration of the overall 
project design while discussions were taking place. Public actors no longer expected to 
validate premises and decisions after the submission of the final documents. As soft 
capacity elements, actors revealed capacity to adjust, to conciliate interests and to 
compromise in order to stay committed to the informal PRI pre-tendering process. This 
section  also  shows  that  public,  private  actors  and  consultancy  directors  enacted  a  ‘learning  
by doing’ approach and participated more actively as coordinators and decision-makers 
during the PPP formulation process.  
9.5.2 Concerns with political risks and agreement on the pecuniary payment 
guarantee arrangement to be offered by the municipality for the PPP 
The analysis of this section will also show actors’   mobilization   in   a   ‘learning   by  
doing’  strategy  for  improving  the  city  centre  PPP  project.  It will reveal that actors dealt with 
insecurities from embedded perceptions that long-term political risks could interfere with 
the city centre PPP intervention. For this, actors engaged in informal discussions and 
demonstrated capacity to compromise and agree on the format of the pecuniary payment 
guarantees from the municipality. The new format was adjusted since in EPISODE 2 the 
guarantee type defined had not been validated with the local government and, as a result, 
not approved in EPISODE 3.  
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Investors worried about political risks because the city centre PPP contract was set 
at 30 years. Thus, the execution period would overlap with different local administration 
terms. Based on the interviews, actors had embedded perceptions that the private sector 
in Brazil was insecure regarding contracts of long term such as PPPs with the public sector. 
For example, interviewees emphasized the short term vision of mayors and governors, and 
the lack of continuity of public policies over different administrations. A comment from a 
private interviewee illustrates the embeddedness of this vision in the context of Fortaleza:  
There is a big difficulty in the country considering PPPs because they are long term 
contracts; but we do not have planning, our administration terms are of 4 years, a 
maximum of 8 years. Politicians only think about one term and only about public 
works that will give results in that period; but PPP projects are not like that. This is a 
huge barrier to PPPs, the lack of planning, the lack of vision. If the municipality of 
Fortaleza had a plan to be implemented during a 20 year period, obliged to it, with 
the City Hall supervising it; but it doesn't have any of that. The plans are all 
prepared when the mayor takes office; that's when he or she decides what will be 
done. Sometimes he/she doesn't even finish what started before; not sometimes, 
many  times;  for  example,  ‘that  square  was  constructed  by  my  opponent,  so  I  won't  
look  after  it  anymore,  let  it  degrade’,  and  so  forth  (private investor 6). 
Considering similar embedded perceptions and insecurities, investors wanted the 
municipality to demonstrate its commitment to the PPP also through pecuniary payment 
guarantees, to cover eventual municipal default in paying the agreed partial compensation 
for service provision, as discussed in the previous section. The next interview quote 
illustrates  investors’  concerns: 
I think that the only problem we face now is the guarantee from the municipality 
for that [pecuniary] payment, which we must be really secure about. That's all, the 
only undefined thing is how this guarantee will work, because today there is one 
person in the municipality, but tomorrow there will be another person, and the 
company will be there for 30 years. It could be any administration, and we cannot 
be subject to any administration. We must be secure in legal terms, in a process 
which guarantees that if we fulfil our responsibilities, we will receive their payment. 
This guarantee must be made clear (private investor 4).  
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For the discussions over guarantees from the municipality, private investors and 
consultancy directors engaged in discussions with the Finance Secretary, who expressed in 
interview that he understood the political risk involved in a long term project such as the 
city centre PPP:  
The project cannot depend on me, on the current mayor, on the consultancy 
general   director,   on   the   current   City   Attorney   General.   It’s   long   term,   several  
administrations. Possibly, I will not stay; it's very likely because there is another 
political context. There is a process of transition in which this PPP is taking place. 
We will stay in office until December 30, 2012. We don't know what the political 
scenario will look like. But if the regulatory framework is very well defined, if the 
regulatory framework is consented upon between the sectors, the process is 
solidified.  
Considering that public and private actors had similar embedded perceptions of 
long-term political risks, they engaged in discussions in order to settle a guarantee 
arrangement. For discussions over guarantees with the Finance Secretary, investors and 
consultancy directors scheduled an informal meeting at the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), the agency expected to provide the long-term loan for private investment in the 
city centre PPP intervention. According to the interviews, private investors and the Finance 
Secretary agreed that the opinion of BNDES was important for the city centre intervention. 
Both sectors understood the systemic embeddedness of the city centre PPP formulation in 
a financial context. The municipality depended on private financing for the execution of the 
city centre intervention, and private investors depended on the Bank to acquire the 
resources for the implementation of the city centre PPP.  
In interview with private investors, they emphasized that long-term financing was 
important because they could not support alone, through equity, the level of investment 
required for the implementation of the city centre PPP. The following comment from one 
investor  illustrates  this  point:  “We have also been thinking about the financial alternatives 
we need in case we win the tendering process, because we don't have the resources to 
absorb  this  without  financing”  (private investor 5).  
Public and private actors had the following objectives with this informal meeting:  
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x To demonstrate the financial feasibility of the city centre PPP project and the risk 
mitigation strategies to obtain favourable financing conditions from the Bank for long-
term investment; 
x To  demonstrate  that  the  scope  of  the  city  centre  PPP  was  in  accordance  with  BNDES’  
line of infrastructure financing;  
x To consult BNDES on the types of municipal pecuniary payment guarantees that could 
reduce  the  Bank’s  perception  on  the  project’s  credit  risk  (risk  of  default).   
As the interviews show, private investors and the Finance Secretary knew that the 
financing conditions offered by the Brazilian Development Bank, especially in terms of 
interest rates, were attractive for projects in line with public infrastructure development 
policies.  They  were  aware  that  among  BNDES’   lines,   it   financed   infrastructure projects by 
private companies alone or in partnership with public entities. According to interviewees, 
the meeting at BNDES was an informal consultation to demonstrate that the urban mobility 
scope of the city centre PPP project was in line with municipal public policies for the central 
area of Fortaleza and in accordance with the Bank’s   infrastructure   line of financing. 
Moreover, in the meeting, actors also explained the feasibility of the intervention and the 
demand risk mitigation strategies that resulted from actors’ previous discussions.  
Furthermore, actors used   the   meeting   to   obtain   the   opinion   of   the   Bank’s  
superintendent on the pecuniary payment guarantee they had designed for the city centre 
PPP to reduce perception of default risk and assure favourable financing conditions from 
BNDES. The arrangement of guarantee discussed in the meeting with the Bank resulted 
from a previous compromise between public and private actions, which is discussed next.  
Prior to the meeting at BNDES, consultancy directors, private investors and the 
Finance Secretary discussed possible pecuniary payment guarantees for the city centre 
intervention. The private sector and the consultancy initially proposed pecuniary payments 
linked to municipal net current revenue. This premise had been included in the PPP project 
submitted to the local government in EPISODE 2, but not validated with public actors at 
that stage. However, after analysing the arrangement in EPISODE 3, the Finance Secretary 
strongly disagreed with this link because net current revenue was the main source of 
municipal investment in health and education, which would make impracticable the 
proposed guarantee arrangement due to tied fiscal obligations. Moreover, in interview he 
expressed an accountability concern with control bodies and mentioned that a 
burdensome guarantee arrangement to the municipality could create future problems for 
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the city centre PPP contract if the Court of Accounts decided to audit the premises of the 
PPP project design. The concern of the Finance Secretary demonstrates once more the 
systemic embeddedness of the city centre pre-tendering process in a fiscal context.  
Although the link between guarantee and net current revenue was defined in 
EPISODE 2 without the agreement from the local government, in EPISODE 3, public actors 
were committed to adjustments and compromise. As a result, after discussions with the 
Finance Secretary and agreement of private investors, consultancy directors oriented 
technicians to adjust the tendering protocol and contract documents by removing from the 
design the guarantee link to the net current revenue. After the adjustment, public and 
private actors agreed that as the guarantee arrangement the local government would 
deposit the equivalent of 12 monthly pecuniary payments in a trust fund.  
Actors’ capacity   to   agree   and   compromise   and   the   flexibility   of   the   ‘learning   by  
doing’   strategy   were   recompensed   in   the   meeting   with   BNDES.   Consultancy   directors  
explained in interview that the BNDES superintendent accepted the new proposed 
guarantee arrangement and the risk mitigation mechanisms. They mentioned that he also 
recognized  the  adequacy  of  the  city  centre  PPP  with  the  Bank’s  infrastructure  financing  line  
and suggested an attractive long term interest rate. The meeting at BNDES also revealed 
the embeddedness of the PPP formulation in the financial context specific for the process, 
because in order for actors to be able to implement the city centre urban mobility 
infrastructure scope, which actors had constructed and prioritized for the PPP instrument, 
it was important that the BNDES also had priority financing lines for urban mobility 
infrastructure scopes.  
After the meeting at BNDES, public, private and consultancy actors were satisfied 
with the results. Consultancy directors informed the technical team to adjust the financial 
model in accordance to the lower interest rate agreed with the Bank. Actors believed in the 
quality improvement of the PPP documents and wanted to move forward towards Public 
Consultation. As a result, investors, consultancy directors and the Finance Secretary 
participated in an informal meeting with the mayor to present the premises the PPP project 
and obtain her political support for publication of the documents for Public Consultation. 
This meeting led to new adjustments in the project design. 
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9.5.3 Influence of mayor in PPP project adjustments  
In   EPISODE   3,   it   became   clear   the   importance   of   the   mayor’s   validation   on   the  
project. This also reflected actors’ engagement  in  the  ‘learning  by  doing’  strategic  approach.  
The interactions at this stage were informal and led to adjustments in project premises and 
in the technical and legal documents. Actors expected the mayor to validate the project 
and to accelerate the process towards Public Consultation. This section will show the 
dynamics involved in formulating a PPP project where decisions on premises depend on 
informal interactions and influence new and simultaneous adjustments in the technical 
documents.  
In April 2012, investors, consultancy directors and the Finance Secretary 
participated in a meeting with the mayor. They presented to her the premises of the PPP 
project and crucial aspects for the feasibility of the intervention, including the commitment 
of the local government to close irregular parking lots in order to secure demand for the 
city  centre  PPP  parking  services.  It  was  also  emphasized  the  municipality‘s  responsibility  to  
publish compulsory purchase decrees and adjust the local urban legislation for the 80% 
construction parameter, based on which the studies at EPISODE 2 had been prepared.  
According to the interview with consultancy directors, in the meeting the mayor 
placed a restriction in one of the properties selected and explained that the municipality 
had a commitment to city centre business owners to transform that space in a square. She 
accepted, however, the construction of underground parking lots in the property, as long 
as investors agreed to construct a square at ground level. This discussion demonstrates the 
city centre PPP formulation was embedded in a political context, in which the local 
government’s  commitment  to  interest  groups  had  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  project  
design. After the meeting, the general director passed new technical premises and property 
adjustment guidelines to the consultancy technical team. These simultaneous 
modifications   in   the   studies   during   actors’   interactions   in   the   adjustment   period   also  
revealed  the  ‘learning  by  doing’  approach  guided  by  the  participation  of  public,  private  and  
consultancy directors as coordinators.  
The Finance Secretary led another discussion in the meeting with the mayor and 
asked for a reduction in the contract term from 30 to 20 years. The 30 year contract term 
was another decision taken at EPISODE 2, but which was not validated with the public 
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sector at that stage. Similar to other instances, actors were also able to reach a 
compromise on this issue in the meeting with the mayor.  
According to consultancy interviewees, in EPISODE 2 investors decided to push the 
contract term for 30 years, but there was no validation with the public sector during that 
stage. Therefore, in EPISODE 3, the Finance Secretary argued that there was no need for 
the municipality to make a 30 year commitment if the financial model indicated that the 
project’s  financial  return  would  take  place  in  a  much  shorter  period (payback). This would 
secure enough profit for private investors to compensate for the initial and upfront costs of 
the project. Interviewees mentioned that the mayor reinforced the arguments of the 
Finance Secretary to reduce the contract term to 20 years, and private investors accepted 
the request. Private actors compromised with the change in order to reach agreements, 
obtain  the  mayor’s  consent  and  move  on.  After the meeting, technicians had to once again 
adapt the technical, legal and financial documents of the project design in accordance with 
the change in the length of the contract term.  
Public and private actors expected the informal meeting with the mayor to move 
the process fast towards Public Consultation. The following comment from a consultancy 
director  demonstrates  this  perception:  “This process had an upgrade in the agenda; it went 
up to the mayor's agenda. She will follow it. The mayor liked the project a lot. She not only 
gave  the  consent,  but  also  prioritized  it”  (general director). The participation of the mayor 
actually gave a boost to the process. The interactions that took place in EPISODE 3 after the 
cabinet meeting, which led to Public Consultation and to the end of the PRI pre-tendering 
stage, will be discussed ahead (section 9.6).  
9.5.4 Summary of Section  
Despite actors’ frustrations after the local government rejected the city centre PPP 
project at the end of EPISODE 2, actors rapidly adjusted their understandings and strategies 
and,  consequently,  the   ‘systemic  strategic  arrangement’   influencing  their   interactions  and  
prevented the informal PRI pre-tendering process from falling apart. In EPISODE 3, actors 
adopted a dynamic,  flexible  and  fluid  ‘learning  by  doing’  strategy  similar  to  the  one  used in 
EPISODE 2, but complemented by increased leadership and participation of consultancy 
directors and public and private actors as coordinators. These actors became more 
participative after frustrated expectations with the rejection of project at the end of the 
previous   EPISODE   and   by   relying   on   ‘commitment   packages’   (political,   business   and  
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credibility elements – discussed in section 9.2). This gave more guidance to the interactions 
for the simultaneous definition of project premises, technical re-formulation and 
adjustment of the PPP project. Moreover, the adjustment in premises during EPISODE 3 
revealed that three aspects had been defined in EPISODE 2 without validation with the 
local government: pecuniary payment composition, guarantee format linked to net current 
revenue, and setting PPP contract term at 30 years. Despite this, through increased 
participation and coordination in EPISODE 3, actors from the public sector were open to 
discussions, adjustments and compromise. Three   main   areas   revealed   the   ‘learning   by  
doing’  strategic  arrangement  of   the  process  and  each  area  revealed   important  aspects   in  
relation  to  actors’  embedded  and  innovative  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’:  
1. Conciliation between public and private actors over pecuniary payment composition, 
demand risk and compulsory purchase costs: 
x Public and private actors used soft capacity elements to stay committed to the 
informal PRI pre-tendering process, which reflected their ability to reconcile 
interests and opinions, compromise and make concessions on technical premises 
and simultaneously adjust the PPP project design; 
x They recognized the embeddedness of the city centre PPP in the economic context 
of Fortaleza by acknowledging the importance of demand risks; 
x Actors also understood the influence of fiscal forces in the context when the local 
government decided to use debts with property tax as an alternative payment 
format for property expropriation. 
2. Concerns with political risks and agreement on the pecuniary payment guarantee 
arrangement: 
x Actors dealt with insecurities from embedded perceptions that long-term political 
risks could interfere with the city centre PPP intervention, which reflected the 
influence of political culture context on actor-relations; 
x Actors engaged in informal discussions and demonstrated capacity to compromise 
and agree on the format of the pecuniary payment guarantees from the 
municipality.  
x The local government through the Finance Secretary demonstrated an 
understanding of the systemic embeddedness of the process in a fiscal context, by 
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showing concern for the role of control bodies in assessing the impact on the 
municipal budget of linking pecuniary payment guarantees to net current revenue; 
x Both sectors understood the systemic embeddedness of the city centre PPP 
formulation in a financial context, as well as their interdependence in obtaining 
private financing for the execution of the city centre intervention; therefore, they 
were collaborative in the informal meeting with the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES);  
x Actors meeting with BNDES also revealed that the selection of a urban mobility 
infrastructure scope to be implemented with the PPP instrument was embedded in 
the systemic financial context. In order for actors to obtain the necessary private 
financing to make the city centre PPP possible, the policy scope had to be a BNDES 
priority financing line.  
3. Adjustment in the PPP project design after discussion with the mayor for validation:  
x The meeting with the mayor for validation showed that actors tried to mobilize the 
political  influence  of  the  mayors’  authority  in  order  to  accelerate  the  completion  of  
the PRI pre-tendering process; 
x  It  highlighted  actors’  capacity  to  collaborate  and  compromise on the length of PPP 
contract term and the informal dynamics involved in formulating a PPP project; 
x These negotiations were embedded in a political context as the PPP project design 
was   modified   with   respect   to   one   of   the   properties   to   account   for   the  mayor’s 
political commitment to city centre business owners.  
9.6 Towards completion of the PRI pre-tendering process  
The involvement of the mayor created the possibility of a legal arrangement based 
on a less bureaucratic and informal route towards Public Consultation. Meanwhile, private 
and consultancy actors expected the local government to follow a formal route towards 
completion of the pre-tendering stage. Even though the informal route accelerated the 
completion of the PRI pre-tendering process, it led to the publication of a problematic final 
PPP design. This section will analyze the perception of a formal route and the informal 
route of interactions that actually led to the completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage and 
to the publication of the city centre PPP for Public Consultation in June, 2012.  
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9.6.1 Formal legal route: perception of private investors and consultancy actors  
According to the interviews, investors and consultancy actors perceived a formal 
route of interactions based on two aspects:  
x Information obtained from the City Centre Secretariat on changes in city centre 
construction parameters and publication of property compulsory purchase decrees;  
x Internal discussions between consultancy technicians, legal advisors from Sao Paulo, 
directors and private investors regarding formal procedures for publication of PPP 
projects based on PPP legislations.  
Information from the City Centre Secretariat 
Consultancy actors explained in interview that a few weeks before submission of 
the final PPP documents to the local government, the City Centre Secretary and her legal 
advisor reassured that they were in control of the publication of property compulsory 
purchase decrees and of the adjustment in the legislation changing the construction 
parameters to 80%. In interview the City Centre Secretary expressed awareness of these 
aspects and acknowledged they could create insecurity in the private sector. As the 
following quote shows, she also mentioned that the local government were already 
negotiating the acquisition of the properties and preparing the decrees:  
We are still in the process of compulsory purchase, we are negotiating with the 
owners, and we have been preparing the decrees. One of the requirements for the 
success of this PPP is having the properties, because without the properties there is 
no  PPP   (…).  So   that's   one   thing   that   creates   legal   insecurity   in   the  private   sector, 
and we must minimize that risk. 
The interviews with private actors also show they relied on the Secretary’s 
arguments:  “She told us the decrees were ready in her desk, and that the mayor has to sign 
them to be published in the Municipal Official Diary. She said  it  was  a  matter  of  one  week”  
(private investor 6). They also requested the municipality to publish the compulsory 
purchase decrees prior to Public Consultation, as the comment ahead illustrates: 
One of the problems faced by the municipality is to determine the properties 
without publishing the decrees of compulsory purchase. What was recommended 
was   ‘Secretary,   you  must   publish   the   decrees   of   compulsory   purchase   before   the  
publication  of  protocol  for  Public  Consultation’  (private investor 7) 
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However, on May 30, 2012, the PPP project documents were submitted to the City 
Centre Secretariat without the publication of the decrees and based on a city centre 
construction parameter of 80%, when the local urban legislation still stated the 60% and 
70%. Although investors were concerned about this legal incoherence, they decided for the 
re-submission because they were confident that, based on the reassurance given by the 
City Centre Secretary, these measures would be implemented soon.  
Formal legal route perceived by consultancy and private actors   
Consultancy actors and private investors also expected the local government to 
follow a formal, legal and bureaucratic route towards Public Consultation. However, they 
failed to consider the fragility of the formal legal arrangement since the local PPP 
legislation had only been recently published, and of the organizational arrangement, 
considering that public sector actors were still learning about PPP procedures. Moreover, 
they were not aware that the mayor allowed the City Centre Secretary and the Finance 
Secretary to engage in a less bureaucratic and informal route for completing the PRI pre-
tendering process. Even though actors were aware of the legal and organizational fragility 
of the local arrangements, they still expected the local government to follow a formal route 
towards Public Consultation. Next, there is a summary of the expected formal route: 
1. Private sector submits PPP project documents to the City Centre Secretariat (Sectoral 
Secretariat). 
2. If approved, City Centre Secretariat evaluates and writes official opinion and sends to 
the PPP Unit and Managing Council for technical evaluation. If not, Secretariat asks 
private sector for adjustments. 
3. PPP Unit and Managing Council evaluate and write official opinion. If approved, they 
send documents to City Attorney Office for legal evaluation; and if not, return to 
Sectoral Secretariat.  
4. City  Attorney  General’s  Office  assesses  the  legality  of  the  procedures,  issues its official 
opinion in favour or not of the publication for Public Consultation. If approved, it 
returns documents to City Centre Secretariat for publication; if not, the Secretariat 
evaluates problems and ask private sector for adjustments. 
5. If approved, City Centre Secretariat sends documents to PPP Unit to organize 
arrangements for publication.  
According   to   actors’   perception   of   the   formal   organizational   arrangement   in  
EPISODE  3,  the  PPP  Unit  and  Managing  Council  and  the  City  Attorney  General’s  Office  were  
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considered crucial actors for leading the process up to Public Consultation. The roles of the 
PPP Unit and Managing Council were stated in the Municipal PPP Decree of December 2011 
(Decree n. 12886, 2011). Actors’  perception  of  a  role  for  the  City  Attorney  General’s  Office  
was based on a common practice in the municipality for traditional pre-tendering 
procedures, in which the Office was responsible for legally approving or not projects prior 
to Public Consultation. Traditionally, the City Attorney  General’s  Office  performed the role 
of consultancy and legal advisor in the public sector sphere (Decree n. 9321, 1994; Law n. 
006, 1992). This  practice   influenced  private  and  consultancy  actors’  expectations  that   the  
PRI process of the city centre PPP would to follow the traditional municipal pre-tendering 
routines, based on the   participation   of   the   Attorney   Generals’   Office.   The   following  
comments illustrate this:  
The process is basically complete. The part that was under the responsibility of the 
private sector has been concluded; the technical material has been entirely handed 
in. Up to where we have information, it was accepted by them. So now it is the 
internal and bureaucratic procedures of City Attorney's Office so that the process 
can be legitimized and published (private investor 7).  
Actors also considered that the PPP Unit and Managing Council would have a 
crucial formal role at this stage based on their roles in the PPP Decree (Decree n. 12886, 
2011). They expected the Managing Council to be in charge of approving the documents 
and authorizing the Public Consultation. Nevertheless, for the city centre PPP, the role of 
the Managing Council was only in the legislation. The Council was informally represented 
by the PPP Unit and did not assume an active role in the discussions or validate any of the 
documents. The following quote demonstrates the non-participation of the members of 
Managing Council in the city centre PPP:  
The Managing Council has a symbolic role. I think they should have been meeting at 
least every 2 months in order to know more and to see the PPP project we have 
been working on. I'm not sure if they know or not, but this dialogue is not a formal 
meeting of the PPP. They can talk about this when they are together in another 
meeting and they comment on this subject. But I think their involvement should be 
specific,   even   if   every   2  months,   in   order   to   strengthen   this.   The   story   is   this,   ‘If  
everything  works  out  great;  but   if   it  doesn’t...’  So   in   reality   the  Managing  Council  
has a symbolic role (PPP Unit legal specialist).  
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Private and consultancy actors disregarded the fragility of the legal and 
organizational arrangements when they expected the local government to follow a formal 
route based on traditional legal procedures for PPP publication for Public Consultation. 
They also expected the municipality to adjust the local urban legislation and to publish the 
compulsory purchase decrees. However, these aspects did not take place under the 
informal route that actually led to the completion of the PRI pre-tendering process.  
9.6.2 Adjustment in the legal arrangement: informal route adopted by the local 
government  
Since the legal and organizational arrangements were still under construction, 
public actors engaged in informal interactions in the  final  days  of  the  process.  The  mayor’s  
consent enabled the informal process of approval of the PPP project for publication and 
permitted public actors to overcome bureaucracies, such as legal administrative 
procedures, that could delay publication, including perceived difficulties related to the 
novelty of the PPP theme within the internal structure of the municipal administration.  
A common embedded perception among private and consultancy interviewees was 
that the local government rushed to finalize the procedures prior to municipal elections in 
the end of 2012. As the following comment by a consultancy director shows, there was an 
embedded perception among interviewees that fast political return was one of the main 
reasons politicians supported partnerships   with   the   private   sector:   “For politicians, it is 
great to have private partners, because they have the ability to execute things fast, and 
within  their  political  time  horizon,  they  are  able  to  give  rapid  responses”  (technical  director). 
Others expressed similar ideas by showing a concern that the end of the administration 
term   would   weaken   previously   observed   “manifestations of willingness”   or   political  will 
from the local government in favour of the city centre PPP intervention.  
At this stage, the City Centre Secretary informally interacted with the Finance 
Secretary,   the   lawyer   of   the  mayor’s   cabinet   and   the   City   Attorney  General,   in   order   to  
accelerate the publication. For public actors, following the legal procedures of sending 
documents from one public entity to another for assessment and official opinions would 
take much longer to reach Public Consultation. They were aware that if a public sector 
entity requested new modifications in the documents, they would have to be formally 
returned to the private sector for adjustments, delaying the process even further. A quote 
from an interviewee from the City Centre Secretariat illustrates this:  
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If you send the official request for analysis to a Secretariat that has not been 
following the process, it might take even longer, because the Secretariat will have 
to learn about it; and this can take longer. In our Secretariat we were fortunate 
because the City Centre Secretary had been verbally conducting this with other 
Secretaries. She was telling that she would be sending it to them, so this made it 
easier. But I think that if this were to be done formally, sending the material and 
waiting for a feedback, it could delay. The experience we have from other things, 
even simpler is that we send it and it doesn't come back. But since this was a very 
new project and the first attempt to make a PPP, consequently this integration and 
engagement is crucial for a more effective feedback (legal specialist). 
The Finance Secretary also commented on the importance of actors informally 
working together for the progress of the PPP formulation. In interview he mentioned the 
need to overcome bureaucratic delays to the process: “We had 2 meetings with the mayor 
and our involvement led to a reduction in the required procedures that were actually 
unnecessary. (…)  If this was supposed to follow the normal formal procedures, it would take 
much longer. So in the end we will have the judicial security of the process but in a much 
faster  way”. Public actors believed in the efficiency of the informal interactions for a faster 
approval of the PPP project and completion of the PRI pre-tendering process.   
The PPP Unit was completely discarded as the technical-coordinating unit during 
the process, even though it still had operational and technical responsibilities according to 
the formal organizational arrangement introduced by the municipal PPP legislation. The 
responsibilities of the PPP Unit stated in the PPP Decree included to perform operational 
activities and coordination of PPPs, as well as to advise the Managing Council; to articulate 
with other entities and stakeholders in the public sector; and to provide technical support 
for the preparation of projects and contracts, especially in financial and public procurement 
aspects (articles 7 and 8, Decree n. 12886, 2011).  
However, interviewees from the PPP Unit expressed that they were only contacted 
after informal decisions had been made on approval for PPP project publication for Public 
Consultation. The following quote from a PPP Unit interviewee demonstrates that the team 
was not allowed to evaluate and modify the technical quality of the documents: 
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The protocol and the six attachments that compose the studies came back, and the 
PPP Unit resumed its responsibilities. In fact, it came back already approved, not 
allowing us to modify anything. There wasn't any official opinion, not from the 
Finance Secretary as well; there were only the studies. We were simply told that we 
had  to  prepare  the  publications  (…),  communicating  that  it  would  be  open  for  Public  
Consultation for 30 days. The same day we sent it for publication (PPP Unit legal 
specialist). 
Before publication for Public Consultation, local government actors failed to assess 
the legal coherence of the PPP project design. The change in the local urban legislation had 
not been approved; the compulsory purchase decrees not published; and the private 
consortium did not submit the value for money document demonstrating the cost-
effectiveness and comparative advantage of the city centre PPP intervention.  The local 
government failed to consider these aspects when approving through an informal route the 
studies for Public Consultation. Despite the problems, the city centre PPP project design 
was published for the 30-day period of Public Consultation, between June 8 and July 8, 
2012. It was also published online, in newspapers of large circulation and in the Municipal 
Official Diary (Notice of Public Consultation - PPP, 2012). This marked the completion of the 
case study pre-tendering process based on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) 
mechanism.   
9.6.3 Summary of Section 
Private and consultancy actors submitted studies with premises that were 
inconsistent with the requirements of the PPP legislation. They expected the local 
government to adjust the legal inconsistencies and to follow a formal route towards Public 
Consultation. Private and consultancy actors relied on the public sector and did not follow 
the process closely. They failed to account for the fragility of the local organizational and 
legal arrangements, which facilitated the conduction of the informal route towards Public 
Consultation and led to the publication of documents that were legally incoherent. Public 
actors, in an attempt to avoid delays and bureaucracies, engaged in informal interactions 
for Public Consultation and approved inconsistent studies. In the end of EPISODE 3, there 
was no value for money assessment of cost-effectiveness and comparative advantage of 
the PPP instrument for city centre project. The studies submitted and approved for Public 
Consultation were not supported by the compulsory purchase decrees of the properties 
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selected, and the 80% construction parameter used as premise in the policy design was not 
accompanied by a change in the local urban legislation. 
9.7 Summary of Chapter 
Based on the descriptive-analysis of EPISODE 3, actors overcame frustrations 
resulting from the rejection of the PPP project by the local government and by relying on 
commitment packages. Private investors, some public actors and consultancy coordinators 
changed their strategic position in the process and promoted a new strategy for the PPP 
formulation.  The   ‘learning  by  doing’  approach  was  a   flexible  attempt  at   constructing  and  
adjusting premises and modifying documents simultaneously. It seemed adequate for the 
complexity and interdependence of studies required for the formulation of the city centre 
infrastructure PPP project. However, the fragility of the local organizational and legal 
arrangements, informal interactions and the attempt to overcome bureaucracies of public 
administrative procedures influenced the publication of projects that lacked technical 
quality and presented legal premises that were inconsistent with the contextual regulatory 
framework. The lack of internal and external control allowed the publication of a deficient 
PPP project for Public Consultation in June 2012. The summary of this chapter, presented 
ahead,   is   organized   in   terms  of   the   elements   of   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’  
produced   through   actors’   interactions   in   EPISODE 3: policy, legal, organizational and 
strategic arrangements. 
9.7.1 Systemic Policy Arrangement:  
In EPISODE 3 of the case study, actors continuously reinforced the priority of the 
PPP instrument for the urban mobility infrastructure scope of the city centre re-ordering 
PPP. They relied on political, business and technical commitment packages and renewed 
their motivation to continue in the informal PRI pre-tendering process despite the 
frustrations and insecurities from EPISODE 2.  Furthermore, with the informal meeting at 
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the case study also shows that the prioritization 
of the scope for the PPP instrument is embedded in a financial context. As suggested by the 
Brazil PPP Framework, a favourable financial and investment scenario was an influential 
element in the PPP formulation because after the positive evaluation of the Bank on the 
PPP  project,  actors’  obtained  new  motivations  to  continue  with  the  pre-tendering process. 
The opinion  of  the  Bank  on  the  project’s  priority  was  influenced  by  actors’  engagement  in  
the  ‘learning  by  doing’  strategy,  in  which  they  compromised  and  collaborated  to  improving  
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the premises of the PPP project, which influenced confidence of the Bank on the project’s  
feasibility.   
9.7.2 Systemic Legal Arrangement 
In EPISODE 3, the formal legal arrangement was composed by the Municipal PPP 
Law published in June 2011 and by the PPP Decree published in December 2011. The legal 
arrangement was complemented by the local urban legislation, represented by the 
Municipal Master Plan (Law n. 062, 2009), and by the federal decree-law on property 
expropriation for public utility (Decree-Law n. 3365, 1941), demonstrating the 
embeddedness of the process in a regulatory context specific to the case study system. 
Considering that actors were still learning about the PPP legislation, they continued to 
informally rely on the office from Sao Paulo, which now had a local representative. The 
presence of the local lawyer facilitated the simultaneous adjustment in documents as 
premises  were  modified  during  the  ‘learning  by  doing’  interactions, but it failed to reinforce 
the alterations in the local urban legislation and the need for publication of compulsory 
purchase decrees of properties. The informal arrangement changed after submission of the 
PPP project design in May 2012. Although Municipal PPP Law and Decree provided 
information on formal procedures for the entities in the local administration to assess the 
legality, coherence and quality of the PPP documents, the local administration followed an 
informal process towards Public Consultation. This was influenced by the fragility of the 
local legal and organizational arrangements, but also by their attempt to overcome 
embedded perceptions that bureaucratic procedures would extend the completion of the 
pre-tendering process. The informal route waved official evaluations and led to the 
publication of a legally incoherent PPP project for Public Consultation.  
The publication of the project complied with the following formal rules and procedures set 
by the PPP legislation and other regulations in Brazil: 
x Fiscal responsibility was met through the selection of guarantee type not linked to 
net current income (article 8, federal PPP law and municipal PPP law) 
x Transparency and social accountability requirements were met with publication of 
project for Public Consultation through online media, in newspapers of large 
circulation and in Municipal Official Diary (article 10, federal PPP law and municipal 
PPP law) 
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However, the publication of the final PPP project did not comply with:  
x Fiscal responsibility: it did not demonstrate official adequacy of municipal 
pecuniary payment commitment with annual and multiannual fiscal and budget 
plans, as well as its compatibility with federal law of budgetary directives and with 
the law of annual budget.  
x Financial accountability: there was no value for money document based on the 
allocation of risks between parties and demonstrating the cost-effectiveness and 
comparative advantage of the PPP with respect to other policy tools (i.e. traditional 
procurement and common concession).  
x Legal and regulatory accountability: the PPP project design was published based on 
80% construction parameter different from the rates of the local urban legislation 
and based on properties that were not owned by the municipality since the 
compulsory purchase decrees were not published.   
9.7.3 Systemic Organizational Arrangement 
The adjustment of the organizational arrangement in EPISODE 3 was based on the 
coordination   from   public,   private   and   consultancy   actors   over   the   ‘learning   by   doing’  
strategy. Actors acknowledged the problems with EPISODE 2 and did not translate those 
understandings into a rigid structure of interactions involving, for example, contractual and 
legal  rules  to  secure  actors’  behaviour  in  expected  ways.  Instead,  they  preferred  to  rely  on  
flexible  ‘strategic  coordinating  capacity’  of  actors  they  identified  to  possess  the  appropriate 
skills to guide the process (Healey, 2004). However, after submission of the completed PPP 
design to the public sector in May 2012, coordination from private and consultancy actors 
was missing. Even though in EPISODE 3 public actors coordinated discussions and decisions 
over technical premises, the submitted city centre PPP project did not go through an 
internal process of control, final assessment and validation. Although there were formal 
organizational and legal arrangements in place, their introduction was not followed by a 
simultaneous cultural adjustment in the local context. The rules existed, but actors in the 
local government were not familiar with them. Moreover, after submission, private and 
consultancy actors completely relied on the coordination and control of the local 
government over the process and for securing the legality of the procedures with respect 
to PPP rules and other regulations. However, although the formal arrangement implied 
hierarchy and control, there was no coordination from the public sector in order to oversee 
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the legality of the procedures during the informal route towards Public Consultation, which 
compromised the overall coherence of the PPP design authorized for publication. The 
publication of the final PPP project evidenced the following fragile aspects in the systemic 
organizational arrangement: 
x Lack of coordination from private actors over the process towards the end of the 
pre-tendering stage; 
x Lack of external control; 
x Lack of internal control: 
o Inactivity of the PPP Unit as coordinator although it has a legally 
determined role; 
o Absence of official technical evaluation and formal authorization from 
Managing Council (article 4, PPP Decree; article 10, municipal PPP law); 
o Absence of official fiscal and financial evaluation from the Finance 
Secretary as   ‘   expenditures   authorizer   ‘   (article 10, federal and municipal 
PPP laws); 
o Absence  of  official   legal  evaluation   from  City  Attorney  General’s  Office  as  
internal legal control body 
9.7.4 Systemic Strategic Arrangement 
In  the  case  study,  actors  used  a  new  strategic  arrangement  based  on  a  ‘learning  by  
doing’  approach guided by coordination. This replaced the embeddedness of a mentality in 
which the role of the public sector was one of ex post validation only. In EPISODE 3, 
premise definition and document elaboration and adjustments happened at the same time. 
Therefore, through the more flexible strategy actors also replaced the rigid instrumental 
plan and overcame insecurities and frustrations with respect to the rejection of the PPP 
design by the local government at the end of EPISODE 2. In the case study, actors also dealt 
with the systemic embeddedness of their interactions and strategy in a broader fiscal, 
financial and economic context, which was not acknowledged in the previous Episode. At 
this stage, they were able to adjust premises and documents as decisions were influenced 
by contextual factors. Moreover, they again handled the perceived influence of political 
culture, in terms of embedded perceptions of long-term political risks; but failed to correct 
incorrect   premises   that   had   been   defined   through   the   strategy   of   ‘political   consensus  
building’.   In   EPISODE   3,   the embeddedness of external forces in context was revealed 
through the following aspects: 
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x Economic: acknowledgement of demand risks related to parking and commercial 
centre service provision; 
x Fiscal:   public   actors’   adoption   of   alternative   involving   property   tax   debt  
resettlement in order to remove property acquisition costs from pecuniary 
payment formula; and local government rejection of pecuniary payment guarantee 
link to net current income for accountability concern with control bodies; 
x Financial: meeting with the Brazilian Development Bank for discussions over 
financing conditions; 
x Political culture:  
o Discussions over pecuniary payment guarantee influenced by embedded 
insecurities with long term public sector commitment (i.e. short term vision of 
mayors and governors and the lack of continuity of public policies over 
different administration terms);  
o Adjustment  in  the  properties  for  the  project  after  mayor’s  request  because of 
local  government’s  commitment  to  local interest groups. 
The descriptive-analysis  of  the  case  study  in  three  Episodes  of  actors’   interactions  
provided an exploratory overview of the dynamics of actor-relations in the pre-tendering 
formulation of infrastructure PPP projects. It was aimed at providing an in-depth 
understanding of the workings of interactions in the pre-tendering stage, which has been 
under explored in the Brazilian context. The next chapter will provide an overall summary 
of the Episodes addressing the research question on how actors were able to socially 
construct   and   continuously   adjust   the   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement‘   that   led   them  
towards completion of the PRI pre-tendering process. It will also highlight the weaknesses 
and strengths of the process and draw lessons from the descriptive-analysis of the Episodes. 
Reflections on implications to policy and practice in order to inform recommendations will 
also be considered in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
The principal aim of this research was to understand why many cases in Brazil are 
not finishing the pre-tendering stage of PPP project formulation based on the Procedure for 
Request of Interest (PRI). More specifically, this research attempted to unpack the workings 
of actor-relations at this stage in order to obtain lessons and contribute with a better 
understanding of PRI pre-tendering processes of PPP formulation in Brazil. While the 
previous three chapters of analysis were used to explore actor-relations in the formulation 
of an infrastructure PPP project that completed the pre-tendering stage, this chapter will 
present a summary of the findings and reflections on the wider implications of the lessons 
learned from this research. This concluding chapter first presents a summary of the 
research findings and lessons learned, followed by answers to the research questions, 
reflections on the research process, as well as new questions and future directions for the 
research and policy/practice communities.  
10.1 Summary of findings 
Based on the study undertaken, there are signs indicating problems with the Brazil 
PPP Framework. The findings of this research indicate that the Framework may not have 
been successful in delivering completion of many PRI cases due, in large part, to problems 
with its basic underlying assumptions about how the process of PPP formulation works and 
the elements that influence actors in their relations in the pre-tendering stage. To this date, 
the focus has been on a structural approach to the formulation of these projects, 
neglecting the complexities and intrinsic elements of the process.  
The findings from this research indicate that two elements of the socially 
constructed   ‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’   were   useful   in   leading   actors   towards  
completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation: policy arrangement and 
strategic arrangement. From these elements, important lessons can be learned for the 
formulation of PPP projects especially considering aspects that have been neglected by the 
Brazil PPP Framework. On the other hand, the other two elements, legal and organizational 
arrangements, emphasize aspects of the Framework that are important for the PRI pre-
tendering process of PPP formulation, but which must be taken into consideration from a 
contextual perspective of the system in which the PPP formulation process takes place.  
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The study demonstrates that process matters and that context is an influential 
element in pre-tendering PPP formulations, both internally in the dynamics of formal and 
informal interactions and through the influence of external forces embedded in the 
‘systemic   institutional   arrangement’.   These elements, however, have been neglected as 
influential in the wider Brazilian context of PPP formulation based on the PRI mechanism. 
In the analysis of the case study used as research strategy, recurrent themes related to 
process included: informal interactions matter, soft capacity elements matter (i.e. 
overcoming frustrations and insecurities, collaboration, compromise, motivation and 
commitment), context matters, flexibility in the strategy matters, but coordination and 
control over procedures also matter and are needed to assure responsibility and 
accountability in the long-run.  
Considering these findings, this research indicates that an essential element for PPP 
project formulation is recognition of process complexity and of the contextual 
embeddedness of actor-relations in PRI pre-tendering arrangements. This research adopted 
a novel analytical perspective on the PPP theme and stimulated initial discussions over 
process-related elements in the formulation of PPP projects; and, from the findings, it 
demonstrates that acknowledging the role of process is relevant for the formulation of PPP 
projects, which in the field of policy analysis in Brazil is often placed in the background.  
It is important to reinforce at this point an observation about the contextuality of 
the case study, which was already mentioned in Chapter 6 (Research Strategy and Methods) 
regarding issues of transferability. The particularities of the case study context are used to 
highlight and exemplify the importance of acknowledging that process and context play a 
role in the formulation of PPP projects. This research does not attempt to transfer to other 
cases of pre-tendering PPP formulation in Brazil the intertwining contextual processes that 
linked actors together in the case study. These were used as evidence of the relevance of 
process and context for pre-tendering arrangements, which have not been generally 
acknowledged with respect to PPP formulation in Brazil. Thus, the lessons learned from the 
case study and their wider implications to other cases in Brazil are related to shedding light 
on the importance of context and process for such arrangements, which share similar 
characteristics across Brazil (in terms of set of public, private and technical actors, project 
finance elements, complexity of interactions, legislative and administrative procedures).  
The case study suggests that process-related elements such as context, strategy 
and formal and informal elements of actor-relations play a role in PRI pre-tendering 
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arrangements. However, unravelling and managing the complexity of intertwining and 
socially constructed processes must be done on a case-by-case basis. Based on these 
observations, the findings from this research represent an initial stepping stone to 
stimulate stakeholders, policy-makers and practitioners to acknowledge the relevance of 
process-related aspects and not to rely uncritically on structurally oriented or one-fits-all 
approaches for the formulation of PPP projects. This research was groundbreaking in 
stimulating the reflection of stakeholders involved in the case study on issues related to 
process, but more attempts are still needed to raise wider awareness in Brazil on the 
relevance of a process approach to PPP formulation.  
10.2 Research Question 1: Summary of case study 
Research   Question   1:   How   did   actors’   construct   and   enact   a   ‘systemic   institutional  
arrangement’   through   their   relations?  How  did   it   influence  actors   in   the   completion  of  
the PPP formulation process in the PRI pre-tendering stage? 
The answer to this question will provide a summary of the case. It provides 
contextual evidence from the study to highlight the importance of process, context and 
socially constructed elements for the pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects. In this 
section, sub-questions   will   be   simultaneously   addressed   per   element   of   the   ‘systemic  
institutional   arrangement’   that   was   continuously   constructed   and   enacted   during   the  
EPISODES of the case study that completed the PRI pre-tendering process of PPP 
formulation. The elements are policy, legal, organizational and strategic arrangements. The 
sub-questions proposed in Chapter 5 (Conceptual Framework) are the following: 
x How  were  actors   and   their   relations   influenced  by  existing   ‘ways  of thinking and 
acting’?  How  did  they  mobilize  or  overcome  existing  ways?   
x How  were  actors  and  their  relations  influenced  by  innovative  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  
acting’? 
x How did actors and their relations influence the process?  
x How did external forces influence the process? 
10.2.1 Policy Arrangement 
The PPP Framework that has been used to guide many PRI cases of PPP formulation 
in Brazil assumes that ex ante prioritization of the PPP instrument for specific policy sectors 
through political, financial, regulatory and other external stimulus are sufficient to lead pre-
tendering processes towards completion. On the other hand, the case study analysed in 
 235 
 
this research shows that other elements are also influential in the prioritization of the 
scope and PPP instrument by the actors involved in the process of project formulation.  
In the case study, prior to engagement in Episode 1, there was no clear 
infrastructure scope indicated for PPP instruments; PPPs were not even a priority in the 
public sector agenda. From the analysis of the case study used as part of the research 
strategy,   four   elements   were   important   in   actors’   construction   and   enactment   of   the  
‘systemic  policy  arrangement’.  These  elements  were:   
x Social construction of scope and selection of the instrument (EPISODE 1) 
x Contextual embeddedness of political culture (EPISODE 2) 
x ‘Commitment  packages’  and  soft  capacity  elements  (EPISODE 1 through EPISODE 3) 
x Contextual embeddedness of financial, fiscal and economic forces (EPISODE 1 
through EPISODE 3) 
EPISODE 1 
Social construction of scope and selection of the instrument 
The case study shows that actors overcame the fact that PPPs had not been 
prioritized as a policy instrument in the public sector agenda by mobilizing and overcoming 
embedded   perceptions   and   developing   new   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’   in   their  
interactions. To conciliate interests on the infrastructure scope for the city centre 
intervention, actors mobilized existing perceptions that the local government lacked 
resources and capacity to implement projects in Brazil. They also mobilized perceptions 
that the private sectors depended on the public sector interest and political will in order to 
invest in a business opportunity that had political and policy relevance to the government, 
that   is,   the   public   sector   had   to   ‘buy   the   idea’.   Both   sectors   also   understood   that   their  
interests were priority areas for infrastructure development, considering the problematic 
urban mobility context of the city centre and pressures from society, media and control 
bodies.   Therefore,   actors’   knowledge   about   complementary   interests,   awareness   of  
interdependence, and relevance of the intervention for the city centre were mobilized in 
the informal interactions between public and private actors that led to conciliation of 
interests and definition of the infrastructure scope for the city centre intervention. Public 
and private actors also overcame several pre-existing insecurities related to lack of 
experience and knowledge in public-private relations for the selection of the PPP 
instrument. This was complemented by their embedded knowledge of difficulties to 
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implement the same scope of the intervention via other alternatives, the traditional 
tendering process (8666 Law) or the common concessions instrument (8987 law).  
EPISODE 2 
Contextual embeddedness of political culture 
In order to overcome embedded perceptions that external opposition, distrust and 
suspicion against public-private relations could negatively affect their systemic context, 
actors engaged in a communication process of ‘political consensus building’ to develop 
support for the city centre infrastructure scope and the PPP instrument. Perceived sources 
of resistance included: councillors, secretaries, civil servants and control bodies; as well as 
actors in society such as representatives of the media, the local community, street vendors, 
city centre business owners, and owners of irregular parking lots. Their mobilization for 
political consensus building demonstrated commitment to prioritize the scope and 
instrument not only internally, but also externally with society and the public sector 
through political strategies of communication and also through political decisions on 
technical premises for the PPP project design. In  EPISODE  2,  actors’  embedded  perceptions  
of political, cultural and judicial obstacles for the publication of the city centre PPP project 
influenced their commitment to the process and the technical decisions of project, but 
detracted attention from the quality of the PPP project. 
EPISODE 1 through EPISODE 3 
Continuous  reinforcement  of  ‘commitment  packages’ and soft capacity elements 
The case study shows a continuous process of commitment building during the PRI 
pre-tendering stage in order to maintain the initial priority given to the PPP instrument and 
to the infrastructure scope. This prevented the interactions from falling apart despite 
problems faced in the process. In EPISODE 1, private investors and public sector actors 
overcame several pre-existing insecurities and also built expectations for the PPP 
preparation process. However, actors’   expectations were frustrated during EPISODE 2, 
especially because of the problems with the enactment of the instrumental strategy and 
because of the quality of the material submitted to the local government. Some of the 
insecurities were dealt with in EPISODE 2 through collaboration and participation under the 
‘emergent  strategy’  and  in  the  interactions  for  ‘political  consensus  building’.  The  initiative  
of technical actors directly contacting the public and private actors and their involvement in 
the discussions also helped to overcome some of the initial frustrations and to build a 
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perception of process ownership. Political decision-making in the studies was used as 
engine to keep actors committed to the mobilization. In EPISODE 3, actors continuously 
reinforced the priority of the PPP instrument by relying on political, business and technical 
commitment packages and renewed their motivation to continue in the informal PRI pre-
tendering process despite the frustrations, insecurities and problems from EPISODE 2.   
Contextual embeddedness of fiscal, economic and financial forces 
The policy arrangement was embedded in a fiscal, economic and financial context 
that enabled the PRI pre-tendering process and motivated actors in the process. Actors 
took advantage of this embeddedness in the process of PPP formulation.  
x Fiscal embeddedness:   public   and   private   actors’   awareness   and   mobilization   of  
perceptions that the local government lacked resources to implement the urban 
mobility   city   centre  PPP  demonstrates   the  embeddedness  of   the   ‘systemic  policy  
arrangement’  in  a  fiscal  context. 
x Economic  embeddedness:  public  and  private  actors’  awareness  and  mobilization  of  
perceptions that the investment in parking lots in the city centre was a profitable 
business   opportunity   demonstrates   the   embeddedness   of   the   ‘systemic   policy  
arrangement’  in  the  economic context. 
x Financial embeddedness: the informal meeting at the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) demonstrates that the prioritization of the city centre PPP scope was 
embedded in a financial context, because actors depended on the Bank to 
prioritize the infrastructure scope of the project in order to secure investment 
resources for the execution of the city centre re-ordering policy.  
10.2.2 Legal Arrangement 
The Brazil PPP Framework indicates that clear PPP laws and decrees setting legal 
boundaries, conditions and standard procedures for PPP formulation are requirements for 
the engagement and completion of the PRI pre-tendering stage. However, the initial case 
study scenario was characterized by the absence of PPP legislations (no municipal PPP law 
or PPP decrees) to orient actors prior to their engagement in the process. They were 
published later on but not followed by a simultaneous cultural adjustment in the local 
context. However, the absence of these elements was not an impediment for   actors’  
continuity in the pre-tendering process.  
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The case study shows that if a policy instrument is set as priority, actors can be so 
commitment and interested in the process that the fragility of the legal arrangement may 
not  represent  an  obstacle  for  actors’  interactions.  They  can  even  ignore  the  importance  of  
process embeddedness in a regulatory context, especially considering the neglect of the 
urban development limits of the Municipal Master Plan (Law n. 062, 2009), and the failure 
to reinforce the need for publication of compulsory purchase decrees of properties 
(Decree-Law n. 3365, 1941). Even though the fragility of the legal arrangement did not 
prevent actors from engaging in and completing the PRI pre-tendering process, it 
compromised the quality and legal coherence of the PPP project published for Public 
Consultation. Towards the end of the EPISODE, in the attempt to overcome embedded 
perceptions of bureaucratic procedures for publication of PPP project, public actors 
neglected legal PPP procedures and formal routes for project publication. They engaged in 
informal interactions and published a city centre PPP project for Public Consultation that 
did not meet fiscal responsibility requirements and financial and legal accountability. 
10.2.3 Organizational Arrangement 
The Brazil PPP Framework indicates that organizations of internal control created 
by PPP Decrees and represented by Managing Councils and PPP Units must be in place to 
guide PRI processes of PPP formulation towards completion of the pre-tendering stage. On 
the other hand, when actors engaged in the pre-tendering stage, there was no formal PPP 
Decree establishing the roles of the PPP Unit and the PPP Managing Council, and public and 
private actors lacked experience, training and knowledge in PPP procedures. However, the 
fragility of the local organizational framework, in terms of public and private organizational 
and human   capacity,   was   not   an   impediment   for   actors’   decision   to   continue   with   the  
formulation of the city centre PPP project. It did not prevent actors from staying 
commitment during the pre-tendering PRI process of PPP formulation; however, the lack of 
appropriate coordination and control influenced problems in the final documents.  
In order to overcome lack of experience, insecurities and fragility of local public 
sector organizational arrangement, actors relied on the perceived experience of local 
consultancy for coordination. The consultancy promoted trainings and seminars, adopting 
embedded practices from the state government, for levelling the knowledge of public, 
private and technical actors on legal and instrumental procedures for PPP project 
formulation. However, during the pre-tendering process there was no active coordination 
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from any group, which allowed political decision making to take over and the production of 
products that lacked integration and technical consistency.   
Despite frustrations with the problems in EPISODE 2 and with the rejection of the 
studies by the local government, actors continued in the process and adopted another 
coordination posture. They were influenced  by  ‘commitment  packages’; public, private and 
consultancy took over as coordinators and acted as institutional entrepreneurs in 
implementing   the   flexible   ‘learning   by   doing’   strategy.   However,   there   was   no   overall  
coordination to control and assess contextual influences on the legal documents and 
technical studies and the premises defined in EPISODE 2 based on political decision-making 
remained. In the end of the process, there was no coordination from private and 
consultancy actors or internal and external public control bodies to oversee the informal 
procedures leading to completion of PRI pre-tendering stage and to Public Consultation. 
These were adopted to overcome embedded perceptions of bureaucratic procedures, but 
led to the publication of projects without assessment and validation of fiscal, financial and 
legal requirements.  
10.2.4 Strategic Arrangement 
As the case study shows, in a scenario of lack of experience and knowledge about 
strategies for the pre-tendering formulation of PPP projects, actors adopted an approach 
that they considered appropriate and suitable based on the perceived successful 
experience of the state government with the football stadium. They initially adopted an 
instrumental strategy based on an ex ante approach that was inadequate for the 
complexity involved in formulating a PPP project and which was replaced by a more flexible 
‘learning  by  doing’  initiative.   
EPISODE 1: Instrumental strategy 
The mainstream guidelines obtained from the state government were in line with 
the approach of the Brazil PPP Framework based on an instrumental strategy set in PRI 
decrees and manuals of best practices detailing strategic guidelines, activities budgets, 
timeframes and objectives. The approach disregarded the complex characteristics of PPP 
formulation based on network of interdependent actors  (project  finance’  concept)  and  on  
dynamic interactions. It also neglected the possibility of contextual particularities 
influencing the process.  
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EPISODE 2: Emergent strategy 
In the absence of coordination in EPISODE 2, groups of interactions engaged in a 
political process of project formulation through collaboration, initiative, and network-
relations for definition of technical premises and project specifications through ‘political 
consensus building’. Under the new strategy actors were able to collect information and 
define specifications for the elaboration of the city centre PPP. Project premises were 
constructed as actors interacted in the process. This is in contradiction with the 
instrumental strategic assumption that project specifications and details and plan activities 
can be defined ex ante and implemented in accordance with a rigid formal plan without 
need for adjustments. In EPISODE 2, actors engaged in a politically contextualized scenario. 
At this stage, besides lack of knowledge and experience  and  coordination  problems,  actors’  
political mobilization to define technical specifications and to prevent judicial, political and 
cultural obstacles in order to overcome their insecurities demonstrates the embeddedness 
of the process in a local context of political culture. This contributed to complexity and 
prevented an instrumental strategy from controlling the process. On the other hand, the 
emergent strategy was based on non-integrated decisions, lack of coordination and 
validation with public actors, as well as neglect for context and complexity. The political 
mobilization was technically useful in bringing the network of actors together and in 
inspiring commitment; but the focus was placed on preventing perceived resistance and 
not on the quality, integration and coherence of documents. The contextual nature of the 
new strategy, without guided leadership and coordination, compromised the quality of the 
PPP project submitted at the end of EPISODE 2, but did not derail the pre-tendering process. 
Despite the problems, actors used soft capacity elements during the EPISODE, such as 
collaboration, initiative and commitment, to define technical premises and to keep the 
process going forward.  
EPISODE  3:  ‘Learning  by  doing’  strategy 
After the local government rejected the studies, actors used a new strategic 
arrangement  based  on  a  ‘learning  by  doing’  approach  guided  by  coordination  from  private  
and public actors and consultancy directors. In the public sector, the role of the City Centre 
and Finance Secretaries was essential at this stage. Actors engaged in informal interactions 
in which premise definition and document elaboration and adjustments happened at the 
same time. This new strategy had a more flexible deadline as actors acknowledged the 
difficulties involved in the formulation of complex PPP projects and as coordinators 
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validated major decisions throughout the process. Through the more flexible strategy, 
actors replaced the rigidity of the instrumental plan and overcame insecurities and 
frustrations with respect to the rejection of the PPP design by the local government. This 
strategy demonstrated that a guided but flexible and contextualized approach was better 
suited for   the   process.   Moreover,   during   enactment   of   the   ‘learning   by   doing’   strategy 
through informal interactions, it became clear the embeddedness of the process in a 
financial, fiscal, economic and political cultural context, which influenced decisions and 
readjustments in the PPP documents.  
10.3 Research Question 2: Reflections on wider implications 
(lessons learned) 
Research Question 2: What are the lessons learned for the formulation of infrastructure 
PPP projects in Brazil in the PRI pre-tendering stage? 
The answer to this question will consider the wider implications of this research. 
Three topics of general implications will be considered in this section: the relevance of 
context, process implications for policy-making and for practice. This discussion will 
consider simultaneously the two sub questions proposed in Chapter 5 (Conceptual 
Framework), which are: 
x What are important aspects that have been neglected by the Brazil PPP Framework? 
x What are important aspects about the Brazil PPP Framework that were neglected 
in the process? Why? How could they be better acknowledged in the process? 
In Brazil the intertwining processes that link actors together at the pre-tendering 
stage have been overlooked by the mainstream structural approach to PPP formulation. 
The answers to the research question in this section about the lessons learned from this 
research will raise attention of policy makers and practitioners to the importance of 
adopting process-lenses to orient arrangements of PPP project formulation. In answering 
this research question, elements of process and context of the case study will be used to 
demonstrate that stakeholders in the case were capable of reflecting on a set of issues that 
brought process and context to the foreground as influential elements. Thus, evidence 
from the case will be used to exemplify the importance of socially constructed aspects in 
the PRI pre-tendering stage. The considerations in this section are not an attempt to 
directly transfer contextual evidence from the study to other cases at the federal, state or 
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municipal levels in Brazil. The applicability of particular evidence from the case study in 
other contexts can be verified by future empirical research, which must then acknowledge 
that elements of process and contextual embeddedness play an important role in PRI pre-
tendering arrangements.   
10.3.1 General implications: context matters 
Despite the existence of a PPP Framework for PPP project design in several PRI 
cases in Brazil, the case study indicates that contingencies and the intrinsic characteristics 
of PRI pre-tendering processes are also sources of complexity, which may influence the 
progress of formulating PPP projects through the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI). 
The PRI pre-tendering process reflects a complex web of interactions in direct contact with 
its context, which cannot be simply organized based on a framework externally imposed on 
actor-relations in the process. Despite the fact that several states and municipalities in 
Brazil have faced difficulties to complete pre-tendering arrangements, suggestions and 
solutions for the PRI mechanism have frequently focused on the structuring conditions for 
these processes, but overlooked the intrinsic complexities of the pre-tendering stage itself 
and the influence of context.  
The case study suggests that the PRI process can be influenced by the dynamics 
that unravel during the pre-tendering stage. These dynamics may enable or not the 
creation of the appropriate circumstances for the progress and completion of the pre-
tendering PPP formulation, despite the existence of a structuring Framework. The 
complexity and dynamics of PRI process are influenced by internal aspects embedded in 
the pre-tendering arrangements (actors, perceptions, expectations and opinions, soft and 
informal capacity elements, interdependencies, networks) and by contextual aspects (time 
and space). They are also influenced by the external environment (financial, fiscal, 
economic, regulatory, organizational aspects), which are similar to the elements of the 
Brazil PPP Framework discussed in Chapter 2; but the external influence occurs through its 
embeddedness in the specific context of pre-tendering formulation. The relation between 
all of these aspects is important for the creation of conditions for the progress and 
completion of PRI pre-tendering arrangements.  
The interplay between the aspects drawn from the case study, mentioned in the 
previous section, is context specific. The way these process elements will become evident 
in other experiences in Brazil depends on contextual specificities of time and space. 
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However, across Brazil these PRI pre-tendering arrangements involve similar PPP and 
tendering legislations and procedures, as well as complex interactions due to the large 
number of actors involved and to project finance characteristics. Consequently, as the 
contribution from the case study suggests, it is worth reflecting on the influence of process. 
In the next sections, contextual evidence from the case study will be used to call the 
attention of policy-makers and practitioners to the importance of a process-oriented 
approach to the formulation of infrastructure PPP projects in Brazil.  
10.3.2 General implications of process for policy-making 
The general implications for policy making will consider the lessons learned from 
the case study with respect to the policy, legal and organizational elements of the Brazil 
PPP Framework.  
Policy framework 
The Brazil PPP Framework assumes that PPPs must be prioritized ex ante and 
matched as policy instrument with infrastructure scopes based on previously expressed 
political will, regulatory, economic and policy stimulus, in favour of specific sectors of 
infrastructure development. However, as continuously mentioned in this chapter, the study 
revealed important aspects that are neglected by the Framework, which demonstrate the 
importance of stimulating reflection on process and context for PPP project formulation in 
the PRI pre-tendering stage. Examples include the possibility of social construction of 
infrastructure scope and for selection of PPP instrument; the role of soft elements; 
continuous   use   of   ‘commitment   packages’;   and   contextual   embeddedness   of   external  
forces in terms of fiscal, financial, economic aspects, as well as political culture. All of these 
elements were revealed as continuous influence on the prioritization of the scope, 
instrument,  as  well  as  an  influence  on  actors’  commitment  to  the  informal  and  non-legally 
binding pre-tendering stage.  
The case study shows that actors are capable of constructing the infrastructure 
scope for a PPP project in innovative ways, which can even increase the utility of the 
instrument for infrastructure development in sectors and areas not anticipated by the 
government. Different from the external and structural assumptions of the Brazil PPP 
Framework, the case study shows that the contextual mobilization of favourable 
environment circumstances can be strongly influential for the prioritization of the PPP 
instrument.   
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Furthermore, based on the analysis, another aspect highlights the importance of 
process and context: the prioritization of the scope can be done with participation from 
both sectors. The public sector does not necessarily have to be the one to determine what 
the priority is and define the circumstances. In the case study, the participation and 
interaction with the private sector was important for the public sector to understand and 
reflect that the private sector priority on parking mobility was also in the interest of the city 
and of the local government. In general, this is an important aspect because the scopes of 
PPP projects often need to be composed of elements that represent priority for both 
sectors in order to attract private actors for the formulation and execution of such projects 
and to stimulate priority of instrument and scope in the public sector agenda. Moreover, 
joint construction of scope can also be relevant for continuous motivation of public and 
private  actors  in  the  process  using  as  engine  actors’  commitment  to  their  own  interests  in  
the scope, as well as perception of commitment from each other.  
The case study also shows that actors may need to constantly overcome embedded 
and new obstacles to the prioritization that arise throughout the process of PPP 
formulation. This may involve continuous reaffirmation and reassessment on whether the 
PPP instrument is appropriate for the policy scope. As an example from the case study, if 
actors perceive contextual resistance, they may engage in a process of continuous internal 
and external reassurance that the PPP instrument is priority in order to maintain 
commitment and confidence in the process. Therefore, the Brazil PPP Framework must 
account for the need of a continuous check on the prioritization of the PPP instrument and 
on keeping actors constantly motivated in the pre-tendering stage, or negotiations may fall 
apart considering the non-legally binding character of these informal pre-tendering 
interactions. However, it is necessary to attend to the fact that the continuous process or 
reaffirmation does not detract attention from the quality and technical consistency of the 
project being produced, even if it helps to keep actors committed. For example, in EPISODE 
2  of  the  case  study,  the  perception  of  process  ownership  through  engagement  in  ‘political  
consensus   building’   helped   to   keep   actors   committed,   but compromised the technical 
quality and legal coherence of the PPP project design. Even though it may inspire 
motivation, this way of working may also run the risk of reducing the PPP formulation to a 
pure political process (Albrechts, 2003b). Therefore, policy-makers need to pay attention to 
the lack of considerations over these aspects by the Brazil PPP Framework currently guiding 
the formulation of PPP projects based on the PRI mechanism.  
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The same way that politics and informality influenced and supported actors in the 
case study towards completion of the pre-tendering process, it can also represent an 
obstacle to interaction in that stage, depending on the context in which the process takes 
place. It is important to mention that if PRI cases in Brazil have failed mostly because they 
were unable to control the negative influence of politics or other contextual elements, 
actors and society might have avoided problems for the future and are in fact better off 
with the cancelation of these processes. For the cases that are struggling but hanging on in 
the pre-tendering process and for the cases yet to come, the findings from this research 
can shed light on elements that may help to improve the PPP formulation and prevent 
future headaches resulting from inadequacies, dismissals and lack of scrutiny during the 
pre-tendering stage, especially with respect to socially constructed aspects and elements of 
process. In the case study, these were related to the   ‘obfuscation   of   the   political’  
(Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012, p. 98) when actors try to deceive or escape from 
considering   the   influence   of   politics,   and   the   neglect   for   or   displacement   of   ‘democratic  
accountability’,  which  in  the  context  of  Brazil  may  represent  avoiding  legislative  intentions  
and instructions of financial, fiscal and social responsibility (Allmendinger & Haughton, 
2012, p. 91; Demir & Nyhan, 2008, p. 83; Haughton & Allmendinger, 2008, p. 145).  
Legal and organizational frameworks  
The case study indicates that the suggestions of the Brazil Framework for PPP 
formulation in terms of well-established organizational and legal frameworks to control 
and guide the pre-tendering arrangements are useful, but in need of complementation 
considering its neglect for the role of process. The Framework indicates that clear PPP laws 
and decrees setting legal boundaries and conditions and standard procedures for PPP 
formulation are important for the engagement and completion of the PRI pre-tendering 
stage. The Framework enforces the necessity of organizational frameworks in place, 
generally created by PPP Decrees and represented by the internal control from Managing 
Councils (or Committees) and PPP Units (or Technical Groups), but also by external bodies 
of control.  
However, it is necessary to add to the Framework that actors involved in PPP 
formulation arrangements must have the knowledge that process matters and be 
convinced of the importance of reflecting on socially constructed aspects during the pre-
tendering stage of PPP formulation, as well as on its contextual embeddedness. In the case 
study, actors did not reflect on the need to stimulate among stakeholders involved in the 
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system concerns over accountability and control, which could be preventive of future 
problems for the PPP project implementation. Thus, a PPP project with problems reached 
Public Consultation, especially considering that the formulation process was negatively 
influenced  by  actors’   lack  of  knowledge   in  PPP   legal  procedures  and   requirements,  by   its  
embeddedness in a political context and by perceptions of bureaucracies in the procedures 
of the public administration. Actors were able to implement a local PPP legislation and 
formally and symbolically create an organizational arrangement, but their implementation 
in the system was not followed by a simultaneous local cultural adjustment. The rules and 
organizations formally existed, but actors were not familiar with them.  
In the study, internalization of legal procedures and a stronger supervision from 
internal and external control bodies were missing to assure fiscal, financial and legal 
accountability of the project. In addition to that, informal interactions helped to 
compromise the legality of the published city centre project. Therefore, the Brazil PPP 
Framework needs to account for the fact that informal relations may play a crucial role. It 
must also consider the importance of contextual dynamics and not simply assume that if 
roles and responsibilities are formally assigned, actors will be able to embody them in 
practice. Moreover, the case study specifically shows that knowledge on legislations and 
their appropriateness to the specific context is essential for preventing problems in the 
design of PPP projects, but also that it is essential the continuous participation of (public 
and private) internal control and external control bodies during the process. It highlights 
the contextual embeddedness of legal and regulatory aspects. The Brazil PPP Framework 
must also acknowledge this because it does not emphasize that other legislations in the 
Brazilian regulatory framework may also be applicable to specific cases. Formal structures 
may be important but are not sufficient to secure meaningful or consistent political 
behaviour for the formulation of coherent and responsible PPP projects (Lowndes and 
Leach, 2004), because the following of public administrative procedures are not 
autonomous, neutral and free from politics, informality, and contextual actor-relations 
(Demir & Nyhan, 2008). 
The legal and organizational aspects suggested by the Brazil PPP Framework are 
important, but must be taken into consideration from a contextual perspective of the 
systemic actor-relations in which the PPP formulation process takes place. The case study 
presents evidence worth considering which demonstrates the relevance of process to 
actors’  engagement  in  PRI  pre-tendering PPP formulation:  
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x Legal aspects: the case study shows that internal knowledge about legislation and 
procedures are important, but also the development of motivation to apply them 
in practice during the processes of interaction; 
x Organizational aspects: public and private actors in the case failed to exercise 
control   for   ‘legislative   oversight’, which is important because embeddedness in 
political context can be influential and compromise conformity with legislative 
instructions (Demir & Nyhan, 2008). 
Although the case study completed the PRI pre-tendering stage and actors 
published the PPP project design for Public Consultation, the lack of fiscal and legal 
accountability  and  the  absence  of  a  ‘value  for  money’  document  were  significant  gaps  left  
from the city centre PPP formulation. Considering that it was in the initial interest of public 
and private actors to engage in an official tendering process for future implementation of 
the city centre PPP project, lack of concern for fiscal, legal and financial accountability was 
a strong indication that the successful implementation of such project could be 
compromised.   Therefore,   they   lacked   ‘democratic   accountability’,   in   terms   of   a   project  
design in conformity with legislative intentions and instructions (Demir & Nyhan, 2008, p. 
83). Public and private actors also lacked  ‘planning  ability’,  that  is,  the capacity to translate 
the initial city centre policy idea of urban mobility infrastructure into a PPP project design 
that was adequate for an official tendering process and for implementation (Demir & 
Nyhan, 2008, p. 83). In an attempt to reach Public Consultation, to overcome bureaucratic 
procedures with the endorsement of the mayor and – in the perspective of private and 
consultancy actors – politically influenced by coming elections, the municipality did not 
officially demonstrate its capacity to fulfil pecuniary payment obligations, in accordance 
with annual and multiannual fiscal and budget plans. It also failed to demonstrate 
compatibility of the fiscal commitment with the federal law of budgetary directives and 
with the law of annual budget (lei de diretrizes orçamentárias and lei orçamentária anual). 
This was fiscally irresponsible considering the 20-year commitment of public resources with 
the PPP project in case it reached official tendering process and contract signature. The 
absence of demonstration of the fiscal capacity of the municipality was also not in the 
general interest of the private sector because a municipal fiscal incapacity could lead to 
default on pecuniary payment and financially compromise the project and the business 
profit to be earned from the intervention.  
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Furthermore, there was no legal accountability and concern for the process 
embeddedness in a regulatory framework that went beyond PPP legislations. The PPP 
project design was published based on 80% construction parameter different from the 
rates of the local urban legislation and based on properties that were not owned by the 
municipality since the compulsory purchase decrees were not published. The informality of 
the process left legal gaps that could impede the actual execution of the PPP project and 
implementation of the urban mobility infrastructure intervention in the city centre.  
Finally, there was the absence of a financial accountability document 
demonstrating   the   ‘value   for   money’   of   the   intervention.   Actors were not able to 
demonstrate that the PPP instrument was the most appropriate tool for the infrastructure 
scope. This shows the lack of public sector concern in guiding or requesting its elaboration 
even though interviewees expressed constant concern over municipal budgetary 
constraints. Actors did not fulfil a legal requirement and failed to demonstrate the cost-
effectiveness of the project in terms of public resources and the comparative advantage of 
the PPP for the city centre project in comparison to other alternatives available (traditional 
tendering and common concession).  
The case study shows that actors engaged in informal and political relations for the 
progress of the PPP formulation. Political decision-making and guidance compromised 
‘democratic  accountability’  and  ‘planning  ability’  of  actor-relations in the PRI pre-tendering 
stage. Therefore, as lessons and implications to policy, it is important to consider that many 
forces, internal or external, may influence the dynamics of actor-relations and lead to 
diverse results, positive or negative. These dynamics may be subject to political, economic, 
and other external determinants; but internal human deliberation and political struggles 
may also lead to modifications in the practical application of bureaucratic and legal 
procedures (Olsen, 2006). In the case study, actors took advantage of their relations and 
financial, fiscal, economic embeddedness for positive definition of technical premises (i.e. 
construction of policy scope, meeting at BNDES and veto on link between pecuniary 
payment guarantees and net current revenue). However, they also used this 
embeddedness in ways that helped with progress but left problems in the technical 
documents   (i.e.   ‘political   consensus   building’   and   informal   procedures for Public 
Consultation). This could imply the need for structural responses such as more procedures 
and  regulations  to  deal  with  the  possibility  that  actors  may  use  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  
which compromise the technical quality and accountability of the project. On the other 
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hand, as the case study shows, the existence of rules does not guarantee that these will be 
followed, especially if taken over by other embedded or socially constructed priorities and 
not internalized by the actors involved in the process.  
Consequently, it must be taken into account the need for internal coordination - 
over the PRI formulation of PPP projects, which acknowledges and reflects on the role of 
process, context and socially constructed aspects. However, this must not reduce the 
flexibility of the process through the over imposing of rules, controls and regulations. It is 
important to prevent that actors become so obsessed with dictating, controlling and 
regulating  everything  (‘how things should be done’)  that  quality, results, and outcomes are 
ignored (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 14). Moreover, as Olsen (2006, p. 9) asserts,   “the 
blessing of rules may be mixed”   because standard operating procedures can improve 
accountability through rules, but reduce necessary discretion  and  ﬂexibility  if  they  hamper  
reasoning and improved adjustments. The alternative is the introduction of a control level 
based on external guidelines and internal supervision that allows for quick decision-making 
but without losing focus of the legitimacy of project formulation and future 
implementation  with  the  link  to  ‘democratic  accountability’  (Demir & Nyhan, 2008). Finding 
this balance is a challenge and an implication for future research.  
A level of control that may not hamper flexibility can include the setting of external 
requirements  of  accountability  as  boundary  guidelines.  They  need  to  work  as  cues  or  ‘fire  
alarms’   to   stimulate   and   trigger   concern   of   actors   involved   in   the   process   that   following  
procedural requirements can improve the sustainability of the PPP project (West, 2004, p. 
66). These requirements need to be accompanied by constant internal supervision that 
accountability checks and balances are being considered. For example, as the case study 
suggests, this depends on the development of internal awareness regarding the 
importance of considering fiscal, financial and social accountability issues while discretion 
for strategic flexibility takes place.  
Next section will discuss general implications for practice based on the findings 
from this research, emphasizing the importance for coordinators, project managers and 
leaders to be aware of the influence of internal process elements, such as complexity, 
contextuality and soft capacity elements. The sub-section that follows will consider 
informed recommendations based on the   previous   reflections   to   inform  actors’   ‘ways  of  
thinking  and  acting’  in  the  pre-tendering formulation of infrastructure PPP projects in Brazil.  
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10.3.3 General implications of process for practice 
The Brazil PPP Framework neglects several strategic elements for the practice of 
PPP project formulation suggested as important in the analysis of the case study: a balance 
between guidance and flexibility/dynamics, informal interactions, mobilization of soft 
capacity elements (i.e. compromise, reflection, participation, coordination) and 
acknowledgement of systemic embeddedness in a broader fiscal, financial, regulatory, 
economic and political cultural context.  
The analysis of EPISODE 2 shows that actors were not able to overcome the 
complexity involved in the contextuality of a PPP formulation process, which demonstrated 
the inadequacy of an instrumental strategy for the formulation of PPP project. The analysis 
highlights that the instrumental strategic approach of the generally adopted PPP 
Framework for PRI cases in Brazil is inappropriate for organizing the formulation of PPP 
projects, especially because it suggests a rigid strategy based on the pre-fixed scope and 
objectives, activities, budgets, timeframes. It also disregards the dynamic, systemic and 
contextual characteristics of PRI pre-tendering arrangements involving the project finance 
elements of network of interdependent actors, informal dynamics and the need for 
constant adjustment in premises and studies during the strategy implementation. The case 
study demonstrated that document elaboration and definition of project premises often 
happen simultaneously for the formulation of projects that rely on network of actors and 
require constant adjustment and readjustment, especially because of the contextual and 
dynamic character of the process.  
It is the instrumental separation of strategy implementation from formulation that 
requests the need for plans, programmes and controls to ensure commitment and the 
following of procedures (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). However, this reduces the ability of 
strategic adjustment, which is important for the formulation of PPP projects, a process 
characterized by dynamics and continual change. Therefore, the Brazil PPP Framework 
needs to account for the importance of a strategic planning approach as suggested by 
Albrechts (2004),   which   “demands   a   decision-making style in which the stakeholders 
become actively involved in solving policy problems on the basis of a joint definition of the 
actual  situation  and  of  the  sharing  of  interests,  aims  and  relevant  knowledge”  (p.  754). 
In Brazil, one of main strategic guidelines for pre-tendering formulation of PPP 
projects is the PRI publication. It is common for PRI publications (usually 15 pages) to have 
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lengthy procedural and regulatory descriptions but only general descriptions of policy 
objectives (maximum of 2 pages), regardless of the complexity of the policy intervention. 
Despite the broad objectives provided and the complexity of the infrastructure scope, PRIs 
generally require from the private initiative to present a work plan for project preparation 
with clear strategic approach, timetable, deadlines procedures and methodologies for the 
PPP project formulation. The period allowed for proposal preparation varies from 15 to 30 
days, which is considerably short for reflection and planning of strategies for the 
elaboration of complex PPP projects. PRIs rarely take into consideration the complexity of 
the infrastructure scope and context, or explicitly requests private parties to account for 
these elements when proposing the strategic approach. This type of PRI format is generally 
adopted in Brazil for different infrastructure types of PPP project formulation. One of the 
few references to complexity identified in the extensive review of PRI decrees and 
publications is with respect to the period for the preparation of studies (pre-tendering 
stage), explicit in article 2 of the Federal PRI Decree: “§  4   In  establishing  the  deadline   for  
submission of projects, studies, surveys or investigations, it should be considered the 
complexity, necessary articulations and licenses for its preparation”  (Decree n. 5977, 2006). 
However, the Federal PRI Decree is only mandatory for formulation of federal PPP projects. 
States and municipalities may use the federal format as guidance, but can also elaborate 
their own decrees and PRIs, which in most cases do not account for complexity. Therefore, 
PRIs in general do not consider the different levels of complexity involved in formulating 
PPP projects at the federal, state or municipal levels. 
The Brazil PPP Framework assumes that actors are able to implement strategies if 
they receive appropriate hard and instrumental technical training and manuals of best 
practices. The case study, on the other hand, suggests that the ex-ante training of teams 
and coordinators are not sufficient. It highlights that soft organizational and human 
capacity elements, which are developed and constantly reinforced during the process, must 
also receive increased attention in a broader PPP Framework. Considering the informality 
of the PRI pre-tendering process, in which there is no legally binding contract holding the 
process together, an important lesson from the study is the importance of soft aspects that 
‘glued’   actors   together   despite initial frustrations, such as motivation, self-perception of 
involvement, commitment, collaboration and initiative. Actors did not rely solely on 
‘capacity   for  what’, that is, trainings, best practices and procedures and on instrumental 
capabilities.   They   relied  more   on   ‘capacity   of  what’,   that   is,   on   the   soft   elements  which  
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influenced the progress of the process and the overcoming of problems, obstacles and 
impediments (Morgan, 2006, p. 17).  
In the case study,   in   the   production   and   reproduction   of   the   ‘systemic   strategic  
arrangement’,   actors   showed   capacity   to   reflect   on   problems,   to   draw   on   ‘commitment  
packages’   during   the   process,   to   make   concessions   and   compromise,   to   engage   and  
collaborate in informal interactions and to coordinate, which inspired a sense of process 
ownership and facilitated agreements and adjustment in technical premises during the 
process. The case study shows that the design of the strategic arrangement that helped 
actors in the pre-tendering stage depended not only on ‘institutional hardware’ in terms of 
rigid and instrumental capacity aspects, formal rules and operating procedures, but even 
more  on  the  ‘institutional  software’  through  practical  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’,  such  as  
collaboration, compromise, motivation, initiative, commitment, process ownership, and 
the overcoming of insecurities and frustrations (Dryzek, 1996, p. 105). 
The case study also indicates  that  the  ‘learning  by  doing’  approach  requested  the  
close participation of leaders guiding and coordinating the strategy implementation for the 
formulation of a PPP project. In EPISODE 2, under the emergent strategy politics took over 
technical and legal requirements when actors worked without coordination, guidance and 
leadership.  The  ‘learning  by  doing’  strategy  of  EPISODE  3,  however, which was more useful 
for the process, compensated for the lack of guidance under the emergent strategy. 
Coordinators had the strategic capacity to recognize, handle and take advantage of the 
contextual influence of economic, fiscal and financial forces. On the other hand, they were 
not able to guarantee a well-designed project and allowed the influence of political culture 
to compromise the final design of the PPP project. Therefore, based on the indications from 
the findings of this research, a strategic approach must include flexibility, but also a 
coordination that is strategically aware of the contextual influence of external forces 
throughout the PRI pre-tendering process. The study undertaken suggests that contextual 
aspects matters and that the stakeholders involved in preparation processes need to pay 
attention to them with discretion, in order to both prevent their negative interference with 
the PPP project design and to take advantage of these aspects when necessary.  
In order to reduce the rigidity of plans and pre-set activities, flexible strategies 
need to be combined with leadership and articulation of intentions in order to prevent 
actors from straying outside boundaries and drawing on contextual influences that may 
compromise the project quality (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). The role of coordinators is 
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essential for continuous guidance, especially because of the interactive nature of feedback 
and learning, as well as the need for continuous monitoring the environment and making 
changes. In the formulation of complex PPP projects, the boundaries between internal and 
external conditions are continuously re-constructed and highly permeable (Chaffee, 1985; 
Hart, 1992).  
The case study emphasizes that experience in coordination and leadership is 
contingent upon specific socio-historical contexts because the appropriate choices, 
solutions and decisions are also specific to the context in which obstacles take place 
(Coaffee & Headlam, 2008, p. 1588). For example, the case study shows that actors may 
draw motivational aspects from contextual factors to stimulate and maintain commitment 
of other crucial actors involved in the preparation process. Identification and mobilization 
of these contextual opportunities requires capacity and alertness from coordinating actors 
involved to act as institutional entrepreneurs. As Lowndes and Leach (2004) suggest, “one 
of the crucial capabilities of leaders is their ability to  ‘read’  (or   interpret) the context and 
adapt  their  leadership  behaviour  accordingly”  (p.  571).  Specific contextual aspects are not 
possible to identify a priori, and the contextual factors that appeared in this case study may 
not be directly applicable to other cases. It is important, therefore, to be alert for 
embeddedness of the pre-tendering process in its specific context, because this awareness 
may prove useful and efficient in assisting the formulation of a PPP project. As the case 
study suggests, leadership, control and coordination are also essential to prevent 
contextual political factors from dictating the details of the PPP documents being produced, 
in case they compromise the technical and legal quality of the design, as well as its 
compliance with fiscal, financial and social accountability requirements.  
Although future research is needed to explore how this possibility takes place, 
other cases of PPP may also be influenced by locally embedded institutional practices and 
politics that can affect how new approaches and strategies are interpreted in the pre-
tendering process of PPP formulation (Coaffee & Headlam, 2008). Therefore, equilibrium 
between flexibility and control must be reached, and this is possible in the Brazilian context. 
As it was mention   in   Chapter   2,   ‘juxtaposition’   of   models is already present in Brazil 
(Capobiango et al., 2013; Drumond & Silveira, 2012; Gomes, 2006; Mafra, 2005; Silva, 2011; 
Siqueira, 2012). This   balance   is   important   because   there   is   a   ‘dark   side’   of   pragmatic  
responses, which may be rooted in the contextual embeddedness of processes in historical 
and local governance traditions and power relations, which can strongly influence 
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outcomes (Coaffee & Headlam, 2008, p. 1588). However, for process strategies to be 
successful it is important awareness for the complex ways in which the dynamics between 
contextual actor-relations, politics and other external influences can corrupt the flexibility 
of a process, as well as to acknowledge tensions within public sector administration and 
between “statute/direction/guidance and creativity/flexibility/experimentation”  (Coaffee & 
Headlam, 2008, p. 1588). 
Therefore, this research suggests for the practice of pre-tendering PPP formulation 
based on the Procedure for Request of Interest a combination of innovation, creativity and 
flexibility in accordance with local contingency, alongside a system of guidance focused 
upon   fiscal,   legal,   financial,   social   accountability   (‘democratic   accountability’),   as   well   as  
performance management and  ‘best-value’  targets,  considering  that  the  main  goal  of  a  PPP  
formulation  process   is   to  design  projects   that  will  be  successfully   implemented  (‘planning  
ability’)   (Coaffee & Headlam, 2008; Demir & Nyhan, 2008). This research suggests an 
approach that allows   the   “application   of   general   and   ﬁxed   concepts   (policies, law, 
standards)   to   particular   and   ﬂuid   practicalities   (situation,   circumstances,   persons)”  
(Hildebrand, 2005, p. 355). These fixed concepts must introduce accountability concerns in 
the elaboration of PPP projects in contextual systems. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to mistake flexible strategies in the formulation of 
PPP projects with flexible accountability guidelines which may compromise the long-term 
success of infrastructure PPP interventions. In this research, the suggestion for strategic 
flexibility refers to the ability to deal with a network of interdependent actors, changing 
decisions and the coherent integration of scattered document production. It does not 
suggest flexibility in the approach to accountability, which must equate concerns over fiscal, 
financial and social responsibility. Thus, external guidelines and internal control are 
necessary to prevent that flexible process strategies are also used to advance short-term 
goals and respond to contextual influences that are not in line with the longevity of 
complex PPP projects (lasting up to 35 years, according to the Brazilian legislation). 
However, to facilitate a systemic process of checks and balances on accountability, 
requirements must be clear and internally absorbed by the actors involved. As argued in 
this research, based on its theoretical and conceptual frameworks, structural forces over 
the pre-tendering process do not prevent actors from creating their own systemic 
institutional arrangement. In the case study, for example, socially constructed elements, 
such as mobilizations for political consensus building and informal procedures for 
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overcoming bureaucracy, became influential rules in the process and compromised the 
project quality and accountability. However, this may be offset if systemic rules are also 
influenced by concerns of conscious actors over the importance of accountability for the 
project in the long run, and if coordinators are capable of intelligently using soft capacity 
elements (i.e. relationships, innovation, adaptiveness, imagination, self-reflection, 
collaboration, etc.) in order to obtain support and commitment of other actors in favour of 
financial, fiscal and social accountability.  
Next section presents informed practical recommendations based on the findings 
from  this  research.  Two  main  aspects  are  considered:  ‘procedural  accountability’   in  terms  
of   rules  and  guidelines   to  trigger  actors’   concern   for  accountability   in   the  process   (West, 
2004); and political/contextual competence, which refers to a mechanism by which 
contingent sensibility promotes systemic responsiveness to democratic values and 
accountability requirements when following procedures and legislative intentions. This 
includes capacity for discretion on whose interests to consider (Demir & Nyhan, 2008; West, 
2004),   as  well  as   for  assessing   the   ‘correctness’  of  decisions   (Rondinelli, 1976, p. 77) and 
the  legitimacy  of  actors’  demands  in  a  specific  systemic  context  (Pettigrew, 1977, p. 85) . 
10.3.4 Informing recommendations  
Before suggesting recommendations, it is important to acknowledge the difficulties 
of such an attempt considering that, based on the research findings, unique specificities to 
actors’  contextual systemic environment will mostly likely influence the formulation of PPP 
projects. Furthermore, in view of the boundaries of the research scope, it would be 
incredibly challenging the attempt to both unravel significant aspects influencing the PPP 
formulation to highlight the relevance of process and, at the same time, to set forth a 
ready-to-implement practical framework to improve pre-tendering processes of PPP 
formulation. Yet, it is still worth reflecting upon issues that may be relevant to most PRI 
pre-tendering systems, such as the complexity and contextuality of formulating PPP 
projects,   the   large   number   of   stakeholders   and   the  multiplicity   of   ‘ways   of   thinking   and  
acting’.   Furthermore,   external   forces   are   also   common   systemic   influences,   such   as   the  
highly politicized scenario in which public-private interactions take place in Brazil, the 
existence of legal and organizational frameworks and the importance of fiscal, financial and 
economic circumstances. These external forces may be revealed differently in various social 
contexts, but they are abstract forces that can recurrently work as constraints or enablers 
in different systems of PPP formulation.  
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Two main topics will be explored in this section to inform recommendations based 
on  this  research’s  findings:  (1)  procedural  accountability,  on  considerations  over  legal  and  
organizational elements, as well as fiscal and financial concerns and the influence of politics; 
and (2) contextual and political competences, which present reflections on the practical 
role of coordinators in the formulation process. Although these two topics were issues 
obtained from the analysis of the case study and drawn as evidence from its context, they 
suggest   observations   that   can   be   transferred   to  other   cases   of  PPP   in  Brazil.   ‘Procedural  
accountability’  considers  the  wider  scenario  of  PPPs, which is largely influenced by Brazilian 
legislative and administrative procedures for the organization of PRI pre-tendering 
processes. As for ‘contextual  and  political  competences’, these refer to the importance of 
reflecting on the contextual embeddedness of the process during the pre-tendering PPP 
formulation, and more specifically to the role of politics, which according to the literature, 
cannot be separated from the analysis of policy-making (H. Campbell & Marshall, 1999; 
Demir & Nyhan, 2008; Forester, 1982; Nalbandian, 2006; Svara, 1999, 2001; West, 2004). 
a. Procedural accountability 
This is a term used by West (2004) which refers to the instrumental requirements 
for following due procedures of the public administration in order to assure that the 
legitimate exercise of responsibilities by public actors is in line with democratic 
accountability. With respect to the formulation of PPP projects, some procedural guidelines 
are well-established in the Brazilian legislation for assessment of the fiscal and financial 
impact of the government commitment with pecuniary payment and guarantees with 
respect to public budget and annual and multiannual plans (article 10, Law n. 11079, 2004). 
However, considering the financial accountability in terms of value for money assessment 
of PPP projects, the absence of clear federal, state and municipal requirements and 
guidelines on how to prepare it and what to consider in the document create difficulties for 
actors to decide on two main aspects: (i) whether to proceed with a PPP based on criteria 
for  evaluating  “the  merit  or  worth”  of  the  PPP  project;  and  (ii) whether the risk transfer and 
allocation between public and private sectors are correctly derived and operationalized 
(Jane   Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003, p. 338). Since value for money requirements are not 
well-established in Brazil, it may influence actors’   neglect   for   preparing   a   document  
demonstrating the project’s   financial feasibility. It may also influence the use of 
methodologies that do not really demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the PPP. This 
research’s  case  study  shows that it is possible that actors involved in the formulation may 
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develop  their  own  systemic  procedures  for  evaluating  the  “merit  or  worth”  of  a  PPP  project  
(or the waving of cost effectiveness assessments), which may not be based on criteria of 
financial, fiscal and social responsibility.  
As many authors argue in the literature, the formulation process of complex 
projects such as PPPs is difficult to control because of the contextual influence of socially 
constructed elements (i.e. Brews & Purohit, 2007; R. Mason, 2007; Sanderson, 2000; 
Sanderson, 2009). However, the difficulty to maintain control over a turbulent and unstable 
process does not necessarily mean that universal guidelines are useless; especially 
considering that they can be internalized by actors involved in the systemic process and in 
turn influence the dynamics of PPP formulation as socially constructed rules. As the case 
study shows, in some instances the existence of external rules and procedures (i.e. 
legislation guidelines for fiscal and financial assessment and delimitation of organizational 
roles) may not be sufficient to enforce accountability concerns because their use in practice 
can be manipulated, ignored or distorted (i.e. through political or informal routes of 
decision-making). On the other hand, this scenario may become more positive if through 
adjustments in local culture and knowledge actors internalize the importance of overall 
guidelines and the need for systemic control over accountability issues for the long-term 
success of the project. It is less likely that actors will consider and worry about 
accountability if clear requirements are not set as constant reminders   or   ‘fire   alarms’  
during the process of interactions (West, 2004, p. 66) 
Nevertheless, as it current stands in Brazil, accountability concerns are often ex 
post project formulation (sometimes only in the implementation stage), when government 
decision-makers may be held accountable (or not) for projects that are not in line with the 
requirements of Brazilian legislations. In some instances, external control bodies, such as 
the Federal Court of Accounts, examine project documents in earlier stages, but this is not 
a regular practice (Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts, 2010b). An alternative to promote 
increased systemic attention over fiscal, financial and social responsibility is the 
participation of representatives from external control bodies not simply as structural forces, 
but as internal stakeholders to raise constant awareness of accountability checks and 
balances during the pre-tendering formulation stage. According to the Brazilian legislation, 
elected officials are also considered external control actors with an important role of 
‘political  guidance’  and  ‘legislative  oversight’  over  policy  processes  (Demir & Nyhan, 2008). 
In the case study, however, they did not have an internal participation in the formulation of 
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the city centre urban mobility project. As a suggestion, elected officials could also join the 
process with more active internal roles as accountability watchers during PPP formulation. 
Since this research considers that actors may develop systemic rules that influence 
their behaviour, the presence of stakeholders with a direct concern over accountability 
constantly participating in the pre-tendering stage could assist in emphasizing the 
importance of attending to the long-term overall sustainability of the PPP project. Actors 
must be aware that decisions based on short-term interests (i.e. neglect for value for 
money assessment and non-compliance with regulations to speed up process towards 
Public Consultation) may lead to adverse consequences in the future, such as the 
implementation of a non-feasible project that will represent a burden to the public budget, 
that may not result in profit to the private sector or that may provide inefficient services to 
the population. To stimulate additional awareness, actors could be reminded of the 
possibility to be held accountable for short-term oriented decisions during the pre-
tendering stage, and not only ex post project formulation, when public officials may no 
longer be in office, or even when the initial private investors that participate in the pre-
tendering stage may choose to transfer responsibility for implementing the project to 
another private consortium.  
The transfer of stockholding control over the Special Purpose Company (SPC) 
responsible for service provision is a controversial procedure allowed by the Brazilian PPP 
legislation, (article 9, § 1, Law n. 11079, 2004 - Chapter 2, section 2.7.2, defines the concept 
of SPC). Although the transfer can only happen upon authorization from the government, 
this is a fragile procedure because actors in the public sector may be under qualified to 
evaluate the capacity of substituting companies or may be influenced by political strategies. 
As result, it is possible that consortiums formed by construction companies will engage in 
the formulation of PPP projects for service provision when, in reality, they are mostly 
interested in the execution of construction works, but not in the service provision aspect of 
the project scope. They may enter the pre-tendering stage, by deceiving already fragile 
procedures that assess qualifications in PRI proposals, and aim to transfer (sell) the project 
to service provision companies after winning tendering competition and executing public 
works. As a result, at the pre-tendering stage, projects may be designed with a greater 
focus on the profits to be earned during the construction phase of infrastructure works, 
while not much consideration is given to the provision of services to the population. In this 
case, it is possible that not much attention will be paid to the quality of technical details 
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related to the PPP service provision, compromising the quality and efficiency of service 
delivery  and  the  project’s  social  accountability  to  society.  However,  these  problems  can  be  
avoided if coordination and supervision from the public sector is (a) actively involved 
during the pre-tendering stage (especially since the phase of assessment of consortium 
members’   qualifications   in  PRI  proposals);   (b)  politically   aware  of   such   strategies;   and   (c)  
capable of developing technical network-relations to assess feasibility of projects premises 
prior to authorizing transfer of SPC control.  In this way, it is possible to internally 
emphasize the importance of decisions based on the long-term success of the PPP 
intervention, considering both construction and service provision. 
Another aspect to be considered, especially at the municipal and state levels, is the 
participation of representatives from federal control bodies to exercise accountability 
oversight during the pre-tendering formulation. This may prove essential because the role 
of actors from state and municipal control bodies in projects at the same federative levels 
may be distorted by pre-established informal connections in those political arenas. It is 
possible that public and private actors involved in the PPP formulation at state or municipal 
level are personal acquaintances of or have previously worked with representatives of 
control bodies in these same states and municipalities, facilitating non-compliance with 
procedural accountability requirements. In the case study, for example, there were 
indications that the role of internal control bodies (City Attorney General Office, PPP Unit 
and Managing Council) was diminished by the informal interactions that may have 
facilitated extra-official discussions and the replacement of the formal bureaucratic 
procedures for Public Consultation. Therefore, it is also important to keep an eye for this 
possibility, considering the involvement of external control bodies at the same level of 
project intervention (i.e. state or municipal Courts of Accounts and state Public Ministries).  
b. Contextual and political competences 
There are numerous criticisms of a politics-administration/planning dichotomy, 
which argues that the work of public actors or planners in processes of policy-making and 
planning can be neutral, objective and independent from politics (H. Campbell & Marshall, 
1999; Demir & Nyhan, 2008; Forester, 1982; Nalbandian, 2006; Svara, 1999, 2001; West, 
2004). From a planning perspective, Forester (1982) asserts,   there   is   “no   choice   to   be  
technical  or  political”.  He  argues,  for  example,  “the  technician  is  necessarily  a  political  actor”  
and, therefore, important aspects that must be addressed include:   “In   what   way?   How  
covertly?   Serving   whom,   excluding   whom?”   (p.   69).   To answer these questions, actors 
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involved in policy processes such as PPP formulations must  exercise  ‘political  accountability’  
(West, 2004), which is discussed in this section.  
Based on the findings from this research, it can be argued that context (i.e. politics) 
influences instrumental-procedural work (Forester, 1982; West, 2004), but this influence 
does not necessarily have an adverse effect, which requires a case-by-case reflection. The 
case study showed, for example, that political sensibility brought to the foreground 
demands of street vendors (i.e. ground level commercial centres located in the city centre), 
which were included in the project design, but could have been ignored in a different 
systemic arrangement. As Demir and Nyhan (2008) mention,  “only a good understanding 
and appreciation of political realities might enable public administrators to act more 
autonomous”   (p.   92),   which   includes   discretion   capacity   to   reflect   on   the   adequacy   and  
legitimacy of political and other contextually constructed demands. Therefore, Demir and 
Nyhan (2008) suggest that neutral competence should be replaced by political competence 
(Nalbandian, 1999) or political accountability (West, 2004), (but also by contextual 
competence) especially to prevent that relevant issues ignored at the formulation stage 
become major problems in the phase of implementation (Demir & Nyhan, 2008, p. 92). For 
example, if demands from street vendors were not considered in the case study, it is 
possible that they would have resisted the implementation of the city centre PPP project in 
later stages, which was the justification provided by many interviewees during mobilization 
for  ‘political  consensus  building’. On the other hand, the inability to prevent the influence 
of sensitive issues during the project formulation stage may also cause problems in the 
future. As it happened in the case study, the engagement of actors in informal routes that 
waved official accountability requirements may lead to the publication of fiscal and 
financial unfeasible PPP projects for Public Consultation. If an unfeasible project progress 
towards the implementation phase, it is possible that public or private actors may become 
unsatisfied and resort to mechanisms of conflict resolution, which can delay and interfere 
with the quality of service provision.  
Being blind to the influence of politics and other contextual issues during the 
formulation of PPP projects will not prevent them from interfering with the process. A 
possible result of ignoring these issues during the pre-tendering stage is the displacement 
of concerns to different arenas in later states to amend the consequences of not having 
considered them in due time (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012). Moreover, as Allmendinger 
and Haughton argue (2012), participation in these arenas of conflict resolution may be 
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“accessible  only   to   those with the expert support and financial  means   to  participate” (p. 
100). In Brazil, disagreements on contractual issues of PPP projects can be solved via 
arbitration, which is stated in the PPP legislation as a tool based on the use of private 
mechanisms of conflict resolution (article 11, item III, Law n. 11079, 2004). Based on the 
Federal Arbitration Law of 1996 (Law n. 9307), the instrument of PPP adopts arbitration 
aiming at consensual solutions and accelerating procedures in case of conflict between the 
parties, especially considering the perception of slowness in the Brazilian judicial system, 
which is overwhelmed with cases (Pincer, 2013). However, resorting to processes of 
arbitration does not necessarily facilitate the resolution of conflicts or make it easier to 
amend issues ignored during the PRI pre-tendering formulation stage. In Brazil, experts say 
that arbitration processes also face difficulties and are time-consuming because of 
inadequate elaboration of clauses in PPP contracts to allow arbitration, lack of experience 
from arbiters and resistance from the Brazilian legal community, considering that the 
culture of arbitration has not yet been strongly incorporated into the Brazilian legal system 
(Santos, 2010; Sette, 2011). Furthermore, political competence is necessary in these 
processes because the definition of arbitration rules and selection of a judge to 
intermediate the process are at the discretion of actors involved. This legal flexibility can 
also be influenced by political and other contextual decisions that may not improve the PPP 
project format as a result of the arbitration. According to the Federal Arbitration Law, 
public  and  private  actors  “may freely choose the rules of law applicable in the arbitration, 
as   long  as  their  choice  does  not  violate  good  morals  and  public  policy”   (article 13, Law n. 
9307, 1996). Moreover, as stated in the law, the definition of judges is also supposed to 
result from consensus between the parties. Experience and know-how are considered 
important,   but   the   only   legal   requirement   is   ‘trust’:   “any individual with legal capacity, 
trusted  by  the  parties,  may  be  appointed  as  arbitrator” (article 2, § 1, Law n. 9307, 1996). 
Consequently, even for conflict resolution in stages of contract execution, recognizing the 
embeddedness of the process in a systemic context is an essential aspect.  
The introduction of concepts such as contextual and political competences in 
practice entails discretion, self-reflection and judgment especially from actors in 
coordinating   roles.   It   also   requires   a   ‘watchful   eye’   for   the   use   political   resources   to  
advance interests which may compromise the democratic accountability and feasibility of 
the PPP  project.  Political   resources  may   include   “money,   credit,   control  over   jobs,  votes,  
information, expertise, popularity and others – and   varying   skills   at   utilizing   them”  
(Rondinelli, 1976, p. 77). In addition to that, these competences require knowledge and 
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expertise of coordinators about different strategies for dealing with the multiplicity of 
stakeholders. They must know which approaches allow them to keep checks and balances 
on accountability while maintaining the flexibility to integrate stakeholders, to guide 
decision-making on technical premises and to manage soft capacity elements for network 
development.  
Alternatives of action in line with guidance and flexibility are important to prevent 
that, when facing a turbulent and complex environment, actors resort to more rigid 
procedures in the attempt to control perceived uncertainties, which is the tendency in the 
way of doing things in Brazil. This controlling approach means that actors are simply 
choosing  “to  hide  behind  the  bureaucratic  machinery  of  standard procedures provided by 
the  state”  (H. Campbell & Marshall, 1999, p. 475), instead of facing the complexities of the 
PRI pre-tendering process. Another strategy to avoid in the complex scenario of PPP 
formulation is choosing to give in completely to flexibility. The latter option can become 
problematic if flexibility as a project formulation strategy is extended to the conceptual 
approach to accountability, which may be influenced by political interests that compromise 
the sustainability of the project. As Nalbandian (2006) mention, the coordinator (or 
manager)  of  the  process  need  to  be  “at  the  nexus  of  what  is  politically  acceptable  and  what  
is  administratively   feasible.   It   is  his/her   job   to   facilitate   the  connection.   (…)  The  manager  
‘convenes,’   ‘builds   bridges,’   and   creates   ‘intersections.’   In   all   of   this,   the  manager  must  
remain politically sensitive but politically non-aligned”   (p.   1049). Therefore, in PPP 
formulation processes, political competence requires flexibility because of the many 
aspects that need to be integrated and balanced. It involves the ability to identify, promote 
and use soft capacity elements to build linkages and connections in order to foster 
compromise between the different interests, perceptions and opinions involved in the PRI 
pre-tendering stage, as well as the ability to manage the embeddedness of external forces 
in the systemic context. As Rondinelli (1976) suggests: 
“Policy-making involves trade-offs among economic, political, social and other 
criteria, weighing tangible facts, information, and data against intangible and 
incalculable potential opportunities and constraints. Quantitative variables must be 
balanced with qualitative factors. Decisions affecting immediate problems and 
issues must be balanced against long range impacts and consequences. A wide 
variety of goals, criteria and interests considered important by different groups and 
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individuals must be reconciled …  [and]  capable of attracting sufficient support to be 
enacted and implemented”  (p.  77). 
An assumption that politics and other contextual elements will not influence the 
formulation process of PPP projects in Brazil is unrealistic. However, it also important to 
acknowledge that introducing the concept of actors as creative learners with capacity for 
constant sensemaking, reflexivity and adjustment of expectations along with political and 
also  contextual  competence  is  an  ‘uneasy  fit’  for  regulatory  systems,  such  as  the  Brazil  PPP  
Framework for the formulation of PPP projects (H. Campbell & Marshall, 1999). As 
Campbell (1999) argues,   “there   is   an   inherit   tension   between   demands   to   maintain  
professional  autonomy  and  the  state’s  requirement  to  implement  due  procedure”  (p.  475).  
However,   based   on   this   research’s   findings,   external accountability requirements and 
external control, although important, are not sufficient to guarantee that PRI pre-tendering 
processes in Brazil will lead to the ‘democratic   accountability’   (fiscal,   financial   and   social  
responsibility)  and  ‘planning  ability’  (successful  project  implementation) of the PPP project 
(Demir & Nyhan, 2008). Since actors have the capacity of creating their own systemic rules, 
these requirements may also be ignored and placed in the background. Therefore, it is 
imperative that coordinators have the capacity to consider the multiplicity of interests and 
different   ‘ways   of   thinking and acting’   influencing   systemic   definitions   of   accountability, 
which may not be in line with long-term feasibility of the project. Coordinators must 
promote shared understandings on boundaries of actions (Richardson, 2005, p. 349) and 
exert internal roles for overseeing fiscal, social and financial accountability during the PRI 
pre-tendering process. This approach may help to reinforce the importance of 
accountability concerns as essential systemic rules guiding decisions and actions. Therefore, 
a flexible strategic approach that accounts for the multiplicity of actors and interests, 
technical decisions and documents must not compromise concerns over fiscal, financial and 
social responsibility. 
10.4 Reflections on learning from the research process  
The theoretical approach and research design adopted allowed the in-depth 
exploration of the PRI pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation in the context of the case 
study. The institutional lenses were actually useful in helping to unravel the dynamics of 
actor-relations in the process of PPP formulation through a qualitative line of inquiry. This 
research demonstrates that it is possible to obtain lessons and insights for solving problems 
in policy-making and practice through the analysis of processes. Consequently, these 
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insights also provide lessons learned from the research process to policy and practice, 
especially considering the limited use of systemic qualitative research design for empirical 
policy analysis in Brazil. Thus, the study in this research demonstrates the importance and 
usefulness of qualitative research for unravelling complexity involved in policy processes.   
The use of a qualitative approach and the focus on process based on the 
institutional theoretical and conceptual frameworks presented in this research were useful 
tools for exploring more influential aspects than it was initially anticipated. These were 
efficient tools for unpacking unclear and tangled arrangements involving a variety of actors 
and interactions. When this research process began, the workings of actor-relations in PPP 
project formulation in Brazil were still under-explored. Based on the insights from the 
literature review and from the unstable traditional public-private relations in Brazil, it was 
initially expected that the analysis of the case study would reveal distrust and suspicion 
between public and private actors as some of the main elements in the internal dynamics 
of the PPP formulation process. It was initially expected that internal instability caused by 
scepticism and suspicion could represent an impediment that actors would have to 
overcome in order to finish the pre-tendering stage, especially based on adjustments in 
actors’  practices  and  perceptions. Nevertheless, distrust, suspicion and scepticism were not 
revealed as major problems in the internal relations between public, private and 
consultancy actors. 
Since these concepts did not take over the data analysis, other aspects were 
brought to the foreground, revealing more important elements that emphasized the role of 
process in the formulation of PPP projects, which has been generally neglected in the field 
of policy analysis in Brazil. For example, among many contextual aspects which exemplify 
the importance of process, the case study revealed that actors internally decided to 
cooperate and compromise, despite their expectations of external scepticism from society 
and other public actors not involved in the process. Based on perceptions of resistance 
against the PPP instrument and through actors mobilization for ‘political   consensus  
building’,   they  defined some of the project specifications, such as property locations and 
the physical design of parking lots and commercial centres.  
The particularities of the case study cannot be directly transferred to other cases of 
PPP in Brazil, but they were substantially useful to highlight the relevance of reflecting on 
the role of process in the PRI pre-tendering formulation of an infrastructure PPP project. 
Therefore, another learning aspect from this research process was the capacity to obtain 
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lessons to the wider Brazilian experience on PPPs from evidence of a qualitative research, 
based on a single in-depth case study.  
Another learning aspect refers to the role of politics in the formulation of PPPs for 
infrastructure development. This was a specific aspect revealed in the analysis of the case 
study, but it is possible that politics will also represent an influential element in other cases 
of PPP in Brazil and worldwide. However, the concept of political decision-making 
influencing the formulation of PPPs is not given enough emphasis in the literature on large 
infrastructure  projects,  especially  ‘external  forces’  strand.  The  focus  is  generally  placed  on  
political culture or on the improvement of process management to facilitate public-private 
interactions, but some empirical attention is given to politics (although not directly related 
to PPPs) in institutional studies in the urban planning literature (i.e. Albrechts, 2003a; 
Albrechts, 2003b) and public administration (i.e. Lowndes & Leach, 2004; Lowndes, 
Pratchett & Stoker, 2006; Nalbandian, 2006). However, there needs to be more awareness 
for the fact that politics cannot be ignored as a possible influential element in the 
formulation of PPP projects, even if clear rules and procedures are in place.   
Finally, in the literature that addresses politics in infrastructure PPP policy 
processes, there is not much emphasis placed on the issue of power relations. In the 
theoretical   and   conceptual   frameworks   of   this   research,   ‘power’   as   a   specific   analytical  
concept was not specifically addressed, even though some aspects related to this concept 
were accounted through considerations over politics. This is the double-side of institutional 
theory, which allows the in-depth exploration of numerous elements that may influence 
processes and the internal dynamics o actor-relations, but may reduce the focus on specific 
aspects. Nevertheless, since this research was interested in unravelling the intertwining 
processes of the PRI pre-tendering stage of PPP formulation, particular issues of politics or 
power are contextual particularities that must be explored on a case-by-case basis.  
Based on the initial analytical lenses, issues of politics were unravelled from the 
case study; but in future research on the topic, politics and power can be given more 
attention in the analytical approach guiding the research process. However, if the use of 
institutional theory is aimed at an in-depth exploration of an empirical the case, it is 
important to attend for other aspects that may also be relevant (i.e. soft capacity elements, 
strategic approaches). 
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10.5 New questions and future directions 
10.5.1 Future research  
This research was pioneering in stimulating the reflection on process by 
stakeholders involved in a pre-tendering formulation of a PPP project. Therefore, future 
research needs to continue to explore the role of process in policy analysis of PPPs or other 
instruments of public policy in Brazil, so as to promote process awareness in the Brazilian 
context.  
Moreover, as a future direction for research, other cases that have completed the 
PRI pre-tendering process could also be explored as in-depth case studies to confirm the 
findings of this research and also to explore the possibility that other elements not 
unravelled here are also important influences on the pre-tendering formulation of PPP 
projects based on the PRI mechanism. For this, researchers can focus specifically or more 
generally on: 
x The entire policy cycle (agenda-setting, formulation, tendering process, contract 
signature and implementation of the PPP project); 
x The influence and participation of other actors in the process, such as media, local 
society, control bodies; 
x The structural role of external forces, such as political economy, financial 
environment for PPPs and legislations; 
x Power relations between actors involved (directly or not) in the pre-tendering 
formulation process of infrastructure PPP projects; 
x The technical aspects of project finance;  
x Relational and flexible contracting methods for PPP project execution, which is an 
approach still not formally adopted in Brazil, but generally acknowledged 
worldwide for contracts of infrastructure PPP projects, especially considering their 
complexities and embeddedness in changing contexts not only at the formulation 
stage, but also during the phase of implementation; and/or 
x The  issue  of  ‘value  for  money’,  since  in  Brazil  there  is  no  standard  format  of  ‘value  
for  money’  that  can  instruct  actors  on  preparing  the  document.  The  elaboration  of  
the document is usually based on quantitative assessments of risk analysis and 
cost-effectiveness of the PPP project; without considering qualitative aspects, such 
as context and human relations. Moreover, the private sector is free to use the 
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format it finds most adequate. Some manuals of best practices propose 
alternatives, but they are not mandatory. 
10.5.2 Policy/Practice community 
There are several future directions for policy and practice, which concern how 
policy-makers   and   practitioners   can   use   the   knowledge   resulting   from   this   research’s  
findings: 
1. Ways to ‘spread’   the   findings  across   time  and  space:   the  knowledge   that process 
matters, informal interactions matter, soft capacity elements matter, context 
matters, flexibility in the strategy matters, but that this must be accompanied by a 
balance between coordination and control to assure responsibility and 
accountability in the long-run. 
2. Finding a balance between flexibility and coordination/guidance:  
a. In Brazil this is important because of the novelty of the PPP theme; 
b. Embeddedness of old ways of thinking and doing things; 
c. Highly politically contextualized scenario. 
3. Overcoming challenges to innovation because public and private actors may be tied 
to  mainstream  ‘ways  of  thinking  and  acting’  based  on  the  models  and  blueprints  of  
the Brazil PPP Framework. 
Thus, considering possible and future attempts at spreading the findings of this 
research and introducing innovations that are different from the mainstream way of 
formulating PPP projects in Brazil, a starting point may be the approach proposed by 
Healey (2006, 2007), Coaffee and Healey (2003) and González and Healey (2005) for 
transformation processes in governance. As they argue, innovative changes start and are 
revealed in systemic episodes of interaction, but for them to spread across different 
systemic contexts, they must move beyond the level of conscious and self-reflective actors’ 
invention and mobilization (specific systems) to that of systemic accepted ‘ways  of  thinking  
and  acting’  (discourses  and  practices)  and beyond to broadly accepted cultural norms and 
values across systems (level of external forces). Consequently, the development of new 
understandings and proposals for the PPP formulation process – informed by the 
suggestions from this research - need to overcome the possible reluctance against new 
ideas and initiatives that challenge mainstream administrative routines, which are mostly 
based on the insufficient guidelines of the Brazil PPP Framework.  
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The   use   of   transformative   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’   based   on   the   lessons  
learned from this research, which are not in line with the current mainstream approach for 
pre-tendering   PPP   formulation,   need   to   start   in   the   specific   cases,   through   actors’  
mobilization, but also need to be introduced in the overall project formulation culture of 
the country and stimulated by the wider social context. For this, three initial suggestions 
are proposed by Healey (2004) based on the kinds of mobilizing efforts that might help to 
build the capacity to encourage innovative practices and move beyond pre-existing 
conceptions and routines: 
x Networking to disseminate the new ideas and to translate them into a wider 
understanding (i.e. local, state and federal levels: seminars, conferences, 
workshops, one-to-one informal interactions, academic, professional and 
governmental publications); 
x The   use   of   ‘institutional   auditing’   (p. 98) to scan across different contexts at 
municipal, state and federal levels in search of capable actors and innovative ideas 
and practices which can help to promote transformative energy and mobilization 
capacity (seeking existing visible arenas where actors are open and receptive to 
new ideas, but also stimulating potentials);  
x Open minded tolerance for accepting and appreciating a new approach to PPP 
project formulation: acceptance   that   experimental   ‘ways   of   thinking   and   acting’  
require recurrent attempts for improvements based on experiences of failure and 
success (p. 98). 
It is also important to consider that the transformation of mainstream ways into 
innovative approaches is a complex process that may take a long time (Healey, 2004). 
Coaffee and Healey (2003) argue that the adjustments in specific cases or systemic 
episodes of interactions are much faster than the transformation in generally accepted and 
mainstream routine and practices. However, as Healey (2004) emphasize,  it  is  “through  lots  
of small interventions around particular projects and initiatives, in networks, in discourses 
and  practices”  that  innovative  systemic  ‘ways  of  acting  and  thinking’ expand and may reach 
the level of external forces, stretching out to different systemic contexts (pp. 99-100). This 
requires persistence and continuous efforts from policy-makers and practitioners, who 
cannot become discouraged in face of possible failures.  
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Appendix 1: List of Documents 
Documents were used as secondary data source in this research to support and expand 
evidence from interviews. The following documents were used in this research:  
1) Legislation: 
x PPP Laws: Federal PPP Law (11.079, 2004) and state and municipal PPP Laws; 
x Contracting out Laws: Bidding Law (8.666/1993) and Concessions Law (8987/1995); 
x The Master Plan of the municipality of Fortaleza: Municipal Law n. 062/2009;  
x Decrees  and Resolutions (PPP and PRI) (federal, state and municipal levels); 
x Procedures for Request of Interest (PR) publications (federal, state and municipal 
levels).  
2) Manual: 
x Ceara state Operative PPP Manual – official manual elaborated with procedures for 
formulation and contracting a PPP project.  
3) Previous sectoral studies about the city centre of Fortaleza: 
x By the municipal government: 
- City Centre Re-ordering Plan and City Centre Housing Plan; 
- Study of the Competitive Advantages of the City Centre (economic and urban 
focus)  
x By an independent agency: 
- Action for the New Centre Plan, elaborated by the Chamber of Retailers (CDL- 
Camara dos Dirigentes Lojistas) an association representing the interests of 
more than 6 thousand local commercial establishments (retailers) in Fortaleza, 
and a large part is located in the city centre.  
4) Local and state level newspapers:  O Povo and Diario do Nordeste 
5) Other documents collected and elaborated during period of field research: 
x Technical documents elaborated during field research: engineering projects and 
feasibility studies (i.e. economic, commercial, financial, social, etc.); 
x Legal documents related to the PPP under study (such as tender protocols or 
“invitation  to  bid”,  contracts,  etc.) 
x Legislations relevant to the case study published during the period of field research; 
x Internal administrative documents from the local government on the case study of 
PPP formulation process.  
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Appendix 2: List of Meetings  
Meetings were also used as secondary data source in this research.  Data was collected as 
notes or recordings via participation in meetings as observer. The information obtained 
was used to validate and triangulate evidence and as sources for discussions in interviews. 
The list of meetings is presented below: 
Meeting 
number Groups involved  Meeting Date  Data registration 
1 
Private Investors 
Consultancy/technical actors 
Public sector actors 
11/11/2011 Notes 
2 Public sector actors Consultancy/technical actors 17/11/2011 Audio/Notes 
3 Public sector Consultancy/technical actors 21/11/2011 Audio/Notes 
4 Private investors Consultancy/technical actors 06/02/2012 Notes 
5 
Private investors 
Consultancy/technical actors 
Legal representative (Sao Paulo 
office) 
20/03/2012 Notes 
6 Private investors Consultancy directors 18/04/2012 Notes 
7 Consultancy directors Technical actors 20/04/2012 Notes 
8 Public sector actors Consultancy directors 14/05/2012 Audio/Notes 
9 
Private investors 
Consultancy directors 
Technical actors 
Legal representative (Sao Paulo 
Office) 
Public sector actors 
05/06/2012 Notes 
10 Consultancy directors Technical actors 12/06/2012 No audio 
11 
Private investors 
Consultancy technical actors 
Public sector actors 
26/06/2012 No audio 
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Appendix 3: Interview schedule (topics and questions) 
Interviews were the primary source of data collection for this research. In the beginning of 
each interview, information sheet (Appendix 4) and consent form (Appendix 5) were briefly 
discussed with interviewees, who had time to ask questions and clarify concerns. In the 
interviews, before addressing the case study topics and questions, interviewees were asked 
to generally introduce themselves, providing name, line of work, role or position in their 
organizations. Since the interviews were open-ended, based on a conversational and fluid 
approach, the topics and questions did not necessarily follow the order below and 
represented a guideline that was used for the data collection process. 
Joining the process  
x Why did you get involved?  
x When did you get involved (at what stage)?  
x How did you participate (or how are you participating)? What was/is your role in 
the process? Can you describe? 
The decision-making process that led to the scope of the city centre PPP project involving 
PCCs and parking lots 
x How did the process start? Where did the idea come from? (who started, where, 
how, when);  
x How was the interaction with public sector or private sector for the construction 
and decision on the scope? Who were the most crucial stakeholders in the process?  
x How was the decision reached? What was taken into account? 
x What is your interest in the scope? What is your opinion about the interest of 
others in the process (public actors, local government, private investors, and 
consultancy)? 
x What are your expectations on this process?  
On the Public-Private partnership (PPP) policy instrument and on the Procedure for 
Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism 
x Why was the PPP instrument selected? How was the decision reached? Who 
participated in the decision? 
x What is your opinion about the PPP instrument? Problems? Advantages, 
disadvantages of PPP in comparison to other instruments? Receptiveness internally, 
externally? 
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x Why was the PRI mechanism selected? How was the decision reached? 
x What is your opinion about the PRI mechanism? 
x What is your opinion on the experience of others in PPPs, PRIs and public-private 
relations? To what extent is this relevant for the process?  
Assessment of relations and participations in the process (interviewee and others) 
x What was/is the role of public actors in the process?  
x What was/is the role of private investors in the process?  
x What was/is the role of consultancy directors in the process?  
x What was/is the role of technical actors in the process?  
x How was their participation? How did you interact with them?  
Technical premises for the PPP project  
x What was your participation in the definition of premises (such as providing inputs 
or validating)?  
x How were the premises defined (decision-making)?  
x Who was in charge of the process? 
x How as the gathering of information?  
x Were there difficulties and obstacles in this process? 
x What has been already defined and what is still missing? Difficulties?  
x Can you give me concrete examples? 
Opinion about the progress of the PPP (critical analysis on the entire process) 
x What have been the crucial factors in this process? To what you determine the 
progress of this process so far? 
x Crucial events? Crucial actors?  
x What can be considered obstacles, difficulties? What are your main concerns? 
x Have  they  been  overcome?  If  so,  how?  Which  ones  haven’t  been  dealt  with? 
x What are your expectations for the process (pre-tendering stage)? Why? 
x Can you mention impediments or aspects that may help to move it forward?  
The interviewee was also asked if he/she wanted to add anything else that had not been 
covered or discussed in the interview.  
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Appendix 4: Information Sheet 
Research Project Title: [     ] 
You have been asked to participate in the interview process of a PhD research study. In 
order to help you make an informed decision, important details about the research project 
and the interview process will be provided to you in this information sheet.  
Considering that Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for infrastructure development is a 
relatively new instrument in Brazil, the purpose of this research project is to understand 
the relations between actors in the pre-tendering formulation of these PPP projects based 
on the Procedure for Request of Interest (PRI) mechanism. For this, the research uses the 
city of Fortaleza as a case study and the on-going formulation of the city centre urban 
mobility PPP project, of parking lots and Popular Commercial Centres (PCCs). In face of the 
current negotiations already taking place in Fortaleza, you have been selected as a possible 
participant in this study because you are one of the key stakeholders involved in the 
interactions at the pre-tendering stage. Your perspective is of great importance for this 
study. By participating in this research project, you will have the opportunity to provide a 
full representation of your perspective on the subject being addressed.  
x Participating in this interview is voluntary, and you will have the right not to answer 
or comment on any of the questions,  
x The interviews are expected to last approximately 45 minutes. 
x If you agree to participate in the interview, you will be asked to sign a consent 
form, in which you will decided the level of confidentiality and disclosure to be 
applied to the information you will provide.  
x Any personal information provided in the interview will be encoded and kept in 
anonymity, and will also be confidentially and securely stored in a private computer 
with password protection.  
The information obtained from the interview will contribute with my PhD Thesis 
(Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom). This 
research project has been ethically reviewed and approved by the Town and Regional 
Planning  Department’s  ethics  review  procedure.   
If you have any questions regarding the research project, the interview process, your rights 
as a potential interviewee or need any other clarification, please feel free to contact me for 
further information by email at trp10fa@shef.ac.uk or by phone at [telephone number in 
Brazil and UK]. Alternatively, you may contact my supervisors, Professor Craig Watkins at 
c.a.watkins@sheffield.ac.uk or Professor Gordon Dabinett at g.e.dabinett@sheffield.ac.uk. 
You should keep this information sheet for further reference and if you decide to 
participate in the interview, you will also receive a signed copy of the consent form to keep. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and to consider participating 
in the interview.  
Kind Regards, Fahyre Andrade de Alencar Loiola     [Date] 
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Appendix 5: Consent Form  
Title of Research Project:  
Name of Researcher:  
Participant Reference number:                       
Initials 
 
I have read the information sheet provided explaining this research project and 
understood its contents. I also had the opportunity to ask questions about the 
project. 
 
  
I confirm that I have voluntarily agreed to participate in this interview.  
  
I understand that I have the right to cancel recording permission and/or 
withdraw from the interview at any time without providing any reasons. I 
also understand that I am free not to answer or comment on any particular 
question without negative consequences. 
 
  
I give permission for this interview to be digitally recorded.  
  
I understand that my personal information and comments will be 
securely and confidentially stored.   
I  give  permission  for  the  disclosure  of  my  role  □  and/or  title  □    in: 
This research project only.  
Any publication that may result from this research, including future 
research.  
  
I agree with the use of the information and comments provided by me in the 
interview, including as direct quotes, in:    
This research project only.  
Any publication that may result from this research, including future research.  
  
 
I have read and understood the above consent form and agree to participate in the 
interview. 
________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Lead Researcher Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
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Appendix 6: List of interviewees per group and job title 
Interview 
number Group Job Title  Date of Interview 
1 Technical Consultancy general director 28/10/2011 
2 Technical Consultancy technical director 04/11/2011 
3 Technical Social specialist 06/02/2012 
4 Private Private investor 1 07/02/2012 
5 Private Private investor 2 08/02/2012 
6 Private Private investor 3 08/02/2012 
7 Private Private investor 4 09/02/2012 
8 Technical 
Consultancy administrative 
coordinator 
09/02/2012 
9 Technical 
Communication company 
adviser 
14/02/2012 
10 Public PPP Unit Secretary 14/02/2012 
11 Private Private investor 5 29/02/2012 
12 Technical Urban mobility specialist 01/03/2012 
13 Technical Consultancy technical director 02/03/2012 
14 Technical Consultancy legal specialist  13/03/2012 
15 Public City Centre Secretary 15/03/2012 
16 Public 
Architect (City Centre 
Secretariat) 
15/03/2012 
17 Technical Consultancy general director 22/03/2012 
18 Private Private investor 6 (Executive) 23/03/2012 
19 Public 
Legal specialist (City  Centre 
Secretariat) 
24/03/2012 
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Interview 
number 
Group Job Title  Date of Interview 
20 Technical 
Communication specialist (City 
Centre Secretariat) 
27/03/2012 
21 Public Infrastructure Secretary 04/04/2012 
22 Public City Attorney 11/04/2012 
23 Technical Consultancy coordinator 26/04/2012 
24 Private Private investor 7 11/05/2012 
25 Public Finance Secretary 14/05/2012 
26 Private Private investor 8 24/05/2012 
27 Technical 
Legal advisor (Sao Paulo 
Office) 
12/06/2012 
28 Technical Tendering process specialist  12/06/2012 
29 Public 
Municipal 
Councillor/President of City 
Hall 
15/06/2012 
30 Public City Attorney General 19/06/2012 
31 Public PPP Unit legal specialist 20/06/2012 
32 Public 
Legal specialist (City Centre 
Secretariat) 
21/06/2012 
33 Technical 
Urban transportation 
specialist 
26/06/2012 
34 Private Private investor 6 (Executive) 04/07/2012 
 
Private 9 
Technical 14 
Public 11 
Total of Interviews 34 
 
